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ABSTRACT 
 
Arming the British Home Guard, 1940-1945 
 
 
The Second World War saw British society mobilised to an unprecedented extent to 
meet the threat of Total War.  ‘Total Defence’ was manifest in organisations such as the 
ARP and Home Guard.  What sets the Home Guard apart was its combatant role.  This 
thesis examines the arms provided for the Home Guard, and concludes that its combat 
power has been seriously underestimated.  It benefitted from huge quantities of high 
quality smallarms purchased from the United States, which were not issued to the 
Regular Army, because they chambered American ammunition.  What is extraordinary 
is that these weapons are always characterised as ancient relics, yet the oldest of them 
was years younger, in real and design terms, than the British Army equivalent.   
 
In 1940 Britain lacked the capacity to manufacture arms in the quantities needed to 
repair the losses of Dunkirk and meet the needs of the expanding armed forces.  The 
remedy was unorthodox weaponry such as the ‘Sticky Bomb’ and the ‘Blacker 
Bombard’.  These are always associated with the Home Guard, yet saw active service 
against the Africa Corps.  These unconventional weapons were more capable than many 
modern authors suggest, but they suffer from an impenetrable ‘orthodox view’ that 
characterises Home Guard weapons as ancient, whimsical and inefficient.  This has its 
origins in the Local Defence Volunteers’ disappointment when the Government failed 
to meet its promise to arm every volunteer; their dismay at receiving foreign equipment; 
the way in which the media portrayed the Home Guard; and the fact that the great 
threats the Home Guard existed to combat – invasion and subversion – appeared to be 
illusory, making the Home Guard itself seem quixotic.   
 
This study strips away that conventional narrative, and exposes a Home Guard that was 
well equipped for its tasks – frequently better equipped than other components of Home 
Defence.  
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 The Home Guard fights to hold a network of isolated 
localities spread over the whole country.  Thus, its main body 
impedes and breaks the cohesion of the invader’s armies. 
 
(From Home Guard Instruction, No. 51, Battlecraft and Battle Drill for the Home 
Guard, Part III, Patrolling.  GHQ Home Forces, January 1943) 
 
 
 
 
 
Principles of Home Guard Defence 
 
 
Defence is final.  A defended locality must fight to the last man and last round. 
 
Defended localities must be sited in depth.  The enemy may infiltrate between 
localities, he may overrun one, but the impetus will be slowed down as he advances 
and he can be dealt with by vigorous counter-attack. 
 
Aggressive defence.  Defence must not be static. Every commander must have his 
mobile reserve to dominate his front by fighting patrols and snipers and to destroy the 
enemy by counter-attack. 
 
Defence must not be concentrated.  Seeds, not soldiers, survive distribution in penny 
packets.  It is fire power that stops an attack.  Keep the size of a locality small enough 
to produce concentrated weapon fire.  Defend essentials only. 
 
Mutual support.  Enfilade fire by machine guns and anti-tank weapons is more 
effective than frontal fire.  It often assists concealment.  It allows one locality or 
strongpoint to support the neighbouring ones. 
 
Concealment is paramount.  A post located can often be neutralized.  A vital element 
in successful defence is surprise.  Conceal yourself, your positions, your weapons.  
Don’t let the enemy draw your fire.  Hold it until he attacks in force. 
 
 
 
(From Home Guard Instruction, No. 51, Battlecraft and Battle Drill for the Home 
Guard, Part IV, The Organization of Home Guard Defence.  GHQ Home Forces, 
November 1943) 
 
 1 
Introduction 
 
 
Two serving members of 32 (Surrey) 
Battalion, Home Guard, pose to 
illustrate the transformation of Britain’s 
Second World War civilian militia, from 
the Local Defence Volunteers of May 
1940, armed with little more than a 
brassard and a sense of purpose, to the 
well equipped and trained (and, in many 
cases, conscripted) Home Guard at 
‘Stand-down’ in November 1944.  
(IWM HU 18501) 
 
 
 
This thesis explores the arming of Britain’s Home Guard between its inception on 14 
May 1940 and ‘stand-down’ in November 1944.  The Home Guard was never called on 
to fight, the invasion it stood by to repel might never have been a practical possibility, 
or even a real intention, and the weapons it used are a byword for the obsolete, 
improvised, naive and whimsical.  So why does it matter?   
 
During the latter half of 1940, and well into 1941, a Nazi invasion of the United 
Kingdom was, for the British, a probability if not a certainty.  The threat of invasion and 
the need to guard against raids and sabotage, provoked popular, political and media 
demands that civilians be armed.  ‘Total Defence’, as it became known, transformed the 
political, military, social and physical landscape of Britain.  The population was more 
politicised than it had been during the First World War and war, as an extension of 
politics, rather than patriotic duty, became a matter for the citizen militant – raising 
important legal and ethical issues over the nature of ‘combatants’, and placing the 
government  answerable to a vociferous, demanding and engaged public.  This resulted 
in the formation of the Local Defence Volunteers – subsequently re-named the ‘Home 
Guard’ – and thus the need for the British Government to arm not only a rapidly 
expanding wartime British Army, but also a paramilitary militia, numbering well over 
1.5 million men.  In June 1940, this was entirely beyond the capacity of the British 
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weapons manufacturing industry, state and private – although this could not possibly be 
admitted for obvious military and political reasons.  The result was investigation into 
the use of unconventional production techniques, non-strategic materials and innovative 
technologies.  Indeed, the very definition of a ‘weapon’ was called into question – 
leading, for example, to the formation of the Petroleum Warfare Department – as was 
the matter of whether any limits could be, or should be, imposed on the means of 
fighting for national survival.  Even the landscape became a weapon, as it was divided 
into fortified compartments by those who favoured a medieval-style concentric defence 
to defeat German use of, what would now be termed, ‘manoeuverist’ warfare – albeit in 
an effort swiftly rendered redundant by the adoption of a ‘manoeuverist’ defensive 
strategy.  
 
This study examines the weapons provided for the British Home Guard between 1940 
and 1944.  In a broader context, it also explores the process through which a perception 
hardens into orthodoxy, and that, in turn, can crystallise into an accepted ‘historical 
fact’.  The perception in question is that the wartime British Home Guard was badly 
armed, ill equipped and poorly trained.  The ineptitude and impotence of the Home 
Guard is a byword, even, I. M. Baxter would have us believe, in comparison to their 
ramshackle German equivalent, the Volksturm (Baxter, 2001, p.16):  
These men, and later women, that joined Germany’s Home Guard battalions 
were not like the soldiers of the Home Guard units that were called-up to defend 
England against a possible German invasion.  The Volksturm were  better armed 
in comparison, and most had greater knowledge of battle tactics.  Unlike the 
British Home Guard, the German Home Defence units were better trained in the 
art of tactical defence, and could be deadly adversaries to an advancing enemy 
tank. 
 
This is deeply unfair, but it does reflect the prevailing view that the Home Guard 
represents a nadir of military effectiveness.  In this study we will examine the way that 
perception formed, in the first few months of the organisation’s existence, as a result of 
a logistic crisis that the government could not possibly expose, was sustained through 
the period when the force actually flourished, became part of the post-war mythology of 
the Home Front – and went on to become the cornerstone of an academic argument that 
the Home Guard itself was little more than an elaborate public relations exercise.   
 
 3 
In the future the Home Guard will continue to arouse interest and will increasingly be 
studied.  Most British families provided a member of the Home Guard, and the 
organisation will be studied as part of the experience of the Home Front in the National 
Curriculum, as well as one of the manifestations of the ‘citizen militant’ that shaped 
post-war Britain.  It is important, therefore, that some attempt is made to differentiate 
between fact and perception, and to point out the dangers of unthinkingly adhering to a 
largely illusory ‘orthodox view’.  There are real lessons to be learned about the way 
Britons reacted to a perceived threat, the way that reaction was handled, and, somewhat 
topically (writing while the British Army is engaged on operations in Afghanistan), the 
dangers of failing to meet public expectations where the provision of military 
equipment is concerned. 
  
The study takes as its framework the author’s Masters Degree dissertation.1  Whilst an 
effective primer on the topic, a dissertation proved too restrictive to fully explore the 
subject of arming the Home Guard.  It was necessary to omit entire areas such as anti-
aircraft and coastal defence, and space precluded an effective examination of the extent 
to which ersatz weapons, which posterity associates with the Home Guard, were used 
by other sectors of the defence forces.  This has been remedied in this greatly expanded 
study.  We will start here by introducing the topic, explaining the origins and 
methodology of the project, and examining the historiography of the Home Guard.  In 
subsequent chapters we will touch on ‘the Threat’ and the subject of ‘Civilians in 
Arms’, before examining the Home Guard’s weapons, grouped loosely by type.   
 
It is important to stress that the aim is not to produce an encyclopaedia of Home Guard 
weapons, but to use weaponry as a prism through which to examine issues surrounding 
the Home Guard.  Modern smallarms are a subject that very few British students have 
the opportunity or inclination to explore.  The author of this study is in an unusual 
position, having been employed for many years as an armourer to the film and 
television industries; much of that time spent with Bapty & Co. Ltd., the UK’s largest 
and oldest supplier of warlike stores to film, television and the theatre.  During the 
Second World War the company’s stock, and the collection of its owner, noted collector 
and authority, the late Mr Mark Dineley, were placed at the disposal of the Home Guard 
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(vide Lyall, 1976).  After the war, the company acquired additional stock, which 
included ex-Home Guard material.  It was during the mid-1990s, while sorting, re-
assembling and restoring these items that the author became convinced that the military 
potential of the Home Guard was being consistently underestimated.  The Bapty 
collection represents a remarkable resource, further enhanced by an un-catalogued 
library/archive, containing a wealth of period documents and illustrations.2   
 
References to the weaponry of the British Home Guard are characterised by 
misunderstanding and misrepresentation.  Misunderstanding stems from the fact that 
very few Home Guards, or subsequent historians, have been ‘weapons specialists’, and 
as a consequence simple mistakes, myths and old wives’ tales have gained undeserved 
currency.  Misrepresentation is a matter of context:  terms such as ‘old’, ‘ancient’ or 
‘Great War’ were associated with Home Guard weapons from the outset, for journalistic 
effect, ignoring the fact that many of small arms and artillery fielded by the British 
Army in between 1940 and 1943 were of First World War or Edwardian vintage.3  The 
wartime British public assumed, with simple chauvinism, that the weapons issued to the 
British Army were the best available.  This, as we shall see, was not necessarily true.  
Indeed, we will make the case that re-equipping the Home Guard in line with the British 
Army, in 1943, actually represented a degradation of performance. 
 
Professor Nigel Hamilton (2000, p.19) has insisted – albeit with reference to biography- 
that a historiography must now extend beyond the written volume to include film, 
television and electronic media, and encompass fact, fiction and ‘faction’.  This 
certainly applies when studying the Home Guard.  Since the 1970s, it has been 
impossible for any commentator to mention the Home Guard without reference to the 
BBC Television situation comedy (also radio series, books and feature film) Dad’s 
Army.  The point is less trivial than it seems: when reporting, in September 1999, the 
release of ‘The MI5 Files’ – a series of documents relating to Home Defence during the 
Second World War, the Daily Telegraph illustrated the feature with a photograph of the 
imaginary “Walmington-upon-Sea platoon” across five columns.4  In the public mind 
Dad’s Army was the Home Guard, and the Home Guard was Dad’s Army.  More than 
that, Dad’s Army is seen to represent the armed aspect of the Home Front.  In fact Dad’s 
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Army did not accurately represent the historical Home Guard – any more than its cousin 
‘Allo ‘Allo can be said to accurately portray the French Resistance.5  Although writers 
Croft and Perry drew on their own experiences, as did the cast, considerable liberties 
were taken, and omissions made, for the comedy formula to work.  Indeed, entire 
demographic groups are omitted – specifically, female auxiliaries, men of military age 
in reserved occupations, and the political (left-wing) element that was so influential 
during the earlier part of the Home Guard’s existence.  One result of this was the need 
to create the portmanteau character ‘Corporal Jones’, an unlikely composite – 
simultaneously representing the ‘traditionalist’ and ‘unconventional warfare’ elements 
of the Home Guard – which only succeeds because of the skill of the writing and actor 
Clive Dunn’s talent.  As we shall see, the actual composition of the Home Guard 
directly affected its expectations of, and reaction to, the weapons that the authorities 
provided and the tactical role it was assigned.6   
 
The Home Guard may be deeply embedded in British popular culture, but it has been 
largely ignored by the academic establishment – despite the fact that the formation of an 
armed ‘peoples’ militia’, numbering, at its peak, almost 2 million men and some tens of 
thousands of women, and incorporating the framework of an organised, post-invasion 
resistance force, are among the UK’s more dramatic responses to ‘Total War’.  A short 
popular history, Norman Longmate’s The Real Dad’s Army,7 was published in 1974 to 
capitalise on the success of the BBC series: the author discreetly accentuating the first 
few months of the organisation’s existence, when it most closely resembled the TV 
portrayal.  But despite, or perhaps because of, the Dad’s Army phenomenon, the Home 
Guard continued to occupy an academic vacuum.  It was not until 1995, that S. P. 
MacKenzie, Assistant Professor of History at the University of Carolina, Columbia, 
published The Home Guard,8 the first academic work wholly devoted to the subject, 
and, inevitably published in paperback with the sub-title ‘The real story of ‘Dad’s 
Army’.  Professor MacKenzie’s conclusion may be summarised in a sentence: ‘National 
Morale, in short, determined the course of Home Guard development rather than strictly 
military considerations’ (MacKenzie, 1996, p.179).  This study will not attempt to 
challenge his entire hypothesis:   
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 … national morale was a key component in sustaining a viable war effort.  
 And what the people in arms wanted badly enough, they either got or 
 appeared to get [my italics].  The LDV had been formed, after all, in order to 
 control the burgeoning demand for civilian defence that manifested itself in 
 the spring of 1940 rather than because there was an overwhelming military 
 need for such a force (MacKenzie, 1996, p.176). 
 
We will, however, undertake a very critical examination of one of the most important 
planks of his argument: that the weapons issued to the Home Guard were simply a sop, 
gestures to appease a vociferous political lobby – as MacKenzie puts it (1996, p.177):  
‘weapons which in reality were of dubious fighting value, but which in all probability 
would never have to be fired in anger and could be presented as worthwhile.’ 
 
Published 12 years after Professor MacKenzie examined the Home Guard from the 
political perspective, Professor Penny Summerfield and Dr Corina Peniston-Bird’s 
Contesting Home Defence explores the organisation in its societal context.9  The authors 
endeavour to tease out the social reality of the Home Guard from subsequent mythology 
and contemporary public relations, in order to determine whether it really served as a 
unifying focal point for national defensive spirit, or proved divisive, as the Left, the 
Right, traditionalists, modernists, and – most particularly – men and women, pulled in 
their own directions.  Summerfield and Peniston-Bird examine the extent to which the 
wartime Home Guard has been mythologized, and, indeed, was actively mythologized 
during the four-and a-half years of its existence, and the effect of the Dad’s Army on 
perception of the Home Guard – themes that will be encountered again in this study, 
albeit from a different angle.   
 
If there is a single, signal contribution for which the present author is grateful to 
Professor Summerfield and Dr Peniston-Bird, it is the way in which the two academics 
have exposed the difficulty of obtaining useful oral history from survivors of the Home 
Guard generation.  The effect of Dad’s Army can be likened to that of Shakespeare’s 
depiction of Richard III, in that a portrayal has become so powerfully established that it 
insidiously alters reality:  
Whether they regarded Dad’s Army as an accurate representation, were critical 
of its omissions, or… rather unwillingly accepted its judgements, men 
remembering their own Home Guard experiences could not escape Dad’s Army.  
As the dominant representation of the Home Guard from the 1970s into at least 
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the early years of the twenty-first century, it influenced the imaginative 
possibilities of their own recall and shaped personal memories.  (Summerfield 
and Peniston-Bird, 2007, p.232) 
 
It is not just that, by repeated exposure, recollections have aligned with the depiction; 
there is a further, pernicious, factor that an audience will not admit an account that is at 
variance with the cherished orthodox view.  This is particularly hard for women who 
served with the Home Guard, and, Summerfield and Peniston-Bird contend, has 
prevented them from keeping memories alive by recounting their experiences (2007, 
p.258):  ‘… to these women, popular historical and ideological interpretations do not 
distort personal memory: they contaminate the public reception of memory stories.’  It 
is important to record, from the perspective of folk, social and oral history, that this 
thesis was written with assistance from three former Home Guards, one of whom served 
in the Auxiliary Units (i.e. the ‘British Resistance’), and their input has been extremely 
valuable.  Nevertheless, seventy years is a very long time, and the greatest weight has 
been placed on contemporary wartime or near-contemporary accounts, and careful 
interpretation of period documents and artefacts.  
 
The strength of the Dad’s Army orthodoxy adds to the challenge of undertaking a thesis 
to determine to what extent the wartime Home Guard was appropriately and effectively 
armed, and may partly explain why the entire subject receives so little serious attention.  
Indeed the whole topic remains slightly embarrassing, almost unworthy of academic 
research.  This self-consciousness is an inheritance from the earliest days of the Home 
Guard, and it is time to lay it to rest.  It is perhaps more comfortable to examine the 
topic in broader terms, and the Home Guard does figure in studies of the English 
Volunteer tradition, such as Ian Beckett’s The Amateur Military Tradition,10 and Glen 
Steppler’s Britons, To Arms!11  It is also present as a component of the machinery of 
Home Defence in Peter Fleming’s delightful Invasion 194012 and, more recently, the 
Defence of Britain project.13  Fleming, like the Punch cartoons used throughout this 
thesis, reflected the sardonic humour that was Briton’s emotional shield against the 
terrifying prospect of unlimited, technological war with an all-conquering Fascist 
dictatorship.  Although immensely entertaining, this does carry the inherent risk of 
subsequent generations laughing at the British of 1940-1944, rather than with them, as 
they prepared, with whatever was at hand, to sell their lives and their freedom dearly.   
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Fleming’s counter-invasion theme was revisited by Arthur Ward in Resisting the Nazi 
Invader,14 a popular history, which, although marred by the indiscriminate use of 
‘reconstruction’ photographs of dubious integrity, and lacking a firm editorial hand, has 
a lively and informative text, particularly with respect to the ‘Auxiliary Units’ (these 
Home Guard ‘special forces’ units appeal to modern taste and have attracted interest out 
of proportion to their size or military significance).  David Carroll’s short illustrated 
history The Home Guard15 added to the popular end of the Home Guard oeuvre, which 
also includes local history, such as K. R. Gulvin’s useful Kent Home Guard: A 
History.16  The internet provides an almost overwhelming Home Guard resource, 
particularly at the local level.  It has proven an invaluable research tool, but needs to be 
approached with caution.  Online material includes numerous educational synopses 
reflecting the ‘orthodox’ (i.e. Dad’s Army) view of the Home Guard and its weapons, 
and, more interestingly, vast amounts of local unit histories and memoirs – admittedly 
of variable quality.17       
 
Home Guard memorabilia, virtually worthless as recently as the 1980s, is now eagerly 
sought by collectors and re-enactors, reflecting a general increase in interest in the 
Home Front, which is reinforced by its inclusion as a topic in the National Curriculum.  
This interest has resulted in a market for niche publications such as Vehicles of the 
Home Guard and Uniforms of the Home Guard in the Historic Military Press ‘Through 
the Lens’ series,18 as well as facsimile reprints of some of the commercially produced 
and official weapons training leaflets.  Nevertheless, for a Second World War military 
topic, coverage of the Home Guard is thin.  In terms of period sources, however, the 
researcher is faced with an embarrassment of riches.  The large and enthusiastic 
membership of the LDV/Home Guard provided a lucrative market for opportunistic 
publishers.  In the immediate absence of official support or infrastructure, a variety of 
manuals were produced – starting with Lt. Col. J. A. Barlow’s The Elements of Rifle 
Shooting, out of print after May 1938, but hastily re-published in June 1940.19  July 
1940 saw the publication of Rifle Training for War:  A textbook for Local Defence 
Volunteers,20  actually a revision of the manual produced for the First World War 
Volunteer Training Corps (VTC).  Capitalising on the organisation’s change of name 
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The Home Guard Pocket Manual (October 1940)21 was supported by the Rubberoid 
Company Ltd., and contained good sense from the RSM of the Sevenoaks Battalion 
Home Guard – as well as useful advice on the employment of Messrs Ruberoid’s 
products in the construction of fieldworks and blackout precautions.  In these early 
manuals revealing assumptions are made about the character, role and armament of the 
LDV/Home Guard. 
 
Specialist military publishers Gale & Polden, of Aldershot, produced training manuals 
for the American smallarms used by the Home Guard.  Their semi-official publications 
were joined by entirely unofficial efforts such as ‘Bernards Pocket Books’, which 
included in their ‘Key to Victory Series’ the Manual of Modern Automatic Guns and 
Commando and Guerrilla Tactics, among volumes dedicated to cycling, photography 
and the “Little Marvel” Vegetable Reference.22  The content of unofficial manuals 
frequently exceeded anything that could or would be found in an official publication, 
and at times verged on the frenzied, as in The Home Guard Encyclopedia (c.1941),23 
which includes under its ‘Sample Diagrams and Exercises’ heading ‘ Fig. 3: Smashing 
Out Of The Jaws Of Death’.  The techniques for ‘tying up securely’, ‘extraction of 
information’ and ‘holds, releases and silent killing’ described in Bernard’s Manual of 
Commando and Guerrilla Warfare: Unarmed Combat24 (‘FOR H.G. & SERVICE 
USE’) reflect the trend towards a ‘people’s war’, and a willingness to set aside 
traditional conventions in order to prosecute a war of national survival.  This was the 
ethos of those who had experience of fighting Fascism, the veterans of the Spanish Civil 
War, including Hugh Slater, author of Home Guard for Victory!25 (published in January 
1941 and reprinted four times before the end of the month).  As already mentioned in 
the context of Dad’s Army, the political conflict between the proponents of 
‘conventional’ and ‘unconventional’ warfare would have a direct effect on the weapons 
and tactics adopted by the Home Guard in its early stages. 
 
Self-appointed guiding spirits of the Home Guard included war correspondent Major 
John Langdon-Davies, and author John Brophy.  Langdon-Davies engaged in an 
exhausting round of lecturing to ‘100 Battalions’ of Home Guard in the winter of 1940-
41.26  His lecture was subsequently published as the manual Home Guard Warfare, 
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which also included much of the content of ‘Home Guard on Parade’, his regular feature 
for the Sunday Pictorial.  Unlike some of the other Spanish Civil War veterans, 
Langdon-Davies was willing and able to bridge the two worlds of the conventional 
military and the ‘people’s war’.  As the publisher noted in the preface to the sixth, 
revised, edition of The Home Guard Training Manual, the successor to Home Guard 
Warfare, published in May 1942: ‘Over 125,000 copies of this Home Guard Training 
Manual have now been sold, and it has become widely adopted since the War Office 
gave official sanction to its purchase out of training grant to the extent of one copy per 
platoon.’27  In its scope and content Langdon-Davies The Home Guard Training 
Manual, and its companion The Home Guard Fieldcraft Manual28 can be said to be the 
definitive contemporary guide to the Home Guard.   
 
An underage volunteer in the First World War, and subsequently a popular historian and 
novelist,29 John Brophy commanded a Home Guard company in the Second World War.  
His manual Home Guard: A Handbook for the LDV was published in September 1940 
and had been reprinted nine times by March 1942, when a revised edition, the Home 
Guard Handbook was produced, itself to be reprinted just two months later.  Like 
Langdon-Davies, Brophy was responsible for a stream of handy pocket-sized manuals 
that sought to instruct and inspire.  Brophy wrote in the forward to the revised edition of 
the Home Guard Handbook: 
I believe that in general and in detail all my handbooks conform to the excellent 
Training and other Regulations of the Home Guard, and I should again like to 
emphasise that anything I write is to supplement and amplify official 
instructions which cannot always be made public and, if only for lack of paper, 
cannot be put into the hands of every member of the Home Guard.  (Brophy, 
1942, p.10) 
 
It is an odd assertion that a private individual should have the liberty to publish material 
‘that cannot always be made public’ and that Hodder and Stoughton, Brophy’s 
publishers, had access to supplies of paper denied to the official organs of state.  
Certainly, in the early months of the LDV’s existence, authors such as Brophy and 
Langdon-Davies were filling a vacuum, but later their chief attraction must have been 
what Brophy himself described as ‘certain informalities of outlook and phrasing’ 
(Brophy, 1941a, p.12).  Professional writers, Brophy and Langdon-Davies kept alive the 
edgy feeling of novelty and threat that drove 1.5 million civilians to take up arms in the 
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Home Guard, even as that threat ebbed away.  The high water mark of these private 
manuals is 1942, then the tide of the war started to turn, the public appetite for DIY 
combat training diminished, and the Home Guard, now a properly integrated component 
of Home Defence – effectively, a new, unpaid, Territorial Army to replace the one 
fighting overseas – was fully supported by the War Office.    
 
The Home Guard did eventually generate a corpus of official documentation under the 
titles Home Guard Instruction (initially LDV Instruction) and Home Guard Information 
Circular.  These sequentially numbered leaflets covered subjects as diverse as expenses 
and damages claims, the preservation of boots through the use of hobnails, and the 
performance of anti-tank mines in the Western Desert.  Contrary to Brophy’s suggestion 
above, very great efforts were made to keep the Home Guard interested and informed, 
with operational lessons being passed on from as far afield as Guadalcanal.   Much of 
this material is preserved, amongst a mass of other Home Guard material, in The 
National Archives, Kew, and a surprising amount is to be found on the stalls of 
specialist booksellers and on eBay.  Of particular significance to this study is a series of 
volumes dating from 1942-43, making up Home Guard Instruction No. 51.  These set 
out the Home Guard’s tactical doctrine, as well as listing the capabilities of weapons, 
and the organisation of platoons and squads, down to the roles of individual soldiers.  
They represent the final stage in the evolution of the organisation into an entirely 
competent, and accepted, component of Home Defence.30   
 
In 1943, journalist and Home Guard Charles Graves celebrated the Home Guard (then at 
its apogee) in The Home Guard of Britain.31  This remains the closest thing to an 
‘official history’ the organisation ever received, although it suffers from the 
disadvantage of having been completed some months before the final ‘stand down’.  
When, in late 1944, the Home Guard did ‘stand down’, most members appreciated that 
this marked the end of a singular and formative experience (the Home Guard was 
officially disbanded on 31 December 1945).32  Various commemorative publications 
were produced, ranging in pretension from a twelve-page leaflet produced by the 
Intelligence Section, 8th Wiltshire Home Guard,33 to the 168-page Bureaucrats in 
Battledress – the history of the Ministry of Food Home Guard.34  The intention of the 
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authors of these and countless similar publications was lyrically expounded by Maj. C. 
E. Mansell, late Officer Commanding “Dog Company”, 20th Battalion, Kent Home 
Guard, in the introduction to the commemorative ‘diary’ of his battalion:35 
Sometimes on a Tuesday or a Thursday winter’s evening in years to come, we 
shall surely be sitting at home, by the fireside, listening to the rain beating  upon 
the window pane and the wind howling, and we shall think of those four winters 
when we used to turn out for Parade at the Drill Hall. 
 
 Perhaps a friend will be there to share our thoughts and we shall start yarning 
 about those Home Guard days and nights…  At such times this little book will 
 certainly be highly appreciated by us all.  It will jog our memories and help us 
 to recall countless incidents which otherwise are bound to fade in the course of 
 time. (Brown and Peek, 1944, p.2) 
 
And fade they have.  Such aides-memoir should be historical gold dust, but the reality 
for the historian is usually frustration.  They are, in Becket’s phrase (1991, p.271), 
‘relentlessly anecdotal’,  concentrating on personality (frequently disguised by oblique 
reference) at the expense of materiel, which contrasts with the Home Guard’s supposed 
clamorous and incessant demands for arms and equipment.  Nevertheless, they should 
not be dismissed.  Content varies, and coverage of the earlier (LDV) period can be 
sketchy, but careful reading is rewarded with invaluable, and frequently startling, first-
hand information.  What immediately becomes clear is that for the Home Guard the 
ideal was to be equipped as regular British Army line infantrymen.  The closer to this 
the authorities came, the less querulous the Home Guard became.  For various reasons 
this was not achievable before the latter part of 1943 and, as a result, expedients and 
alternatives were adopted which did little to diminish the Home Guard’s effectiveness, 
but which were poorly presented, ill-received and continue to have a largely undeserved 
bad press. 
 
But this is jump ahead.  To return to our historiography, the ‘wartime’ publications end 
with Britain’s Home Guard: A Character Study,36 written, appropriately, by John 
Brophy and masterfully illustrated by fellow Home Guard, artist Eric Kennington.  This 
fits, in MacKenzie’s words (1996, p.2): ‘among the dozens of local Home Guard unit 
histories written by former members that were appearing around the same time and 
which celebrated their comrades’ outlook and activities.’  The tone is elegiac:  
 13 
… without the Home Guard Britain itself could not exist.  It guaranteed 
determined, skilful, organised resistance to the invader everywhere.  It 
symbolized and made effective the will of the British people to defend their 
liberties, not merely while the period of acute danger persisted, but 
unremittingly till the continental despotism is overthrown. (Brophy, 1945, p.9) 
   
Professor MacKenzie (1996, p.2) reveals that attempts to produce an official history of 
the Home Guard were ‘abandoned in the early 1950s after the proposed author died’ 
and, indeed, several copies of an unpublished History of the Home Guard lie in the 
National Archive.37  After a brief revival during the 1950s, the Home Guard lapsed into 
obscurity until 1968, and the screening of the first episode of Dad’s Army, which, of 
course, brings us full circle. 
 
The key facet of this study is military technology, and, in particular, the study of 
military firearms.  In this context With British Snipers to the Reich, by Captain Clifford 
Shore is of particular significance.38  Shore, an enthusiastic rifle shot, served in the 
Home Guard before undergoing officer selection and joining the RAF Regiment (he 
was 33 years old in 1940).  He crossed into Europe on ‘D’ Day +1 and saw active 
service with the RAF Regiment, before becoming an instructor to the Army Field 
Sniper School in Holland.  In the words of the jacket notes to the 1997 facsimile reprint 
of Shore’s book ‘his interest was combined with sound common sense, and he would 
never countenance a rumour about a particular weapon or incident unless he was able to 
confirm it for himself.’  With British Snipers to the Reich was written immediately 
following Shore’s demobilisation, between March and December 1946, at the 
suggestion of an American publisher.  Although best known as a book on sniping, the 
references to the Home Guard, their smallarms and musketry are of considerable 
importance.  It was the discovery of Shore’s book, in its facsimile edition, in 1997 that 
convinced the author of this study that his own observations on the quality of Home 
Guard arms had some significance.  Other sources will be introduced in later chapters, 
but those most familiar to firearms cognoscenti, are the important corpus of painstaking 
work by the Australia-based researcher and writer Ian Skennerton, and the ‘Collector 
Grade’ series of large format monographs, edited by R. Blake Stevens of Ontario.  
Goldsmith’s The Grand Old Lady of No Man’s Land, Laidler and Howroyd’s The Guns 
of Dagenham, Easterly’s The Belgian Rattlesnake and Ballou’s Rock in a Hard Place 
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are the key resources for (respectively) the Vickers machine gun, Lanchester and Sten 
‘machine carbines’, Lewis light machine gun, and Browning Automatic Rifle.39  Other 
very useful and diverse technical information has emerged thanks to the efforts of the 
author’s colleagues in the Historic Breechloading Smallarms Association.   
 
It is, of course, impossible to undertake a study such as this without recourse to one or 
more of the late Ian Hogg’s books, and those of other noted specialists such as Terry 
Gander.  However, wherever possible, technical specifications have been extracted from 
contemporary Home Guard publications, as data such as effective ranges or penetration 
of armour were often modified, in the light of experience, by the time the equipment 
entered service with the Home Guard.  Like Clifford Shore, the author of this thesis 
prefers to examine matters for himself, and he has examined, handled, restored, and in 
many cases, fired, almost every weapon mentioned herein.   
 
This study strives for two goals:  firstly, for the author in his capacity as a military 
weapons specialist, to add something to the slim corpus of academic work concerning 
Britain’s wartime Home Guard – in the hope that this will be of use to other students.  
Secondly, it aims to test the tenacity of an established orthodoxy when confronted with 
an alternative, evidence-based, interpretation.  Much of the following argument is 
directed against conclusions drawn by Professor MacKenzie in his The Home Guard.  
This should not be allowed to detract from Professor MacKenzie’s huge achievement in 
establishing an academic basis on which to discuss this hitherto neglected topic.  It is 
appropriate to end with a quote written on 6 December 1944 – just as the Volksturm was 
preparing for its last-ditch defence of the Reich – by A.E. Stroud, a Home Guard trained 
to defend a ‘Tank Island’ in Wiltshire, summing up the feelings of all those who had 
given so much time and effort to the Home Guard: 
 
 Towards the end of 1943 and early 1944 … it was obvious that our invasion 
 was near with its possibility of airborne raids in this country for disruption of 
 communications and traffic. 
 
 I suppose we shall learn one day why this never happened, perhaps the answer 
 is that we were so well prepared for it.  I’m glad it didn’t happen, of course, 
 but I can’t help feeling sometimes that I’d have liked to have seen our wheels 
 go round in action just once, after all we did build a lovely machine, and never 
 saw it work.  (Stroud, 1944, p.7) 
 15 
 
 
Experimental archaeology – February 2010, the author fires an ex-Home Guard M1917 
rifle in a military-style competition course of fire at the National Shooting Centre, 
Bisley.  The next firer on the point is using a Canadian Ross, another rifle used in 
extremis by the British in 1940.   
(Photograph Dr J. Butler)  
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CHAPTER 1 
The Threat 
  
The Home Guard was born of a spontaneous reaction by the British public to the twin 
threats of invasion and subversion.  In order to place the organisation, and its equipment 
and tactics in context, it is necessary to explore those threats, which so galvanised the 
British population.  When Great Britain declared war on Nazi Germany, in September 
1939, the obstacles presented by the Maginot Line, the French army, and the Royal 
Navy, meant that an invasion by German troops was not regarded as a serious 
possibility.  Eight months later that view was completely reversed, when the Phoney 
War gave way to a stunning German victory on the Western Front, as Professor John 
Erickson describes (Schellenberg, 2000, p.xi.): 
 The possibility of a German seaborne invasion had not escaped the notice of 
 the British War Cabinet … on 30 October [1939] the prospect of a German 
 invasion was examined after ‘a spate of diplomatic and SIS reports’ on 
 German intentions.  In November the Chiefs of Staff evaluated the likelihood 
 of invasion, discounting it as long as British naval and air forces remained 
 largely intact.  In May 1940 the position changed dramatically.  The Chiefs of 
 Staff, prompted by SIS reports, set up the Home Defence Executive to co-
 ordinate anti-invasion measures among both military and civilian 
 organisations.  British intelligence calculated that Germany would have no 
 difficulty in assembling the necessary troops and shipping for an invasion.  It 
 was assumed in late May that with fully developed plans Germany could 
 invade at any time, given suitable conditions.  
  
Following the German advances into Scandinavia on 9 April 1940 and on the Western 
Front a month later, the British public and newspapers quickly reached the same 
conclusion as the Chiefs of Staff.  MacKenzie writes (1996, p.20):   
 These developments transformed both the strategic situation and the public 
 mood.  In the wake of the demonstrated ability of the German armed forces to 
 carry out a large-scale combined operation in Norway and in the knowledge 
 that most, if not all, of the Channel coast would soon be occupied, the prospect 
 of a German invasion of England suddenly seemed alarmingly real.  The 
 public apathy characteristic of the Phoney War rapidly dissolved into general 
 concern and alarm.  
 
‘Apathy’ is perhaps too strong a word, as international affairs were followed with a 
close, if jaded interest.  The anti-climaxes of Chamberlain’s failure to secure lasting 
peace, followed by months of ‘Phoney War’, had left the public cynical, while the 
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combination of censorship and inactivity meant that the man-in-the-street felt 
uninformed, and disengaged.  This was something which Winston Churchill turned to 
his advantage, as civilian George Beardmore, a cost clerk employed by the BBC, noted 
in his diary on 19 April 1940:  
How we look forward to the Churchill broadcasts! Everyone adores him, if only 
because he warned us of the German threat years ago.  He contrives to endow 
the word ‘Nazi’ with supreme contempt, and his literary phrases … put new life 
into the news …  As well as the dramatic content of his speeches there is often 
an item of brand-new information.  That’s what we are starved of – information.  
(Beardmore, 1984, pp.49-50) 
 
From 10 May 1940, the day Churchill became Prime Minister, the British watched with 
growing horror and alarm as the apparently unstoppable German army sliced through 
Western Europe.  ‘One waits for a counter-attack…’  Beardmore wrote forlornly on 22 
May 1940 (1984, p.56).  He went on:  
 One imagines that when the objective of the coast towns is attained, the 
 troop-carrying bombers will be diverted to landing in this country, laying 
 Canterbury waste and its cathedral a crumbling grey ruin such as Rheims 
 cathedral was left twenty-five years ago, besieging places like Manchester, 
 turning our own selves into refugees trudging down English roads and lanes 
 that have suddenly become hostile (Beardmore, 1984, pp.56-7).     
 
The threat of invasion had suddenly become real, and if one single factor seized the 
public imagination, it was the German use of parachute troops.  This innovation seemed 
to render the Royal Navy, England’s traditional bulwark against invasion, impotent.  
The possibility of airborne assault on the United Kingdom had been discussed since the 
first tentative ascents in hot air balloons, but in truth, air-landings, had been the stuff of 
science fiction.  That was entirely changed by the German assault on Norway.  The 
effective use of parachute and air-landing troops there, and subsequently in the Low 
Countries, added instantaneous and ubiquitous invasion to the now well-established 
aerial threat – vide George Beardmore’s ‘troop-carrying bombers’.  One concerned 
citizen observed on 12 May 1940, in a letter to The Times:  ‘I have spent this Sunday in 
my village in Sussex.  An air troop carrier landing on the Downs – indeed a handful of 
German parachutists – could take possession of the village and of the look out posts on 
the cliffs’ (MacKenzie, 1996, p.25).  Whether German high command would consider 
that particular Sussex village worth the investment of a force of elite paratroopers was 
not the issue, the point was that Germany had the capability and had demonstrated it.  
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Importantly, the British public’s response to this new threat was not to flee, or demand 
that the Government sue for peace, but rather to insist that the hitherto ‘disengaged’ 
population be assisted to take up arms:  the correspondent went on:  
Some dozens of able-bodied men and myself, armed with rifles, could handle 
this situation with at least some measure of success.  But as things are we should 
be obliged to stand by helpless and do nothing.  A similar situation might arise 
in hundreds of other villages and towns from Land’s End to John o’Groats 
within the next few months.  Ought we not anticipate it by arming – and swiftly?   
 
 
The UK population chose to arm, first unofficially through ‘patriotic’ groups and 
organisations such as the Legion of Frontiersmen, and then, following Anthony Eden’s 
radio broadcast on the evening of 14 May 1940, as officially-sanctioned ‘Local Defence 
Volunteers’.  In his broadcast, the Secretary of State for War outlined the new threat 
posed by German parachute troops, and asked for volunteers to report to their local 
police stations: 
Since the war began the Government have received countless enquiries 
from all over the Kingdom from men of all ages who are for one reason or 
another not at present engaged in military service, and who wish to do 
something for the defence of the country. 
Now is your opportunity.  We want large numbers of such men in Great 
Britain who are British subjects, between the ages of 17 and 65, to come forward 
and offer their services in order to make assurance doubly sure.  The name of the 
new force which is now to be raise will be the ‘Local Defence Volunteers.’  This 
name, Local Defence Volunteers, describes its duties in three words.1  
 
However, the German threat, which seemed so real and immediate with enemy troops 
just across the English Channel, became rather less tangible when subjected to close 
scrutiny.  This is reflected in the first of the unofficial LDV handbooks, Rifle Training 
for War, published in June 1940.  The editor struggles with the fact that that, whilst in 
broad terms, the raison d’être of the LDV was obvious, its actual role was far from 
clear:   
At the time of writing, the precise duties of the L.D.V. have not been defined.  
They can, however, be guessed at and whatever they have to do they will surely 
find a knowledge of the rifle useful.  The author wishes the best of luck to all his 
readers.  They have answered the appeal to “repel boarders,” whether they come 
by sea or air.  (Robinson and King, 1940, p.xii) 
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As envisaged in Rifle Training for War, the operational role of the LDV appeared to 
consist of small numbers of concerned citizens stalking and killing equally small 
numbers of Nazi paratroopers, preferably before they landed: 
 For instance a Volunteer [sic] or a pair of volunteers may see two or three 
 parachutes dropping.  If the volunteer is alone and is a good shot and near 
 enough to open fire – say within two or three hundred yards of the nearest – he 
 may decide to attempt to get one or two, or perhaps all of them, before they 
 land.  If two volunteers are on the watch in such a situation one may go back 
 to report whilst the better shot remains to watch and shoot if he gets the 
 chance.  (Robinson and King, 1940, p.2) 
 
It is not apparent what purpose it would serve the enemy to drop such small numbers of 
parachutists, but it is abundantly clear why downed RAF aircrew ran a serious risk of 
being shot by their own countrymen. 
 
Parachutist hysteria, and a persistent willingness to credit the Germans with 
extraordinary military capacities, led contemporary authorities to some unfortunate 
overestimations of German capabilities.  In dismissing these exaggerations historians 
can also dismiss the threat.  MacKenzie, for instance, after explaining that Lord Croft 
believed the Germans could land up to 10,000 paratroops, points out:  ‘the German 
armed forces had only 7,000 fully trained paratroopers in the spring of 1940, and had 
suffered quite severe losses in men and transports during operations in Holland’  
(MacKenzie, 1996, p.23).  Derek Robinson (2006, p.116) puts the German parachute 
force still lower, 4,500 men at the start of Fall Gelb (Case Yellow), the invasion of 
France and the Low Countries, many of whom became casualties, particularly in the 
airborne set piece ‘Battle for the Hague’.  Although the Fallschirmjäger captured by the 
Dutch were released when Holland capitulated on 14 May, Robinson makes the point 
that the losses of Junkers Ju52 transport aircraft in the campaign (213 out of 475) were 
crippling.  Nevertheless, he estimates that in June 1940, German could have launched a 
lift of a maximum of 3,000 paratroops to England (Robinson, 2006, p.112).   
 
The airborne assault could only be the overture for the main thrust, an amphibious 
landing by conventional troops, and German plans for cross-Channel invasion have 
suffered from being measured against the Allied landings of June 1944.  Operation 
OVERLORD was an entirely different undertaking, if only because of the scale and 
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preparedness of the defences.  German preparations in the summer of 1940, and their 
chances of success, need to be measured against previous joint operations.  It is 
instructive to consider Churchill’s summation of the German assault on Norway:  
Surprise, ruthlessness, and precision were the characteristics of the  onslaught…  
Nowhere did the initial landing forces exceed two thousand men.  Seven army 
divisions were employed…  Three divisions were used in the assault phase, and 
four supported them through Oslo and Trondheim.  Eight hundred operational 
aircraft and 250 to 300 transport planes were the salient and vital feature of the 
design.  Within forty-eight hours all the main ports of Norway were in the 
German grip.  (Churchill, 1954a, p.473) 
 
Even 3,000 fully trained, equipped and combat-tested paratroops were considerably 
more than any other combatant nation could field in the summer of 1940, and they were 
backed by the world’s largest and most modern air force, undefeated in the recent 
campaigns in Poland and Western Europe.  ‘Speed, ruthlessness and determination to 
advance at all costs’ might have got German troops across the Channel before a 
shocked, demoralised and largely disarmed Britain could properly organise itself, and at 
that stage in the war it was impossible to believe that such a determined and capable 
enemy would let the opportunity slip through his fingers.   
 
Periodical Notes on the German Army No. 28 (published by the War Office on 27 June 
1940) explained:  ‘From the time when the German Army overthrew the restrictions 
imposed by the Treaty of Versailles, the offensive spirit has been stressed in all training.  
The result of this teaching, an offensive, violent both in speed and ruthlessness, has 
already been well illustrated in the campaigns in Poland and on the Western Front.’2  
The British public was never quite able to accept that such an army would fail to take 
any sort of direct action against the UK mainland.  Writing in 1945, John Brophy put 
the popular view of Germany’s missed opportunity: 
The probability is that it lay beyond the German imagination to conceive the 
state of defencelessness into which Britain had been allowed to lapse by her 
former rulers.  Had they guessed how few tanks, guns, machine-guns, supplied 
with what scanty stocks of ammunition, lay between them and the greatest 
conquest they could hope for, they would certainly have launched their invading 
fleets, and reckoned any losses at sea and in the air a small price to pay.  
(Brophy, 1945, p.18) 
 
In his book Invasion 1940, Derek Robinson seeks to draw attention to the ‘elephant-in-
the-room’ in discussions about the practicality, or otherwise, of a German invasion of 
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England in 1940 – the presence of a vastly superior British navy.  It was this factor, he 
insists, not The Battle of Britain, and the pilots of Fighter Command, which prevented a 
German invasion (Robinson, 2006, p.5): ‘Historians themselves have perpetuated one 
mistaken belief about what happened in 1940: the myth that ‘The Few’ alone saved 
Britain from invasion.’  Robinson’s argument about the neglected importance of the 
Royal Navy is well made, but it misses the point that it was not the old threat of a 
surface invasion that really alarmed the British, but the entirely new threat of airborne 
envelopment.3  The counters to this ubiquitous threat were fighter Command in the air, 
and the Local Defence Volunteers on the ground, and that is the contemporary context 
in which the LDV/Home Guard must be viewed.   
 
Periodical Notes on the German Army, No. 30, published by War Office intelligence 
department MI 14 in August 1940, contains two sections:  ‘Lessons of the Battle of 
France’ and ‘Possible German Tactics in an Attack on Great Britain’.  The British 
General Staff’s viewpoint at the time is made perfectly clear: 
 In operations in the United Kingdom the German forces will be inferior in 
 numbers to our own, are likely to be less well supplied with tanks and heavier 
 supporting weapons and will also be handicapped by long and uncertain lines 
 of communications across a sea dominated by the British Navy, and, it may be 
 hoped, after the first 48 hours, by a shortage of food, ammunition and petrol.4  
 
MI 14 thus allows Robinson his point, but then (proceeding in the anticipated order of 
arrival in the UK) goes straight on to discuss parachute troops.  After a general 
description of organisation and training the notes continue: 
 These troops might be employed against this country:- 
(a) To prepare the way for the landing of air-borne troops.  For this purpose 
they would land near areas (in open flat ground, not necessarily 
aerodromes) suitable for the landing of troop-carrying aircraft.  They 
might, for example, be landed in an open space between two woods. 
(b) To co-operate with landings from the sea.  Parachute troops might be 
dropped in comparatively large numbers close to suitable beaches or 
harbours in order to cover the landing of sea-borne troops.  These 
parachute landings might take place before or during attempts to gain a 
foot-hold on the beaches, etc. 
(c) To cause confusion or effect dispersion of our own forces by widespread 
landings in small groups.  These small detachments would try to 
establish contact with agents and Fifth Columnists with the object of 
carrying out sabotage, stampeding the population and bringing the 
normal life of the country to a standstill.  Parachutists might be used 
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simultaneously in all three roles described above and some might be 
disguised in British uniforms and speak English fluently. 
 
Point ‘c’, above, is of interest, because it illuminates the ‘penny packet’ threat of small 
numbers of parachutists.  Next to arrive are the air-landing troops, described in the same 
format: 
 
 In this country the tasks of air-landing troops would probably be:- 
(a) To seize important areas in the early stages of an attack, establish 
[seize?] aerodromes, coastal batteries and forts. 
(b)  To establish bridgeheads for troops and material landing by sea. 
(c) To create chaos, to aim at achieving dispersion of our forces and to draw 
off troops from areas where sea landings might be attempted. 
 All these tasks are likely to be undertaken simultaneously and in co-operation 
 with parachute troops. 
 
The air landing troops are followed in sequence by the sea-borne contingents: 
• Mechanised reconnaissance units 
• Armoured formations 
• Motorised infantry and infantry divisions 
 
The Notes also cover: 
 Engineers (some of whom will be amongst the first troops landed) 
 Smoke troops 
 Possible use of gas 
 Irregular methods of warfare (dirty tricks) 
 
MI 14 concludes: 
(a) Once landed German forces of all kinds will use every endeavour to 
advance inland as far and as fast as they can.  They will rely on 
immediate and effective support from dive-bombers to attack opposition 
which they are unable to overcome with their own resources.  Infiltration 
tactics are to be expected and success will be reinforced wherever it is 
obtained. 
(b) Difficulties of terrain set a limit on the effectiveness of armoured forces 
in certain districts in this country.  Their dependence on sea 
communications is another important limiting factor, though they may 
hope to obtain some fuel and food by capture. 
(c) The enemy will aim at creating civil chaos as one of the conditions for 
the success of his military plans.   The landing of parachute and air-borne 
troops together with heavy air bombing, all of which will probably 
precede and accompany the arrival of sea-borne forces, will be employed 
to create this confusion. 
(d) The extensive employment of smoke (possibly in conjunction with gas) 
to cover the approach to and subsequent landing on beaches must be 
expected. 
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(e) The employment of gas on a large scale is probable.5 
 
 
This then is the British Army intelligence template for a German invasion, against 
which all British counter-invasion preparations were made, and it remained so for as 
long as full-scale invasion remained a planning contingency.  It determined that the first 
threat for the Home Guard (as the LDV became known from 23 August 1940) would be 
dealing, probably unaided, with German parachutists, who may be dropped in small 
numbers in order to force the British field army to disperse, and in order to join up with 
Fifth Columnists.  That scenario became, and remained, the principle preoccupation of 
the Home Guard throughout its wartime existence.  In the introduction we noted that the 
authors of official instructions for the Home Guard made great efforts to make their 
publications interesting and accessible.  This includes what must rank as one of the most 
extraordinary military manuals ever produced, Colonel G.A. Wade’s The Defence of 
Bloodford Village.  Released in late November 1940, the booklet has a short forward by 
the Director General Home Guard, Major General T.R. Eastwood, DSO, MC: 
  “The Battle of Bloodford Village and how it came to be successfully 
 defended as a result of the lessons learnt from the dreams of the local Home 
 Guard Commander, makes most interesting and instructive reading.” 
“The story contains many useful hints that should help other Home 
Guard Commanders in planning the defence of their villages.” (Shown in 
inverted commas on the original.  Wade, 1940, frontispiece) 
 
The 16-page booklet opens with a description of the imaginary village of Bloodford as 
we might encounter it after Hitler’s war has been won:  Overlooked by a picturesque 
windmill on a hill, the village features an old stone bridge over the River Booze; the 
half-timbered Bridge Inn, with its lichened roof; Hag’s Pond, still with ducking stool; 
the Grange; and a huddle of quaint old houses around the village green.  On the green 
stands an old gibbet – and three destroyed German tanks, proud trophies of the village 
Home Guard. 
 
In the narrative, Bloodford Home Guard is under the command of Geoffrey ‘Skipper’ 
Gee (Home Guard commissions and military ranks were only introduced on 3 February 
1941), resident of the Grange.  After a long night spent working out a Defensive 
Scheme for the village, an exhausted Gee eats a large piece of cheese before heading to 
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bed.  In the nightmare that follows, Gee finds himself helplessly watching the first 
stages of a Nazi invasion: 
 
It was early morning, patches of mist still hung on the Village Green, the 
sun rising over OAK WOOD was reflected in the water of HAG’S POND and 
sundry roosters proclaimed the birth of another day.  No one could be seen in the 
streets although the rattle of buckets and the clank of the pumps showed that 
early risers were astir.  “The best time of the day,” thought Gee, “when the larks 
are singing and the sky is a lovely deep blue, and – My God! What’s that?”  for 
floating downwards were some tiny white specks.  “Parachutists! – Yes, eight of 
them, and look there’s a score of them over there as well!  In agony Gee looked 
round.  Why didn’t somebody do something?  They would come to earth only a 
mile away and be here in no time and yet still the buckets were rattling and the 
men whistling and the cocks crowing just as though DEATH was not advancing 
from two directions at once!  (Wade, 1940, pp.2 and 3) 
 
Inevitably, none of the busy villagers looks up to see the descending parachutists, who 
‘heavily armed and dangerous’ are soon ‘converging on the unsuspecting village, their 
minds set on MURDER, PILLAGE and RAPE’.  A warning from a mortally wounded 
child on a bicycle comes too late, the Home Guard are caught napping and massacred.  
Horrified, Gee watches his own dead body being hoisted onto the gibbet. 
 
Rising, shaken, the following day, Gee immediately sets about re-organising the 
village’s Defensive Scheme to ensure that Bloodford cannot be taken by surprise.  
However, poor Gee cannot get a good night’s sleep.  Over five nights, five more dreams 
follow, and awaking from each the unfortunate Home Guard Commander further refines 
Bloodford’s defences.  In the second dream, light tanks outflank the village road block 
and machine gun the Home Guard from behind.  In the third, a Fifth Columnist dumps 
the Home Guard’s ammunition in the river, while in the fourth, Windmill Hill, the 
dominating feature, is taken and held by the enemy, despite a suicidal bayonet charge by 
the Home Guard.  In the fifth dream a German troop-carrying aircraft lands on the 
village green, and in the sixth, and last, the Home Guards are scuppered by the lack of a 
mobile reserve.  Finally, the Bloodford’s defences achieve perfection – just in the nick 
of time as the real invasion takes place.  German troops and tanks attack the village and 
are soundly defeated by the Home Guard.  Interspersing the text are 28 boxed ‘Points’ 
for the reader to note, such as:  
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Point No. 16. 
KEEP A RESERVE 
  This is of tremendous importance for every Defensive Scheme seems 
 weak in parts and the temptation to employ every available man in the initial 
 stages must be sternly resisted. 
  When the attack is taking place, the reserves should be used only to re-
 establish the defences if they are penetrated.  Once this is done, they should 
 return at once to reserve. (Wade, 1940, p.11)  
 
 
In its 16 small pages, The Defence of Bloodford achieves many goals.  Firstly, we are 
shown the likely component phases of a German invasion (paratroops, air-landing, 
armoured reconnaissance, etc.), and how, in general terms, the Home Guard can deal 
with each of them, thus boosting confidence, (and initiative – when the ammunition is 
found to be missing, thanks to the treachery of the Fifth Columnist, the Home Guard are 
undaunted and do their best with Molotov Cocktails).  Then there are specific learning 
points to increase military efficiency and effectiveness.  Underlying all this is the 
juxtaposition of murderous German paratroopers with an idealised bucolic English 
landscape (an effective character assassination, and not entirely without foundation, as 
we shall see).  It is interesting to note, and it is a theme we will return to, that despite the 
20th century urbanisation, suburbanisation and industrialisation of Great Britain, the 
Home Guard is depicted fighting in, and for, a rural ‘Dream of England’. 
 
Robinson describes the German paratrooper, the Fallschirmjäger, as ‘probably the most 
overrated soldier of the war’ (Robinson, 2006, p.108).  Certainly, the threat posed to the 
UK by German parachute troops was overrated, both because of the shortage of men 
and transport aircraft, and inherent problems with their equipment and modus operandi.  
Faced with the need to confront elite German paratroopers, the Home Guard made 
themselves the masters of the subject, identifying the points where the Fallschirmjäger 
would be most vulnerable to attack.  It was soon realised that airborne invasion would 
not be constituted by handfuls of Nazi paratroopers, as Hugh Slater explained, in his 
hugely popular book Home Guard for Victory! in January 1941:   
 The Home Guard has developed in a rather typically English, spontaneous, 
 way.  First of all there were the Parashots.  They were to patrol the countryside 
 with shot-guns and to blaze away at enemy parachutists as they came slowly 
 sailing down to earth.  After about a fortnight it was realised that the Eschner 
 parachute, used by the Germans, is so designed that it may take no longer than 
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 five seconds for the parachutists to be landed from the plane, and therefore the 
 conception of potting at them as they floated through the air had to be 
 regarded as obsolete.  (Slater, 1941, pp.11-12) 
Fallschirmjäger, as shown in the British manual The German Army in Pictures, 
published by department MI 14 at the War Office, in January 1941. (Author’s 
Collection) 
 
The actual time of descent was 20-30 seconds, not ‘five seconds’ as a moment’s 
sensible reflection would make obvious – it would not be the only time that Slater 
would misinform his eager readers – but at least the danger posed to friendly aircrew 
was appreciated:   
  Parachute troops will generally be landed from low levels, and will not 
 come down singly or in batches of up to six men as the crews of crashed 
 fighters or bombers will do.  They will be seen, as a rule, in groups of more 
 than six…   
   
  If parachutists are seen to drop in batches of more than six from 
 enemy aircraft, fire may be opened on them by members of the armed forces 
 while they are in the air.  In no other circumstances should parachutists be shot 
 at while coming down. 
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  Fire should not be opened on parachutists after they have landed unless 
 they take, or show unmistakeable signs of taking, hostile action. (Slater, 1941, 
 pp.85-86) 
 
Slater persists in the fiction that the Germans would deliberately crash-land transport 
aircraft, which, presumably, reflected a misinterpretation of the use of troop-carrying 
gliders and battle-damaged Ju52s crash landing with troops still on board:  ‘A troop-
carrying plane can make a pancake landing in almost any large field even if there are 
wooden stakes, stone piles and pits or other obstacles in the field’ (Slater, 1941, p.19). 
 
The British gained a fuller appreciation of German airborne tactics following 
Unternehmen MERKUR (Operation MERCURY), the invasion of Crete by 22,000 
airborne and mountain troops in May 1941.  The second edition of John Langdon-
Davies Home Guard Fieldcraft Manual was published in April 1942, and the book 
reflects thorough understanding of the limitations of Fallschirmjäger equipment and 
tactics.  The German Ruckenpackung Zwangauslosung (RZ) -16 and -20 parachutes 
were effectively unstearable (which is why German paratroopers can be seen on 
contemporary newsreels furiously kicking and pedalling as they come in to land, trying 
to swing themselves towards a better landing place), and had risers which connected in 
such a way as to result in an uncontrollable face-forward landing.  This limited the 
amount of equipment or weapons the paratrooper could safely carry during the jump, 
and also resulted in the need to issue knee and elbow pads to minimise injuries.  
Langdon-Davies explained (1942, p.36): 
(a) The Nazi parachutist on landing is seldom equipped with anything 
but an automatic pistol, four grenades and a long knife, which cannot 
be accurately used at a range of more than fifty yards.  The first 
airborne troops to land often carry machine pistols strapped to their 
backs, and three or four hand grenades in their pockets. 
(b) The Nazi parachutist is dazed to a certain extent on landing, and there 
are a high percentage of sprained ankles and other minor casualties. 
(c) His clothing is arranged to assist him in his fall, and he has to re-
arrange it before he is in a suitable condition to fight. 
(d) The rest of his equipment comes down by a separate parachute in a 
container which is unrolled directly the parachutists recover from 
their fall. 
 
It may seem hopelessly optimistic, pitting the civilian militia of the Home Guard against 
Nazi paratroopers, but the Fallschirmjäger were genuinely vulnerable immediately after 
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landing and before they had collected their weapons, as the invasion of Crete would 
prove.  The resulting tactical pause was factored into Langdon-Davies’ Home Guard 
exercises (Langdon-Davies, 1942, p.35): 
  When everybody is on the alert, twelve parachutists appear at a spot 
 which has not been indicated to the Home Guard beforehand.  Their position 
 must be about 1,000 yards from the defending position.  They will indicate 
 their landing by waving white flags.  They will remain stationary for four 
 minutes, thus representing the initial period when the parachutists are 
 practically immobilized by the difficulty of landing. 
  The cylinder containing their equipment, represented by a red flag, has 
 dropped within about fifty yards of them.  At the end of the four minutes they 
 must recover the cylinder and they will have five minutes to drag it into cover 
 and distribute the equipment.  At the end of five minutes, that is to say, at the 
 end of nine minutes from the zero hour, they are free to move off… 
 
 
Nine minutes might be pushing it, judging by contemporary footage of Fallschirmjäger 
in action, but there definitely was scope for the first British troops on the scene – and 
that would almost certainly be the Home Guard – catching the Germans before they had 
time to properly organise and arm themselves.6   
 
 
 
 
Two Fallschirmjäger weapons containers, offered 
for sale on the internet some years ago.  This size 
might have held rifles, larger and heavier examples 
were equipped with wheels.  Until they had 
recovered their containers, German paratroopers 
were only armed with a pistol and a knife.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If the German Army was seen, correctly, as an essentially offensive force, it was also 
perceived as willing to stoop to any underhand and unscrupulous tactics in order to win.  
This reputation was built at the outset on supposed Nazi ‘dirty tricks’ during the 
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campaign in Western Europe, and widely accepted on the British side.  This supposed 
new form of war required special vigilance on the part of the British, as John Brophy 
explained in Home Guard, a Handbook for the L.D.V.:   
 Enemy parachute troops may be looked for (a) in their own uniform, (b) 
 disguised in civilian dress to act as spies and sabotage agents.  Their numbers 
 and their behaviour should give them away if their intention is to pass 
 themselves off as British troops.  If they come in civilian disguise they will 
 almost certainly be dropped in darkness.  Genuine clergymen, nuns or farm 
 labourers are not going to descend out of the night sky, and the pretenders 
 should be promptly and suitably dealt with.  The author of this Handbook has a 
 “hunch” that adolescent enemy agents may be dropped in the uniforms of Boy 
 Scouts or Sea Scouts.  (Brophy, 1941a, p.50) 
 
Writing some 70 years after the event, it is difficult to comprehend the threat to national 
security Brophy imagined would be posed by a teenage Nazi Sea Scout, and even in the 
febrile atmosphere of 1940, this sort of silliness undermined the authority of the Home 
Guard’s self-appointed guiding lights.  That said, had the manuals stated that Nazi spies 
would appear at country railway stations and in seaside towns wet from the knees down, 
speaking heavily accented English and carrying Mauser pistols, torches marked ‘made 
in Bohemia’, primitive encoding equipment and a length of German sausage, no one 
would have believed it.  But that is exactly what did happen (Jowitt, 1954, p34). 
 
It is clear in retrospect that the majority of the supposed German ‘dirty tricks’ of April 
and May 1940 were imaginary, or due to incompetence and the muddle brought on by 
the fog of war, amplified by the speed of the German advance – which prevented 
headquarters from establishing themselves and threatened or broke lines of 
communication, compromising the Allied chain of command:  ‘Cock-up’ rather than 
conspiracy.  Nevertheless, in August 1940 the War Office authoritatively listed a litany 
of ‘Irregular Methods of Warfare’: 
  The Germans do not admit that there are any “rules” in warfare and 
 any form of trickery or cunning which would assist them in attaining their 
 object must be expected. 
  The following are some of the methods believed to have been 
 employed by the Germans which may be described at least as unorthodox. 
 
 (a)  A small party allows itself to be captured; then produces concealed 
 weapons, kills its captors and holds an important point until reinforcements 
 arrive. 
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 (b) A telephone call to a demolition party in perfect English saying that the 
 bridge should not be blown until a party of British troops have crossed.  The 
 party arrives in British uniforms, is allowed to pass and then turns on the 
 demolition party and annihilates it. 
 
 (c) Tanks flying French flags arrive at a bridge.  The defenders lead the tanks 
 through a minefield covering the position.  Once through, the tanks turn and 
 attack the position from the rear. 
 
 (d)  Spreading false rumours among the civilian population concerning the 
 approach of German troops, thereby blocking the roads in rear of the [Allies] 
 with hordes of refugees. 
 
 (e)  Bombing and machine-gunning columns of refugees to cause blocking of 
 roads in rear of the [Allies]. 
 
 (f)  Concealing A.Tk. guns in farm carts driven by civilians or troops in 
 civilian clothes. 
 
(g) Employment of agents to guide troops and aircraft, to increase panic among 
civilians and to interfere with defensive measures.  They were also used for 
sabotage, to spread defeatism among enemy troops, and even to fire on them. 
 
Whilst there is no doubt that the Germans would make the most of a ruse de guerre if 
they could, the suggestion that they did not admit any rules in warfare was dangerously 
misleading.  It is appropriate at this point to juxtapose the German paratroopers’ own 
perspective.  The following is extracted from an article on German paratroops in an 
American military publication, Intelligence Bulletin, produced in September 1942,7 with 
the benefit of information from the battle of Crete.  
  
 e. The Parachutist's "Ten Commandments"  
 Here is a translation of a document captured from a German parachute trooper 
 who was taken prisoner in Greece. Its title is "The Parachutist's Ten 
 Commandments."  
 
 1. You are the elite of the German Army. For you, combat shall be fulfilment. 
 You shall seek it out and train yourself to stand any test.  
 
 2. Cultivate true comradeship, for together with your comrades you will triumph 
 or die.  
 
 3. Be shy of speech and incorruptible. Men act, women chatter; chatter will 
 bring you to the grave.  
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 4. Calm and caution, vigor and determination, valor and a fanatical offensive 
 spirit will make you superior in attack.  
 
 5. In facing the foe, ammunition is the most precious thing. He who shoots 
 uselessly, merely to reassure himself, is a man without guts. He is a weakling 
 and does not deserve the title of parachutist.  
 
 6. Never surrender. Your honor lies in Victory or Death.  
 
 7. Only with good weapons can you have success. So look after them on the 
 principle—First my weapons, then myself.  
 
 8. You must grasp the full meaning of an operation so that, should your leader 
 fall by the way, you can carry it out with coolness and caution. 
  
 9. Fight chivalrously against an honest foe; armed irregulars deserve no quarter. 
  
 10. With your eyes open, keyed up to top pitch, agile as a greyhound, tough as 
 leather, hard as Krupp steel, you will be the embodiment of a German warrior.  
 
Point nine of the ‘Ten Commandments’ is worthy of note, and, as we will discuss 
further in the next chapter, indicates the likely temper of operations against the Home 
Guard, especially in the pre-uniform LDV period. 
 
If the British public was mesmerised by the threat of airborne invasion, it was enemy 
armour which fixated the General Staff.  Periodical Notes on the German Army, No. 30:  
A. Lessons of the Battle of France explained:   
  The armoured divisions were the decisive factor in German ground 
 successes against Poland and in Flanders and France.  There can be little doubt 
 therefore that the Germans will make every effort to land A.F.Vs. on these 
 shores from transports (should they capture a suitable port or ports) and 
 perhaps from smaller craft such as fishing vessels, and barges and rafts of 
 special construction.  Mention has already been made of the possible transport 
 of light tanks by aircraft.8 
 
For the public it was the ubiquity of the paratrooper menace that made it so terrifying; 
for the General Staff, it was the recollection of enemy armour punching through the 
Allied front line in France and Flanders to threaten any and everything behind: 
The main tasks of the armoured divisions were to secure control of the 
system of communications in the area attacked and in particular the nodal points, 
thus disrupting the [Allied] organization and L. of C. [lines of communication] 
and opening up the way for the motorized and infantry divisions.  The advanced 
elements spread out across the road system and pushed on ruthlessly, seeking to 
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increase the area of ground captured without in any way attempting to 
consolidate it.  The Germans relied on speed and surprise to neutralise any 
[Allied] counter-measures.9 
  
It is quite plain from the tone of training literature produced at the time that the 
overriding fear was that morale would collapse in the face of a tank threat, particularly 
given the fact that virtually all the British Army’s anti-tank weapons had been lost, and 
those that survived were only marginally effective.  The War Office turned to highly 
coloured language to rally the troops, as in Local Defence Volunteer Instruction No. 8: 
Tanks and Tank Destruction, issued in mid-July 1940: 
  From the moment that enemy tanks are located they must be harried, 
 hunted, sniped and ambushed without respite.  Goliath was slain by David’s 
 sling, and the lessons of Spain and Finland confirm that tanks can be destroyed 
 by men who have the bravery, resource and determination to do so.10 
 
Military Training Pamphlet No. 42: Tank Hunting and Destruction, of 29 August 1940, 
is important for the light it sheds on British Army anti-tank equipment in the period July 
to December 1940, and will be examined in closer detail later in this study.  In general 
terms it is sufficient here to note that it was produced for Army use and closely matches 
the earlier LDV document quoted above in tone and content, albeit turning from 
Biblical to sporting metaphor: 
  It has been proved that tanks, for all their hard skin, mobility and 
 armament achieve their more spectacular results from their moral effect on 
 half-hearted or ill-led troops.  Consequently, troops which attempt to 
 withstand tanks by adopting a purely passive role will fail in their task, or at 
 the best only half complete it. 
Tank hunting must be regarded as a sport – big game hunting at its  best.  
A thrilling, albeit dangerous sport, which if skilfully played is about as 
hazardous as shooting tiger on foot, and in which the same principles of stalk 
and ambush are followed.11 
 
It is curious that the battle envisaged is man versus a tank, not man versus tanks 
intimately supported by infantry; just as the public focused on paratroopers operating in 
small numbers in isolation, so the General Staff seem to envisage German tanks 
operating on their own.  This may reflect the experience of the Dunkirk campaign when 
the Panzers out-ran their support, but it probably does not reflect the reality of a post-
landing all-arms operation in the English countryside. 
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During June 1940, as the British waited for Nazi parachutists, Hitler prevaricated, 
expecting Britain to come to terms.  The difficulty in interpreting the events of the 
summer of 1940 is that the British and the Nazi high command viewed the grand 
strategic situation in the second half of 1940 in totally divergent ways.  For the British, 
the second Great War had reached its climax, the seconds were out and what lay ahead 
was the final battle.  For Hitler, the war was already over, ended, as the last had been, 
with the signing of an armistice in a railway carriage in the forest of Compiegne.  
Having been driven out of Europe and at the mercy of the most powerful air force in the 
world, Britain must soon come to its senses and agree to an armistice.   
 
Britain at bay characterised itself as 
an embattled fortress – Joyous 
Gard,12  and Hitler concurred, 
instinctively preferring the 
traditional siege tactics of blockade 
and bombardment to achieve his 
desired outcome, rather than a 
costly assault.  Nevertheless, 
Kriegsmarine (navy) studies for an 
invasion of the UK had commenced 
as early as November 1939, the 
Heer (army) and Luftwaffe (air 
force) following suit in December.  
The navy plan became Studie 
England, which included 
preliminary work on 
commandeering barges and 
developing a landing craft, the 
‘Pionierlandungsboot’, which 
closely resembled the mechanised landing craft or LC(Mech) used later by the Allies.  
Although this was a thoroughly efficient landing craft design, only two of the first 
‘Type 39’ pattern were available in the summer of 1940, which meant that the bulk of 
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the landing would have to be made using converted barges.13  The barge expedient has 
proven a rich vein for speculation regarding the feasibility, or otherwise, of a German 
invasion.  It should be born in mind that the Germans had managed to land a sizeable 
invasion force in Norway without any specialised landing vessels at all, while the 
British had withdrawn over 330,000 troops from the Dunkirk beachhead using a mixture 
of naval, merchant marine and civilian vessels.  In both cases destroyers did the bulk of 
the work.14  Furthermore, Rhine barges should not be confused with English 
narrowboats, and the expedient of inserting a reinforced concrete floor and replacing the 
bow section with a ramp resulted in something that was certainly equivalent to a LC(T).  
To quote Dr Peter Schenk:  ‘the barges proved quite seaworthy and the powered ones 
subsequently performed well during landings on the Soviet-held islands in the Baltic in 
1941.’15   
 
Although Hitler planned to use his victory speech to the German people at the Reichstag 
on 19 July 1940 to offer peace terms to the British, he also ratcheted-up military 
preparations, and on 16 July issued Weisung Nr 16 (Directive No. 16), the order to 
commence planning and preparation for a landing on the British mainland, codenamed 
SEELÖWE (Sea Lion).  The directive began: 
     Since England, in spite of her hopeless military situation, shows no 
 signs of being ready to come to an understanding, I have decided to prepare a 
 landing operation against England, and, if necessary, to carry it out. 
 
The aim of this operation will be to eliminate the English homeland as a base for 
the prosecution of the war against Germany and, if necessary, occupy it 
completely. 
 
I therefore order as follows: 
 
1. The landing will be in the form of a surprise crossing on a wide front 
from about Ramsgate to the area west of the Isle of Wight.  Units of the Air 
Force will act as artillery, and units of the Navy as engineers.16 
 
After the war German generals downplayed SEELÖWE, suggesting that it was little 
more than a bluff – Guderian (1952, p.138) commented: ‘Even from the very beginning 
this operation was never taken seriously.  In my opinion the lack of a sufficiently strong 
air force and of adequate shipping made it a completely hopeless undertaking.’  In July 
1940, the Luftwaffe was undefeated and had swept all before it, so Guderian’s post-war 
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comment needs to be treated with some scepticism.  On reading Directive No. 16, it is 
immediately apparent that this is not a bluff.  But it is a contingency – as is made quite 
clear in the first paragraph.  Hitler hoped he would not need to land troops in England, 
but wanted to have a workable plan and forces in place if he had to: ‘I have decided to 
prepare a landing operation against England, and, if necessary, to carry it out.’  What is 
important in understanding the original SEELÖWE concept is that Hitler’s ‘surprise 
crossing’ is a coup-de-grace – the Todesstoss or death blow – an occupation of a beaten 
enemy, rather than a D-Day-style assault.  
 
Given the scale of SEELÖWE, and its inevitability, the appellation ‘surprise crossing’ 
seems at first optimistic, if not naive.  However, it is the crossing itself, rather than the 
preparations which are the ‘surprise’.  There is, quite sensibly, no emphasis on secret 
preparation – which could scarcely be achieved when large numbers of vessels and 
troops had to be gathered and moved to the Channel ports, and huge guns emplaced 
opposite the Straits of Dover.  It is implicit in Directive No. 16 that these preparations 
will tighten the screw on Joyous Gard.  The battered and hungry defenders would see, 
in the invasion barges, the besiegers’ saps moving ever closer to their outworks, and 
know that if they did not surrender while negotiation was still possible, they would have 
to face the consequences of being taken by storm.  Thus SEELÖWE should be 
interpreted as a threat rather than a bluff.  In this respect, it was a huge miscalculation, 
as Peter Fleming pointed out:   
 Even before [Hitler] actually decided on invasion his propaganda machine was 
 working for the British Government, instilling in even the sceptic, the slacker 
 and the dullard a sense of drama against which it was both easy and becoming 
 to make sacrifices and submit to restrictions, to fill sandbags and to stand in 
 queues.  (Fleming, 1957, p.306) 
 
German operational orders fascinated British staff officers, who thrilled at their ‘brevity 
and simplicity’.  MI 14 explained in a digest of lessons from the Battle of France: 
Simplicity and absence of detail is very marked in all German orders and 
instructions.  Only the essentials are given, subordinate commanders being left 
to use their own initiative to a great extent.  This fact assisted greatly to keep 
operations highly mobile, as each situation was treated on its merits and 
commanders were able to use their imagination and ingenuity to overcome the 
particular type of resistance that was encountered.’17 
    
 37 
Here lies the essence of Auftragstaktik.  ‘Absence of detail’ should not be confused with 
vagueness - what will be done is explained, how it will be done is left to the 
subordinate.  Furthermore, detail is added where it helps illustrate the concept of 
operations.  Directive No. 16 is as good an example as any:  the commander’s intent is 
quite clear, so is the concept of operations and allocation of responsibilities – the action 
required of subordinates is to plan for a crossing to the UK on the axis described, and 
simultaneously begin preparations.   
 
The army dominated the operation, the navy only having primacy in matters of 
navigation.  This reflects the concept of operations, which envisaged SEELÖWE as the 
movement of troops from one land area to another across a water obstacle: ‘Units of the 
Air Force will act as artillery, and units of the Navy as engineers.’  The English Channel 
is not an inland waterway, but a sea, and a particularly treacherous one at that.  This is 
not to say that the movement of troops and war materiel across it is impossible – as the 
entry and exit of the BEF had demonstrated, but it does require a maritime, rather than 
riverine, perspective.  In the UK, MI 14 spotted the immediate relevance in the manner 
in which the Germans approached major water obstacles and published the following on 
27 June 1940, it forms a useful background against which the British view of German 
activities should be judged: 
C. NOTES ON OPPOSED RIVER CROSSINGS 
 
The following notes on opposed river crossings, taken from the German 
manuals, are of particular interest at the present time. 
 
1. The attack on weakly held water obstacles should be carried out (after a 
quick reconnaissance) by all available infantry supported by their heavy 
weapons.  The attack should be made simultaneously at different points, full 
use being made of existing bridges, fords, boats and all other means 
available. 
2. The attack on strongly defended water obstacles requires careful preparation 
and above all surprise.  The co-operation of engineers is also essential. 
  
 Surprise is achieved by the careful concealment of all preparations for the 
 attack, by moving troops up at the last possible moment, and by attacking 
 simultaneously along the whole front.  Air photographs of the front should, if 
 possible, be obtained.  A reconnaissance should be made of assembly areas, 
 approaches and possible crossing points, as well as enemy defences.18 
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This extract makes it clear that, were the Germans to regard a cross-Channel operation 
as a species of river crossing – which they did – then they would either launch a hasty 
surprise attack on a poorly-defended opposite shore, or a deliberate surprise attack on a 
well-defended one.  On that basis, the likelihood was that there would be a surprise 
attack. 
 
On 19 July, three days after issuing Directive No. 16, Hitler delivered his victory speech 
to the Reichstag, and his peace offer to Great Britain.  Hitler’s peace offer was treated 
with derision by the British, nevertheless, the Fuhrer remained determined to somehow 
prevail directly on the British people; on night of 1 – 2 August the Luftwaffe dropped 
leaflets bearing a translation of the Reichstag speech and headed ‘A LAST APPEAL 
TO REASON BY ADOLF HITLER’.  It was a headline which, viewed from the British 
perspective, could hardly fail to be seen as the start of the final countdown.  Detailed 
invasion planning was indeed underway, the initial concept being for 13 German 
divisions to be landed on a broad front, at Weymouth, between Portsmouth and 
Brighton, and between Margate and Hastings, with a follow-on force of 26 divisions.  
Given carte-blanche, and following the precept that a crossing should be made by ‘all 
available infantry supported by their heavy weapons’, army planners had conceived an 
overwhelming over-the-beach amphibious assault that anticipated operations, 
techniques and equipment that would only develop later in the war.  The navy was able 
to reject the plan, on the basis that only a crossing where the Channel was at its 
narrowest, near Dover, could be regarded as a realistic proposition.  In late July the 
army agreed to a main landing between Folkstone and Eastbourne, with a diversionary 
landing of shock troops from motor trawlers in Brighton Bay.  This latter would only be 
reinforced ‘if the situation was favourable.’  There were to be nine divisions in the first 
wave and seven in the follow-up.  These were to hold the Kent and Sussex bridgehead 
for up to 16 days while third-wave reinforcements were brought across.   
 
Assembling the invasion fleet took time: visiting the Channel coast in August, 
American journalist (and influential post-war historian) William Shirer failed to find 
any invasion barges, and began to form the view that the invasion was a bluff (Shirer, 
1962, p.761).  In fact the first barge, the Rhemosa, had been commandeered in 
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Duisburg-Ruhrort, at 11.30am on 7 July (Schenk, 1990, p.6).  The conversion of barges 
into landing craft was carried out at Mannheim, Mainz, Duisburg, Amsterdam, 
Rotterdam and Antwerp, and eight points along the Seine between Paris and Le Havre.  
By the end of September the fleet consisted of 2,318 barges, 174 freighters converted to 
troop transports, 426 tugs, around 1,600 motor fishing vessels and yachts, and 100 
coasters (Schenk, 1990, p.8).   
 
In addition, specialised equipments were investigated and developed which anticipated 
those used by the Allies on D-Day.  SEELÖWE spurred the development of some far-
sighted and sensible equipment including tidal mines to help secure the Channel, 
amphibious and submersible tanks, the Nebelwerfer multi-barrelled rocket launcher and 
a prefabricated jetty.19  The amphibious tanks were PzKpfw IIs fitted with floatation 
devices, the submersibles PzKpfw IIIs and PzKpfw IV Ausf F Tauchpanzers, fitted with 
snorkels, which enabled them to move along the sea bed at depths down to four 
meters.20  These were later successfully used crossing the River Bug on 22 June 1941 – 
General Guderian subsequently recording:  ‘At 04.15 hrs. advance units of the 17th and 
18th Panzer Divisions forded the river.  For this they were equipped with the 
waterproofing that had been tested for Operation Sea-lion, which enabled them to move 
through 13 feet of water.’  (Guderian, 1952, p.153)  
 
The suggestion that AFVs might be landed by air, made in Periodical Notes on The 
German Army No. 30, was unrealistic in August 1940, with only Ju52 transports and 
eight-seater DFS 230 assault gliders in Luftwaffe service, and reflects a melding of the 
two greatest British bogies.  However, the Germans recognized this as a gap in their 
capability, and in October 1940 issued an urgent specification for a large glider capable 
of transporting 130 fully armed and equipped troops; an 8.8cm Flak, its half-track 
tractor, ammunition and crew; or a fully armed and crewed PzKpfw II, III, IV tank, or 
Sturmgeshütz assault gun. Junkers and Messerschmitt were given just 14 days to submit 
initial designs.  The Junkers design was unsuccessful but the first Messerschmitt Me321 
‘Gigant’ was test flown on 25 February 1941, by which time 11 gliders had been built 
and 62 more were under construction.21  At the time the largest aircraft in the world, the 
Gigant required air superiority and, preferably, a captured airfield to land on, if it was to 
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be used safely, but if these were achieved the giant transports had the potential to 
transform the prospects of a successful cross-Channel operation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Above):  PzKpfw II amphibious variant fitted with boat-like buoyancy tanks, 
(www.odkrywca-online.pl) 
 
 
 
 
(Right):  A PzKpfw III 
Tauchpanzer, showing 
the waterproofing on 
the gun mantlet and the 
snorkel erected.  
(www.mundosgm.com) 
 
 
 
 
 
But most of this special equipment would not be ready until 1941.  To return to the 
prospects for a ‘hasty’ crossing in 1940, on 12 August the air war began with a strike 
against the British early warning system and airfields in the South East.  Five radar 
stations were attacked, opening a gap 100 miles long in the CHAIN HOME.  The 
station at Ventnor was damaged so severely that it remained out of service for 11 days.  
This was a major achievement at the very start of the air offensive, however, on 15 
August, fooled by the lack of damage to the masts, and by dummy transmissions, 
Göring declared that: ‘it is doubtful whether there is any point in continuing the attacks 
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on radar sites, in view of the fact that not one of those attacked has so far been put out 
of operation’ (Fleming, 1957, pp.224-225).  The early warning given by CHAIN 
HOME was crucial in ensuring that RAF fighters were, if not in the right place at the 
right time, then on their way there.  In retrospect, and with the importance of CHAIN 
HOME established, one is inclined to the view that, were the radar sites really too 
difficult to destroy from the air, a hole might have been punched through them by 
completely destroying several in ground attacks – anticipating the British raid on the 
German Würzburg radar site at Brunval, in February 1942.   However, the Battle of 
Britain was not to be decided by such imaginative coups de main.  While the Germans 
persisted in imagining that their air arm could achieve victory in isolation, the British, 
perhaps demonstrating a greater comprehension of the joint force nature of Blitzkrieg, 
continued, until June 1944, to prepare to defences against ground attacks on airfields 
and other key parts of the air defence infrastructure – tasks with which the Home Guard 
became increasingly involved.  
 
On 3 September 1940 OKW issued a directive announcing 21 September as the 
provisional date for the invasion.  On the same day, Luftwaffe high command decided to 
mount huge daylight bombing raids on London, which would serve the double function 
of forcing the RAF to commit its fighters, while demonstrating the reality of ‘terror 
bombing’ to the British capital.  On 5 September, Chief of Staff, Heersgruppe A, issued 
Vorläufige Weisung für Durchführung des Unternehmens „Seelöwe” – the preliminary 
instruction for implementation of operation SEELÖWE (Klee, 1959, p.373), a detailed 
breakdown of the units involved in SEELÖWE and their areas of responsibility.  It 
ended with: ‘The date and approximate time of day of the first landing on the English 
coast has still to be announced.’  The order demonstrates the difficulty inherent in 
planning a complex and ambitious operation for which neither the date or time could be 
fixed until the Luftwaffe had achieved air superiority and the Kriegsmarine, 
subsequently, selected a day with appropriate weather and tides.  By September 1940, 
given the navy’s requirement for a flat calm, the army’s need for 11 days to mount the 
operation, and the air force’s inability to bring the RAF to a decisive and final battle, it 
was obvious to both sides that time for SEELÖWE was running out.   
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The first bombing raid on London took place on 7 September 1940 and was the most 
devastating aerial attack, anywhere, to that date, and sufficiently dramatic to precipitate 
an invasion stand-to.  Alan Brooke, C-in-C Home Forces, recorded in his diary: 
All reports look like invasion getting nearer.  Ships collecting, dive bombers 
being concentrated, parachutists captured, also 4 Dutchmen on the coast.  Drove 
in from Chequers with Dill.  On arriving in office was sent for to attend COS 
meeting to discuss latest intercepted message concerning German plans for 
putting down fog.  Back to St Paul’s to discuss expansion of armoured forces.  
Finally dined with Bertie after sending out orders for ‘Cromwell’ – i.e. state of 
readiness in Eastern and Southern Commands.  (Danchev and Todman, 2001, 
p.105)   
 
Danchev and Todman have inserted ‘exercise’ in parentheses after the word ‘Cromwell’ 
in their rendering of Brooke’s diaries.  Whether or not issuing CROMWELL was 
intended to be some form of test exercise was a subject of debate among the Home 
Guard themselves, as the historian of the Ministry of Food Home Guard recorded: 
 About midnight on the 7th/8th September the telephones buzzed with a code 
 word – no exercise warning preceded it – and many a Home Guard, turned out 
 of his bed in the small hours, speculated on the chance of trying his mettle and 
 his improvised weapons against an invader, while his officers ruminated upon 
 the means to muster their men more rapidly in future.  (Smith, 1945, p.14) 
 
There is absolutely no suggestion from his diary that Brooke was ordering an exercise – 
which was an unlikely thing to do, given the apparent imminence of a German invasion.  
He was, rather, raising the level of readiness, as every indication pointed to 8 or 10 
September as ‘S-Tag’, landing day.22 
 
The sheer scale of the aerial bombardment of London and the ensuing devastation 
stunned both sides, but it failed in both of its military objectives, bringing neither the 
end of fighter command, nor civil collapse.  As time ran out for the invasion, the aerial 
assault, which had come close to success, was steadily de-focussed, diluting the effect 
in a self-defeating effort to increase impact.  The RAF was not only undefeated, but 
representing a growing threat to the invasion fleet, which was being heavily bombed.  
Dispersal of shipping began on 19 September, after which point SEELÖWE ceased to be 
an immediate option for 1940, a fact which was officially recognized by Hitler on 12 
October: 
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The Fuhrer has decided that from now on until the Spring, preparations 
for the landing in England shall be continued solely for the  purpose of 
maintaining political and military pressure on England. 
 
 Should the invasion be reconsidered in the spring or early summer of 1941, 
 orders for a renewal of operational readiness will be issued later… 
 
 
An RAF aerial photograph taken 
on 19 September, 1940, showing 
part of the docks at Dunkirk.  
Invasion barges for SEALION are 
moored in the Bassins de 
Freycinet.  Sunk and damaged 
barges can be seen at the top of 
Darse No. 4 (upper right), and 
the dock buildings to its right are 
completely destroyed. Two of the 
three warehouses on Mole No. 4 
have been gutted by fire and 
wharves, roads and railway 
sidings are pitted with bomb 
craters. The IWM holds similar 
pictures of Calais, Boulogne etc. 
(IWM C1819) 
 
 
Whilst the order postponing SEELÖWE is now generally taken as the end of the 
invasion threat to the UK mainland, this was by no means apparent at the time.  Hugh 
Slater published Home Guard for Victory! in January 1941, and whilst he acknowledged 
a German invasion as a possibility rather than a probability, he went on to outline seven 
invasion plans of varying degrees of ambition.  Plan 2 ‘Head on to London’ almost 
exactly matches the actual scheme for SEELÖWE, with a Channel crossing on a narrow 
front into Kent and Sussex.  Comfortingly, and very optimistically, Slater anticipated 
that a ‘highly mechanised counter-attack force of well over 250,000’ would engage the 
invaders within a few hours (Slater, 1941, p.25).  Therefore, in order to maintain an 
attacking advantage of three-to-one, the Germans would need to land around 800,000 
men, with 15,000 tanks, 80,000 motor vehicles and 10,000 motor cycles ‘at least’.  On 
Slater’s calculation, such a force would require 5,500,000 gallons of petrol for one 
week’s operation. 
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In June 1940 MI 14 had assessed the frontline German tank force at 12 armoured 
divisions, approximately 4,800 light and medium tanks.  The entire German tank stock 
was estimated at 7,000 – 7,500 of all types.23  The actual figure was around 2,500 tanks 
(Guderian, 1952, p.94), which had risen to around 3,000 by 1941, although a significant 
proportion of these were still poorly armed and armoured PzKpfw Is24).  Unless we 
accept that Slater, ‘late Chief of Operations, International Brigade Staff’, was 
completely off his head, we must assume that his aim was to accentuate the practical 
difficulties of the various schemes and thereby reassure the public.  Anyone, Army or 
Home Guard, patrolling the South Coast was well aware that a mere couple of hundred 
German tanks would present a quite sufficient challenge to defenders still awaiting 
effective anti-tank guns, nevertheless, Slater’s book was reprinted four times before the 
end of the month.  
 
Alan Brooke, as C-in-C Home Forces, started 1941 determined to use the opportunity 
provided by the winter weather in the Channel to strengthen invasion defences: 
 10 January 
 The PM held one of his quarterly conferences of Cs-in-C of the three 
 services…  My points were connected with the increased danger of invasion 
 owing to Axis reverses in the Mediterranean, and danger of withdrawal of too 
 many troops from this country.  (Danchev and Todman, 2001, p.134) 
 
He later added to the entry: 
During the discussion I raised the lamentable lack of arms that still prevailed 
after 1½ years of war.  Shortage of rifles, .303 ammunition, tracer  ammunition, 
Boys rifles and their ammunition, anti-tank guns, tanks, armoured cars, etc etc.  
This did not please Winston at all…  
 
Brooke devoted his considerable energy to improving and reorganising Home Defence 
throughout the first half of 1941, although it was becoming increasingly evident that 
Hitler’s attention was fixed on the Soviet Union.  Hitler’s decision to turn his back on 
an actively hostile Britain to prosecute a new campaign against the Soviet Union was 
greeted with surprise by his own commanders, as Guderian recalled:   
 …when they spread out a map of Russia before me I could scarcely believe 
 my eyes.  Was something which I had held to be utterly impossible now to 
 become a fact?  Hitler had criticised the leaders of German policy of 1914 in 
 the strongest possible words for their failure to avoid a war on two fronts; was 
 he now, on his own initiative and before the war with England had been 
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 decided, to open this second-front war against the Russians?  All his soldiers 
 had warned him repeatedly and urgently against this very error, and he had 
 himself agreed with them. (Guderian, 1952, p.142) 
 
The military logic behind the campaign was that the huge, but disorganised and 
weakened, Red Army would be quickly defeated: 
 …the supreme command was sunk in its dream of defeating the Russian Army 
 in eight or ten weeks; this defeat would result, they thought, in the political 
 collapse of the Soviets.  So confident were they of this that in the autumn of 
 1941 a considerable portion of Germany’s industry was switched from war 
 production to other purposes.  (Guderian, 1952, p.151) 
 
However, even if this outcome was achieved, the preparation, execution and recovery 
from the operation would lose the Germans the 1941 campaigning season against 
Britain, as Brooke subsequently noted against his entry for 22 June: 
 …As long as the Germans were engaged in the invasion of Russia there was 
 no possibility of an invasion of these islands.  It would now depend on how 
 long Russia could last and what resistance she would be able to put up.  My 
 own opinion at the time, and an opinion that was shared by most people, was 
 that Russia would not last long, possibly 3 or 4 months, possibly slightly 
 longer.  Putting it at 4 months, and as we were then in June, it certainly 
 looked  as if Germany would be unable to launch an invasion of England until 
 October, and by then the weather and winter would be against such an 
 enterprise. 
  It therefore looked as if we should now be safe from invasion during 
 1941.  (Danchev and Todman, 2001, p.166) 
 
It will be noted that Brooke viewed invasion as a continuing threat, assuming that the 
Germans would return to deal with Britain once the Soviet Union had been dispatched.  
The UK’s defences were in better order than one year previously, but the Germans too 
would be better prepared and equipped.  Although dispersed, the invasion fleet 
remained under military control and the vessels had been modified.  New specialist 
equipment had entered service including landing craft, the prefabricated jetties and 
heavy gliders – the tank-transporting Me321 would shortly be joined by a new general 
purpose assault glider, the Gotha Go242, capable of carrying 21 fully equipped troops, a 
Kubelwagen (jeep), or light artillery piece. 
 
As the British Army became more involved with overseas operational commitments, the 
Home Defence role rested more and more heavily on the Home Guard.  Thus although 
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the actual threat was diminished, or at least deferred, the Home Guard’s responsibility 
increased – indeed compulsory enrolment for Home Guard service, ‘for the duration’, 
was introduced with effect from February 1942, although it was evident from the 
middle of the year that the likelihood of a German invasion was diminishing fast.  All-
out invasion was not, of course, the only Home Defence threat.  We have noted the 
galvanising effect on the British public of the actual possibility of a German invasion, 
and how this threat was personified in the figure of the Nazi paratrooper.  Hard on the 
heels of this came the much older fear of betrayal.  In 1940 potential enemies of the 
State formed a worryingly large constituency: persons of pan-German origin resident in 
the UK; refugees from occupied Europe, about whom little was known and who were 
vulnerable to pressure on relatives at home; British Fascists – and those of the political 
Right who had openly admired Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy; and those of the 
extreme Left who (until Germany’s invasion) took their orders from Germany’s tacit 
ally, the Soviet Union.  There were too unprincipled opportunists, and the lazy and 
careless.  It would have been extremely difficult to invent an identity to embrace all 
these disparate groups, had it not been for General Emilio Mola, as John Langdon-
Davies explained (1942b, p.181):   
 Fifth Column.  General Mola, a supporter of the Spanish General Franco, 
 invented this phrase at a time when four of Franco’s columns were closing in 
 on Madrid.  “We will capture Madrid” he said, “with the Fifth Column hidden 
 inside.”  That is, the secret traitors working to destroy Madrid from within.  
 “Fifth Column” is now used for the activities of Nazi sympathizers who 
 secretly prepare the way for the Nazi invasion of their countries.  
 
The existence of a Fifth Column in the UK was an article of faith from May 1940, 
indeed to deny it would be to place oneself under immediate suspicion.  Belief in the 
existence of the Fifth Column was due not only to the fractured nature of the popular 
attitude to Germany and the war prior to Dunkirk – which was far from the pro-war, 
anti-Nazi, monolith it would be forged into, and later remembered as – but also the 
alleged activities of the Fifth Column in recently defeated countries such as Holland and 
Norway, and the Spanish prototype, as experienced by veterans of the Spanish Civil 
War, John Langdon-Davies, for example (1941, p.10): 
 The Nazis [have] seen long ago that in this modern world of Total War, if  you 
 desire to destroy a country by military force you must first of all see that you 
 have paralysed their defence, weakened their will by raising up within them, 
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 allies, secret sympathisers, Fifth Column traitors, able to insinuate themselves 
 into key positions and to weaken hopelessly the chance of their country 
 resisting the Nazi military machine when it comes. 
 
In reality the closest thing to an organised Fifth Column in the UK was the ‘Right 
Club’, founded in May 1939 in an attempt to unify the various British ultra-Right 
organisations including the British Union of Fascists and the Nordic League.  The Earl 
Jowitt, who, as Solicitor-General from June 1940 to March 1942, prosecuted members 
of that organisation and those captured Nazi spies who were not ‘turned’, attributed the 
inability of the Nazis to establish effective supporters or rings of agents in the UK to the 
vigorous, indeed ruthless, way in which the Government took action against those who 
constituted a possible threat (Jowitt, 1954, pp.15-16):  ‘The suspension of our doctrine 
of Habeas Corpus, and the internment of suspected persons without a trial – or even 
without an accusation – was a harsh and hard procedure and one which is opposed alike 
to our traditions and our principles.  But in view of our perilous situation, I, for one, do 
not question the necessity.’  This not only affected refugees and immigrants, but also 
stretched to Members of Parliament, as in the case of Captain Archibald Ramsay, 
founding member of the Nordic League and the Right Club, interned ‘for the duration’ 
without trial.  As Jowitt put it:  ‘It is no doubt necessary that the Executive in wartime 
should have such extraordinary powers as would enable it to intern without accusation 
even a Member of Parliament; but it is only right to realise that such powers may inflict 
grave hardship upon individuals’ (Jowitt, 1954, p.45).  Although great pains were taken 
to play-down the British ultra-Right during and after the Second World War, it was 
pervasive, and fuelled by anti-Semitism and anti-communism, which made it a 
comfortable bedfellow with National Socialism – whatever those involved might claim 
to the contrary.  BUF had numbered some 40,000 members in 1934, the Nordic League, 
actually founded in 1934 by Nazi agents, whilst far smaller, included such high-profile 
individuals as Major General J. F. C. Fuller and the Duke of Hamilton among its 
members.  General Sir Edmund Ironside’s comment on the Fifth Column, when he was 
still C-in-C Home Forces, was actually close to the mark:  ‘My experience is that the 
gentlemen who are the best behaved and the most sleek are those who are doing the 
mischief.’25  (vide MacKenzie, 1996, p.56-57)   
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Effective as the draconian legislative measures may have been, a case can be made that 
the intensity with which a Fifth Column threat was sought-out within the UK silenced 
and subdued those with leanings toward the ultra-Right.  It is wrong to characterise the 
Fifth Column scare as a ‘grass roots’ phenomenon – the threat was something impressed 
on the LDV and Home Guard by their superiors.  Writing in late 1943, a member of 4th 
Battalion, Cambridgeshire Home Guard gave an intriguing summation of the whole 
episode:  
 Did not the officers back from Dunkirk assure us that the curious cryptograms 
 scrawled on walls and trees were precisely the same as those to be seen in 
 France, Holland, and Belgium, before their fall?  Were not the coloured flares 
 that went up mysteriously when the Boche planes were over at night just the 
 same as those sent up by the fifth column to give away the position of an H.Q. 
 or battery in Flanders?  We did not end this hunt of the invisible fifth column 
 till Germany invaded Russia in 1941, and then abruptly all the signs and 
 wonders ceased.  (Smith, 1944, p.52) 
 
In the popular mind it was the twin terrors of Nazi paratrooper and Fifth Columnist 
traitor which were the Home Guard’s nemesis, its natural enemy.  Notwithstanding that 
the Home Guard actually spent most of its time preparing to defend ‘nodal points’ 
against tank attack, operating anti-aircraft artillery or locating unexploded bombs, when, 
by 1945, the paratroopers had failed to appear and the Fifth Column was proven to be 
largely illusory, the force came to be seen, unfairly, as quixotic.      
 
Vigilance also had to be maintained, if not for invasion, then for raids and landings 
throughout the country.  CHAIN HOME and airfields have already been identified as a 
useful target for a ground attack, and vital parts of Britain’s manufacturing base were 
also extremely vulnerable.  All these ‘Vulnerable Points’ were identified and listed for 
protection by the Home Guard.26  Given the Germans’ record for unconventional 
operations during the Second World War, it seems remarkable that no raiding was 
attempted.  Although they had embraced emerging technologies, including airborne 
warfare techniques, from before the start of the Second World War, and used them to 
effect at Eben Emael and elsewhere, it appears that the Germans were only stimulated 
into establishing special operations forces to undertake unconventional operations once 
the effectiveness of British commando tactics had been demonstrated – and once the 
outcome of the war began to inexorably slide away from them.  Thus, in a curious way, 
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the British made their own fears real.  Indeed, Germany’s commando mastermind, Otto 
Skorzeny, relied heavily on British-manufactured special weapons, including silenced 
Sten machine carbines, Hawkins mines and plastic explosive, captured from air drops to 
the Dutch resistance (Whiting, 1998, p.20).   
 
As the time for the Allied invasion of Europe approached, the defenders of the UK 
become increasingly certain that the Germans would not allow this to proceed without 
some form of intervention – just as they had been convinced that the Germans could not 
possibly miss the opportunity of neutralising the UK in July 1940.  The Ministry of 
Food (11th Denbighshire Battalion) Home Guard were informed by their CO in a special 
New Year message on 31 December 1943: 
  The New Year will see the launching of the combined offensive 
 against the enemy’s European fortress, and the supreme effort to secure his 
 speedy surrender.  We know enough of his military skill and resource to 
 realise that our attack will inevitably call forth every possible effort to 
 dislocate our offensive if, indeed, it is not anticipated. 
  We must, therefore, regard it as certain that the opening of operations 
 on the Western Fronts will synchronise with offensive action against this 
 country, in which this district may be involved.  This will be critical – the 
 decisive hour when courage, determination and past technical training will be 
 the key to success. (Smith, 1945, p.88-89) 
 
Rather more realistically ‘front line’ were the defenders of the aerodrome at Biggin Hill, 
which included ‘E’ Company, 20th Battalion, Kent Home Guard.  A preserved operation 
order, dated April 1944, contains administrative instructions and an assessment of the 
threat.  Note that the Fifth Columnist no longer figures:27   
 When Allied invasion of the continent commences, the enemy may be 
 expected to  
(a) Bomb ports, communications, airfields and other V.P.s 
(b) Raid by air to disrupt communications and movement. 
(c) Land enemy agents by air and sea for sabotage. 
 
German spoiling raids to disrupt the Allied invasion were the last never-to-be-attempted 
threat for which the Home Guard ‘stood-to’.  The Home Guard had done its bit, and, 
although the country was still at war, and there remained a requirement for anti-aircraft 
defence, bomb disposal, and general local defence and security duties to be undertaken, 
it became increasingly difficult to maintain the commitment needed to keep this huge 
voluntary force operational – demonstrating, as nothing else, the extent to which 
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maintenance of the Home Guard was a direct response to the threat of enemy troops on 
British soil.   
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CHAPTER 2 
The Carriage of Arms 
 
 
 
 
“…and then, before the enemy has recovered from his surprise…” 
E. Seviour, Punch, 24 July 1940.  
 
In late 1940 J. B. Priestly commented: 
 It so happens that this war, whether those at present in authority like it or not, 
 has to be fought as a citizen’s war … it has been found necessary to bring into 
 existence a new network of voluntary associations such as the Home Guard, 
 the Observer Corps, all the ARP and fire-fighting services … what might be 
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 called the organised militant citizen.  And the whole circumstances of their 
 wartime life favour a sharply democratic outlook. (Cited in Agar, 1972, p.79) 
 
What set the Home Guard apart from the other ‘militant citizens’ of the Home Front 
was its armed role; as Earnest Raymond, an ARP warden at Haywards Heath admitted, 
he was: ‘enthusiastically resolved to be transformed from a civilian warden to a 
combatant of sorts …’ (Longmate, 1974, p.8).  In this chapter, we will examine issues 
surrounding that transformation, including the German response, the attitude of the 
authorities to militant citizens favouring ‘a sharply democratic outlook’, and the use, 
and misuse, of firearms by the LDV/Home Guard. 
 
The homely, gently quixotic, image of Dad’s Army parading twice weekly in the church 
hall is more comfortable and familiar than an alternative vision of the British civilian 
population armed, and encouraged to fight German troops by whatever means at its 
disposal – in the certain knowledge that such conduct would be met with the utmost 
ruthlessness, indeed, in the anticipation that German reprisals would serve the beneficial 
purpose of precipitating the entry of the United States into the war.  That however, was 
the reality of what came to be referred to as ‘Total Defence’.1  Historically, the German 
military has demonstrated a singular robustness in its handling of enemy civilians.2  The 
issue is clouded by the heavy-handed Allied propaganda of 1914-18 and the racist 
precepts of National Socialism; but even when these are filtered out, and underlying 
trend remains.  Christopher Dowling examined German conduct during the First World 
War, in the context of atrocity propaganda, in a particularly enlightening article written 
in 1970: 
 The Germans were genuinely terrified of being shot at by unseen assailants, a 
 form of attack they regarded as cowardly and treacherous.  They imagined a 
 civilian with a sporting rifle lay in ambush on every rooftop, behind every 
 window and in every cellar.  The novelist Walter Bloem, who was serving as a 
 reserve officer in Kluck’s First Army [Dowling’s italics], was haunted by the 
 ‘monstrous’ thought that he might be killed or wounded by a bullet fired by a 
 civilian.  When they were sniped at, the Germans dealt out ruthless reprisals.  
 Houses and villages were burnt and suspects summarily executed.  These were 
 much the same methods as had been employed, with far less outcry, in 1871.  
 Sometimes innocent people were shot, for the Germans believed in the 
 principle of collective responsibility (which had been laid down by the elder 
 Moltke) and made little attempt to establish where the guilt lay.  So obsessed 
 were they by the spectre of the terrible franc-tireur that they tended to assume 
 that any shot coming from an unexpected quarter was fired by a civilian…  To 
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 protect themselves against these ubiquitous snipers the Germans, contrary to 
 international law, seized large numbers of hostages and not infrequently 
 executed them.   (Dowling, 1970, p.791) 
 
Whilst admitting that ‘fighting a series of short, sharp engagements with the local Home 
Guard’ would have slowed a German invasion of Britain during the Second World War, 
Professor MacKenzie argued that: 
 The cost might have been high.  The German government had claimed since 
 May 1940 that Home Guard were francs-tireurs and did not recognize them as 
 members of the armed forces.  Moreover, as operations in Crete in 1941 
 showed, German paratroops were not overly conscientious in observing the 
 Geneva Convention when striving to establish landing sites.  Battles with the 
 Home Guard could easily have led to the killing of innocent civilians as well.  
 (MacKenzie, 1996, p.182) 
 
The reference to the Greek campaign is well made.  Those for whom the ‘model 
occupation’ of the Channel Islands during the Second World War (in the words of Asa 
Briggs, 1995, p.9) ‘stimulates thoughts about what would have happened in the bigger 
island of Britain had the Germans invaded’ should bear the Greek experience in mind.  
According to General Hubert Lanz ‘The Germans harboured no hatred against the 
Greeks.  On the contrary, they admired the great past and lofty culture of Hellas’ 
(Mazower, 1998, p.158).  But how would they react to guerrilla warfare?  Mark 
Mazower reveals: 
 The Wehrmacht responded with a series of anti-guerrilla operations, based on 
 reprisal killings and the arrest of civilian hostages.  Violence, to put it simply, 
 became the chief way of reasserting German control over the countryside.  
 Terror became the basis for rule in the urban areas.  Not solely the response of 
 nervous soldiers in the field, the logic of violence and terror reflected the core 
 values of the National Socialist Weltanschauung. (Mazower, 1998, pp.xviii-xix) 
 
 
Writing shortly after the Second World War, Churchill (1955, p.232) was candid: 
 
 The massacre would have been on both sides grim and great.  There would 
 have been neither mercy nor quarter.  They would have used Terror, and we 
 were prepared to go to all lengths.  I intended to use the slogan “You can 
 always take one with you”.  I even calculated that the horrors of such a scene 
 would in the last resort turn the scale in the United States. 
 
An invasion of the UK appears to represent the crossing of a boundary in the Prime 
Minister’s mind that separated ‘war’ from the struggle for British ‘national survival’.  
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Once the latter was invoked, no holds were barred.  And Churchill was not the only one 
prepared to ‘go to all lengths’.    The general preface to the Home Office publication Air 
Raid Precautions Handbook No. 1: Personal Protection Against Gas, 3 of 1937, stated 
that: ‘The use of poison gas in war is forbidden by the Geneva Gas Protocols of 1925, to 
which this country and all the most important countries of western Europe are parties, 
and the Government would use every endeavour on an outbreak of war to secure an 
undertaking from the enemy not to use poison gas’.4  Yet Alan Brooke noted in his 
diary against the entry for 22 July 1940 (as he was succeeding Ironside as Commander 
in Chief Home Forces):  ‘I was relying on heavy air attacks on the [German] points of 
landing, and had every intention of using sprayed mustard gas on the beaches’ 
(Danchev and Todman, 2001, p.94). Brooke’s willingness to make pre-emptive use of 
chemical weapons therefore marks a deliberate decision by the British high command to 
disregard international law in the interests of national survival. 
 
In this campaign there were to be no ‘innocent civilians’.  If Churchill expected the 
British public to resist the invader by every means available to them – “You can always 
take one with you” – this also appeared to be the message spread by John Langdon-
Davies during his evangelizing tour of Home Guard units over the winter of 1940-41: 
  … the civilians can no longer stand back and say to the armed forces:  
 “You fight the war and we will help you, but of course we do not expect to 
 have to take an active part in the fighting ourselves.” 
That has been more or less the position in wars hitherto.  The civilians 
have helped, of course; they have made munitions or they have knitted socks, 
and just a few have been content to be the civilisation for which the others  were 
fighting. 
  But it has never occurred to people that the civilian should be asked to 
 hit back.  In this war he has to hit back, not merely because total war calls for 
 total defence of every town, village and country field by its inhabitants, but 
 because only by hitting back can the civilian make quite certain of keeping his 
 own heart up, keeping a good morale, and that, as I have said, is the master 
 key to Victory.  (Langdon-Davies, 1941, pp.49-50) 
 
Langdon-Davies is, however, a complex case.  In his weekly articles for Sunday 
Pictorial, reprinted in Home Guard Warfare, his Home Guard is drawn from the 
civilian population, yet separate, reflecting the real difficulty of defining the status of 
the Home Guard.  This ambiguity is compounded by Langdon-Davies’ use of ‘civilian’ 
as shorthand for non-Home Guards: 
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  All experience of war teaches us that the civilian population must be 
 out of the town and away from any route that the enemy may take before the 
 first shot is fired. 
  The reason for this is that if they see their women and children at the 
 mercy of the enemy, the best-trained soldier or Home Guard in the world 
 cannot be expected to fight. 
  Moreover, there is the grim danger that the Nazis will exact reprisals 
 on the civilian population, as by the laws of war they are entitled to do, and 
 once it is known that they have shot a dozen civilians in one town the morale 
 of every other town in Britain will suffer. (Langdon-Davies, 1941, p.123) 
 
The quote above contains Langdon-Davies’ only reference to reprisals against the 
civilian population.  Whilst that in itself is unsurprising in a manual (Slater makes none 
in Home Guard for Victory!), what is startling is his assertion that the Nazis are 
‘entitled’ to exact reprisals.  ‘Entitled’ or not, it would not have required a great leap of 
the imagination to appreciate the sort of response that action by the Home Guard would 
generate.  Indeed radio Bremen had spelt out the German attitude towards the LDV in 
terms which make it clear that little had changed since Walter Bloem marched through 
Belgium with von Kluck’s First Army: 
 The British Government is committing the worst crime of all.  Evidently it 
 permits open preparation for the formation of murder bands.  The preparations 
 which are being made all over England to arm the civilian population for 
 guerrilla warfare are contrary to the rules of international law.  German 
 official quarters warn the misled British public and remind them of the fate of 
 the Polish francs-tireurs and gangs of murderers, whether they are priests or 
 bank clerks.  British people you will do well to heed this warning.  (Vide Graves, 
 1943, p.16, Beckett, 1991, p.273) 
 
Thus, for a British civilian or paramilitary to take up arms against German troops was a 
committed move.  There is, therefore, an important element of symbolism inherent in 
the carriage of arms, particularly in the earliest days, which is missed by commentators 
concentrating on the effectiveness (or otherwise) of the volunteers’ armoury.  This 
symbolic significance was not restricted to a prospective invader.  The possession of a 
weapon – any weapon – in a public place by a British civilian is a serious matter, and 
the forming of an armed group even more so.  Nevertheless, the use of German 
parachute troops in Norway and the Low Countries prompted the formation of what 
were, in effect, vigilante groups, proto-LDV, which became known as ‘parashots’.  As 
one countryman reminisced in the 1970s:  ‘The beginning of this little army was so 
simple as men volunteered to keep watch over our village.  At this stage no drill had 
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been practised, there were just two men with twelve-bore guns, walking as the dawn 
broke and waiting …’ (Archer, 1975, p.65).  
 
Even when this energy and commitment had been channelled into the officially-
recognised Local Defence Volunteers, relations between the LDV and the police could 
be, as Norman Longmate pointed out, strained (1974, p.57):  ‘It was the LDV’s great 
delight … to pull up all policemen and ask for their identity cards, especially inspectors.  
One squad even tried to detain a constable, who refused to comply, while he in turn 
threatened to arrest them for carrying arms without a licence.’  Amusing as such 
anecdotes are, it should be born in mind that the police played a vital role in establishing 
the LDV as a properly constituted and armed force.  Anthony Eden’s plea for Local 
Defence Volunteers was broadcast on the evening of Tuesday 14 May 1940.  Eden 
instructed applicants: ‘In order to volunteer, what you have to do is to give in your name 
at your local police station; and then, as and when we want you, we will let you know’ 
(Cambs. and Isle of Ely TA Assoc., 1944, p.101). The official enrolment form, Army 
Form W.3066, was not available until several days after the broadcast (a situation 
wonderfully parodied in the feature film of Dad’s Army).  Nevertheless, at 9pm, and 
with volunteers flocking to police stations, the police managed to improvise, as a 
member of the Cambridgeshire and Isle of Ely Home Guard recalled:  ‘Invaluable 
assistance was given by the police in enrolling the LDV.  Within a few hours they had 
duplicated the form setting out the questions which applicants were required to answer.  
These forms were checked by the police on the security side and then passed to the 
Home Guard commanders who selected recruits’ (Cambs. and Isle of Ely TA Assoc., 
1944, p.16).  Police assistance also extended to distributing firearms and uniforms, thus 
it was only through heroic efforts by Kent County Constabulary that 1,000 LDV, with 
rifles and ammunition were patrolling the South Coast within 72 hours of the initial call 
for volunteers (Gulvin, 1980).  The same was true in the vulnerable eastern counties, 
where – for example – 350 rifles, with ten rounds apiece, and 350 denim overalls were 
quickly delivered to Melbourn police station, Cambridgeshire, for distribution to the 
LDV (Cambs. and Isle of Ely TA Assoc., 1944, p.51).  
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In instructing volunteers to report to police stations, Eden was making use of an obvious 
organisational focal point, but the underlying motive was for the police to filter out 
‘undesirables’ among the applicants.  After forty years of Dad’s Army, it is difficult to 
associate the word ‘revolutionary’ with the LDV/Home Guard.  However, the whole 
concept of placing the population in arms was fraught with political implications.  There 
were those, Churchill foremost among them, who saw the LDV/Home Guard as 
continuing a tradition of loyal defence in extremis that could be traced back, through the 
yeoman longbowmen of the Hundred Years War, to the Saxon Fyrd, and there were 
those in the military who could accept the LDV on the basis of a second-string 
Territorial Army, to be administered through the TA Associations.  It is quite apparent, 
however, that many volunteers totally rejected these views: they would not welcome 
any backward-looking imagery that might link them to the Volunteer Training Corps of 
the First World War (whose Georgius Rex ‘GR’ official armbands were variously 
interpreted as ‘Grandpa’s Regiment’, ‘Genuine Relics’, or ‘Gorgeous Wrecks’), or, for 
that matter, the conventional military.  The Home Guard was different; it was modern.  
In the words of International Brigade veteran Hugh Slater (1941, pp.119-120): 
  The development of the Home Guard is one of the most fundamental 
 historical significance.  From the military point of view, the Home Guard, 
 combined with the regular forces, makes a military occupation of Britain by 
 German Fascism improbable.  Politically, a fully developed Home Guard 
 provides an absolute guarantee against both the crude Fascism of a Mosely 
 and the more insidious Fifth Column activities of any would-be British 
 Petains. 
  Because it is a Citizens’ Army, the Home Guard can be fully 
 democratic and energetically modern…  
 
 
 
 
A contemporary picture postcard by Reg Maurice 
lampooning the First World War Local Volunteer 
Training Corps.   
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Slater was not alone in seeing the Home Guard as heralding a new era, as Professor 
MacKenzie explains (1996, p.69): 
 …  a small number of very active left-wingers outside of the Communist Party 
 [saw] in the Home Guard the basis for a future people’s militia.  Mostly 
 intellectuals and publicists who had at some point in the past come into 
 conflict with the Party line, such as George Orwell, Tom Wintringham, and 
 John Langdon-Davies, they believed that what was needed to defeat Fascism 
 was not just better weapons but a conviction that the war would bring about 
 true democracy, a people’s peace. 
 
This view might have mattered as little as the small number of fellow-travellers 
of the Right involved in the Home Guard if it had not been very much in 
harmony with public sentiment in the summer of 1940 … the old guard were 
running the show and calls for a democratic, egalitarian people’s war were 
increasingly common. 
 
Brimming with enthusiasm for the new force, George Orwell went so far as to note that:  
‘a million British working men would not lightly surrender the rifles now placed in their 
possession.’5   
 
But the ‘old guard’ was on the alert: 
 As early as 15 May the police had been instructed to weed out undesirable 
 persons from the lists of applicants compiled at police stations, and both 
 Fascists and Communists had been barred from joining the LDV in a secret 
 War Office order dated 27 May.  The police, however, had a rather different 
 idea of who was or was not a security risk … in practice, as a staff officer later 
 wrote, ‘nearly all men on the police lists were accepted … (MacKenzie, 1996, 
 p.31) 
 
This led to some strange bedfellows.  In the Ministry of Food Home Guard:  ‘Some of 
them wanted the Unit to be more like His Majesty’s Brigade of Guards in the days of 
His Majesty King Edward VII; others wanted it to be more like the Red Army in 1917’ 
(Smith, 1945, p.29).  It is a curiosity of Dad’s Army that the Home Guard’s extremes – 
the exponents of guerrilla warfare with their ‘jam tin bombs’, and the veterans in their 
mothballed uniforms – should be amalgamated in the single character of ‘Corporal 
Jones’.  It is possible that this has softened our perception of the Home Guard’s political 
edge.  It is clear, however, that the LDV/Home Guard was, throughout its existence, 
dominated by the thinking of militant (in the true sense of the word) socialists.  The 
practical effect was that a German assault on the UK, at any time after May 1940, would 
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have met with national resistance of a sort the Germans had not yet encountered – and 
would not meet until their first winter in the Soviet Union. 
 
But what of sexual politics in this ‘democratic and energetically modern’ force, fighting 
a ‘democratic, egalitarian people’s war’?  Women were not encouraged to participate in 
the Home Guard – due to conservatism both on the part of the authorities, and pundits 
like Langdon-Davies.  When illustrating the vulnerability of tanks to determined 
defenders Langdon-Davies gives the impression of Spanish women joining-in with the 
men (Langdon-Davies, 1941, p.42):   
  And to make everything quite certain, the Spanish Militia co-operated 
 with their wives. 
  These ladies collected old rags, even the double bed blanket off the 
 double bed, and soaked them in paraffin.  They hung a rope from one side of 
 the street to the other, through the windows above the door, and when the tank 
 crew was hesitating as to what to do about other plans for their reception, they 
 pulled on the rope, dropped a mass of oiled textiles on top of the tank, and set 
 it alight with perfect confidence that the fumes would make it necessary for 
 the tank crew to come out.  
 
This passage reveals much about Langdon-Davies (previously author of a Short History 
of Women6) – that any females involved are ‘wives’, the specific and rather unnecessary 
reference to marital beds and so on.7  It does, though, give the impression that the 
ambushing was, in this case, carried out by women.  It may be that such behaviour is, 
like slitting the throats of bailed-out tank crew, something that could be tolerated in 
Spain,8 but would be inappropriate in Britain, even in conditions of ‘Total Defence’ – 
Langdon-Davies went on to set the matter straight: 
  I do not find myself always in complete agreement with that very fine 
 woman, Dr. Edith Summerskill.  She wants women to be allowed to join the 
 Home Guard on equal terms with the men. 
  I am against it, although probably Dr. Summerskill would consider 
 some of our reasons mere old-fashioned prejudices. 
  I think the average Home Guard has joined it because he wants to 
 protect his hearth and home, and he would feel a bit annoyed if the hearth and 
 home insisted upon coming along with him and doing some protecting. 
  But there is a still better reason why I do not want the baker’s wife to 
 stand shoulder to shoulder with the baker at the road-block, shooting down 
 Nazis.  It is that I want the baker’s wife to be doing something much more 
 useful at home in the baker’s shop. 
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  When the Nazis come, and if they get through the defences of the road-
 block, there should not be left one pound of flour, one loaf of bread, one cake 
 in the baker’s shop for them to eat. (Langdon-Davies, 1941, pp.54-55) 
 
 
One could speculate that with the additional firepower of the baker’s wife the road-
block might have held, but this obviously never occurred to the author.  Once again we 
see only one kind of female exists in Langdon-Davies’ mental landscape, and overall, 
his polemic is so devoid of ‘reasons’ as to make discussion superfluous.  Against similar 
hostility from all sides, Labour MP and medical doctor Edith Summerskill felt obliged, 
in 1941, to form ‘Women’s Home Defence’ to lobby on behalf of women who wanted 
to join the Home Guard.  In fact, women were involved with the Home Guard from the 
outset, and many received some informal weapons training.  Vera Harrison, for example 
was one of several women who enrolled in the ‘Women’s Home Guard’ (subsequently 
Women’s Home Defence) in Sevenoaks, Kent. The women participated in a shooting 
competition at nearby Shoreham range, one winning a silver cup as second prize.9   
 
It is important when considering any Home Guard issues to keep in mind the progress 
of the war, as Miss Bridgman, a female auxiliary from the Ministry of Food Home 
Guard recalled:  ‘In September, 1942, when the achievements of the Russian Women 
were making headlines, a member of the staff of the Ministry of Food circulated a 
round-robin for the names of women interested in forming a Women’s Home Guard.  A 
hundred and thirty names were soon added to the list…  We became affiliated to the 
Women’s Home Defence under the chairmanship of Dr. Edith Summerskill, M.P.’ 
(Smith, 1945, p.122).  By 1943 an estimated 50,000 women were serving alongside the 
Home Guard, and the Government, now keen to keep Home Guard numbers up – to 
provide anti-aircraft crews, bomb disposal teams and shoulder a significant portion of 
the Home Defence burden – agreed to the formation of a women’s auxiliary.  An 
‘urgent memorandum’ from the War Office, dated 15 April 1943, set out the terms 
under which women could be employed ‘to assist the Home Guard’:10 
 
 1.  Since the foundation of the Home Guard valuable assistance of a non-
 combatant character has been rendered unofficially by women. 
 
 It has been decided to place this assistance on an official footing… 
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 2. Duties. 
 
(a) The employment of women will be restricted to non-combatant duties, and 
no duties will be undertaken by them which necessitate training in weapons.  
Training of women in weapons by the Home Guard is, as hitherto, forbidden.  
(b) The principle duties on which they may be employed are: 
(i) Clerical and telephonist 
(ii) Cooking and service of food 
(iii) Driving motor vehicles 
 
 
It is clear from contemporary documents that women auxiliaries were highly valued.  
The Salisbury Home Guard Intelligence Section, for example, depended on ‘Mrs Gould, 
[and] Misses Townsend, Warhirst, Simmonds, Bond and Ferret’, four of whom were 
still serving when the unit stood down’(Stroud, 1944, p.3).  The total establishment of 
the Intelligence Section at stand down was two officers, seven other ranks – and four 
ladies.  But, in the final analysis, even the politically ‘modern’ Home Guard had a 
highly traditional understanding of a woman’s role.  As David Carroll records (1999, 
p.120): 
 One former auxiliary in Kent … recalls that she was asked to take part in her 
 platoon’s mock battle one night.  Quite excited by the prospect she duly 
 presented herself on the evening concerned, was issued with a password and 
 then cruelly disillusioned to be told that her part in the exercise was to shell 
 peas for the officers’ meal! 
 
 
For the modern student of the Home Guard, the female ‘Auxiliary’ creates a confusing 
clash of terminology with Home Guard stay-behind ‘Auxiliary Units’ – although this 
was not an issue at the time, as the Auxiliary Units were formed and operated in secret.  
In 1957, Peter Fleming – a founding member – revealed the existence of wartime stay-
behind parties in Invasion 1940 (Fleming, 1957, p.270).  In May 1968, American 
researcher David Lampe published The Last Ditch, which had the advantage of 
interviews with many of the key participants, if lacking the official documents revealed 
by research in the 1990s.  In 1974 the Sunday Telegraph Magazine added a feature 
article on the Auxiliary Units accompanying ‘The Defence of Britain’ series by Correlli 
Barnet.11  The enduring fascination of special operations forces ensured that, by the end 
of the 1990s, the Auxiliary Units threatened to eclipse the main body of the Home 
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Guard entirely.  Even in 1974, the terms ‘Home Guard’ and ‘Special Forces’ 
represented opposite ends of the military spectrum, making it difficult to accept the 
Auxiliary Units as Home Guard formations.  More recently, the television documentary 
series The Real Dad’s Army came perilously close to suggesting that the Home Guard 
merely existed to conceal the existence of the Auxiliary Units.12 
 
To appreciate that the Auxiliary Units were a component of the Home Guard is to 
appreciate the special strengths of the Home Guard, particularly in rural areas, in terms 
of fieldcraft, skill-at-arms and local knowledge.  Fred Archer recalled of his local LDVs 
(1975, p.68):  ‘Colonel Somerton chose his men like a dealer choosing horses.  Smart 
young tractor drivers who spent their winter evenings in the woods, shooting the hordes 
of pigeons which came to roost after packing their crops … were his marksmen.  These, 
with the ex-servicemen who had worked their small-holding between the wars, made up 
a company of good shots, some crack shots, potential snipers on our hill.’  That the 
authorities viewed the Auxiliary Units as genuinely Home Guard is apparent from 
contemporary correspondence.13  On 8 August 1940, Duncan Sandys described the 
mission of the Auxiliary Units in a letter to the Prime Minister: 
 
HOME GUARD – AUXILIARY UNITS 
 
1. I think you may care to know of the progress which is being made in 
the organisation of the Auxiliary Units of the Home Guard. 
 
Object 
 
2. These Auxiliary Units are being formed with two objects: 
 
(a) They are intended to provide, within the framework of the Home 
Guard organisation, small bodies of men especially selected and 
trained, whose role it will be to act offensively on the flanks and in 
the rear of enemy troops who may obtain a foothold in this country.  
Their action will particularly be directed against tanks and lorries in 
laager, ammunition dumps, small enemy posts and stragglers.  Their 
activities will also include sniping. 
 
(b) The other function of the Auxiliary Units is to provide a system of 
intelligence, whereby the regular forces in the field can be kept 
informed of what is happening behind enemy lines.14 
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No military commander would miss the opportunity to place ‘humint’ intelligence 
assets behind enemy lines, but the offensive action aspect of the Auxiliary Units’ role is 
controversial – Sandy’s list of ‘offensive actions’ appears tailor-made to goad the 
German military to take punitive measures, and one could speculate that the existence of 
Auxiliary Units was as much political – intended to ensure that there could be no 
‘model occupation’ – as to achieve militarily significant results.   
 
A consequence of arming large numbers of civilian volunteers was that incidents 
occurred involving the discharge, negligent or otherwise, of firearms.  Much has been 
made of this,15 if only because, in Norman Longmate’s words: ‘the policy of shooting 
first and asking questions afterwards…  was to earn for the LDV a unique position as 
the only army in history to have killed more of its own countrymen than its enemies’  
(Longmate, 1974, p.40).  Longmate’s assertion regarding the LDV’s ‘unique position’ is 
open to discussion, but his is a serious charge – that the LDV was more of a hazard than 
a help – and needs to be examined in context.  Unthinkingly adopting British musketry 
practice with an American M1917 bolt-action rifle could have dire consequences.  The 
M1917 lacked the magazine cut-off of the British SMLE, and some negligent 
discharges resulted from veterans closing the bolt and squeezing the trigger to ease the 
mainspring, forgetting that in the absence of a cut-off, they had just chambered a live 
round.  Some British weapons, notably the Sten machine carbine and the ST Grenade 
(‘Sticky Bomb’), were inherently dangerous designs and accidents were bound to occur 
through carelessness or complacency.  The Home Guard was certainly not unique in this 
respect, as Captain Clifford Shore recounted (1997, p.316): 
… one of my [RAF Regiment] sergeants shot himself with a Sten gun; in a 
crowded tramcar of all places… I liked the particular NCO immensely and 
realised that no matter what I could do there could only be one finding for  such 
a case – that of negligence.  It was a good job the magazine was not on the Sten 
otherwise there might have been wholesale killing…  
 
1,206 Home Guards died while on duty, and, never having engaged the enemy in 
ground combat, statistics are not on the organisation’s side.16  Professor MacKenzie 
quotes an ‘on-duty death rate’ of 0.7 per thousand for the Home Guard, against 0.05 per 
thousand ‘among regular troops’, suggesting that a mixture of old age and lack of 
military competence made the Home Guard more subject to fatalities while on duty 
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(MacKenzie, 1996, p.124).  It should be remembered, however, that the vast majority of 
the Home Guard were in a ‘teeth arm’, tasked as infantrymen, and later, gunners and 
bomb disposal, and their role frequently required that they be out and about during air 
raids.  Furthermore, such statistics from the Second World War are skewed by the 
administrative ‘tail’ supporting the regular forces; as John Ellis Explains (1990, p.156):  
‘In the British, American and most Commonwealth armies as many as two-thirds of the 
troops were involved in activities behind the front line, working in the numerous roles 
necessary to a mechanised army in the field.’  In order to compare percentages of 
combat casualties to the First World War, Ellis (1990, p.159) states that ‘they must be 
multiplied at least threefold’.  Logically, something similar should apply when 
comparing casualty statistics with the Home Guard. 
 
Apart from accidents, there were instances when the LDV/Home Guard opened fire 
deliberately, occasionally at parachutists, but on several occasions when manning 
roadblocks.  A rash of incidents occurred during June 1940, at the height of the invasion 
scare, and when the status of the LDV was unclear both to its members and the wider 
public, as one ex-LDV explained:  ‘we were still short of arms and uniforms.  There 
was a certain amount of moral backing in stopping cars at night when properly armed 
and in uniform, but it was not so easy in a mixture of khaki and plain clothes’ (Cambs. 
and Isle of Ely TA Assoc., 1944, p.79).  A member of the Isle of Ely Home Guard 
battalion recorded the period when road blocks were the LDV’s chief activity:   
Invasion preparations on the other side of the Channel increased the tension.  
Alert periods became frequent.  Road block sentries had to inspect identity cards 
of all passing through after dusk; lorries had to be stopped and examined to see 
if they were being used for conveying hostile troops or fifth columnists.  About 
once a week some car with a particular number had to be stopped and held.  If it 
did not stop it was to be fired upon.  The general public were not too helpful and 
could not understand the need for these measures.  Considerable trouble was 
experienced with junior officers of the Field Army who were most indignant at 
being stopped and asked to prove their identity.  One motor cyclist tried to rush 
the sentries on the south of Wisbech.  He was brought down by the first shot 
which struck him immediately in front of his rear mudguard.  (Cambs. and Ely 
TA Assoc., 1944, pp.78-79). 
 
The foregoing, which was written in 1943, makes it quite clear that the tendency to 
‘shoot first and ask questions later’ reflected policy, rather than – as it is often portrayed 
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– trigger-happiness on the part of the LDV.  We have already seen that shooting 
parachutists was featured as an LDV responsibility in the first (albeit unofficial) LDV 
manual.  Action on roadblocks is a more difficult case, if only because the LDV was 
almost entirely devoid of formal administration – indeed it prided itself on a ‘no bumph’ 
culture – which has left little in the way of documentary evidence.  The Cambridgeshire 
and Isle of Ely Home Guard history is useful in this respect, being assembled in 1943 (it 
was published in January 1944), when the Home Guard was at its apogee, the ‘Second 
Front’ had not yet opened, and May and June 1940 were still fresh memories: 
 There was a hectic background which must in many ways have resembled that 
 at the time of the Spanish Armada or the threatened invasions of the 
 eighteenth century.  All the main points were there; the inadequate force at 
 sea, neglected and cut to the bone; the minute and ill-found army; the 
 suspicion of widespread treason; the wonderful volunteer spirit of the 
 countryside.  “No bumph” was the promise from above, and bitterly have 
 officers of the H.G. regretted ever since that it was ever given, or being given, 
 not adhered to.  Operational orders were simple.  “If anything happens, start 
 shooting.”  (Cambs. and Isle of Ely TA Assoc., 1944, p.51) 
 
Throughout the war strenuous efforts were made to inculcate in the British a 
‘watchfulness’ that was close to paranoia.  Apart from Fougasse’s cartoons, which 
showed Hitler or Göring listening-in on every conversation, there were such efforts as 
the 1942 film Went the Day Well?, in which the population of sleepy ‘Bramley End’ 
overlook a series of clues and allow the village to fall into the clutches of a party of 
ruthless German commandos.17  Loosely based on a short story by Graham Greene The 
Lieutenant Died Last, which was published in the American publication Collier’s 
magazine in June 1940, the film uses little of Greene’s original material, and his hero, a 
poacher called Bill Purves, is reduced to a minor role.18  The film does though bear a 
striking resemblance to some aspects of The Defence of Bloodford Village, discussed in 
the previous chapter.  It too starts in an imaginary future, when the German invasion has 
been defeated “and old Hitler got what was coming to him”.  Although Bramley End’s 
own Home Guard section is ambushed before they can play any part in saving the 
village, there is no suggestion of bumbling incompetence that we might today associate 
with the Home Guard.  They are, rather, too trusting and gentle – ‘failings’ exhibited by 
all the villagers.  For example, the disguised German commander is greatly helped in 
putting the village into a state of defence against counter-attack by having the Home 
Guard’s own very competent defensive scheme explained to him by the Home Guard 
 67 
section NCO, as (in shades of Bloodford) they examine the terrain from a vantage point 
beneath the abandoned windmill on Windmill Hill.   
 
The look of the village, including the windmill, is extraordinarily close to the 
description of the mythical Bloodford, and once again, the action takes place, not 
around some vital factory, airfield or military facility, but in a dream of rural England.  
The production location, Turville, Buckinghamshire, is, quite literally, the quintessential 
English country village, having subsequently provided the external location for 
Goodnight Mister Tom, The Vicar of Dibley, Little Britain, Midsomer Murders, and 
many more.  The windmill, Cobstone Windmill, was Professor Potts’ residence and 
workshop in Chitty Chitty Bang Bang and later bought and restored by Hayley Mills.  In 
Greene’s original conception, however, the invaded village has the much more prosaic 
name of ‘Potter’, and is rooted in a far more convincing 1940s British landscape.  There 
is also some logic to the arrival of the enemy there, in this case, paratroopers: 
  You would hardly expect to find Potter the scene of the first invasion 
 of England since French troops landed near Fishguard in the Napoleonic War.  
 It is one of those tiny isolated villages you still find dumped down in deserted 
 corners of what we call in England Metroland – the district where commuters 
 live in tidy villas within easy distances of the railway, on the edge of scrubby 
 commons full of clay pits and gorse and rather withered trees.  Walk for three 
 miles in any direction from Potter and you will find cement sidewalks, nurses 
 pushing prams, the evening paper boy, but Potter itself lies off the map – the 
 motoring map, that is to say … 
That was the odd scene of the ‘Invasion’, though if you examined  Potter 
carefully you may conclude it was not an accident that parachutists landed there.  
Potter itself could be isolated by a few snips of a wire cutter, and from that little 
hidden spot in Metroland half a dozen men acting quickly could do an 
astonishing amount of damage – a mile and a half across unfrequented common 
and you had the main line to Scotland and the northern coast, and one supposes 
that the German air chiefs had planned for such attempts which our air defences 
foiled.  Their psychological effect might have been incalculable:  they would 
have destroyed any sense of security  Englishmen still feel … (Greene, 1999, 
p.46-47)  
 
BFI Screenonline says of Went the Day Well? 
 Turville in Oxfordshire stands in for Bramley End, the sort of village 
 invariably described as 'sleepy'. True to form, the villagers take some time to 
 wake up to the presence of the enemy among them. But when they are 
 roused, they respond with determination, resourcefulness and, when 
 necessary, a surprising ruthlessness. 
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 The film is almost cruel in the way it repeatedly frustrates its audience's 
 hopes. After the Germans' merciless extermination of the village's small 
 platoon of home guards, the villagers make a number of attempts to summon 
 help … 
 … Most extraordinary is a scene in which the postmistress (Muriel George) 
 throws pepper in the eyes of her unwelcome lodger, then finishes him off with 
 an axe. Shortly after, when her telephone call for help is ignored by a 
 gossiping switchboard operator, she meets her own end, on the blade of a 
 bayonet.19 
 
Eventually a wounded small boy (further echoes of Bloodford) – an evacuee and 
poacher Bill Purvis’ sidekick – gets through to the local Home Guard platoon 
commander, the baker in the next village, who contacts district command.  The Army, 
with Home Guard attached, re-take the village and relieve the besieged villagers 
defending the manor house – itself an echo of the 1909 anti-German melodrama An 
Englishman’s Home.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Went the Day Well?  A masterpiece of subliminal messaging – Bramley End’s urbane 
squire (played by Leslie Banks) turns out to be a Fifth Columnist, and betrays the 
villagers to a disguised Nazi officer (Basil Sydney) against the background of the 
village’s Great War memorial.   
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No Home Guard emerging into the sunlight after a matinee performance of Went the 
Day Well? could have the slightest doubt that ‘shooting first and asking questions 
afterwards’ was not only permissible, it was his duty.  If he still harboured any doubts, 
The Home Guard Training Manual would soon allay them: 
 The following are the official instructions for sentries on roads: 
 
 (a) When active operations are not in progress.  As reliance cannot be placed 
 on the voice to stop motorists, the following procedure should be adopted by 
 troops or Home Guards.  By day the sentry should use ordinary police signals.  
 By night the sentry should stop motor traffic by waving a red lamp.  In either 
 case there should be another man twenty yards behind the sentry stopping, 
 who is ready to fire if the car refuses to halt [my italics]. (Langdon-Davies, 
 1942b, p.84) 
 
Were that not enough, Hugh Slater’s Home Guard for Victory! was reassuring on the 
legal consequences of a fatal shooting: 
 A member of the Home Guard can be charged in the civil courts for any illegal 
 act that he may commit, but if it may reasonably be supposed that he was 
 acting in good faith under orders he will probably not be so charged.  For 
 example, if a sentry is ordered to shoot any person ignoring the challenge, he 
 may not be charged, even if there is a fatal result.  (Slater, 1941, p.82) 
 
Under the circumstances, and in the context of the times, we should be cautious about 
characterising the LDV/Home Guard as trigger-happy. 
 
In The Home Guard Training Manual, Major John Langdon-Davies explained why 
British civilians taking up arms against an invader were required to join the Home 
Guard (Langdon-Davies, 1942b, p.14): 
…  the laws of war, which must be obeyed by every British subject, whether or 
not they are obeyed by the Nazis, do not permit of civilians offering armed 
resistance, unless they are organised in a regular corps and wear a recognizable 
uniform. 
  That is why people, who would otherwise be civilians have to join the 
 Home Guard and receive uniform, in order to conform to the rules of war and 
 at the same time offer the necessary resistance to the invader. 
 
The LDV/Home Guard was established as an officially-sanctioned armed civilian 
association – in the belief that this would maintain a moral ascendancy – although, as 
we have already seen in the previous chapter, there was very little likelihood that such a 
device would grant any protection from reprisal or summary execution by German 
 70 
paratroops.  The importance attached to the LDV/Home Guard must be judged by the 
willingness of the British Government to arm huge numbers of civilians, despite 
widespread (and widely voiced) disenchantment with the Establishment.  These legal 
and political issues aside, the authorities were then confronted with the challenge of 
making good Mr Eden’s promise in his call for volunteers of 14 May 1940:  ‘You will 
not be paid, but you will receive uniform and will be armed’20 – which was interpreted 
by the volunteers as a commitment to arm every member of a force that had, at a stroke, 
almost doubled the size of the mobilised British Army.  As we shall see in the next 
chapter, that was very much easier said than done. 
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CHAPTER 3 
The Rifle Crisis 
 
 
The American .300in calibre M1917 rifle (top) was almost identical to the British .303in 
P14, being built using the same production machinery.  The aspiration for the Local 
Defence Volunteers was to be issued the much-admired Rifle, Short, Magazine, Lee-
Enfield, Mk III (below), the expectation, that they would receive the P14.  In the event, 
the standard rifle of the Home Guard would be the American M1917.  A superb combat 
rifle and familiar to service veterans, the SMLE was not, however, as accurate as the 
P14, or powerful as the M1917.  The SMLE shown above is a rifle club version. 
(Author’s photograph)  
 
On 7 October 1939, Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, drafted a 
memorandum to the Home Secretary (Churchill, 1954, p.393): 
 Why do we not form a Home Guard of half a million men over forty (if they 
 like to volunteer), and put our elderly stars at the head and in the structure of 
 these new formations?  Let these five hundred thousand men come along and 
 push the young and active out of all the home billets.  If uniforms are lacking a 
 brassard would suffice, and I am assured there are plenty of rifles at any rate. 
 
Churchill’s memo anticipated the raising of the Local Defence Volunteers by seven 
months, and serves to illustrate the imagined prerequisites of such a force: brassards and 
rifles.  Space precludes an examination of the thorny issue of Home Guard uniform, but 
rifles are central to this study.  No modern author, whether it be ex-Home Guard 
Norman Longmate, military historian S.P. MacKenzie, or K.R. Gulvin, local historian 
and chronicler of the Kent Home Guard, has been able to discuss the subject of the 
Home Guard’s smallarms without some significant inaccuracy.  This is unfortunate, as 
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the rifle saga is central to the story of the Home Guard, to the organisation’s self-
perception, and the way we perceive it today. 
 
When, in May 1940, mainland Britain was threatened with invasion, the response from 
the general public was to demand that a rifle be made available for every male of 
military age.  Artillery, the machine gun and chemical weapons had dominated the First 
World War battlefields, aerial bombardment had emerged as a viable weapon; yet the 
bolt-action military rifle continued to enjoy a status that is difficult for those of a post-
Second World War generation to fully comprehend.  The rifle was, as shooting pundit 
Lieutenant A.G. Banks exclaimed in his 1940 shooting manual “A.G.’s” Book of the 
Rifle: ‘the cleanest and noblest of all weapons’ (Banks, 1950, p.10).  The failure of the 
Government to provide .303-inch calibre Short Magazine Lee-Enfield service rifles to 
all the volunteers of the LDV resulted in a legacy of resentment that obscures, and 
continues to obscure, the detail that weapons that did reach the LDV/Home Guard were 
in some respects better than those in service with the British Army.  The notion that the 
Home Guard was ill-served lingers on, and in order to unpick reality from perception 
we must first establish the historical background. 
 
In Britain, pre-eminence of the military rifle occupies a period commencing with the 
formation of the Rifle Volunteer movement in 1859 and ending with the issue of the 
Sten machine carbine to the Home Guard in 1943.  The spring of 1859 saw the ‘Long 
Acre Indignation Meeting’ and the re-establishment of the volunteer movement in 
response to an imagined French threat (Cole and Fulton, 1990, p.1).  The British 
military rifle had ceased to be the prerequisite of the specialist sharpshooter with the 
adoption of the ‘Minié Rifle’ in 1851, and, subsequently, the Pattern 1853 Enfield Rifle.  
There now existed the possibility of placing the defence of the United Kingdom in the 
hands of a ‘nation of riflemen’ and, in December 1859, a National Rifle Association 
was established from the ranks of the Volunteer movement.  When, in 1890, the NRA 
headquarters and ranges moved from Wimbledon to Bisley, the Illustrated London 
News explained the role of the association (cited in Cole and Fulton, 1990, p.16): 
 The National Rifle Association, which is so important as an Auxiliary to the 
 Volunteer Service, in promoting skill in the use of the Infantry weapon, holds 
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 its Annual Meeting, this year, on the newly acquired camping ground, with the 
 ranges and offices there provided, on Bisley Common … 
 
In the event, Britain never did achieve a nation of minutemen along American or Swiss 
lines, but target shooting with the service rifle remained a highly respectable, if 
essentially middle-class, activity (Cole and Fulton, 1990, passim).  As the British 
service rifle evolved, each new rifle or type of ammunition was adopted in parallel by 
the NRA.1  In 1888, the .303in Lee-Metford bolt-action repeating rifle was introduced 
and, following the introduction of smokeless propellant, the ‘Rifle Magazine Lee-
Enfield Mk I’, in 1895, establishing a smallarms dynasty that would remain in frontline 
service with the British Army until 1992.2 
 
The Rifle, Magazine, Lee-Enfield (MLE) had design characteristics which limited the 
accuracy it could achieve, even under ideal conditions.3  After a poor showing in the 
Boer War, the long rifle of the infantry and the short carbine of the cavalry were 
replaced by a new universal ‘Short Rifle’.  For many small arms aficionados this 
compromise concept was the last straw; as Hogg and Weeks put it (1973, p.3.17): 
 Universally execrated by every self-styled expert in the Western world when it 
 was introduced, the rifle was held to be too short to be a target shooter’s arm 
 and too long to be a cavalryman’s companion – and that, in fact, it was an 
 abortionate device developed by unscrupulous government technicians by 
 robbing wherever possible every good feature from other rifles then ruining 
 them. 
 
Nonetheless, the Rifle, Short, Magazine, Lee-Enfield or ‘SMLE’ entered service in 
1903, reaching its definitive Mk III version in 1907.  Despite inauspicious beginnings it 
generated a loyalty among its users which bordered on idolatry: 
 The short Enfield is handy, reasonably light, reasonably accurate, foolproof, 
 and above all, utterly reliable.  You can (if you are fool enough) throw it over 
 a wall without damaging the sights.  You can rapid-fire it for scores of rounds 
 on end until it is nearly red-hot, and it will never jam or misfire.  You can drop 
 it in sand and half fill the action with grit, or mud, but it will continue to work 
 cheerfully.  These things happen in war. (Banks, 1950, p.177) 
 
However, the War Office, stung by the criticism levelled at the SMLE, had commenced 
work at the Royal Small Arms Factory (RSAF) Enfield on a completely new rifle, 
designed around a powerful .276in (7mm) rimless cartridge and a Mauser action 
(Skennerton, 1993, p.140).  The weapon was issued for troop trials as the Pattern 1913 
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or ‘P13’, but development was halted as the First World War approached – it would 
have been a poor time to introduce a new calibre of ammunition, even if the .276 round 
had been sufficiently developed for service use, which it was not.  During 1914, there 
was concern that production of the SMLE might not meet demand, and orders for 
service rifles were placed with American manufacturers Winchester, Remington and 
Eddystone (a subsidiary of Remington) (Canfield, 1991, p.59).  Rather than tool up for 
the elderly SMLE, a .303in calibre version of the new P13 rifle was placed in 
production as the P14.  The P14 rifle was accepted into service in June 1916 (Canfield, 
1991, p.59), but substantial quantities were not available until 1917, in which year 
production ended (Skennerton, 1984, p.72).  Compared with the SMLE, the P14 was a 
rather clumsy-looking weapon, particularly with a sword bayonet fitted.  At 46.25 
inches it was two-and-a-quarter inches longer than the SMLE, and rather heavier, 9lbs 
10oz against 8lbs 3oz.  Unlike the SMLE, which had open sights, the P14 had aperture 
sights, a Mauser action, and integral five-round magazine.   
 
Introduction of the P14 rifle was marred by problems with interchangeability of parts.  
In effect, each of the three American companies had been required to reverse-engineer 
P14s from prototypes built in the UK.  The result was, that whilst each produced well-
made, accurate rifles, perfectly capable of ‘killing Germans’ (as one of the British 
inspectors commented), they differed subtly in their tolerances, and, as a result, each 
manufacturer’s weapon had to be treated as a separate sub-species: P14 W 
(Winchester), P14 R (Remington) and P14 E (Eddystone).4  In the event, SMLE 
production was sufficient to meet the demands of frontline units, and most of the 
production run of P14 rifles remained in the UK for training and Home Defence, or 
went straight into reserve (Canfield, 1991, p.59).5  The only P14 rifles to reach the 
Western Front did so because the SMLE had failed in the technically demanding role of 
sniper’s rifle.  Winchester-made P14 rifles (held to be of superior quality and 
performance) were fitted with fine-adjusting aperture sights to become the Pattern 14 
Winchester (Fine Adjusting), or ‘P14 W (F)’ sniping rifle.  Ian Skennerton notes (1984, 
p.73):  ‘In nearly all instances, the sniping schools preferred the aperture sighted Pattern 
1914 W (F) to the telescope fitted S.M.L.E. rifles, and towards the end of the war it was 
issued in the line on a scale of 3 per battalion’.  The P14 (W) was also fitted with 
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telescopic sights, and it remained the standard British sniping rifle until February 1942 
(Skennerton, 1984, p.105). 
 
While the robust and handy SMLE was popular with the soldiery, the more modern P14 
was easier to mass-produce and, as befitted its target shooting ancestry, a deadly 
accurate weapon.6  Loyalty for the SMLE notwithstanding, neither rifle had proved 
entirely successful during the First World War so, after the war, work commenced on a 
replacement.  Service nomenclature changed on 31 May 1926, the SMLE became the 
‘Rifle No.1’, and the P14 the ‘Rifle No. 3’ (the ‘Rifle No. 2’ was a .22 training rifle).  
To avoid confusion, in this study we will refer to the No. 1 as the SMLE and the No.3 
as the P14 throughout, as that was how the Home Guard referred to them.  The new 
service rifle in development was initially termed the ‘No.1 Mk VI’, but later evolved 
into a new weapon, the ‘Rifle No. 4 Mk 1’.  It commenced troop trials in 1931 and 
featured a strengthened Lee action and ten-round box magazine, whilst the aperture 
sights, heavy ‘target’ barrel and fore-end design, as well as the use of screws and fixings 
that were standard sizes, rather than ‘gunmakers’ specials’ showed the influence of the 
P14.  In total, about 3,500 No. 4 rifles were manufactured prior to the Second World 
War (Skennerton, 1993, p.175).  The design was considered successful, but shelved due 
to financial stringency.  Thus, in the spring of 1940, the situation, as regards British 
service rifles stood as follows:  the Rifle No. 1 (SMLE) remained the service rifle, with 
substantial quantities of the Rifle No. 3 (P14) in reserve, and small numbers of the Rifle 
No. 4 in store, with an intention to produce more.  There was, in addition, a residue of 
‘long’ Lee-Enfields of various types, particularly the modernised Charger Loading Lee 
Enfield (CLLE), which had soldiered on through the First World War.7 
 
In May 1940 it was assumed that to place the nation in arms the Government would 
simply issue a rifle, i.e. an SMLE, or at worst a P14, to every volunteer; as Churchill 
reassuringly put it, in the quote at the opening of this chapter:  ‘I am assured that there 
are plenty of rifles at any rate.’  This assumption was reflected in the initial wave of 
publications targeted at Local Defence Volunteers; thus we have, in June 1940, the 
reissue of The Elements of Rifle Shooting by Bisley service rifle champion, Lt. Col. J. 
A. Barlow.  This was followed in July by Bisley King’s Prize winner Capt. E. H. 
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Robinson’s Rifle Training ForWar:  A Textbook for Local Defence Volunteers.  This, as 
we have already noted, was an update of the First World War VTC training manual.  It 
was ‘revised and brought up to date’ by Gordon R. King ‘Late arm.-Quartermaster-
Sergeant, Royal Marine Artillery, Winner of Grand Aggregate, Bisley, 1926’.  October 
1940 saw Lt. A. G. Banks’s “A. G.’s” Book of the Rifle, which, like Col. Barlow’s 
book, concentrated on the technical aspects of marksmanship, and in the same month 
The Home Guard Manual, by RSM A. Southworth, formerly Warrant Officer Instructor 
at the Small Arms School, Hythe.8   In this first rush of enthusiasm we recognize the 
cri-de-cœur of the Rifle Volunteers, in A. G. Banks’ words (1950, p.20): 
Some peoples are wiser than we.  I am told, by a friend who has spent much 
time in Finland, that every householder there has a Service rifle, as much as a 
matter of course as we have an umbrella or a set of golf clubs.  The Government 
provides the rifles.  And at the week-ends the whole family  sallies forth to the 
ranges to compete in matches.  That may not be strictly true. But it is true that in 
February 1940 Finnish soldiers routed an enemy which outnumbered them by 
fifty to one. 
 
 
 
 
 
May 1940, confronted by the 
German airborne threat, John 
Bull reaches for his SMLE.  
Punch cartoon by Bernard 
Partridge.  
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When updating the VTC manual, Gordon King added some information concerning the 
P14 rifle.  He was determined to instil confidence (Robinson, 1940, pp.25-6):  
 You are probably armed with the “Pattern ‘14” rifle.  This is a better weapon 
 than the S.M.L.E. (our present service rifle) from the point of view of 
 marksmanship but it is not so handy in the field.  It is the official “Sniper’s 
 Rifle” and when fitted with a telescopic sight is almost ideal for this work. 
 
King went on to give a brief history of the development of the P13-P14 series 
concluding: ‘The result is the P14 and a remarkably good rifle it is.’ In a memorandum 
dated 29 June 1940, War Office department TA2, responsible for administering the 
LDV confirmed that King had been correct in his assumption that many of the LDV 
would be armed with the P14, stating that ‘A considerable number of 1914 pattern rifles 
have been issued.  Ross rifles [q.v. below] are now arriving up to a total of 75,000.’9  A 
month later, LDV fortnightly returns showed that there were 495,294 .303 service rifles 
in the hands of 1,456,127 volunteers.10  
 
The obvious shortfall notwithstanding, The LDVs were extremely fortunate, because, 
despite the assurances given to Churchill in 1939, there were not ‘plenty of rifles’.  Ian 
Skennerton records (1993, p.286):  ‘By the end of 1940, all the 1.5 million rifles in 
Britain were in use and 190,000 reservists were without arms at all.’  This unforeseen 
rifle shortage was the result of several factors.  Firstly, there was the need to replace the 
rifles lost or abandoned on mainland Europe.  Churchill (1955, p.126) gives a figure of 
90,000 rifles ‘left behind at Dunkirk’, but Skennerton (1993, p.286), looking at all the 
campaigns up to the end of 1940, puts the loss at over 300,000.  Secondly, the policy of 
limiting regular Army recruitment to 60,000 men per month was abandoned by 
Churchill in June 1940.  Between June and August 1940, 324,000 men were enlisted.  
As David French explains (2000, p.185): ‘they were organised into 122 new infantry 
battalions, not because the army needed such a large increase in its infantry, but because 
the only weapons it had in stock were 300,000 First World War pattern rifles.’   The 
reference is clearly to Pattern 1914 rifles, but, as we have seen, with the exception of 
3,500 No. 4 Rifles, any rifles available to the British Army were ‘First World War 
pattern’.   
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(Left) A typical village 
scene from the summer of 
1940.  Bishop’s Cleeve 
Gloucestershire, the village 
LDV muster on the green 
with brassards and SMLE 
rifles, plus one Canadian 
Ross (third from right).  
(www.imagesofbishopscleev
e.info) 
 
 
 
(Above) In the absence of sufficient rifles, dummies, antiques or broom handles could at 
least be used to learn or revise the principles of rifle drill.  This rare survivor is a 
simple wooden dummy, the same length as the service SMLE.   It is displayed with a 
late-pattern (khaki) Local Defence Volunteers brassard.  The dummy rifle is stamped 
with the address of the retailer, Gamages’ department store in High Holborn, in the 
City of London.  Some ill feeling was caused because it was possible to purchase steel 
helmets from Gamages (along with all manner of other civil defence stores), but they 
were not formally on issue to the LDV, or, later, Home Guard, until Army Council 
Instruction 2502 of 15 December 1941, and then on the basis of operational priority 
(Hunt, 2002, p.29).  (Author’s photograph) 
 
By August 1940, Eden’s broadcast of 14 May had generated over 1.6 million Local 
Defence Volunteers, rather than the 500,000 anticipated, and all of these men expected 
to be armed.11  Furthermore, in many districts, the LDV constituted the first line of 
defence against invasion or subversion and needed to be armed.  It is quite apparent that 
no serious thought had been given to the possible size of the LDV, beyond an 
assumption that 500,000 was a reasonable figure.  As a War Office report dated July 
1949 laconically commented: ‘in the light of experience it is at least worthy of 
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consideration as to whether it would not have been better policy to have restricted the 
number of volunteers to a figure more closely approximating to the amount of 
equipment actually available at the time, and to have opened a waiting list for men who 
could not be accepted at once.’12  That was, however to be wise after the event, and the 
public relations consequences of disappointing two-thirds of the volunteers, who found 
themselves without rifles, were to dog the Home Guard throughout the organisation’s 
existence. 
 
There was another, crucial, element in the ‘Rifle Crisis’:  although Britain had been at 
war with Germany since September 1939, there was almost no production of service 
rifles in the UK.  This last circumstance was one that the Government was unlikely to 
publicise, for excellent reasons, domestic and international, and it has failed to attract 
the attention of historians.  The situation had arisen because production of SMLE rifles 
was terminated after the First World War, with the exception of commercial 
manufacture, for the gun trade and export, at the BSA factory at Small Heath, near 
Birmingham.  Production at the Royal Small Arms Factory was limited to barrels and 
receivers, to enable old rifles to be reconditioned (Skennerton, 1993, p.177).  In 1939, in 
anticipation of war, sites were purchased for factories to build No. 4 rifles – Royal 
Ordnance factories at Fazakerley (Liverpool), Maltby (near Sheffield), and a BSA plant 
at Shirley (Birmingham) (Skennerton, 1993, pp.194-5) – and contracts for No. 4 rifles 
were placed with Stevens-Savage in the USA and Long Branch Arsenal in Canada 
(Skennerton, 1993, pp.194-5).  But, as with the P14 in the previous war, it would take at 
least two years for the new factories to reach volume production.   
 
Thus from September 1939 until late 1941 (or later still, as it turned out), the provision 
of British service rifles depended on new production at one privately-owned factory, 
and the cannibalisation of old weapons by the Royal Small Arms Factory and the gun 
trade.  In August 1940, an air raid destroyed the barrel mill and associated workshops at 
Small Heath, halting production, and further raids in November caused the machinery to 
be dispersed – the factory finally ceased production in late 1943.  The depth of the ‘rifle 
crisis’ is illustrated in the table overleaf, which compares service rifle production 
figures during the crucial period of 1940-41 with yearly figures for the First World War.  
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Full No. 1 (SMLE) rifle figures for 1939-45 cannot easily be given in this format, 
because of the methods employed to re-manufacture and repair as many rifles as 
possible (Skennerton, 1988, p.5), but the table serves to illustrate the inadequacy of 
production.  Once volume production of the No. 4 rifle in the UK, USA and Canada was 
under way, the crisis receded, but as Skennerton (1993, p.198) notes: ‘The No. 4 does 
not appear in photographs with the forces until the latter part of 1942, and then this was 
generally with specialist units, such as the Airborne Division.’   
 
Wartime UK Service Rifle Production 
 
YEAR SMLE YEAR No 1 (SMLE) No 4 
1914 120,093    
1915 613.461 1940 59,071 Nil 
1916 852,928 1941 42,043 33,914 
1917 1,205,572    
1918 1,062,052    
TOTAL 3,854,106    
 
 
There is another .303-inch calibre rifle that is relevant to this study, the Canadian Ross, 
which, as we have seen in the memorandum of June 1940, quoted above, was being 
issued to the LDV at that date.  Supposedly the ‘perfected’ version of Sir Charles Ross’s 
design of 1896, the Ross service rifle was a full 50.56 inches long and weighed 9lbs, 
14oz.  Although adopted by the Canadian Army, it was never a popular or successful 
service rifle.  For brevity we will turn to Hogg and Week’s Military Small Arms of the 
Twentieth Century (1973, p.3.37-3.38): 
 The Ross was extensively tested in Britain between 1900 and 1912 but … 
rejected as a possible service weapon.  The Commandant of the Small Arms 
School at Hythe summed up military opinion in his 1910 report on the Ross 
Mark 2**: ‘It seems clear that this rifle is designed as a target rifle pure and 
simple, without regard to the requirements of active service or of the training of 
large bodies of men of average attainment.’   
 In spite of this opinion, the Canadian Army of 1914 went to war with the 
Ross, but, by 1915, it was found that the troops had lost confidence in the 
weapon, and were abandoning them in favour of Lee-Enfields … 
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Official investigation revealed that the muddy conditions of trench-
warfare … were ill-suited to the bolt design … The Ross was consequently 
withdrawn from combat and relegated to a training role … Approximately 
419,130 Ross military rifles were manufactured in the period 1903-15, 342,040 
of which were delivered to the Canadian military authorities, and 67,090 to 
Britain. 
 
The lengthy Canadian .303in Ross rifle on the ranges at Bisley.  This Mk 3 may well be 
one of the 75,000 purchased by the UK in 1940, as the only Ross adopted by the British 
Army was the Mk 3B, which was fitted with a magazine cut-off.  (Author’s photograph) 
 
It is worth pointing out that, whilst the Ross was unpopular with the rank-and-file, it 
was, like the P14, favoured by snipers, who benefitted from its 30.53 inch barrel and 
‘straight pull’ action (Hogg and Weeks, 1973, p.3.38).  Ian Skennerton’s study of 
Second World War British small arms contracts reveals an undated order for 75,000 
Ross rifles from Canada, which, on the evidence of the weekly returns quoted above, we 
can place in, or before, June 1940 (Skennerton, 1988, p.18).13  The Ross rifle’s inability 
to cope with the muddy conditions of trench warfare was unlikely to prove a serious 
embarrassment to the LDV/Home Guard, even in combat, but the weapon did have 
another undesirable feature, in that its bolt, if disassembled and then incorrectly 
reassembled, failed to lock in the forward position, whilst still being able to fire a round.  
For the firer, the consequences of such a situation were particularly unpleasant.  That 
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this was occurring (and that Ross rifles were in hands of the Home Guard), is confirmed 
by an exasperated memorandum from TA2, dated 2 November 1940: 14  
 Dismantling of Ross bolts 
 
 This subject is fully dealt with in the pamphlet on the Ross Rifle. Issued in 
 July, 1940, so that there would appear to be no reason for cases of mal-
 assembly. 
 
I am to add that normally there should be no necessity for dismantling the bolts 
of these rifles.  
 
The plain truth about the unwieldy, but accurate, Ross rifle was that the rifle was not 
‘soldier proof’.  Nevertheless, by early 1941 there were over 79,000 Ross rifles in use 
with the Home Guard.  In May and June 1941, .303 calibre SMLE, P14 and Ross rifles 
started to be withdrawn from the Home Guard and handed over to the Army.15  By April 
1942 the SMLE and P14 were almost extinct in Home Guard service, with 4,233 of the 
former and 2,410 of the latter in the returns (from a high of 26,249 of the two types of 
rifle in February 1941).  The number of Ross rifles had fallen by 60,000, to around 
19,500.16  This transfer of around 80,000 .303 calibre rifles from the Home Guard to the 
Army was achieved because very large amounts of American .300-inch calibre 
smallarms had arrived, and were being issued almost exclusively to the Home Guard.   
 
Purchasing military equipment in America effectively bankrupted the British economy, 
costing the country its economic and political freedom (vide Ponting, 1990, pp.196-
215), and reaction to the arrival of these dearly bought weapons is crucial to the thrust 
of this study.  To fully appreciate the issue, we must take another historical detour:  As 
we have already established, the production of the First World War British P14 service 
rifle had been handled by three American factories.  Entering the First World War in 
1917, the Americans were themselves faced with a possible shortfall of their own 
service rifle – the United States Rifle, calibre .30, Model 1903, widely known as the 
‘’03 Springfield’.17  After considering various options, the P14 was adapted to chamber 
American .30-06 ammunition, and production resumed at Winchester, Remington and 
Eddystone.  Thus the final derivative of the experimental British Pattern 1913 rifle was 
the US Rifle, calibre .30, Model 1917, popularly known as the ‘Enfield’.  American 
author Bruce Canfield comments (1991, pp.60 and 70): 
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… this decision [to continue production of the P14 in .30-06 calibre] was 
eventually hailed as ‘the greatest executive decision of the war.’  Even though it 
appears in hindsight to be the only reasonable choice. 
 
Approximately three quarters of the troops of the AEF (American Expeditionary 
Force) were armed with M1917 rifles.  The most famous Doughboy of them all, 
Corporal Alvin C. York, used an M1917 rifle in his celebrated exploits.  York’s 
pinpoint shooting, while attributably mainly to his remarkable marksmanship, 
nevertheless illustrated very clearly that the M1917 rifle was capable of fine 
accuracy.” 
 
The M1917 represented a further design evolution of the original P13 concept, with 
lessons learned from production of the P14 (Canfield, 1991, p.63): 
 Although the only major difference between the US M1917 rifle and its British 
Pattern 1914 counterpart was the different calibre … A number of 
manufacturing short cuts were instituted in the M1917 rifle’s production, made 
possible by the experience gained during the production of the British rifle … 
unit cost of the British Pattern 1914 rifle was approximately $42.00 while the 
per unit cost of the US M1917 rifle was only $26.00.  Furthermore, the record 
for Pattern 14 rifles assembled by one man was 50 per day whereas some 280 
M1917 rifles were assembled by one man in the same period of time.18 
 
‘Manufacturing shortcuts’ sound sinister, but these were actually the deletion of 
unnecessary and obsolete long-range volley sights, and their attendant machining and 
fitting, and other minor machining processes.  It should not be imagined that this 
streamlining of manufacture resulted in a lowering of quality; indeed the opposite was 
true (Canfield, 1991, pp.63-4): 
 The M1917 rifle proved to be an excellent military weapon … the M1917’s rear 
sight was … a better battle sight than the Springfield’s … [and the] .30-06 
cartridge actually functioned in the M1917 better than did the .303 in the Pattern 
1914.  This was due to the fact that the Pattern 1913 rifle, the predecessor of 
both weapons, was originally chambered for the rimless .276 cartridge.  The 
rimless .30-06 fed from the magazine much better than did the rimmed .303. 
 
The US .30-06 round is ballistically superior to the British .303 Mk. VII (having a 
flatter trajectory), which further enhanced the combat performance of the ‘American 
Enfield’.  As an additional bonus, the Americans discovered that six rimless US rounds 
would fit into the magazine designed for five rimmed British rounds. 
 
As soon as M1917 production for the US Government commenced the problem with 
standardisation re-emerged, and a preliminary batch of rifles, rushed to the front line, 
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with the best of intentions, by Winchester caused more harm to the rifle’s reputation 
than good (Canfield, 1991, p.62).  Eventually, however, the standardised M1917 proved 
to be a robust and accurate military rifle.  However, like the P14 in the UK, the bulk of 
the M1917 rifles manufactured between 1917 and 1919 were placed in reserve after the 
First World War (Canfield, 1991, p.63).  Canfield explains (1991, p.70): 
 After the war, some thought was given to making the M1917 the standard 
service rifle and retiring the M1903 (Springfield).  Subsequent post-war labour 
problems in the civilian plants which had produced the M1917 rifle soon killed 
this idea and the ’03 remained the standard issue rifle while the M1917 was 
relegated to the war reserve stockpile. 
 
Canfield is, perhaps, being over-generous, as the M1917 was never especially popular 
with American troops.  Partly this was due to the fact that it was a foreign design, and 
partly due to the same lack of ‘handiness’ that SMLE users complained of, when 
compared to the M1903 ‘Springfield’.  Also, great emphasis was placed on technical 
marksmanship in US military circles, and the M1917 had a rear sight that was only 
adjustable for elevation, and the foresight block was punched to fix the foresight blade 
in place, making lateral adjustment by the firer difficult.  This was because the rifles 
were zeroed at the factory, and each one was entirely capable of hitting a man-sized 
target at battle ranges, if pointed with a reasonable degree of accuracy.  This is entirely 
different, however, to target shooting on the range, and the lack of fine adjustment was 
another factor that militated against the design.  These are, of course, ‘niggles’, and are 
a better indicator of the loyalty engendered by the ’03 Springfield, than real 
shortcomings of the M1917 as a battle rifle, but the M1917 was, nonetheless, reduced to 
war reserve status following the First World War. 
 
United States infantry adopted the M1 ‘Garand’ self-loading rifle in 1936, thus by 1940 
the US military was equipped with the M1 and the M1903 ‘Springfield’, with further 
M1903 rifles and most of the production of M1917 in reserve (Canfield, 1991, p.125).  
Churchill (1955, p.127) described the transfer of materiel from the US reserve stockpile: 
 As early as June 1 the President sent out orders to the War and Navy 
Departments to report what weapons they could spare for Britain and France…  
In forty-eight hours the answers were given, and on June 3 [General] Marshall 
approved the lists.  The first list comprised half a million .30 calibre rifles 
manufactured in 1917 and 1918 and stored in grease for more than twenty years.  
For these there were about 250 cartridges apiece.  There were 900 “soixante-
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quinze” field guns, with a million rounds, 80,000 machine-guns, and various 
other items…  Since every hour counted, it was decided that the Army should 
sell (for thirty-seven million dollars) everything on the list to one concern, which 
could in turn resell immediately to the British and French. 
 
By these extraordinary measures the United States left themselves with the 
equipment for only 1,800,000 men, the minimum figure stipulated by the 
American Army's mobilisation plan. 
 
To avoid the logistic nightmare of two calibres of service ammunition, and because 
supplies of .30-06 were short, every round having to be imported, the use of ‘.300’ 
calibre weapons (as the British termed them) was restricted, from the outset, to ‘the 
Home Guard or fixed defensive points’.19 
 
The purchase of 500,000 American rifles represented commitment and sacrifice on both 
sides of the Atlantic.  So how did the Home Guard react to these weapons?  For the 
student of the Home Guard, dependent on historians, this can be a confusing matter.  
Longmate tells us (1974, p.70): 
 The first real weapons to reach the LDV in any quantity were half a million 
ancient rifles, sent by the United States during June and July in response to an 
appeal from Winston Churchill.  Their vintage was betrayed by their popular 
name ‘Springfield 1917’, or ‘17’ for short, and they arrived caked in heavy 
grease, like congealed Vaseline, which had protected them during their long 
years of disuse.  Removing the grease proved to be a dirty and wearisome job.  
Opinions about the Springfields varied.  One experienced ex-officer considered, 
‘we might have been much worse served’, though the weapon was ‘rather 
cumbersome’ with ‘a difficult bolt action for rapid fire’.  But the rifle’s real 
disadvantage was that it fired .300 ammunition instead of .303, and to prevent 
the wrong calibre being used a red band was painted round the barrel.  Another 
foreign rifle distributed at this time, the Canadian Ross, was of standard calibre, 
but, as one user noted, ‘unsuitable for Service conditions as … any earth or dirt 
may cause a jam.’  Another veteran, whose platoon in Devon possessed ten Ross 
rifles between sixty men, regarded it as ‘a grand shooting rifle, but … a heavy 
ill-balanced brute to lug about’.  He was delighted when their Ross’s were 
replaced by ‘light, handy and accurate’ Remingtons. 
 
Longmate gives the impression that the Americans generously cleared out their attic to 
help the embattled Brits, although, as we have seen, the American war reserve was 
maintained, and the Americans sold that which they could be persuaded to part with.  
More importantly, how can M1917 rifles be ‘ancient’, compared to the SMLE (1907), 
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P14 (1914), or Ross (1910) and what is a ‘cumbersome’ ‘Springfield 1917’, and how 
does it relate to a ‘light, handy and accurate Remington’? 
 
The horror of cleaning cosmoline preservative from American rifles left an enduring 
mark on the folk memory of the Home Guard.  There was, however, nothing unique 
about the preservation methods applied, which ensured the weapons reached their users 
in as-new condition.  The author can confirm that removing cosmoline is a wearisome 
task, but under the circumstances it seems a small price to pay, shaving days, or even 
weeks off the delivery time of the rifles.  A conscious decision was made to avoid the 
additional delay of passing them through ordnance depots for degreasing – on 8 July 
1940, a signal was prepared from HOFOR (HQ Home Forces) to all UK commands:20 
 
 To H.Q. Eastern Command – Northern Command – Western Command – 
 Southern Command – Scottish Command – London Area. 
 
 From HOFOR       8-9 July 1940 
 
 Approx ________ rifles will arrive at your command depots during next few 
 days (.)  Imperative to have distribution ready and that no delays are caused (.)  
 Personal message on subject has been sent to your MGA but rifles will have to 
 be degreased LDVs themselves (.)  WO is issuing instructions how to do it. 
 
 Eastern 24,000 – Northern 59,000 – Western 49,000 – Southern 49,000 – 
 Scottish 29,000 – London Area 6,000   
 
 
To return to the literature, from Professor MacKenzie (1996, p.91) we learn that in 
September 1940: 
 … many veterans were less than happy with what they got – especially if it 
involved handing in the beloved SMLE in exchange for a foreign weapon.  The 
Canadian Ross and the US Remington and Springfield rifles, covered in the 
thick grease in which they had been stored for over twenty years, were longer 
and more unwieldy than the standard Lee-Enfield, and the Ross tended to jam 
when dirty (the reason it had been withdrawn from service in the First World 
War). 
 
Again, we find cosmoline and careless terminology: ‘Remington’ and ‘Springfield’ 
rifles – no mention of Winchester or Eddystone.  K.R. Gulvin (1980, pp.22-3), in his 
history of Kent Home Guard, manages yet another version: 
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 The first weapons to reach the Kent Home Guard in large numbers were 
consignments of American P14 and P17 rifles, known as Springfields, 
Remingtons or Eddystones, depending on which company had manufactured 
them…  All these rifles fired the standard American .300 rimless cartridge, 
which was in very short supply in Britain at this time…  Another rifle issued to 
the Kent Home Guard in large numbers in 1940 was the Canadian Ross rifle, 
which fired a different design of cartridge to either the British .303 or American 
.300. 
 
 
It should now be clear why we have laboured the history of the various different service 
rifles to be issued to the LDV/Home Guard.  There is evidence that some M1903 
‘Springfield’ rifles were supplied to Britain – Skennerton (1993, p.198)  lists 64,003 
M1903 A1 and A3 rifles, 38,001 M1 “Garand” self-loading rifles, and a further 119,000 
M1917 rifles as supplied by the US Government to the ‘British Empire’, under the 
terms of the Lend-Lease Act, passed in March 1941.  Indeed, 200 ‘Lend-Lease’ M1903 
‘Springfield’ rifles were purchased from the UK Ministry of Supply in 1955, by an 
American entrepreneur, and imported back into the United States.  Now eagerly sought 
collectors’ items, the ‘Red Star’ rifles (as they are known, after the museum/dealership 
that distributed them), include various marks of M1903, but are largely rare, first-
pattern, Remington-made M1903s, manufactured in 1941-42.21   Researchers in the 
United States have associated these with the distinctive order mentioned by Skennerton, 
and also recorded in US Army archives, for 64,003 M1903s.22  All are marked with a 
red painted band on the forward woodwork, often with ‘.30’ or ‘.300’ stencilled on it.23  
We can, therefore, reasonable conclude that, some 1903 ‘Springfields’ may have been 
included in the 500,000 rifles purchased in 1940, and that as many as 64,003 arrived in 
1942 (Skennerton, 1988, p198) and were issued to the Home Guard.   Nevertheless, as 
is clear from contemporary photographs, and training manuals, the ‘signature’ weapon 
of the Home Guard from 1941 to 1943 was the US .30-06 M1917 rifle, manufactured by 
Winchester, Remington or Eddystone, but often erroneously referred-to as a ‘P17’, 
‘Pattern 17’, or ‘Springfield’.24  
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A low serial number Remington-made M1903 ‘Springfield’, supplied to the UK under 
the Lend-Lease scheme in 1942 and returned to the United States in 1955.  The barrel is 
dated 12/41, the receiver February 1942. Note the mismatched top hand guard (the red 
stripe is stepped) indicating the woodwork came from two different weapons.  The 
complex US M1907 leather sling did see Home Guard service, and is typical of the US 
military’s obsession with technical marksmanship. Many of these slings ended up on 
Lee-Enfield No.4(T) and L42 sniper rifles. (www.snipershide.com) 
 
Clifford Shore, the Home Guard-turned-sniping instructor, took every opportunity to 
examine and shoot any small arms that came his way.  Of the M1903 he recorded: ‘This 
Springfield rifle is seldom seen in England, and my personal knowledge of it is not 
extensive.  But I have used it enough to know it is a first-rate rifle’ (Shore, 1997, 
pp.197).  He says of the M1917: 
 The M17s which I used in England in the years 1940-43 [his Home Guard 
service] were really splendid weapons; I never came across a bad one.  In certain 
quarters they were not popular, but that can be primarily and summarily 
dismissed with the one word “ignorance.” … 
 
… Many of the Home Guard in 1940 did not like the M17; usually these fellows 
were veterans of the First World War and the word rifle to them meant only the 
S.M.L.E… 
 
The higher velocity .300 cartridge gave slightly improved ballistics than the .303 
cartridge in the P14, and I should say that the M17 was probably the most 
accurate rifle I have ever used… (Shore, 1997, pp.198-199) 
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The definitive Home Guard personal weapon during the period from late-1940 to late-
1943, an Eddystone manufactured M1917.  US-pattern accessories included the 
complicated patent Kerr ‘NobuckL’ sling, M1917 bayonet, cleaning kit-cum-oil bottle 
(‘thong case’ in US terminology) with a weighted pull-through (‘thong’) and bristle 
brush.  Also shown are a wartime diecast .300 drill round, with a .303 drill round for 
comparison, and one of a pair of the distinctive Home Guard pattern ammunition 
pouches.  Each rifleman was issued with 50 rounds of .300 ammunition, here displayed 
using inert rounds and empty cases.  The three brass chargers are correct for pre-war 
manufactured ammunition.  The books are Lt. Col. Barlow’s The Elements of Rifle 
Shooting, Hertfordshire Home Guard instructor’s course notes, including ‘shooting 
with the P.17’, and The Home Guard Pocket Manual. (Author’s photograph) 
  
John Langdon-Davies’ The Home Guard Training Manual contained a chapter on ‘rifles 
and rifle shooting’, penned by Lt. Col. J.A. Barlow, author of Elements of Rifle 
Shooting.  In the sixth (1942) edition Barlow summed up the situation regarding Home 
Guard’s rifles (Langdon Davies, 1942b, p.93): 
You, as one of the Home Guard, may be armed with any one of the following 
rifles: 
(a) The .303” British Service Rifle (S.M.L.E.). 
(b) The .303” pattern Dec. 14 rifle (P.14). 
(c) The .303” Canadian Ross rifle (Ross). 
(d) The .300” U.S.A. 1917 model which looks almost exactly like the British 
P.14, having been copied from it (Model 17). 
(e) The .300” U.S.A. Springfield rifle (Springfield).  
When you first joined up you probably had a British rifle given you.  If you have 
not already had it changed for one of the U.S.A. types, it is probable that this will 
happen shortly.  The reason is that at first you had to be armed at once with what 
was immediately ready; now that large stocks of U.S.A. weapons are arriving, it is 
obviously better for all the Home Guard to have American weapons while the field 
army, which has to move about, keeps the British types. 
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All U.S.A. rifles, and in fact any weapons which will not take the British Service 
cartridges, are marked with a red band two inches wide, in order to distinguish them. 
 
 
The author of this study can confirm, as a regular shooter with an ex-Home Guard 
Eddystone M1917, that the rifle may be a little awkward to carry about, due to the point 
of balance being on the action (bolt and magazine), rather than just in front, as it is with 
the SMLE and M1903 ‘Springfield’.  But, once one is settled in the prone firing position 
it comes into its own.  The M1917 is, as Shore described, satisfyingly accurate, and its 
extra weight helps absorb the recoil of the powerful .30-06 bullet, which achieves an 
almost flat trajectory over normal battle ranges, obviating the necessity for accurate 
sight setting and distance judging.  The need to import this ammunition was a problem, 
as Professor MacKenzie comments (1996, p.91): 
 Ammunition was also scarce.  Given that most of the rifles issued to the Home 
Guard were .300 calibre rather than the standard British .303, ammunition had to 
be imported along with American arms, which allowed for a maximum of 50 
rounds per rifle and 750 rounds for BARs [Browning Automatic Rifles] and 
machine guns. 
 
Fifty rounds of SAA (small arms ammunition) was the normal scale of ‘ready’ 
ammunition, carried in the webbing of a British soldier.  Standard issue 1937-pattern 
webbing included two double-pocket ammunition pouches, giving the soldier 40 rounds 
on his belt (two chargers of five rounds in each pouch), plus ten in the SMLE rifle 
magazine.  Infantrymen normally carried ‘utility pouches’ instead of the ammunition 
pouches, each capable of holding three magazines for the section’s Bren light 
machinegun, or grenades, as well as rifle ammunition.  In anticipation of shortages of 
canvas webbing equipment, a leather version of 1937-pattern webbing equipment was 
approved in 1939.  This is often, but incorrectly, associated with the Home Guard.  1939 
pattern equipment was chiefly used by training battalions and some colonial troops.  
Modified with belt loops, 1939-pattern utility pouches were, however, initially issued 
on a scale of one per gun, to accompany the Browning Automatic Rifle, discussed 
below in Chapter 5, and extended versions of ’39 and ’37-pattern utility pouches were 
later to become available to those issued with Sten machine carbines (Hunt, 2002, p.18).  
The Home Guard had its own distinctive personal load carrying equipment, comprising 
a leather single prong buckle belt (1903-pattern, greatcoat order), two webbing 
ammunition pouches and a slip-over webbing back piece with two buckles, to enable 
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’37-pattern webbing braces to be worn.  There was also a slung rubberised cotton 
haversack and a felt covered water bottle in a leather cradle.  The bayonet (if issued) 
was held in a pattern 1939 leather bayonet frog.  The Home Guard ammunition pouches 
were large enough to hold two hand grenades, or two magazines for the Browning 
Automatic Rifle – the other key US rifle import, which we will examine later – and had 
two pockets on the inside of the front face, each holding two chargers of five rounds of 
M1906 .30in ammunition.  This gave the Home Guard forty rounds on his belt, just like 
a Regular, plus five rounds in the rifle, with a spare charger of five rounds in hand.25  
 
In 1940-41, the ammunition scale for the Home Guard would not have been considered 
abnormally low, were it not that very little more was held in reserve or available for 
training.  Operation Orders – Defence Scheme No 3 of 20th Battalion Kent Home Guard 
(dated 27th January 1941) noted that on the invasion alarm being given, NCOs and men 
would make their way to company HQs, with their mobilisation equipment, including 
arms and ammunition.  CQMSs (Company Quartermaster Sergeants) would collect 
further ‘available ammunition’ and twelve loaded magazines for the company Lewis 
light machine gun: thus would Sevenoaks go to war (Brown and Peek, 1944, p.6).  
Although it limited the amount of practices that could be shot with the M1917 rifle, the 
shortage of .300in ammunition was less of a handicap than is sometimes maintained, as 
the Home Guard were able to practice ‘GAS’ (Grouping, Application and Snap 
shooting), and even more elaborate exercises, with .22 rifles in local TA drill halls, and 
on the ranges with borrowed .303 rifles, and ammunition from the National Rifle 
Association, as described in Home Guard Instruction No 38 of September 1941:26   
Many units have shown great ingenuity in constructing miniature ranges 
with moving targets representing descending parachutes, dive bombers, 
defenders appearing at the windows of houses, round corners of models, etc., 
which greatly add to both interest and instructional value of this training.  It is 
hoped to maintain a regular, though probably reduced, supply of .22-inch 
ammunition throughout the winter.  As regards the open range, it may not be 
generally known that a small pool of .303-inch “small mark” ammunition is 
supplied weekly by the N.R.A. for issue to the Home Guard.  A proportion of 
this ammunition is used for exercising Home Guard units who are within reach 
of the N.R.A. ranges at Bisley, the remainder is distributed to affiliated rifle 
clubs throughout the country and may be used by units. 
The regulations for safety areas for ranges have been relaxed and will 
facilitate provision under command supervision of open ranges for Home Guard 
units. 
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Arrangements will be made locally for the loaning of .303-inch rifles by 
Commands to Home Guard units. 
 
The Home Guard was but one part of the machinery of Home Defence, which included 
many other organisations, all of which shared the problems of supply.  Indeed, the 
Home Guard, by cornering the American weapons, had a highly advantageous situation.  
On 27 May 1942, Churchill wrote to the Secretary of State for War and the CIGS 
concerning the state of an Army unit detailed to protect him at his residence at 
Chartwell – about twenty minutes’ drive away from the M1917-armed Home Guards of 
‘D’ Company in Sevenoaks (Churchill, 1954b, pp.694-5): 
 A company of Young Soldiers Battalion of corps troops, Buffs, were detailed for 
my protection when I visited Chartwell this weekend.  I naturally inspected it, 
and asked questions about its equipment.  I was told they were short of Bren gun 
carriers and very short of Bren guns.  The output of Bren guns and Bren gun 
carriers has been very good for some time.  I was not aware there was any 
deficiency in these two items. 
 
2. I also noticed there were in the battalion two different marks of Lee-
Metford rifles.  Even some platoons were half-and-half.  The sighting of these 
rifles is different, although of course they have the same ammunition.  Could 
you let me have a note on this, stating whether any other units are in a similar 
condition? 
 
3. I request that no trouble should be caused to the company or the 
battalion, as I am responsible for asking the questions, which it was the duty of 
those concerned to answer. 
 
We can assume that Churchill, having served at Omdurman and during the Boer War, 
knew a Lee-Metford when he inspected one.  That, as late as May 1942, British Army 
troops guarding the Prime Minister were equipped with rifles dating from 1888 and 
sighted for black powder ammunition, brings the rifle crisis sharply into focus, and 
places the imagined problems of the Home Guard and their modern, high velocity, 
M1917 rifles in perspective.27 
 
The main criticism of the P14/M1917 series was that they were not as ‘handy’ as the 
SMLE.  One important aspect of ‘handiness’ was the rifle’s suitability for bayonet 
fighting.  The Second World War British Army remained firmly wedded to the ‘Spirit 
of the Bayonet’ and, inevitably, this percolated down to the Home Guard (Shore, 1997, 
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p.308).  Home Guard Instruction No 14 (September 1940) detailed the training syllabus, 
stating: 
 The Bayonet (for units armed with the bayonet): The object is to develop the 
offensive spirit and give the man facility with the soldier’s best method of 
offence and defence when he cannot shoot and he wishes to kill without noise.28 
 
Given the supposed importance of the bayonet as an offensive weapon, it was perhaps 
inevitable that an attempt would be made to arm those who ‘could not shoot’ simply 
because they still had no rifle, by welding bayonet blades to a rifle-length piece of steel 
tube.29  The result was, quite correctly, but tactlessly, termed a ‘pike’.   Lord Croft 
commended the pike to the House of Lords in a debate on 4 February 1942:   
I would rather have trained bombers for fighting in urban areas, and if a 
bombing attack could be swiftly followed up by cold steel, it would be most 
effective.  If I were a bomber in such a formation – and I think I have thrown 
most types of bombs that have been used in the Army – I should like to have a 
pike in order to follow up my bombing attack, especially at night.  It is a most 
effective and silent weapon.30  
 
A very similar situation to the one which Britain found itself in during the first three 
years of the Second World War was faced by the American Confederate States in 1861.  
Also short of firearms, and firearms manufacturing capability, Confederate authorities 
decided to produce pikes – six foot wooden shafts to which a blade (sometimes spring-
loaded, and sometimes with a bridle cutter) was affixed.  The intention was that rather 
than be totally unarmed, volunteers could carry a pike until they were able to capture a 
musket – as described in the Historical Journal of the Georgia National Guard: 31 
Governor Brown also instructed in his letter how the pike and side knife were to 
be used. He explained his tactics for his pikemen as follows: "Let every army 
have a large reserve, armed with a good pike, and a long heavy side knife, to be 
brought upon the field, with a shout for victory, or when the time comes for a 
charge with bayonets." Governor Brown went on to explain: "When the 
advancing columns come within reach of the balls, let them [the pikemen] move 
in double quick time and rush with terrible impetuosity into the lines of the 
enemy. 
 Confident in the superiority of his pike and side knife over the ordinary 
 bayonet, Governor Brown continued: "Hand to hand, the pike has vastly the 
 advantage of the bayonet, and those having the bayonet, which is itself but a 
 crooked pike, with shorter staff, must retreat before it." 
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The concept has some theoretical merit, but volunteers armed with ‘Joe Brown’s 
toothpicks’ (as they were known after the Governor of Georgia, who ordered 10,000) 
proved unwilling to close with enemy carrying firearms and the issue of pikes proved 
deleterious to morale: 
Although the soldiers from Habersham County seemed content to parade with 
their pikes, the practice of being armed with an ancient style spear was not 
always accepted by those being issued the weapons. For example, at Big Shanty 
(Kennesaw), where the Andrew's Raiders stole the Confederate supply train and 
locomotive "General," the soldiers on guard at Camp McDonald (next to the 
railroad station) were armed with pikes. Henry Whitley, assigned to Company F, 
56th Georgia Infantry, on guard duty at the station at the time of the raid 
complained that he was powerless to do anything because he and the other 
soldiers were only armed with pikes.  
 Knowing they would shortly be sent to the front in Virginia, Confederate 
 conscript units were bitterly opposed to being armed with a pike, which was in 
 their eyes little better than a sharpened stick, facing an enemy equipped with a 
 modern rifle and bayonet. For example, when pikes were about to be issued to 
 the 31st Georgia Regiment, it almost caused a revolt among the troops. They 
 had no illusion about the killing efficiency of the modern firepower they were 
 about to face in the north. 
Pikes might (possibly) have been welcome expedients in June 1940, but by the time 
they were issued to the Home Guard, in late-1941,32 they proved such a public relations 
disaster that, as the minister responsible, Under-Secretary of State for War, Lord Croft 
(who had opposed them in the first place), resigned.33  In Peter Fleming’s words (1957, 
p.202): 
 [They] seriously annoyed the Home Guard, who by that time were armed with 
sub-machine guns as well as rifles, grenades and even a primitive form of anti-
tank gun. …  The well-meant ironmongery was consigned with contumely to 
their unit stores. 
 
The infamous pikes were taken as proof that the Government was not taking the Home 
Guard seriously, and that continues to be the way the pike saga is viewed.  Professor 
S.P. MacKenzie, for example, devotes several pages to exposing what he portrays as 
Churchillian whimsy (MacKenzie, 1996, p.97-100).  This might be a fair comment, but 
for the fact that the pikes were not an exclusively Home Guard weapon.  General Sir 
Frederick Pile, former General Officer Commanding Anti-aircraft command Great 
Britain, explained in 1949: 
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The ground defence games played by A.A. Command were very old-fashioned 
indeed.  The shortage of rifles was such that many of our units had to give up 
these weapons and were given instead pikes and cudgels.  The pikes consisted of 
bayonets mounted on heavy piping, and the cudgels were of a design so novel 
that the gas-pipe handles were heavier than the small iron heads.  Although it 
was generally known that the Home Guard had been issued with these weapons, 
we were asked to keep quiet about having them too.  It was thought that the 
civilian might have been depressed by the knowledge that our soldiers had no 
other means of defence. (Pile, 1949, p.220)  
 
 
An unidentified Essex Home Guard unit parade with pikes, illustrating that they were a 
substitute for bayonet and rifle.  (www.home-guard.org.uk) 
 
Home Guard returns list an item ‘Bayonet, standard’, from March 1942, which is the 
infamous ‘pike’.  36,884 were already held at that date, along with 105,972 examples of 
the ‘Truncheon, various’.  The numbers would eventually climb to over 45,000 pikes 
and 155,000 truncheons, in September 1942, before beginning a rapid decline.34  
MacKenzie (1996, p.97) is somewhat perplexed by the apparent inability of anyone 
involved to halt the pike project, although, as he points outs out: ‘P.J. Grigg, among 
others, was not averse to occasionally ignoring orders from 10 Downing Street which he 
considered foolish if he thought he could get away with it’.  MacKenzie goes on to 
hazard that ‘…the explanation may be that the War Office itself was genuinely misled 
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into thinking that pikes would be welcome by the extent to which foot drill, smartness, 
and bayonet fighting were encouraged in some Home Guard units’.   
 
That the pikes and cudgels were also, at the same time, issued to the Army casts the 
entire episode in a rather different light.  The pikes are the product of a combination of 
an abject lack of personal weapons – without which the soldier, or Home Guard, would 
have no option in the face of the enemy but to flee or surrender – and the orthodoxy of 
the ‘Spirit of the Bayonet’.  This latter has its roots in episodes such as the taking of the 
Austro-Hungarian-held island of Papadopoli during the crossing of the River Piave in 
October 1918. To preserve the element of surprise, a force led by a battalion of the 
Honourable Artillery Company seized the island in a silent attack, at bayonet point, as 
described by  George Cassar (1998, p.193)  
Pushing inland, the British entered the first line of trenches with orders to 
maintain the strictest silence and to use the bayonet only.  They advanced 
several hundred yards before surprising several thinly-manned Hungarian 
outposts and, in the ensuing hand-to-hand combat, killed or captured all the 
defenders.   
 
This the sort of operation the unfortunate Lord Croft was trying to describe, defending 
the pikes in the House of Commons.  It is a moot point whether the knowledge that 
Army units were also issued pikes and cudgels would have made them more acceptable 
to the British public, or created alarm and despondency, but for the purposes of 
historical analysis, we must accept them as weapons in extremis, rather than an ill-
conceived effort to mollify the Home Guard. 
 
The tenth edition of former RSM, now Captain, A. Southworth’s The Home Guard 
Pocket Manual was published in January 1944.  The only bolt action rifle featured was 
the M1917, indicating the extent to which it had by that stage become the standard 
personal weapon of the Home Guard.35  Ironically, almost as the Pocket Manual went to 
print, Southworth’s own company, in Sevenoaks, Kent, achieved its ambition of re-
equipping in line with the Regular Army.  ‘D’ Company diary records: ‘ 19/12/43.  
Exchange of Rifles.  The .300 Rifles were handed in and .303 No4 Lee Enfield Rifles 
issued’ (Brown and Peek, 1944, p.31).  At the next trip to the ranges, on 16 January 
1944, five Home Guards achieved four-inch groups, which suggests that the new rifles 
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were satisfactory (Brown and Peek, 1944, p.31).  A year earlier, ten four inch groups 
were scored with the M1917s, but these were familiar rifles (Brown and Peek, 1944, 
p.23).  The quality of the No. 4 rifle was, though, likely to be inferior to that of almost 
any other rifle the Home Guard had encountered.  During three years of wartime 
production, manufacturing shortcuts had been introduced and quality standards eased.  
The keen student is directed to Ian Skennerton’s The Lee-Enfield Story (1993), for our 
purposes Captain Shore’s comments will suffice (Shore, 1997, pp.152-4): 
 Many of the early rifles were very poor and had many faults, and at one stage 
opinion was dead against the model.  Bolts needed a lot of work before they 
functioned decently; rear sights had considerable lateral play; magazines were 
faulty; the bores were poorly finished due to lack of machining operations, and 
there was great tolerance and allowance manifest when passing the bores for 
gauging – anything from .301 to .305 was passed as being fit for use.  Some of 
the rifles were terrible … 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A No.4 Mk I* Lee-Enfield, manufactured in 1943 by Stevens-Savage in the United States 
and supplied under Lend-Lease.  The excellent Mk 1 sight (above, centre left), was time-
consuming to manufacture and delayed production.  As a result, the simple L-shaped 
Mk 2 battle sight was introduced.  In theory the rifle would hit a target at 300 yards 
using the ‘300’ aperture of the battle sight with the spike bayonet fixed; 400 yards, 
using the same aperture but without the bayonet.  The ‘600’ aperture was used without 
the bayonet fixed.  At 200 and 500 yards the firer aimed low to compensate.  Even on a 
range where distances are known, it is extremely difficult to fire the rifle accurately in 
this way.  However, it is highly accurate with the Mk 1 sight fitted.  Eventually a 
compromise was reached, with the introduction of a cheap, pressed steel version of the 
Mk 1, with a simple sliding adjustment, instead of a micrometer screw (the Mks 3 and 
4).  Other items shown are (from left to right) Bakelite oil bottle and pull through, a 
drill .300 round for comparison, a Mk VI  .303 round, a cotton bandolier for 50 rounds 
of .303 Mk VII, and a charger of five Mk VII .303 rounds.  The rifle is fitted with a 37-
pattern webbing sling, beneath it is an ‘austerity’ sling made of cotton and plastic, 
manufactured in 1943, and the spike bayonet and scabbard.  (Author’s photograph) 
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As we have seen, the US M1917 rifle represented an improvement on the already quite 
respectable P14 rifle, and was ten years, two design evolutions and one major war 
newer than the British service rifle, the Rifle No. 1 or SMLE.  The irony that the 
excellent M1917 military rifle should be superseded by gimcrack wartime-
manufactured No. 4 Lee-Enfields was entirely lost on the Home Guard.36  As the war 
entered its final phase, the Home Guard had at last achieved parity with the Army.  
Attitudes had also changed, and the painstaking Bisley marksmanship of Lt. Col. 
Barlow and the traditional Rifle Volunteers now belonged to a vanished age: ‘The day 
our platoon was issued with Sten guns’, remember[ed] one Edinburgh Home Guard, ‘I 
knew we were going to win the war.  “At last”, I thought, “we’ve ditched the fine 
British craftsmanship nonsense”.’ (Longmate, 1974, p.75).   
 
Ian Becket sought to link the LDV/Home Guard with a ‘Volunteer Tradition’.  The 
issue is a complex one, if only because the Volunteer movement was essentially 
reactionary, mobilising to defend the established order, while the Home Guard was 
enthusiastically socialist, rejecting the ‘Old Guard’.  However, what the ‘Parashots’ of 
May 1940 did undoubtedly share with their Victorian forebears was the conviction that 
to place the nation in arms was to create a nation of skilled riflemen.  At the outset, the 
civilian volunteers of the LDV were not looking for uniform, formations, rank structure 
– or any of the other paraphernalia of formal military organisation: their expectation 
was simply that the government put a service rifle – scarcely cutting edge technology – 
in the hands of every volunteer.  But catastrophic losses of materiel, the extraordinary 
response to Eden’s call for volunteers, the need to re-equip an army that was expanding 
exponentially, and the near-total lack of new production, made even this modest 
expectation unreasonable.  The apparent unwillingness (an inability had consequences 
too serious to contemplate) of an already discredited government to meet its 
commitment to arm all of the LDV was perceived as a lack of faith in the volunteers, 
and ensured that any subsequent issue of non-standard weapons or equipment, however 
suitable for their purpose, was seen as ersatz.  It threw the volunteers back on their own 
resources.  In the end, the arrival of mass-produced sub-machineguns, requiring the very 
minimum of skill to build and operate, satisfied the demand for weapons, supplanted the 
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rifle and demonstrated the universality of Stalin’s maxim that ‘quantity has a quality of 
its own’. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Improvisation 
 
The type and amount of weaponry delivered to the LDV/Home Guard varied according 
to the level of threat, and it is therefore important to bear in mind, when considering 
accounts of poorly-armed or un-armed LDV preparing to meet the Nazi invader, that 
resources were placed where they were most likely to be needed.  Kent, for example, 
was particularly threatened.  K.R. Gulvin (1980, pp.9-10) relates that: 
 On the evening of 17th May, Brigadier General Franklin [organising the LDV in 
Kent] was ordered to have 1,500 men on armed patrol by the next evening.  On 
receiving the order from Eastern Command, the Zone Commander visited 
Chatham and obtained 1,500 rifles and 15,000 rounds of ammunition from the 
Chatham Command.  On the following date a further 2,000 rifles were drawn… 
 
By 1030pm the following night, more than 1,000 armed men were on duty 
throughout Kent. 
 
Such speed and efficiency is far from the conventional view of the early days of the 
LDV.  However, there would eventually be over 100,000 men in Kent Home Guard 
alone – approximately the strength of the entire modern British Army – so 3,500 rifles 
would not go far (Gulvin, 1980, p.6). 
 
Second World War British Army tactical doctrine held that seven was the largest 
number of men that could be controlled in battle by voice.  Accordingly, the infantry 
section consisted of a corporal and seven men; in order to allow for sickness, detached 
duties or casualties, each section had an establishment of ten men.1  The LDV/Home 
Guard, at over 1.5 million men, was larger than anticipated and, in many respects, larger 
than was needed – although the necessity of maintaining efficient war work limited the 
amount of time each Home Guardsman could devote to training or operational duties.  
As a result, platoons and sections were administrative structures – the combat units 
equivalent to Army platoons and sections being ‘battle platoons’ and ‘squads’.  In May 
1941 each Home Guard section had an establishment of twenty-five men and there was, 
doctrinally at least, no requirement to provide arms for the squad and its reserves.2  
Skennerton tells us that in 1940-41 the Home Guard had one rifle between two men 
(1993, p.286), while MacKenzie notes that ‘even under ideal conditions at least 740,000 
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Home Guards would have no personal weapons’ (1996, p.91).  In terms of historical 
perspective, it is worth noting that in the build-up to ‘D’ Day, in March 1944, the 
Maquis of the French Resistance were estimated to have one rifle for every eighteen 
men (Marks, 2000, p.461); nevertheless, the shortfall of personal weapons was a source 
of frustration to the volunteers and, whatever doctrine or military logic might have 
dictated, embarrassment to the Government. 
 
Since 14 May 1940, public-spirited citizens had been handing in weapons to police 
stations, while the National Rifle Association issued over one thousand rifles on loan to 
members in the LDV (Cole and Fulton, 1990, p.41).  The highest figure for (declared) 
privately-owned rifles in the Home Guard returns is 8,019,3 so private weapons only 
ever met a tiny fraction of the overall requirement.  Nevertheless, they did help boost 
moral, particularly in areas away from the immediate threat, where official issues would 
be slow in coming.  Mark Dineley, collector, and proprietor of theatrical armourers 
Bapty & Co Ltd, placed a quantity of weapons at the disposal of the Lord Lieutenant of 
Wiltshire, for issue to the local LDV.  Beneath his authority from the Chief Constable of 
Wiltshire to hand over his firearms, pasted in a scrap book, Dineley laconically noted: 
‘Dates from the great “Wind Up” and the organisation of the LDV and Home Guard.  I 
armed all the neighbourhood out of my store thusly allaying a great deal of alarm.’4  
Bapty’s premises in the West End of London were also striving to help the war effort, as 
Walter Lyall recalled in 1976: 
 Until 1940 the wooden partition at the back of the landing also carried a tall, 
 glass-fronted display case, removed by the police from a London pub, which 
 contained a fine show of bulldog and Constabulary revolvers grouped round a 
 .31 percussion Colt.  When the war got rolling after Dunkirk Mrs Rush [the 
 Manager] decided to break it up to satisfy the demand for handguns, just any 
 handguns, in the Home Guard …  (Lyall, 1976, p.309)  
 
Like the clubs and cudgels some Volunteers crafted for themselves, many of these 
firearms were of more symbolic than practical significance.  Despite all efforts, private 
and public, Great Britain failed, in 1940, to become a nation of riflemen, and the 
emphasis shifted to improvised resistance. 
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Authority to hand over privately owned weapons to the LDV.  (Bapty 2000) 
 
 
Major General Peter Pellereau recalls joining Ightham LDV (near Sevenoaks, Kent) 
between leaving school and going up to Trinity College, Cambridge.5  Ightham LDV 
were armed with shotguns and Molotov cocktails – having received a lecture from 
Spanish Civil War veteran Tom Wintringham on preparing the latter.6  The chief 
armament of Clifford Shore’s Home Guard platoon (prior to the arrival of their M1917 
rifles), was three shotguns.  Shore recorded: 
 Quite a number of people held the opinion that if the Hun did arrive and perforce 
landed in wooded areas where he would probably escape detection much more 
easily, and where it would certainly be better for him to hide up, then the 
shotgun would be a better weapon than the rifle.  There is no doubt that for very 
close quarter work the lethality of the 12, 16 or 20 bore cartridge cannot be 
dismissed lightly.  (Shore, 1997, pp.223-234) 
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Characteristically, Shore had some observations on shotgun ammunition: 
Very tentatively we suggested to some of the more blood-thirsty volunteers that 
they might pour melted wax into the shot charge after loading, but warned them 
that with this procedure this is a very definite danger of bulging the barrel at the 
choke.  (Shore, 1997, p.236) 
 
The expedient did, however, prove gratifyingly effective: 
 The firer took up his stance about 20 yards from the barn, put the gun to his 
shoulder and pulled the trigger.  Most of the watchers were standing close to him 
and probably blinked at the noise of the explosion of the charge.  They must 
therefore have been greatly surprised when, after the blink, they opened their 
eyes to find that the door had vanished! … The door must have been in a far 
worse condition than was apparent from looking at it, but nevertheless it was a 
most spectacular demonstration, and everyone went away very impressed with 
the terrific power of such a projectile fired from a 12 bore gun.  (Shore, 1997, 
p.237) 
 
It is relevant to note that modern hostage-rescue teams carry a shotgun loaded with lead-
dust and wax ‘Hatton’ rounds, for the specific purpose of opening doors.  Almost all the 
energy of the projectile is transmitted to the immediate target, with very little potential 
for collateral damage.  This phenomenon may explain why the barn door demonstration 
was so spectacular.  Shore continues: 
 “… my advice was … [to] take a 16 bore cartridge and cut it in half through the 
felt wad and load the half containing the shot into a 12 bore cartridge instead of 
the charge.  The pressure developed by such a projectile would be normal, but I 
warned them that even with this idea there was a risk of bulging a barrel at the 
choke in the case of a heavily choked weapon…  
 
At this time quite a number of ‘lethal’ bullets made their appearance for use in 
shotguns, and I never could look at these without a grimace of distaste.  
Assuredly I should not have liked to be on the receiving end of such projectiles 
at close range.  It took quite a time to persuade some men that such bullets were 
perfectly safe to use in shotguns … from a full choke to a true cylinder …” 
(Shore, 1997, p.237) 
 
A ‘shrapnel ball round’ for shotguns was in production as early as 15 June 1940.  
Shrapnel balls were lead-alloy spheres .5in diameter, and could, according to the 
circular  Notes for Guidance in Examining 12 bore Guns (issued by TA2 on 15 June 
1940) therefore pass through even a fully choked Belgian shotgun – the tightest 
generally available.7  Subsequently three types of ‘man-killing’ shotgun ammunition 
were issued.  ‘SG’ and ‘LG’ shot, with a spread of three feet at forty yards – at which 
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range SG shot could penetrate a triplex car windscreen – and Lethal Ball, which could 
kill at longer ranges but lacked the dispersion of shot.8  Having already noted their 
sensitivity to ‘dishonourable’ attacks by civilians, it is germane to the discussion in 
Chapter 2 to see what view the Germans would have taken of Volunteers using 
shotguns.  Unlike the British, Americans have a tradition of using shotguns in war.  
Bruce Canfield says of the First World War US ‘Trench Gun’: 
 … The Germans accused the Americans of ‘Schrecklichkeit’ (barbarism) for our 
use of the shotgun in warfare … On September 14, 1918, Secretary of State 
Lansing was presented with a formal complaint which stated: 
 
‘The German Government protests the use of shotguns by the American 
Army and calls attention to the fact, that according to the laws of war, 
every prisoner found to have in his possession such guns or ammunition 
belonging thereto forfeits his life.’ 
 
… The American  response to the German threat was swift and firm.  It stated 
that shotguns were not prohibited by the Hague ban.9  It was made very clear 
that the United States’ government would not hesitate to ‘make the necessary 
reprisals’ if the Germans followed through on even one such execution … 
 
The United States considered the matter closed and continued to issue trench 
guns … The Germans, however, … continued to exploit the situation for 
propaganda purposes …  It has been said that the Germans feared the shotgun 
more than any other weapon they faced during World War I and their diplomatic 
protests certainly give this oft-repeated claim some validity.”  (Canfield, 1991, 
pp.100-101) 
 
British civilians were perfectly aware of the significance of taking up arms against 
German troops, as the historian of the 1st Cambridgeshire Home Guard Battalion 
recalled: 
 A certain 12-bore hammerless shot gun by Evans had spent most of its forty-five 
 years in Cambridge or in Cambridgeshire… It was a heavy weapon with 
 Whitworth barrels, taking 2¾ in. brass “Perfect” cases.  And now in late April 
 and early May in that year of Grace 1940, the old gun found itself a focus of 
 unusual activity.  For its owner, not unaware of what his decision implied, had 
 made up his mind that if fighting drew near, he was turning out to join in 
 repelling the invader, at least until turned back by troops or police on the spot.  
 To this end then two cartridge belts were bought and joined together, forming a 
 well-filled and well-greased bandolier, while three men, a gardener, a church 
 verger and the owner of the gun, spent many hours in charging the powerful 
 brass cartridges with a load more lethal than they had yet carried.  (Cambs. and 
 Isle of Eley TA Assoc., 1944, p.31) 
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It should be noted that the use of shotguns as combat weapons was not limited to 12 
bores: 
 There was the breech-loading punt gun of 1 in. calibre, the £20 spent in 
 cartridges and their conversion to AA., anti-tank and anti-personal loads.  The 
 reader may smile at all this, but a steel ball (ex ball-race) 1 in. in diameter with 
 14 drs. of powder behind it, falls at least within the category “S.A.P.” [semi
 armour piercing].  And 26 bullets, .360 in. calibre nicely patterned at a high 
 velocity were calculated to be a considerable danger to low-flying aircraft at 
 least.  (Cambs. and Isle of Eley TA Assoc., 1944, p.32) 
 
 
 
 
A 12-bore brass cased ‘Lethal Ball’ round by 
Kynoch (left) and half-inch shrapnel ball. 
(Author’s photograph) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On 15 November 1940, War Office weekly returns showed that shotguns accounted for 
43,697 of the personal weapons carried by members of the Home Guard – against 
804,023 rifles – having fallen from a high in July of 56,033.10  By November 1942 the 
figure had declined to 29,233 12-bore guns and 913 16-bores.  Skennerton (1988, p.23) 
notes that: ‘In the general “call-up” of all firearms, considerable quantities of shotguns 
were also brought into service.  Their main uses included guard duty and Air Force 
gunnery practice.’  However, he lists official UK Government contracts for only 1,662 
assorted shotguns – dating from May 1940 to May 1943 (plus an order for 6,751 
Greener Police Guns – a weapon based on a Martini action and chambering a special 
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round – which are unlikely to have been for Home Guard use, because of their unusual 
ammunition).11   
 
It is therefore misleading to overplay the numerical significance of the shotgun, bought 
or borrowed, to the Home Guard; their chief advantage appears to have been that some 
were on hand wherever an LDV platoon was formed.  It must be said, however, that 
Home Guard Instruction No 51 Part II: Battle Drill lists a shotgun as an alternative to a 
rifle or Sten machine carbine (submachine gun) for four of the eight members of a 
Home Guard ‘squad’, as well as the platoon serjeant (sic) and runner, indicating that 
shotguns remained as combat weapons with some units into 1943.12  This was not to 
suggest, though, that half a Home Guard ‘battle platoon’ would be armed with shotguns, 
merely that shotguns could be used effectively by Home Guards with those duties – e.g. 
No. 2 on the BAR (Browning automatic rifle).  Major General Pellereau recalled that all 
the shotguns used by the Ightham Home Guard (and, presumably, those of other units) 
were all safely returned to their original owners when the Home Guard was stood-down 
in 1944.13 
 
Alongside the shotgun, the other early weapon of Ightham LDV was the Molotov 
cocktail.  A mix of shotguns and rifles might have been adequate for potting Nazi 
parachutists, but they were no use against tanks, the threat that most exercised British 
high command immediately after Dunkirk.  E.W. Ashworth notes: 
 … the Home Guard still faced the problem of dealing with German tanks …  
The initial solution was the adoption of two weapons improvised during the 
Spanish Civil War (1936-39) and Finland’s ‘Winter War’ with the Soviet Union 
(1939-40).  These were the Molotov cocktail (named in ‘honour’ of the Soviet 
minister for War) and the satchel charge. (Ashworth, 1998, p.42) 
 
The Molotov cocktail was more than a simple petrol bomb, but the distinction was 
unclear in 1940 and remains so today – Ashworth explains: 
 The Molotov was familiar to most members of the public thanks to extensive 
press coverage during the Russian/Finnish war, in fact many Home Guard units 
managed to equip themselves with these long before the first official issue of 
small arms.  This was unfortunate for some of them because the device 
described in the newspapers amounted to no more than a bottle of petrol with a 
petrol soaked rag stuffed into or tied around its neck.  Users quickly discovered 
that the newspaper reports were misleading and that the weapon described in 
them was both dangerous and inefficient.  (Ashworth, 1998, p.42) 
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The ‘secret ingredient’ of a Molotov cocktail is the addition of a gelling agent, as the 
post-war US Army manual TM 31-200-1 Unconventional Warfare Devices and 
Techniques describes:14 
 
 GELLED FLAME FUELS – LATEX SYSTEMS    02-7 
 
 Description: Commercial rubber latex or natural latex (obtained from certain 
trees and plants) can be used in combination with acetic acid, sulphuric acid, 
hydrochloric acid or with suitable acid salts to gel gasoline for use as a flame 
fuel.  In the commercial method, the latex is added to the gasoline mix and the 
mixture agitated until thickening occurs.  In the natural method, the gasoline is 
added to the latex in a container.  The container is covered and the mixture 
allowed to stand until it gels. 
 
Comments:  This technique was tested.  It is effective.  
 
When one appreciates the full ‘recipe’, the appellation ‘Molotov cocktail’ makes more 
sense.  The Home Guard Training Manual took a slightly less scientific approach: 
 A mixture often made of paraffin, petrol and tar, which can be put in a bottle or 
tin, lit with a fuse and thrown at a tank, either to destroy part of the mechanism 
or to smoke out the crew.  Although such methods were first used in Spain the 
name is a result of the great use made of it by the Finns against the Russians.  
(Langdon-Davies, 1942b, p.182) 
 
The official British Second World War recipe, as given in Military Training Pamphlet 
No. 42: Tank Hunting and Destruction (War Office, 29 August 1940), specified the 
inflammable substance as ‘petrol and tar in approximately equal measures’, but allowed 
that naptha, paraffin and diesel oil might also be used.  Any one pint bottle could be 
used, provided that it would break easily (which excluded beer and champagne bottles).  
The bottles were to be scored lengthwise two or three times with a diamond to aid 
breaking.  Ignition was by ‘fuzees’, which could be a couple of lifeboat matches 
attached to the bottle with adhesive tape, rag or cotton waste soaked in paraffin and 
dipped in petrol ‘immediately before use’, or even an 18 inch length of cinema film.15 
 
The efficacy of petrol bombs against modern armoured fighting vehicles was 
dramatically demonstrated in Basra, Iraq, on 21 September 2005, when rioters 
bombarded two British Warrior infantry fighting vehicles with petrol bombs, resulting 
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in the crews being forced to abandon their vehicles, as Thomas Harding, Defence 
Correspondent for the Daily Telegraph explained:16 
 … the driver had to open the hatches to see when the vehicle's periscope sights 
 were damaged. A hail of petrol bombs hit the turret and burning fuel poured in, 
 forcing the soldiers to leap out. 
 
Private Burton, of the Staffordshire Regiment – one of the drivers – described the effect 
of the bombs on the crew and vehicle: 
 "Once the bomb had gone into the turret it seeped down in the back with the 
 troops in the back." 
 With fire raging on the top and behind, Pte Burton had to kick open his hatch, 
 which had jammed. "I just jumped through the fire and got out," he said. "I 
 couldn't breathe at all  because of the fumes. I just needed to get out and was 
 thinking about my life, basically."  
 
As early as 1940, the Germans themselves had tested Molotov cocktails, decided that 
they were ineffective against current tanks, as the ‘incendiary fluid did not reach the 
interior’ (Fleischer, 1994, p.16).  The Germans subsequently revised their opinion of 
petrol bombs.  By 1942, Germany’s deteriorating military situation prompted the 
publication of H.Dv.469/4 Anti-tank Defence, All Weapons (vide Fleischer, 1994, p.15).  
This included improvised anti-tank weapons, which the Germans divided into ‘sight 
obscuring’ and ‘destroying’ agents – recognizing the necessity of blinding or halting a 
tank to enable it to be destroyed with thrown charges (or a jerry can of petrol/oil mixture 
with a stick grenade wired to it as an initiator).  German ‘incendiary bottles’ were 
‘bottles of any size … filled 2/3 with gasoline and 1/3 oil or burning oil [paraffin].  Two 
matches were taped to the bottle and enclosed in wads of tow’ (Fleischer, 1994, p.15).  
The need to slow, halt or blind tanks, to enable an attack, had been identified in the 
Spanish Civil War, and resulted in the construction of various obstacles, and the use of 
expedients such as blanket or tentage strung across roads or dropped from above (Slater, 
1941, p.60).  There were also the famous ‘soup plate mines’ – ordinary china plates 
placed upside down in the road –  which, Slater tells us, were successfully used by a 
British company commander during the retreat to Dunkirk to delay German armour 
while his troops withdrew (Slater, 1941, p.59).  This latter improvisation has the 
unusual distinction of featuring in Military Training Pamphlet No. 42, Slater’s Home 
Guard for Victory and the SOE training syllabus, as an example of an effective and 
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proven improvisation, and an early episode of Dad’s Army and Norman Longmate’s 
The Real Dad’s Army for comic effect – as an illustration of the inadequacy of Home 
Guard anti-tank preparations.17 
 
Unlike the Molotov, the Home Guard satchel charge has largely been lost to history.  
Ashworth notes: 
 The satchel charge was widely used during the Spanish Civil War, probably 
originating with the coal miners of Asturia.  As its name suggests it consisted of 
an explosive charge fitted with a detonator and short length of safety fuze in a 
haversack or sandbag …” 
 
The Home Guard version contained about 3lbs. of explosive and the fuze was 
nearly always fitted with a friction igniter of the standard military type.  
(Ashworth, 1998, pp.42-43) 
 
The effectiveness of a satchel charge depends on characteristics of the propagation of an 
explosion, particularly with regard to the position of the detonator relative to the surface 
of the tank. Ashworth concludes: 
 It is obvious that the chances of a thrown satchel landing in a favourable 
orientation are very slim … Given these facts it is easy to understand why the 
Home Guard much preferred the Molotov cocktail.  (Ashworth, 1998, pp.43) 
 
A certain Spanish flavour will already be apparent in the improvised weaponry of the 
LDV.18  Finding themselves in universal demand to expound theories of improvised 
warfare, Tom Wintingham and other veterans of the Spanish Civil War, came up with 
an ambitious plan – as Professor MacKenzie relates: 
 Over dinner with Edward Hulton (owner of Picture Post) and his friend Tom 
Hopkinson one evening in early July 1940, Wintringham came up with a scheme 
to circumvent War Office delays and procrastination in the training of the Home 
Guard through the setting up of a private school.  The Earl of Jersey was asked 
by Hulton to allow use of the grounds of his mansion at Osterley Park, just 
outside London.  ‘Could we dig weapon pits?’ asked Wintringham, his 
imagination racing, ‘loose off mines? Throw hand grenades? Set fire to old 
lorries in the grounds?’  Lord Jersey agreed to it all, as long as the house itself 
was not demolished in the process.”  (MacKenzie, 1996, p.71) 
 
MacKenzie comments: 
 There is no evidence to suggest that Wintingham and his staff consciously 
sought to inculcate political values as well as tactical roles, but in drawing 
comparisons with the Spanish Civil War and promoting the methods practised 
by the militias – heavily grounded in personal initiative and passionate 
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commitment to the anti-fascist cause – both the school at Osterley Park and 
Wintringham’s articles in Picture Post tended to invite empathy with the values 
that inspired the Republican war effort.  (MacKenzie, 1996, p.72) 
 
On 26 July 1941, Picture Post ran a feature by Wintringham on that sine quo non of 
Home Guard improvisations – the mortar.  “We Make our Own Mortar for 38/6” ran the 
headline – Wintringham opened with a description of the first mortar built at the school, 
a year earlier: 
 …  Major Wilfrid Vernon made the first mortar that the Home Guard possessed.  
It was a clumsy piece of scrap boiler tube, set at an angle of 45 degrees in a flat 
lump of concrete.  The concrete was its base-plate, and we aimed it by wedging 
up one corner or another of the concrete.  The local police gave us fireworks 
they had confiscated from children, and from the fireworks we sorted out 
gunpowder to charge our comic little gun.19 
 
The Bapty collection includes several Home Guard mortars and grenade throwers.  
Anything but ‘comic little guns’, all are highly finished and well thought out, and make 
it quite clear that such weapons should not be lightly dismissed.  Where the skill existed 
– whether at Bapty or Osterley Park – extremely serviceable mortars could be produced.  
Tom Wintringham explained the process of development: 
 From those days of July, 1940, we have been making many home-made mortars.  
We soon dropped the heavy base plate; all such a weapon needs is a spiked tail 
that sticks firmly in the ground.  We became experts at kicking a mortar, stuck in 
the ground, or wedging it with a piece of stone, in such a way as to alter the 
range or angle of fire, to get the second shot on the target if the first one went a 
little wide.  And with our fifth or sixth mortar, we got the idea of making the tail 
in the form of a spade, so that the man handling it can dig a hole for it quickly 
and easily. 
 
Powder taken from fireworks is not reliable, so we made our own gunpowder.  It 
was not smokeless, but it worked.”20 
 
Apart from the mortar itself, there was also the matter of a projectile.  Osterley Park 
mortars discharged a ‘jam tin bomb’, made, as its name suggests, from a standard tin 
can containing improvised shrapnel and a black powder charge ignited by a slow fuse, 
in the manner of an eighteenth century siege mortar.  The mortar featured in 
Wintringham’s article was in firing a homemade smoke bomb, but reasonably effective 
high explosive grenades had been made out of jam tins in the Dardanelles campaign, 
during the First World War.21  The majority of the ‘mortars’ in the Bapty collection are 
bomb throwers, using single-shot rifle actions.  In principle these are similar to early 
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versions of the 4in smoke grenade dischargers fitted to British AFVs during the Second 
World War.22  Without knowing what charge and projectile was used, it is difficult to 
assess the performance of these weapons.  There is, however, no reason to imagine that 
they were any less effective than the contemporary AFV smoke grenade discharger, or 
the EY grenade-launching rifle, and they would therefore be a useful addition to the 
firepower of the platoon, and provide an effective weapon for a pair of Home Guards 
(Nos. 1 and 2 on the mortar), using only one obsolete rifle mechanism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Home Guard grenade thrower in the Bapty collection.  This highly evolved design 
consists of an obsolete Martini rifle action (mounted with its trigger guard towards the 
camera), to which has been attached a standard issue grenade launching cup for the 
No.36M grenade (Mills Bomb), the whole being adjustable for elevation and traverse, 
and mounted on a spiked base plate.   
(Bapty 2000 Ltd, photograph, author) 
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A selection of Home Guard-attributed improvised ordnance from the Bapty collection.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Above) A folding-stock weapon that appears designed to fire a traditional stick tailed 
rocket from the upper tube, using a .22 cap firing mechanism in the lower tube.  Note 
the elaborate sights, sling fittings, and blast shield.   
 
 
(Left) A trench mortar or bomb-thrower 
based on a Mle 1885 8mm Guedes rifle 
mechanism.  The ‘toffee apple’ bomb is 
modern and entirely conjectural, however 
the bore is extremely narrow for any 
other sort of projectile.  Guedes rifles 
were built by OEWG in Austria for the 
Portuguese government, but the single 
shot design was overtaken by magazine 
rifle technology, and most went instead to 
South Africa.  Thus this Second World 
War Home Guard weapon is built on the 
receiver of a Boer War trophy. 
 
 
 
(Right) A mysterious ‘take down’ 
bomb thrower, with a barrel 
extension that stows in the base.  
The mount is also fitted with a 
plumb bob (inset below) to 
ensure that it is placed flat 
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In conversation with the author, Chris Henry, Curator of the museum of Royal Naval 
artillery, formerly curator of the Royal Artillery museum, and an authority on the 
Spanish Civil War – confirmed that, like the Home Guard, Spanish Republican forces 
suffered from a crippling lack of artillery, which led to special emphasis being placed 
on comparatively simple (to build, maintain and operate) mortars, including First World 
War trench mortars.  Each Republican ‘mixed brigade’ included a ‘heavy weapon 
group’, with a single heavy machine gun, mortar and anti-tank gun, which provided the 
organic fire-support for the brigade.23  It is easy to see that such an organisation would 
have appealed to Home Guard battalions, which could not depend on indirect fire-
support from artillery batteries, and there is a wry allusion to this in John Langdon-
Davies’s Home Guard Warfare:   
 There is another kind of war – ‘Small War’ or ‘Guerrilla’, and here everything is 
 different.  This is the kind of war which the Spaniard has fought for centuries 
 amid his mountains – the Finn amid his lakes and forests … In this kind of war 
 it is no good the Infantry hoping for support from the Artillery, because nobody 
 has the slightest idea where anyone else is.  (Langdon-Davies, 1941, p.29) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hertfordshire Home Guards firing a homemade 3in mortar, from the frontispiece of 
Training Course for Home Guard Instructors, first published in 1941.  The shoulder 
tabs, but lack of area markings suggest this picture was taken early to mid-1941, when 
homemade ordnance was, supposedly, already being suppressed in favour of the official 
‘sub-artillery’ discussed in Chapter 7.  The officer on the right of the picture is 
probably Lt. (later Capt.) C.A. Marques MBE, School Commandant, Gt. Amwell, author 
of the book, and designer of the 3in mortar and bombs illustrated.  (Author’s collection) 
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There can be no doubt that the Army issue 2in. mortar would have made an excellent 
weapon for the Home Guard, but demand outstripped supply of what was, small size 
notwithstanding, a sophisticated weapon (remaining in service into the 21st century24).  
In the absence of 2in. mortars, the Home Guard had, initially, to fall back on their own 
expedients, whether they were the highly evolved mortars of the Osterley Park team, or 
the catapult built by employees of the Royal Mint (MacKenzie, 1996, p.55).  This later 
sort of device is a boon to the ‘Mind my Pike!’ school.  In fairness to such efforts, and 
there seem to have been many (vide Longmate, 1974, p.69), one should point out that a 
catapult – ‘West’s Spring Gun’ – was adopted by the British Army in 1916, because it 
could project ‘bombs’ (grenades) in the same manner as a mortar, but without the tell-
tale ‘signature’ of smoke or a report, and was therefore less vulnerable to counter-
battery fire – a serious shortcoming of  black powder weapons such as the Osterley 
mortars, and the ‘sub-artillery’ which would replace them (Hogg, 1992, p.15). 
 
Another ad-hoc weapon available to the Home Guard was what we today term the 
victim operated improvised explosive device (VOIED), but known at the time simply as 
the booby trap.  At the time of writing (December 2010), IEDs account for the greater 
proportion of ISAF casualties in Afghanistan, and there can be no doubting the 
effectiveness of this type of warfare in slowing an enemy, limiting his freedom of 
manoeuvre and imposing a defensive mindset.  That the Home Guard were trained to 
prepare VOIEDs is a statement of fact, but it is harder to determine how well equipped 
General Service (GS) Home Guard units were to construct IEDs.  Home Guard special 
operations Auxiliary Units were, as we shall see in Chapter 9, lavishly equipped with 
explosives and initiators, but the extent to which these were available to GS units awaits 
further research.  However, they certainly were instructed in preparing electrically 
detonated VOIEDs, and devices using their issue grenades.  Home Guard Instruction 
No. 51Battlecraft and Battle Drill for the Home Guard, Part IV, The Organization of 
Home Guard Defence, published in November 1943, explained:  
 
 1.  Passive obstructions can be greatly strengthened by the use of simple booby 
 traps.  They make the progress of the enemy slower and have considerable moral 
 effect.  They must be intelligently sited not to interfere with our own patrols and 
 always be well concealed. 
  116 
  The methods of setting them should be ingenious and varied so that the 
 enemy does not learn easily how to detect them. 
  The principles:- 
(a) Preservation of outward appearances.  If time permits, cover up all traces 
such as wire and spoil. 
(b) Constricted localities.  Choose a close site when setting traps [;] avoid a 
bottleneck when expecting them. 
(c) Double Bluff.  This is the principle of laying a well-concealed trap close to a 
fairly obvious one.  This tends to attract the attention to the obvious one, 
and, in avoiding it, the well-concealed trap is set off. 
(d) Inconvenience.  The employment of obstacles and things which might be 
removed by troops entering the building. 
(e) Curiosity.  The principle of using booby traps in connection with souvenirs, 
crooked pictures, food and drink containers, etc.  Never be curious.  Do not 
touch anything unnecessarily. 
(f) Everyday operation.  Traps operated by opening or closing doors or 
windows, telephones, light switches, WC plugs.  
 
The manual goes on to outline how the No. 36M grenade (‘Mills bomb’) and No. 69 
and No. 73 (percussion detonating) grenades could be used in booby traps, as well as 
the construction of a simple electrical VOIED, indicating that explosive, and electrical 
detonators, were available.  There is no mention of IEDs in The Defence of Bloodford 
Village, published in November 1940, although (somewhat ambitiously) flooded pitfalls 
are dug, deep enough to swallow enemy tanks (Wade, 1940, p.6).  However, Langdon-
Davies includes an almost identical list of possible booby traps in the The Home Guard 
Training Manual of 1942, adding:   
 These can be supplemented by baiting objects [the enemy] is likely to handle.  
 Thus the Nazi is a fanatical admirer of Hitler and is likely to waste time 
 destroying any rude caricature of Hitler that may by prominently displayed on 
 your mantelpiece.  He is also an inveterate souvenir hunter and will take a fancy 
 to all sorts of knickknacks.  All such objects can be attached to electric cables, 
 explosives etc., and even if they merely go off with a bang they will increase 
 the general feeling of insecurity.  (Langdon-Davies, 1942, p.143).   
 
Grenades started to reach the Home Guard in early 1941, and it is unlikely that there 
would have been the equipment or training to create IEDs before that date.  However, 
from 1941 onwards, Home Guard defences would undoubtedly have been strengthened 
by the use of basic, but effective, VOIEDs.  
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(Above) Two pages on the construction of booby traps from Home Guard Instruction 
No. 51, of November 1943.  The No. 69 and No. 73 (bottom left) were percussion 
grenades.  The No. 69 was a Bakelite ‘offensive’ grenade, which would cause limited 
casualties and damage as a booby trap.  The No. 73 was an anti-tank blast grenade 
which would be devastating in an enclosed space. (Author’s collection) 
 
Attempts to rationalise the rifle shortage by arguing (not unreasonably) that there were, 
in fact, enough rifles available for the LDV/Home Guard to meet its military 
commitments were doomed to failure.  Frustrated, the Volunteers turned to the veterans 
of the International Brigade, whose experience of improvised warfare suddenly assumed 
much greater importance than that of conventional operations.  Their so-called “Buffalo 
Bill” approach met with some scepticism, particularly from those cynics who pointed 
out that the Spanish Republican forces had actually lost.  Nonetheless, from the rifle 
crisis a distinctive ethos evolved, very early in the life of the LDV/Home Guard; 
suspicion of established, centralised authority, and a determination to solve problems 
locally with improvisation and imagination.  Many of their solutions displayed a greater 
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degree of finish and effectiveness than the improvised weapons of modern insurgents 
and terrorist groups. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Pistols and Automatic Weapons 
  
  Could you please oblige us with a Bren gun? 
  We need it very badly, I'm afraid 
  Our local crossword solver has an excellent revolver 
  But during a short attack on a fort, the trigger got mislaid 
 
  In course of operations planned for Friday afternoon 
  Our orders are to storm the Hippodrome 
  So if you can't oblige us with a Bren gun 
  The Home Guard might as well go home 
 
                                             From Could you please oblige us with a Bren gun?  
Noël Coward, 1943 
 
 
Although, in the formative days of the LDV/Home Guard, the emphasis was on the 
rifle, other smallarms soon joined the armoury.  In this chapter we will examine the 
Home Guard’s use of handguns, light and medium machine guns, and the Thompson 
submachine gun.  Some LDVs armed themselves with handguns from the outset, 
including, as we have seen, the contents of Bapty’s display case of 19th century 
revolvers.  Bapty’s owner, Mark Dineley, commanding the Berwick St John Home 
Guard near Salisbury, affected an American Colt 1911 Government Model .45 
automatic,1 and in Kent, Volunteer Pellereau was brandishing his grandfather’s .455 
Webley service revolver when he captured a German airman whose parachute had 
become entangled in a tree.  In 1940, many handguns were in circulation, frequently 
private-purchase service weapons or military souvenirs.  There were, therefore, and like 
shotguns, quantities of pistols of various sorts available wherever LDV units formed.  
However, even when handguns were ex-military smallarms, they were not particularly 
highly valued.  British doctrine and tradition places little emphasis on the pistol, which 
has always been regarded as a weapon of last resort and self-defence.  In Home Guard 
service pistols were (officially at least) restricted to officers and dispatch riders.2  The 
service revolver was described in training literature as being capable of ‘short range 
rapid-fire.  Only accurate in hands of an experienced shot.’3  Nevertheless, in August 
1939, 57,940 service pistols (the Enfield-designed .380in Pistol, Revolver, No 2 Mk I or 
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I*) were in store or on issue to the British armed forces, and a note on the War Office 
contract records ledger, of 2 February 1940, recorded: ‘Deficiency between requirement 
& stock: 233,541’(Skennerton, 1988, p.26).   
 
Efforts were made to repair that deficiency by increasing production, purchasing 
commercial .380 Webley Mk IV revolvers, and placing orders in the United States with 
Colt, Smith and Wesson, Iver Johnson and others, for over 420,000 handguns of various 
types (Stamps and Skennerton, 1993, p.88).  The list of pistols ordered overseas (chiefly 
in the USA), during the period 1940-42, includes exotics such as 7.63mm Mauser 
machine pistols, and others in diverse calibres and variations of calibres (Skennerton, 
1988, p.26).  Although it is tempting to see this as further evidence of desperate times 
leading to desperate measures, and ascribe all these weapons to the pressing needs of 
Home Defence, Stamps and Skennerton (1993, p.95) speculate that the relative rarity 
today of some of the more exotic imports – 2,000 small-framed Iver Johnson pistols, for 
example – may be due to them being sent into occupied Europe for use by resistance 
forces. Certainly, pistols, particularly concealable ones, and those of continental 
manufacture or calibre, were more likely to advance the war effort in the hands of 
resistance fighters than the relatively conventional troops of the Home Guard.   
 
As we shall see later in this study, the Home Guard Auxiliary Units, which were 
expected to operate in a manner similar to that of the resistance movements, were issued 
either .380 revolvers or .32 automatics, on a scale of one per man, plus 36 or 40 rounds 
of ammunition respectively.4  The majority of imported handguns were those 
manufactured by Colt or Smith and Wesson, in calibres .380/.38in revolver, .455in 
revolver, .45in revolver or .45 Automatic Colt Pistol (ACP).  Where these guns were 
not designed to chamber standard British service .38 or .455 calibre ammunition, they 
were painted with a red band and carried the calibre stencilled.  Thus ‘Category II .38 
Special Smith and Wesson revolvers, various types’ were marked with a red band 
painted round the rear of the barrel and the words ‘.38 SPECL’ stencilled in black 
(Stamps and Skennerton, 1993, p.95).  In addition to .380 calibre pistols, 25,969 
examples of the First World War service Webley Mk VI (re-designated as .455in. 
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Pistol, Revolver, No 1) were ordered from Webley and Scott during the early part of the 
Second World War (Skennerton, 1988, p.24).   
 
Officially, pistols appeared with the Home Guard quite late, only featuring in monthly 
returns from March 1941, with an undifferentiated national total for that month of just 
1,880.  It is likely that there were far more, undeclared, privately-owned pistols already 
in service.  However, the number of pistols in Home Guard units climbed rapidly to 
12,948 in September 1941.  March 1942 saw the figure in the returns broken down by 
calibre for the first time, to reveal that the majority of handguns were of .445 calibre.5  
The table below shows the first and last ‘by calibre’ sets of entries given.  There is a 
degree of fluctuation in the returns, and probably some inaccuracy, nevertheless trends 
emerge, and it is apparent that .455 and .45 were the most numerically important Home 
Guard pistol calibres.  There also appears to be evidence of standard-issue .380 calibre 
weapons being withdrawn from the Home Guard in 1942.  We can therefore conclude 
that the ‘typical’ Home Guard pistol was either a British .455 Webley, or an American 
.45 M1917 revolver – but a reasonable case can be made for almost any contemporarily 
available make, type or calibre. 
 
Pistols in Home Guard Service, by calibre6 
 
 .32 .32 auto .38 .45 .45 auto .455 Other 
Mar 
‘42 
1,365 232 3,495 5,154 229 9,905 645 
Nov 
‘42 
913 2,011 470 3,807 469 9,751 770 
 
 
 
(Left)  .455in Pistol, 
Revolver, No. 1 – formerly 
the Webley Mk VI service 
revolver – showing the 
weapon’s break action for 
reloading. (www.fmft.net) 
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(Above) Imported pistols that might have been found in Home Guard use – Colt M1908 
.38 Special; Colt M1917 .45AC;  Smith & Wesson K-200 .38/200 (.380).  
(milsurpafterhours.com)  
 
(Above) A Home Guard 'Austerity' cotton canvas holster for a .455/.45 large frame 
revolver, and a shortened tank crew holster for a .380 revolver, as favoured by the 
Auxiliary Units.  Between are a ‘half-moon’ clip to enable rimless .45ACP rounds to be 
loaded into a revolver cylinder and extracted, various wartime .45 ACP drill rounds, 
and two inert .38 Special rounds, showing the increased length compared to the .380 
drill rounds in the web holster.  (Author's photograph) 
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Whilst the issue of .455 and .45 calibre revolvers to the Home Guard might be viewed 
as clear evidence that the organisation was receiving second-quality weapons, it is 
worth noting that the .455 Webley service revolver was only replaced in British Army 
use when it became clear that such a large and powerful handgun was too much for the 
soldiers of the First World War to master in the abbreviated training time that wartime 
conditions allowed (Skennerton, 1988, p.24).  The .380 Enfield that replaced it was, in 
essence, a smaller version of the earlier weapon, chambering a less-powerful round.  
The British .380in round was a version of the American Smith and Wesson .38in, with a 
heavier 200-grain bullet to increase its stopping power (Stamps and Skennerton, 1993, 
p.9).7  Combat experience has demonstrated that whilst the power of  the .38/.380 round 
is adequate, the .45 is a guaranteed manstopper – which was why the US Army returned 
to that calibre for its 1909 revolver and 1911 automatic pistol.8  Thus the .455 Webleys 
and .45 Colts issued to the Home Guard were reassuringly powerful combat handguns – 
albeit something of a handful.9  The standard scale of issue for .380 pistol ammunition 
to British regular troops was just 12 rounds, and the same was allowed for the Home 
Guard, in a War Office memorandum on Home Guard ammunition scales of 28 July 
1940.10  However, that memorandum specifies that three rounds were to be used for 
practice.  Thus the revolver-armed Home Guard would probably go into action with a 
full cylinder of six shots and half a cylinder of reloads in his ammunition pouch.  Given 
that British doctrine assumed the revolver would only be used for self-defence in the 
last resort, this was not unreasonable, and in line with British Regular Army doctrine.11  
 
At the opposite end of the firepower scale from revolvers were machine guns.  Norman 
Longmate (1974, p.73) described: 
 By the end of 1940… the first automatic weapons had also begun to arrive.  The 
first received by one West Country unit was a Lewis gun, mounted on a pivot 
and tripod behind which its two-man crew squatted, swinging it freely right 
across their front, as it poured out 600 bullets a minute.  For heavier support this 
battalion relied on a Hotchkiss of very ancient vintage, and a veteran swore he 
recognised it as an old friend of the South African campaign. 
   
Former-Home Guard Longmate was being mischievous, and inaccurate.  The Lewis was 
a light machine gun, fitted with a small bipod,12 and the Hotchkiss machine guns issued 
to Home Guard units were generally the British Gun, Machine, Hotchkiss, .303in. Mks I 
and I*, introduced in 1916 and declared obsolete in 1946, and therefore much too young 
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to have seen action on the veldt.  Although also a light machine gun, the Hotchkiss was 
mounted on a miniature tripod.  A British version of the French Hotchkiss Mle 09, the 
weapon was adopted to provide a light machine gun for the cavalry and was retained 
when that arm mechanised.  It is conceivable that the West Country unit in question was 
equipped with the larger, tripod-mounted Hotchkiss Modèle 1914,13 but in neither case 
could the weapon have served in the Boer War.  What the passage does serve to 
illustrate, however, is the convention that any smallarms issued to the Home Guard 
must be ‘ancient’ – in fact neither the Lewis, nor the Hotchkiss machine guns were even 
obsolete.   
 
 
 (Right) A Home Guard lance corporal 
with a Hotchkiss light machine gun during 
a major exercise in Colchester in August 
1942.  At that date there were only 134 
Hotchkiss machine guns in use by the 
Home Guard.14  (IWM H 22519) 
 
 
(Left) Competition for light machine guns 
was fierce and the requirements of the 
Merchant Navy and fishing fleet absorbed 
large quantities.  7 May 1942, a gun crew 
on the armed merchant ship SS Scythia 
man a twin Hotchkiss anti-aircraft mount.   
(IWM A 8520) 
 
The light Hotchkiss was also adopted by the US Army as the M1909 Benét-Mercié 
Machine Rifle, Calibre .30.  Only 665 guns were purchased (Goldsmith, 1994, p.200), 
and the gun was long out of US service by 1940, but it is possible that some were 
supplied to the UK (see photograph p.144).  It should be noted, however, that there is 
no entry for ‘.300in’ Hotchkiss guns in the Home Guard returns.  Skennerton (1988, 
p.60) records a total of 10,993 British Hotchkiss Mks I and I* reconditioned during the 
early part of the Second World War for service, he surmises, ‘mostly with the Home 
  
 
125 
Guard’.  Actually the Hotchkiss LMG was a fairly rare machine gun in Home Guard 
service, with the first (just seven) appearing with the Home Guard in July 1941.  The 
number slowly increased, but had only reached 100 by January 1942, and, by November 
1943, just 323 were reported in service.15  The numbers suggest an increase due to the 
guns being gradually released from Army service, probably as more Bren guns became 
available.16   
 
 
 
American Look magazine, 30 
December 1941, was devoted to 
pundits’ predictions for the coming 
year.  The image shows a Home 
Guard armed with a British .303 
Mk I Lewis gun and, almost hidden 
by the caption, a P’08 Parabellum 
'Luger' pistol, probably a First 
World War trophy.                     
(Via Andrew Fletcher) 
 
 
 
 
 
It is a curiosity of the Home Guard that improvised weapons, like the homemade 
mortars and Molotov cocktails, which appear rather feeble to modern eyes could, at the 
time, embody values such as ‘modernity’ and ‘a people’s war’, while conventional 
weapons of proven reliability, such as M1917 rifles, were condemned as ‘old 
fashioned’.  This has made it difficult to give some Home Guard weapons the credit 
they deserve – the Lewis light machine gun being a particularly good example.  
Adopted by the British Army in 1914, Mk I Lewis guns were placed in reserve after 
1938, when the Bren light machine gun entered service as the infantry’s light machine 
gun.  At the same time the Vickers ‘Gas Operated’17 supplanted the Mk II and III Lewis 
aircraft guns.18  The Bren gun inspired a loyalty similar to that engendered by the 
SMLE rifle and, from the outset, rendered the Lewis gun completely obsolete in the 
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minds of the Army, press and public.  This is unfortunate, firstly because the Lewis was 
one of the younger British infantry weapons (adopted two years after the Vickers Mk I 
machine gun and seven years after the SMLE rifle), and secondly, because the Second 
World War has been called – with some justification – the Lewis gun’s ‘finest hour’ 
(Easterly, 1998, p.309). 
 
Reporting to the War Cabinet on 29 August 1940, Minister of Supply Herbert Morrison 
stated that 11,000 machine guns had been lost in France, of which 8,000 were Bren 
guns.19  Until this loss could be made up, Mk I Lewis guns had to be issued from 
reserve, but that was not the full extent of the demand.  The Lewis was employed, 
chiefly as a light anti-aircraft weapon, in a bewildering variety of roles: on fishing boats 
and defensively equipped merchantmen (DEMS), on RAF rescue launches, in 
searchlight batteries, and on airfields.  The guns even saw action on a diminutive 
armoured train on the Romney, Hythe and Dymchurch miniature railway (claiming a 
Luftwaffe bomber that, apparently confused by the small size of the train, flew within 
machine gun range).   In the opening months of 1940 there was fierce competition for 
Lewis guns between AA Command Great Britain and the Admiralty, as described 
shortly after the war by General Sir Frederick Pile, formerly GOC-in-C Anti-aircraft 
Command (Pile, 1949, p.112): 
The shortage of [Bofors] light anti-aircraft weapons was very great, and, in place 
of them, between 3000 and 4000 Lewis guns had been made available.  No one 
pretended that these were suitable anti-aircraft weapons – indeed the R.A.F. had 
worked it out that, apart from a lucky accident, 850 actual hits by light machine-
gun bullets were necessary to bring a plane down – but, anyhow, they were 
something.  In February, however, the Admiralty cast envious eyes on them and 
demanded 800 for the protection of shipping.  In March they raised this figure to 
1300, and asked for a further 1600 to be made available at the rate of 250 a 
month. 
 
General Pile’s quote raises the question as to why the RAF had chosen to equip all its 
combat aircraft with rifle-calibre machine guns, and why the Admiralty wanted them as 
light anti-aircraft weapons too.  The answer was that rifle-calibre guns were effective at 
close range, unless the aircraft’s pilot and fuel tanks were protected with armour 
(Wallace, 1972, p.36).  It was in anticipation of increased aircraft armour that work was 
underway on the 20mm Hispano cannon for the RAF (as described in Chapter 8).20  As 
it turned out, the Lewis gun was a more effective anti-aircraft weapon than was 
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imagined, particularly against fleeting low-level targets.  Indeed such was its efficacy 
that it was included among the guns of Anti-aircraft Command in Roof over Britain, an 
official booklet celebrating the command’s efforts up to 1943 (MOI, 1943, p24): 
 The last-war Lewis gun has been surprisingly successful, mounted singly, or in 
twin or quadruple for greater fire power.  It has brought down many low-flying 
raiders who sought by diving from cloud to surprise the defences.  The function 
of the light guns is to hold off the bomber from low-level attack, or from 
vulnerable points all over the country. 
 
It is claimed that Lewis guns accounted for 20% of the aircraft brought down by ground 
fire in the London area during the Battle of Britain (Easterly, 1998, p.302). 
 
The Lewis gun was a very low level air defence weapon, and therefore should have 
been used in addition to the 40mm Bofors anti-aircraft gun, rather than instead of it – 
which is the situation General Pile was referring to.  Merchant Navy Lewis gunners 
were instructed that the effective anti-aircraft range of the Lewis gun was 500 yards, 
and that, where it was available, tracer ammunition should be loaded every fifth round.21  
The DEMS manual explained:   
The Lewis gun is a light automatic gun, very simple in design and capable of a 
high rate of fire.  It can be used with effect against men not under cover, but is of 
particular use at sea in repelling an aeroplane attack, when it has a most 
disturbing effect on the occupants of the aeroplane…22 
 
On dry land, and across the countryside, some pillbox designs (the FW 3/23, for 
example) featured a post-mounted Lewis in the light anti-aircraft role (Wills, 1985, 
p.17), while 199 Alan-Williams prefabricated steel airfield defence turrets were 
produced with various mounting brackets for the Bren and Lewis in the ground role, 
Lewis in the anti-aircraft role, and Hotchkiss and Browning (q.v. below) ‘for Home 
Guard use’ (Wills, 1985, p.22).    
 
On 7 July 1940, Department MT7 at the War Office issued a memorandum outlining the 
need to provide Lewis gun training pamphlets for the LDV, indicating that at least some 
.303 Lewis guns were already being used by the new force.23  The lack of training 
materials for the LDV was exploited by Messrs Gale and Polden of Aldershot, who 
swiftly republished their 75-page instruction book The Complete Lewis Gunner, which 
had been out of print since 1918.24  As it transpired, the most significant Home Guard 
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LMG would not be the familiar British .303 Mk I Lewis, but the .300 calibre US M1918 
Savage-Lewis aircraft machine gun.  Easterly (1998, p.300) gives a figure of over 
45,000 Lewis guns in .300 (US .30-06) calibre supplied to the UK during the Second 
World War.  Of these 4,170 were ‘Mobile Army’ LMGs and 41,710 aircraft guns.  The 
latter were either mounted as light-AA for Merchant Navy use, or converted into 
ground-role LMGs for the Home Guard (designated the ‘Mk III*’).  Over 11,000 were 
with the Home Guard in February 1941,25  and the Home Guard inventory of .300 
calibre aircraft guns peaked at 12,756 in September 1942, with a further 3,282 .300 
calibre ground role guns and 412 .303 calibre guns in service.26  Initially the American 
aircraft guns were fitted with a standard issue wooden butt (in place of a spade grip), 
and crude battle sights.  It was not easy to fire the guns using the tall 97-round aircraft 
magazine with the cheek rested on the butt in the usual manner, so only the standard 
infantry 47-round magazines were used.  As supplies of wooden butts dried up a new 
fabricated butt was produced based on a modified spade grip which was much higher in 
the comb, making it easier to use the guns with 97-round magazines (Langdon-Davies, 
1942b, p.108).     
 
British Mk III aircraft guns were also issued (as the Mk III**), similarly modified 
(Easterly, 1998, p. 306).  When these too were exhausted, guns were made up by the 
gun trade and light engineering firms from spare or scrap parts and deactivated drill-
purpose (‘DP’) examples (Easterly, 1998, pp.298-311).  These reconstituted guns 
became the Lewis Mks IV and V (or ‘SS’, for ‘Sea Service’).  The first edition of Hogg 
and Weeks’ classic Military Smallarms of the Twentieth Century (1973, p.5.58) records: 
 Gun, Machine, Lewis 0.303in Mark 4 (introduced on 16th August 1946).  A 
conversion of Mark 3 guns to simplify manufacture.  It is doubtful if any were 
ever made, as the gun was declared obsolete on the day it was approved. 
 
This is a chastening example of the dangers of jumping to conclusions.  No one was 
seriously considering manufacturing Lewis guns, simplified or otherwise, in August 
1946 – the entry is a piece of administrative housekeeping.  The various wartime 
expedient Lewis guns could not be declared obsolete unless they had first entered the 
system; therefore these marks were approved and declared obsolete on the same day.27  
Indeed, wartime smallarms contracts reveal that, in September 1941, Westley Richards 
and H. Atkin each received orders to assemble 1,000 Mk IV Lewis guns from parts.  
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Contracts list around 44,000 Lewis guns of various marks returned to service during 
1940-41, plus 15,000 ex-US .300 calibre Lewis guns reconditioned at Enfield 
(Skennerton, 1988, p.59).   
 
 
 
 
Commercially produced manual for 
the .300 Lewis.  The quality of the 
graphic design of this little manual 
by the Bravon Ledger Company is 
particularly noteworthy.  Note that 
the American aircraft gun illustrated 
has been given simple aperture 
sights a British pattern wooden butt 
(with oil bottle) and 47-round 
infantry magazine.  These guns were 
initially issued without any form of 
mounting, to be fired rested on 
cover.  Subsequently a rudimentary 
triangular ‘bipod’, was developed, 
which bolted to the mid-gun 
mounting lug.  Other versions of the 
Lewis were given a forward grip. 
(Author’s collection)  
 
 
 
In 1940-45, the Lewis was still a perfectly serviceable squad automatic, and its 47-
round drum magazine gave a useful volume of fire in the light anti-aircraft role, while 
the gun’s unusual air-circulation cooling system prevented it from overheating firing 
long bursts.  Conversely, ex-aircraft Lewis guns proved quite capable of operating as 
terrestrial squad automatics, and in the light-AA role, had the considerable advantage of 
a 97-round magazine.28  The gun did have its shortcomings, but whether in .303 or .300 
calibre, the Lewis was crucial to the British war effort, and made a significant 
contribution to anti-aircraft defence.  Yet, in the public mind, the Lewis gun remained 
irredeemably associated with the Great War.  In the quote from Roof Over Britain 
above, for example, the official historian referred to ‘the last war Lewis’ – yet one does 
not read of ‘last war’ SMLE rifles, Vickers machine guns or Mills bombs.  For the 
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Home Guard to be issued with Lewis guns was to share a scarce, valuable and effective 
resource – but the Lewis gun was never presented or perceived as such.  Ironically, the 
last combat use of the Mk I Lewis would be in the hands of the German equivalent of 
the Home Guard, the Volksturm, who were issued the ‘7.7mm leMG 137(e)’ – the 
German designation for the Lewis guns captured at Dunkirk (Gander and Chamberlain, 
1978, pp.9 and 83). 
Lewis Mk III**/ IV light machine gun and ancillaries.  Built during the First World War 
as a Mk I infantry LMG, this gun was converted into a Mk III aircraft machine gun, 
then rebuilt again during the Second World War.  The issue pistol grip and return 
spring make this particular gun closer to a Mk III**.  Definitive Mk IV guns had a steel 
strap pistol grip and coil return spring exiting through a hole in the rear of the receiver.  
It is, however, almost certainly one of the 1,000 ‘Mk IV’ guns ordered from H. Atkin in 
September 1941.  Typical of these ‘emergency’ guns are the ‘austerity’ fittings – the 
cocking handle, the receiver endpiece (mating the receiver to the barrel and cylinder, 
and acting as a mounting point – carrying the H. Atkin manufacturer’s stamp), the 
trough-shaped cylinder housing with wooden fore-grip, the foresight (design approved 
May 1941 – tall enough to clear a 97-round aircraft magazine) and flash eliminator.  
All of these are rough wartime fabrications.  The gun is missing its fabricated butt.  
Ancillaries are (L-R) ‘aim corrector’ (a prism which allowed an instructor to see the 
sight picture); burst case extraction tool; 97-round magazine adaptor; loading tool; an 
unusual first-pattern (1915) 47-round magazine; Mk V inspector’s drill round; two Mk 
VIII (1942 ‘austerity’) wooden-bulleted .303in drill rounds; pullthrough; cylinder mop; 
spare parts tin; Gale & Polden Home Guard instruction manual Lewis Gun Mechanism 
Made Easy.  (Author’s Photograph) 
 
In most Home Guard platoons the squad light support weapon was not a Lewis gun but 
a weapon for which there was no British equivalent,
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Rifle (BAR).  Home Guard Instructions of September 1942 make clear that the BAR 
was the standard squad light automatic at that time: 
The organization shows that for a Browning automatic rifle.  The team is known 
as the  B.A.R. group.  Throughout this Instruction Lewis gun will be substituted 
for B.A.R. by those units using Lewis guns.  [Original italics]29 
 
It is said of the BAR that it was rather heavy for a rifle, and rather light for a light 
machine gun.  In fact the weapon was a proto-assault rifle, styled a ‘machine rifle’ in 
contemporary documents (Ballou, 2000).  Developed to provide suppressing fire from 
the ‘marching fire’ position for US troops crossing no-man’s land during the First 
World War, the BAR was originally provided with an extra-long sling and a special 
gunner’s belt with a cup to hold the butt of the weapon, in order to facilitate accurate 
fire ‘from the hip’ (Canfield, 1991, pp.79 and 81).  The idea was to fire single shots 
during the approach, and a burst of full automatic to keep the defenders’ heads down at 
the last moment to allow the ‘bombers’ (grenade throwers) to close with the enemy 
(Ballou, 2000, p.20).   
 
 
 
 
 
M1918 BAR from Bernards’ Manual of 
Modern Automatic Guns.  (Author's 
collection) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the interwar years modifications were made to the BAR, bringing it closer to a true 
light machine gun.  These included provision of a bipod (M1918A1) and the 
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replacement of the semi-automatic/automatic fire selector with one offering two rates of 
automatic fire (M1918A2) (Ballou, 2000, pp.128-139).  These alterations were, 
however, peripheral, as the true character of the gun – with its light, fixed barrel and 20-
round box magazine, remained the same.  US author Lieutenant Colonel John George 
was scathing about the inter-war modifications to the BAR in his book Shots Fired in 
Anger (cited in Canfield, 1991, p.85): 
 Ordnance had thrown a lot of gadgets – buttrests and bipods and hooked 
buttplates on both ends of the poor weapon…  This was an effort to give the 
weapon long range accuracy and sustained steadiness throughout long bursts; a 
typical American attempt to substitute gadgets for skill.  The BAR as originally 
issued was wonderful in the hands of a good man…  Two weeks after we were 
on Guadalcanal we had thrown away all of the gadgets and were using the guns 
stark naked – the way old John Browning had built them in the first place. 
 
 
The BAR was a signature Home Guard arm, serving as the squad light support weapon.  
Automatic fire was at first discouraged, and later entirely forbidden, due to the lack of a 
quick change barrel or bipod.30  For accurate fire the gun was rested on cover, as 
shown here, with Ross rifle-armed Home Guards, on a ‘rifle range in the North’, 24 
September 1940.  (IWM HU 86079) 
 
A quantity of unmodified M1918 guns remained in US reserves, and it was these that 
were supplied to the British.  Almost 24,000 BARs reached the Home Guard between 
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August 1940 and November 1942.31  Although ‘D’ Company, 20th Kent Home Guard 
had a single Lewis gun from the outset, they received their BARs rather late – the 
earliest reference in their Diary (Brown and Peek, 1944, p.14) being: ‘15/2/42.  
Shoreham range…  The B.A.R.’s were also fired by twelve members of the coy, with 
almost negative results.’  The disappointing shooting with this unfamiliar weapon is 
noteworthy, but by June 1944 the BAR shooting team was able to record scores of 
between 15 and 18, out of a possible 20, in the Champion-at-Arms competition (Brown 
and Peek, 1944, p.33).  Being the squad automatic weapons, the BARs were retained 
when the company exchanged its M1917 rifles for No 4 Enfields (Brown and Peek, 
1944, p.31).   
BAR ancillaries including a cotton ‘bandoleer’ for 60 rounds of .30 ammunition and the 
provisional BAR manual, issued on a scale of one per gun from 28 August 1940, as well 
as an unofficial Gale and Polden guide.  The distinctive Home Guard ammunition 
pouches (left) each held two BAR magazines (left and centre), as well as 20 rounds of 
rifle ammunition. (Author’s photograph) 
 
The BAR was a rather meagre substitute for a Bren gun as a squad automatic, but the 
Home Guard was little worse off than the Belgian or Polish regular forces, which used 
versions of the BAR as an LMG, or even US Marines and US Army units, which were 
armed with M1903 Springfield rifles and BARs during the early part of the war, 
(Gander and Chamberlain, 1978, p.82-83).  BARs arrived in the UK quickly, and in 
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large quantities.  2,290 provisional instruction booklets were published in August 1940, 
to be issued on a scale of one per gun,32 but over 20,000 BARs were in service with the 
Home Guard by 1 February 1941.  The highest figure in the Home Guard returns is 
23,684 in September 1942, although the quantity may have increased further 
subsequently.33   
A pre-Second World War postcard showing Belgian troops posing with an FN Modèle 
30, a BAR derivative, in the anti-aircraft role.  The Mle 30 featured a pistol grip, bipod, 
and a heavy, finned, quick-change barrel.  Nevertheless, it was still essentially J.M. 
Browning’s automatic rifle.  The gun did not find much favour with the Germans, who 
suspended production, but used captured examples.  Post-war it was put back into 
production in its ultimate version, the FN-D, which saw service with many armed 
forces, including the Dutch, Egyptian, Israeli, Belgian, Venezuelan armies. 
(Author’s collection) 
 
Although the Lewis was the definitive Home Guard light machine gun, and the BAR the 
most widely-encountered light automatic, it was, as we have seen from Noël Coward’s 
lyric at the head of the chapter, the Bren LMG that was the aspirational weapon in the 
LMG category.  The Bren really did represent a genuine step forward, a truly 
outstanding modern LMG, which would remain in frontline service with the British 
Army from 1938 until the Gulf War of 1991.  In terms of reliability, robustness and 
simplicity, the Bren gun was in a class of its own, as Gale & Polden’s The Bren Light 
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Machine Gun: Description and Mechanism enthused: ‘…it cannot be assembled 
incorrectly… It is practically immune from STOPPAGES provided the firer attends to 
the points in “PREPARE FOR ACTION”…’34   Although not usually considered Home 
Guard weapons, Brens were issued to ‘front line’ units, in exposed positions and those 
working closely alongside the Army.  Charles ‘Chas’ Medhurst who, in late 1940, 
joined the Polgate Home Guard platoon, about five miles inland from Eastbourne, and 
directly in the path of the German 9th Army in the event of invasion, recalled that 
throughout his 18 months service with the Home Guard (he subsequently served with 
the Royal Navy) his unit at Polgate was equipped with .303 service rifles (SMLEs) and, 
shortly before he left in mid-1942, was in Coward’s words ‘obliged with a Bren gun’.35  
In fact Bren guns – an extraordinary investment when ‘D’ Company in Sevenoaks, only 
32 miles inland, had only recently received BARs.   Numbers of Bren guns in Home 
Guard service were always small – 51 appear in February 1942 (probably when Polgate 
Home Guard received theirs), and had slowly climbed to just 112 by November 1942.36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Home Guards on the green, Dorking, Surrey, 1 December 1940.  It is interesting to note 
that Dorking Home Guard, on a direct line between the planned German landing 
beaches and the capital, are (apparently) armed with a Mk I Bren light machine gun 
and a Thompson sub-machine gun (q.v. below), when many other Home Guard units 
were still waiting for .300 calibre rifles.  (IWM 5844)  
 
Lewis gun, BAR or Bren, the light automatic was important because it was a key 
component of British infantry tactics.  As originally formed, the Local Defence 
Volunteers were riflemen roaming the countryside ‘rounding up’ Nazi paratroopers, but 
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very quickly the Home Guard became conventional infantry, training to operate in 
‘battle platoons’ consisting of a platoon headquarters and three eight-man squads.  By 
the late summer of 1942, the organisation and armament of a ‘battle platoon’ was as 
follows:37 
  
Battle platoon headquarters:- 
Platoon commander  Pistol,  Sten or rifle 
Platoon serjeant [sic]  Rifle or shotgun and No. 36 grenades (rifle) 
Runner   Rifle or shotgun 
Rifle-bomber   E.Y. rifle, cup discharger and No. 36 grenades (rifle)  
Sniper    Rifle 
 
Three squads each consisting of:- 
Rifle group 
Squad commander  Sten 
No. 1 Rifleman  Rifle 
No. 1 Bomber   Grenades, shotgun, rifle or Sten 
No. 2 Rifleman  Sten or rifle 
No. 2 Bomber   Grenades, shotgun, rifle or Sten 
 
BAR Group 
Second-in-command  Rifle or shotgun 
No. 1 on the BAR  BAR 
No. 2 on the BAR  Rifle or shotgun 
  
 
Division of the infantry squad into rifle group and gun group served the British Army 
well until the introduction of the selective fire SA80 Individual Weapon in the 1990s, 
and depended on the volume of fire generated by the rifle group being matched by that 
of the gun group, which contained an effective long-range automatic weapon.  Home 
Guard Instruction No. 51 explained:38 
Where NO light automatic is available for the B.A.R. group.  This group may be 
composed of three men armed with rifles.  The B.A.R group can be increased by 
the three reserve men of the squad to increase its firepower.  It might be called 
the Fire Group.  If rifles are not available for the other part of the squad the men 
who will make the assault should be armed with Stens, shotguns and bombs.  
They might then be called the assault group.  They must, however, have a rifle 
for the sniper who will have to cover the advance of the fire group. 
 
As noted in the previous chapter, those individuals described as carrying a shotgun were 
those that could, rather than would be so armed.  In military terms, shotguns are close-
quarter weapons – which is why, if possible, they were grouped in the ‘assault group’.  
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The other close quarter weapon that came to the Home Guard was the submachine gun 
– the .45in Thompson and, replacing it, the 9mm Sten.  Submachine guns appeared at 
the end of the First World War, but failed to generate any interest from the British 
military, which regarded them as – at best – police weapons.  This situation changed in 
1940, and the British were soon searching for a ‘machine carbine or gangster gun’ 
(Hobart, 1973, p.9).  The only one immediately available was the original ‘gangster 
gun’, the American Model 1928 Thompson.39  This was, in manufacturing terms, a 
deeply conventional weapon, finely finished and blued, and fitted with walnut furniture.  
Typical of a high-quality peacetime product aimed at the law enforcement market.     
 
The Thompson 
M1928 dismantled.  
This plate from The 
Thompson 
Submachine Gun 
Mechanism Made 
Easy shows the 
quality and relative 
complexity of the 
Thompson.  (Inset) 
1940 handbook as 
supplied with each 
‘Tommy Gun’ 
(Author's collection) 
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An evolution from an unsuccessful self-loading rifle concept, the gun’s delayed-
blowback mechanism had failed with full-power .30-06 ammunition.  However, it did 
work with the other American service smallarms ammunition, the low velocity .45 Auto 
Colt Pistol (ACP) round.  The result was a selective fire, pistol-calibre weapon 
producing a large volume of fire at relatively short range.  In this respect the Thompson 
was in the well-established ‘machine pistol’ category.  Nevertheless, John Taliaferro 
Thompson40 chose to invent a new category of firearm to assist with his marketing 
efforts – giving the world the term ‘submachine gun’ (Hobart, 1973, p.33).41  To further 
complicate matters, in wartime British nomenclature, this class of gun was officially 
known as a ‘machine carbine’, although the ‘Tommy gun’ was widely referred to as the 
‘TSMG’.42  British orders for Thompson submachine guns commenced on 1 February 
1940, with no quantities being recorded in the contract books (Skennerton, 1988, p.44).  
Hobart (1973, p.37) lists orders for two lots of 3,000 guns from the French 
governments, and from the British – for a paltry 450 guns – both in February 1940.  By 
the end of 1940 British orders had increased to 107,500 guns (Hobart, 1973, p.37) and 
514,000 by April 1942 (Skennerton, 1988, p.44).  Allocation of the first 100,000 
Thompson machine carbines in British service was as follows (extracted from 
Skennerton, 1988, p.44): 
 
Recipient 
 
Guns Drum magazines Box magazines 
Army (initial order) 56,000 474,100 870,040 
RAF 12,000 156,000 240,000 
Dominions 5,000 (Included in total 
below) 
(Included in total 
below) 
Home Defence 
Battalions 
5,000 (Included in total 
below) 
(Included in total 
below) 
Special operations 2,000 (Included in total 
below) 
(Included in total 
below) 
Special 
contingencies (allies 
etc.) 
15,000 166,000 322,000 
India 5,000 18,000 30,000 
 
Total 
 
100,000 
 
814,100 
 
1,462,040 
 
  
 
139 
Home Guard returns show the first thousand Thompsons arriving in April 1941, and 
numbers climbing to a peak of 43,017 one year later, after which they rapidly declined 
as the weapons were transferred to the Army.43  Auto-Ordnance Corp. in the USA 
produced 217,420 Thompsons during 1940-41, mostly for export to Britain; of these, 
Hobart (1973, p.38) states, ‘over 100,000 were lost to U boat sinkings in the Atlantic.’  
Given the desperate imperative to provide submachine guns to the British army, and the 
fact that half the guns ended up at the bottom of the Atlantic, that any were issued to the 
Home Guard must be taken as evidence of the importance of the Home Guard as a 
military force – to share such a scarce resource in desperate circumstances, cannot 
easily be dismissed as ‘tokenism’.  Indeed once sufficient supplies of the mass-produced 
Sten ‘machine carbine’ were available in 1943, all Thompsons were withdrawn from the 
Home Guard and issued to regular units.  Like the Thompson, the Sten gun was an 
automatic weapon chambered for a foreign pistol cartridge – but there any similarity 
stopped.  The Sten marked a complete departure from the conventional smallarms that 
preceded it, and will, therefore, be considered in the next chapter, alongside the Home 
Guard’s other unconventional weapons. 
 
The submachine gun was new, not just to the Home Guard, but to the British Army.  
Adoption of the SMG into British service did not lead to a dramatic change in British 
tactics – no storm troopers or tank-rider battalions.  Instead, it was integrated into the 
standard infantry section, and standard infantry tactics.  This is not to suggest, however, 
that the British authorities failed to appreciate the SMG’s advantages and limitations.  A 
table in Home Guard Instruction No. 51 sets out the ranges of the various section 
weapons:44 
      Maximum  Best 
 Rifles and Browning Automatics  400 yards  200 yards 
 Stens     50 yards  10-20 yards 
 Revolvers    40 yards  15 yards 
 Shotguns    40 yards  20 yards 
 LMG and MMG   500 yards  200-300 yards   
 
 The manual went on to examine the tactical handling of the various weapons: 
The rifle.  Flat trajectory up to 400 yards.  Good accuracy in hands of well-
trained man. 
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Tactical use.  To fill the gaps in the killing ground not fully covered by MMGs 
and LMGs.  To arm the battle platoon as laid down…  To arm snipers. 
 
Browning Automatic.  As for the rifle, except that its fire is more rapid than the 
rifle, so that it is a waste of fire power to give it to a sniper. 
 
Stens.  A light handy weapon with a high rate of fire and accuracy at short 
ranges. 
Tactical use.  The use of the Sten may be likened to an extended bayonet.  To 
arm the battle platoon as laid down…  To protect sub-artillery and MMG 
positions.  To arm DRs and Home Guard MT companies. 
 
 Shotguns.  An effective man-killing short range weapon… 
Tactical handling.  … [The] spread with SG and LG make the shotgun a 
peculiarly suitable and effective weapon for night patrols, and ambushes.  By 
day it may be used to supplement the close range defence of sub-artillery 
positions. 
 
 Revolvers.  Short range rapid fire.  Only accurate in hands of experienced shot. 
Tactical handling.  To arm battle platoons as laid down.  To arm officers and 
DRs (if they prefer them to Stens). 
 
MMGs [Medium Machine Guns] and LMGs.  These guns have the highest 
sustained rate of fire of any weapon with which the Home Guard is armed.  The 
effective beaten zone of the bullets is long and narrow.  MMGs are not very 
mobile.  LMGs are more so, but both weapons are best reserved for the defences 
of the localities; light automatics being used for patrols. 
Tactical handling.  MMGs and LMGs should be sited to fire enfilade so that the 
maximum number of the attackers will be within the beaten zone in any one 
burst.  They are less easy to conceal than rifles and automatics, so should, when 
possible, be defiladed from the enemy. 
 
The ranges given for medium machine guns are extremely short, considering that the 
tripod-mounted guns issued to the Home Guard were theoretically capable of effective 
fire out to 3,300 yards with American M1 ball ammunition.45  In Home Guard tactical 
doctrine, the medium machine gun served solely to stiffen the defence.  Minor tactics, in 
terms of section or platoon attacks, or patrols, did not envisage the use of the MMG as 
fire support.  Officially this was due to the weapon’s lack of mobility, but there were 
also issues of communication – given that the Home Guard only received wireless sets 
from mid-194246 – and accuracy, as the guns issued were only fitted with iron sights, 
and firing on fixed lines or at registered targets were not practiced.47 
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Home Guard march past with new American weapons, 11 September 1940.  (L-R) 
M1918 Marlin tank machine gun; M1915 Vickers; M1917 Lewis gun; Browning M1917 
machine gun; M1918 BAR.  Behind the BAR a Home Guard is carrying a tripod, behind 
him is what appears to be a Hotchkiss LMG, or possibly the US version, the model 
1909Benét-Mercié.  (IWM H 4058) 
 
The eclectic selection of automatic weapons provided to the Home Guard from the US 
reserve stockpile, as illustrated in the photograph above, was a reflection of the fact that, 
although many of the great automatic weapon promoters and designers of the late 19th 
and early 20th Century were Americans – Maxim, Lewis, Browning, and the eponymous 
founder of Hotchkiss et Cie – the history of rifle calibre machine guns in US service is 
not a happy one.  The keen reader is directed to the Collector Grade series of 
monographs listed below in references, but it is enough to note that vested interests, 
nepotism, doctrinal confusion, low-quality mass production, and a very powerful 
service cartridge combined to ensure that the US forces never really had a truly 
successful infantry machine gun until the belated adoption of the FN MAG as the M240 
series in the late 1980s.48  This is not to say that the guns were poor; rather that they 
never quite achieved the success that was anticipated, and the Americans swiftly moved 
on to the next latest design.  They were, though, designs of weapons used successfully 
by other nations, and all quite suitable for the kind of intensive, but short, defensive 
battle envisaged for the Home Guard.  
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The US Army adopted Colt-built Vickers machineguns in 1915, to replace the M1909 
Benét-Mercié Machine Rifle, the American version of the Hotchkiss light machine gun 
already described.  Replacing an LMG with an MMG led to complaints from the troops, 
and shoddy First World War manufacturing, together with the high pressures developed 
by the .30-06 cartridge, resulted in the Vickers gun developing a reputation for 
unreliability in US service.  This cleared the way for adoption of a new recoil-operated, 
water-cooled machine gun designed by Browning, and designated the Gun, Machine, 
Caliber .30, Browning M1917. Performance of the two guns is generally agreed to have 
been similar, but the Browning was American-designed, and cheaper and easier to 
manufacture (Goldsmith, 1994, p.212).  The Americans were keen to replace the 
Vickers with the Browning, and as soon as production was established the US 
government’s Vickers guns were either converted into aircraft machine guns or placed 
in reserve.  The British, on the other hand, who had adopted the Vickers in 1912, found 
the combination of gun and .303in cordite-propelled bullet a perfect match.  The British 
Mk.I Vickers MMG remained in service until 1968, enjoying a reputation for reliability 
that was second-to-none.  Thus, while the Americans were relieved to get rid of their 
stock of Vickers guns, the British were delighted to receive them.  7,071 US M1915 
Vickers machineguns were supplied to the UK in 1940-41 (Goldsmith, 1994, p.229).  In 
February 1941 124 aircraft guns and 832 ground-role versions were with the Home 
Guard.   
 
By January 1942 the ground role guns had peaked at 1,405, but aircraft guns had fallen 
to 51.49  Vickers aircraft guns would have overheated very quickly in the ground role, as 
ventilating slots were cut in the barrel casing to enable the aircraft’s slipstream to cool 
the gun.  This meant they could not hold water, as required on the ground, and it is most 
likely that they were converted back to ground role specification by replacing or 
patching their casings.  It is also a comparatively straightforward matter to convert 
Vickers guns from one calibre to another.50  Of the M1915 Vickers supplied to the UK, 
one thousand were converted to .303 calibre at RSAF Enfield Lock between July 1942 
and January 1944 (Skennerton, 1988, p.47).51  By the end of 1942 there were just 76 US 
Vickers aircraft guns and 130 ground role guns showing on Home Guard returns, but 
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the number of .303 Vickers had rapidly increased from just two in May 1941 to 655.  
What is interesting is that during the ‘darkest days’ of 1940-41 all these Vickers 
machine guns were kept in the ‘Home Guard calibre’ of .300 (.30-06) – once again 
reinforcing the importance attached to providing good automatic weapons for the Home 
Guard. 
 
The US .300 Vickers 
machine gun from 
Bernard’s Manual of 
Modern Automatic 
Guns.  The American 
rear sight is shorter 
than that of the British 
gun, due to the flatter 
trajectory of its 
ammunition, and the 
muzzle attachment is 
shorter too.  The tripod 
differs in having a 
square, rather than 
rounded rear foot – but 
essentially the gun and 
tripod were nearly 
identical to the British 
service equivalents. 
(Author’s collection) 
 
 
The Browning water-cooled machine gun, which supplanted the American Vickers, 
served as the US infantry support machine gun from 1918 until the end of the Korean 
War.  Its air-cooled derivative, the M1919, remained in action worldwide into the 
1990s.  The Second World War M1917A1 Browning differed from the original M1917, 
as supplied to the Home Guard, in a few small modifications – chiefly a strengthening 
bracket riveted across the bottom of the receiver.  This was a response to a problem with 
the receiver side plates parting under the pressure of sustained fire with powerful .30-06 
rounds for prolonged periods – not an issue likely to affect Home Guard facing German 
invaders.  To all intents and purposes the ‘BMG’ was, like the BAR, a weapon the 
Home Guard shared with the US armed forces.  In defensive positions – such as those 
the Home Guard would occupy in action – the water-cooled .30 Browning was 
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formidable, as described by Colonel Jeff Cooper, a former wartime US Marine (cited in 
Easterly, 1998):   
The Marines within the Lunga Point perimeter [on Guadalcanal] were engaged 
in throwing back increasingly large numbers of basically unsupported infantry, 
which chose to attack mostly at night and at very close range, against stationary 
defensive positions.  The BAR served well under those conditions, but we had a 
good supply of the superb Browning water-cooled, belt-fed machineguns, and 
these chewed up the Nips in highly satisfactory fashion without a great deal of 
support from the squad automatics.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The M1917 Browning machine gun in British service, taken from the Gale and Polden 
booklet The Browning Heavy Machine Gun .300 calibre model 1919 (water cooled) 
Mechanism Made Easy, published in 1942. The firer is a Regular Army instructor, and 
the gun is mounted on the M1918 tripod. Note that the pistol grip is held with the left 
hand, while the right is used to adjust elevation and traverse. (Author’s collection) 
 
M1917 Brownings in British service are generally seen mounted on the M1918 tripod, a 
rather sophisticated device, which incorporated fine traverse and elevation adjustments, 
flexible leg joints – to ensure the gun was perfectly level on uneven or sloping ground – 
and the use of light alloys to keep the weight manageable.  All this sophistication was a 
luxury, and although there is nothing inherently wrong with the M1918 tripod, it was 
another example of America’s muddled and wasteful machine gun procurement 
policy.52  The opportunity to clear such embarrassments out the stores, and benefit 
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financially, was seized in 1940 – which is something to bear in mind when considering 
America’s supposed generosity in selling its reserve arms to the UK (Goldsmith, 2008, 
p.58).  Home Guard Instruction No. 26-1941, Miscellaneous Notes makes it clear that 
M1917 and M1917A1 tripods were also in Home Guard service, the former having its 
own instructions, the latter being covered in Instruction No. 26.  The M1917A1 tripod 
was the version in current use with US forces.   
 
The 1940 British instruction manual for the M1917 Browning sought to accentuate the 
similarity between the Browning and Vickers medium guns, because of the familiarity 
old soldiers would have with the British Vickers.53  However, the Browning won the 
respect of the Home Guard in its own right, Graves (1943) states that the Browning was 
preferred to the Vickers:    
Home Guard in Cornwall:  On September 18th [1940] machine guns were issued 
at last.  The general opinion is that the Browning MG is a much better weapon 
than the Vickers…   
 
Polgate Home Guard, on the Sussex Coast, had a ‘BMG’ in late 1940, while ‘D’ 
Company, in Sevenoaks, 32 miles inland, only received theirs in July 1943 (Brown and 
Peek, 1944, p.25).54  There were already 4,331 Browning machine guns in Home Guard 
service in February 1941, a figure that reached 6,330 in November 1942.55  The gun 
weighed 30 lbs and the tripod approximately 45lbs.  Each 250 round belt of ammunition 
weighed 14½lbs, and seven pints of cooling water added another 6¾ lbs of weight to be 
carried by the team – a load that frequently led Home Guard units to improvise trailers 
for their BMG.56  Interestingly, in view of the dire situation usually depicted, former-
Home Guard Browning gunner Charles Medhurst could not recall there being any 
shortage of .300 ammunition for the BMG, indeed, he remembered regular firings with 
the gun on the Downs at Willingdon.57   
 
The other American ‘heavy’ machine gun supplied to the Home Guard, and displayed in 
the September 1940 ‘march past’ photograph (p.144 above), is the M1918 Marlin-
Rockwell tank machine gun.  A derivative of the Colt-Browning Model 1895 ‘Gas 
Hammer’ machine gun, J.M. Browning’s first automatic weapon design, the Marlin-
Rockwell, and various related guns, saw service with the Home Guard, although chiefly 
in anti-aircraft roles.  The M1895 tapped off gas near the muzzle which impinged on an 
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arm that swung down and to the rear, reloading the gun.  It was the action of this arm 
which earned the M1895 its soubriquet of ‘Potato-digger’.  Eccentric as the M1895 
mechanism appears, it actually worked rather well, to quote Hogg and Weeks (1973, 
p.5.69):  
However odd this action may appear there is no doubt that, owing to the 
mechanical linkage it produced a very progressive and gentle movement of the 
bolt which gave particularly effective and clean extraction and kept the rate of 
fire down to a practical value. 
 
 
 
 
 
An incomplete early Marlin-
Rockwell ‘Colt M1917’ 
machine gun in the Bapty 
collection.  Note the gas 
cylinder below the barrel (top), 
which replaced the swinging 
arm of the original ‘Potato 
digger’.  The style of sight 
(below) indicates this particular 
gun was intended ground role 
use. The metal loop is the 
cocking handle; the pistol grip 
and trigger are missing from 
the rear of this example.  
(Photograph author, courtesy 
of Bapty 2000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Production of the Colt-Browning machine gun was passed to Marlin-Rockwell in 1916, 
and under their auspices Colt’s improved M1914 design received a series of further 
modifications and improvements, including replacing the distinctive ‘gas-hammer’ with 
a conventional piston and cylinder.  When the United States went to war in 1917, the 
gun was already in use by the Italians and Russians, US, Canadians and British, in 
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various versions (Ballou, 200, pp.44-45).58  As a result of the urgent need for machine 
guns, several models were introduced into US service, including the M1917 improved 
ground machine gun, the M1916, M1917 and M1918 aircraft machine guns, and the 
M1918 tank machine gun.   
 
The original Colt ‘Potato-digger’ is one of those quirky designs, like the Madsen 
LMG,59 that turns up in odd places – one being London District, where 13 ‘Colt 
machine guns’, appeared in the Home Guard returns in June 1941.  This is undoubtedly 
what Charles Graves is describing in Home Guard of Britain (1943):60  
34th County of London Battalion, Home Guard:  About this time [1941] a parcel 
of forty heavy Colt guns were received as a gift from an American friend, and 
having these and a good number of personnel of a disbanded unit they were 
organised as an MG Company to man river defence block-houses commanding 
the Thames river.  Soon after they grew into battalion size, and were absorbed 
into “R” Zone.  Their training had been given to them by Grenadier Guards 
sergeants who, considering that the Colt guns were new to them, did a 
remarkably efficient job.  It is not generally known that a machine gun battalion 
equipped with 1914 Colt machine guns served in World War Two, even though 
they never saw combat. 
 
Inevitably our attention is drawn to the age of the guns – ignoring the fact that this 
vintage is two years younger than the service Vickers machine gun.  As described, the 
number of ‘Colts’ with the Home Guard shot up to 98 in March 1942, 54 of which were 
in London district.61  Analysis of the statistics is not helped by the returns simply listing 
‘Colt machine guns’ (Marlin guns were listed separately), which, in theory, could cover 
anything that the Colt’s ever manufactured, from the somewhat antediluvian M1895 to 
the modern MG38B (a successful commercial derivative of the water-cooled M1917).62  
If this is a problem for the modern researcher, it was too for those trying to keep track of 
American weapons in British service at the time.  On 25 July 1942, the Assistant 
Director of Small Arms and Ammunition, Inspection Board of United Kingdom and 
Canada, in Washington DC, submitted a report, listing the various Browning derivatives 
(including BAR types, aircraft and .50in calibre weapons), the user guide or manual 
appropriate to the weapon, and the mount.  The report’s author explained (cited in 
Goldsmith, 2006, p.74):   
 
1. A large number of different types of Browning Machine Guns have been 
shipped from North America to the UK during the period 1939-1942.  In the 
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first place, old war-stock batches, received from US government sources, 
and in the second place, odd lots from other sources were shipped.  These 
included a number of early types of both commercial and US service 
weapons.  In the third place, British contracts placed with firms in the USA 
led to the production of a number of commercial type weapons.  
Subsequently, as these contracts were converted to, or superseded by, Lend-
Lease contracts, deliveries of commercial weapons were succeeded by 
deliveries of standard US service weapons. 
 
2. Not infrequently difficulty is experienced in identifying these various 
Browning Machine Guns on account of the facts that  
a. Some of them are called Colt guns and some Brownings. 
b. Some of them are gas operated and some recoil operated. 
c. Some of them are automatic rifles, with or without bipod mountings, 
and some machine guns, medium or heavy. 
d. Some of them are air-cooled and some water-cooled. 
e. Some of them are fixed type [aircraft] guns and some flexible type. 
f. Some of them are commercial type guns and some standard US 
service weapons. 
 
3. To clarify the situation, the attached tables of the various Colt-Browning 
Machine Guns of 0.30 inch and 0.50 inch calibres and their mountings have 
been drawn up so as to indicate the correct nomenclature of, and relationship 
between, each. 
 
4.  As a general rule, though a number of these weapons have been made by 
firms other than Colt’s Patent Fire Arms Manufacturing Company, the 
majority of them were in the first place manufactured by that firm, and all of 
them were made chiefly to Browning Patents.  Consequently these guns have 
become known under both names, Colt and Browning.  Strictly speaking, 
however, the term “Colt” should be reserved for the commercial models and 
the name “Browning” applied only to the service models, except in the case 
of the 1914 Colt gas operated machine gun, and the later models derived 
from it, the service models of which are termed Colt M1914, Colt M1917 
and Marlin M1917. 
 
5. Many of the later models of commercial weapons are of similar design to the 
latest types of US service weapons, but the commercial guns are generally 
made to commercial drawings and inspected to commercial standards, while 
the US service weapons are made to US Ordnance drawings and inspected to 
US Ordnance standards.  Consequently the components of the former, 
though often of the same design as those of the latter, cannot be regarded as 
fully interchangeable with them, except in the case of the Colt MG40-2, 
MG52-2 and MG53-2 Machine Guns, which are in fact the same as the Cal. 
.30 Aircraft M2, the Cal. .50 Watercooled M2, and the Cal. .50 Aircraft M2 
Browning Machine Guns, respectively, with which they should have full 
interchangeability of parts. 
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The report goes on to examine interchangeability between the various guns, before 
setting out a chart listing all the Browning derivatives, land and air, their feed type, the 
manual or instructions, and their mountings.  A shortened extract is shown below, 
listing only the medium machine guns that are most relevant to this study: 
 
Model  
Designation 
Text and  
Reference Books 
Nature  
of Feed 
Remarks 
Commercial Guns 
 
Colt Automatic 
Machine Gun 
Model 1914. 
The Colt Automatic 
Gun Model of 1914 
(Browning’s Patent) 
Instruction Book, 
Text Book of Small 
Arms Published by 
H.M. Stationery Off.  
1918. 
Fabric Belt,  
Left Hand 
Only. 
Air-cooled, gas operated, 
MMG of very early 
design, normally mounted 
for field use on a tripod.  
Actuated by radial lever; 
...  Originally 
manufactured by Colt’s 
Patent Fire Arms 
Manufacturing Co. to 
Browning Patents.  (A 
number of these guns 
were manufactured by 
Colt’s during 1914-1918 
for the British government 
to take 0.303 in. 
ammunition.  They have 
since been declared 
obsolete. 
Colt Automatic 
Machine Gun – 
Rifle Calibre MG 
38 and MG38B 
(Water-cooled). 
Colt Automatic 
Machine Gun – Rifle 
Calibre MG 38 and 
MG 38B (W.C.) 
Instruction Book. 
(Early Models) 
Fabric Belt.  
Left hand only.  
(Later Models) 
Fabric belt or 
metal 
disintegrating 
link belt.  Left 
hand only. 
Water-cooled, recoil 
operated, MMG of early 
design.  Pistol grip firing 
control.  The MG 38B is 
fitted with spade grips and 
rear trigger control.  Guns 
MG 38 and MG 38B 
supplied since 1939 will 
function with metal link 
disintegrating belt as well 
as with fabric belt. 
Commercial models of 
guns M1917 and 
M1917A1 below, with 
which they have only 
limited interchangeability 
of parts. 
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Commercial Mounts 
 
Colt Tripod The Colt Automatic 
Gun Instruction 
Book.  Handbook of 
Ordnance Data (No. 
1861) 1918. 
 Field tripod mount for use 
with Colt 1914 guns. 
Tripod M35. Colt Automatic 
Machine Gun – Rifle 
Calibre MG38 and 
MG38B Instruction 
Book. 
 Field tripod for ground 
use – commercial model 
of Tripod, Machine Gun, 
M1917. 
Tripod M37. Colt Automatic 
Machine Gun – Rifle 
Calibre MG38 and 
MG38B Instruction 
Book. 
 Field tripod mount for use 
in ground or A.A. roles.  
Special commercial 
model.  Instantly 
convertible for A.A. use 
with all-round traverse. 
Anti-aircraft 
mount (M67). 
Colt Automatic 
Machine Gun – Rifle 
Calibre MG38 and 
MG38B Instruction 
Book. 
 Tripod-type A.A. mount. 
US Military .30 Calibre Machine Guns 
Gun, Machine, 
Cal. .30 Colt, 
M1917. 
Handbook of 
Ordnance Data (No. 
1861) 1918. 
Fabric belt, left 
hand only. 
A later model of the Gun, 
Machine, Cal. .30, Colt, 
M1914 manufactured by 
the Marlin-Rockwell 
Corporation.  Now 
declared obsolete. 
Gun, Machine, 
Cal. .30, Marlin, 
Aircraft, M1917. 
Handbook of 
Ordnance Data (No. 
1861) 1918. 
Metal link 
disintegrating 
belt, left hand 
only. 
Air-cooled, gas operated 
MMG, for use in fixed 
positions in aircraft.  This 
is a modified Gun, 
Machine, Cal. .30, Colt, 
M1917, actuated by 
horizontal piston instead 
of by radial lever.  It has a 
smooth barrel without 
radiating fins, and an 
improved lock mechanism 
designed for 
synchronization purposes.  
It is fitted with a trigger 
motor for remote control.  
Developed and 
manufactured by the 
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Marlin-Rockwell 
Corporation in 1917.  (An 
alternative model for use 
as a flexible gun was 
developed in 1918 but not 
widely adopted).  Now 
declared obsolete.  
Gun, Machine, 
Cal. .30, Marlin, 
Tank, M1917. 
Handbook of 
Ordnance Data (No. 
1861) 1918. 
Fabric belt, left 
hand only. 
This is the Gun, Machine, 
Cal. 30, Marlin, Aircraft, 
modified for use in tanks.  
It is fitted with an 
aluminium Lewis-type 
radiator, sights, a pistol 
grip and a hand operated 
trigger.  Now declared 
obsolete. 
Gun, Machine, 
Cal. .30, 
Browning, 
M1917. 
SNL A-1; SNL A-5; 
FM 23-55; FT 0.30-
C-4; FT 0.30-A-4; 
FT 0.30-AA-D-1. 
Fabric belt, left 
hand only. 
Water-cooled, recoil 
operated MMG of early 
design.  Pistol grip rear 
trigger control.  Designed 
for ground use.  Now 
declared obsolete.  
Referred-to as “Gun, 
Machine, Browning, .30in 
USA, Mk.I” in Weedon 
[UK] SA identification 
Lists CI American 
(January 1942). 
Gun, Machine, 
Cal. .30, 
Browning, 
M1917A1 
SNL A-1; SNL A-5; 
FM 23-55; FT 0.30-
C-4; FT 0.30-A-4; 
FT 0.30-AA-D-1. 
Fabric belt, left 
hand only. 
This is a modified Gun, 
Machine, Cal. .30, 
Browning M1917, 
incorporating a new 
bottom plate with integral 
elevating bracket 
US Ordnance Mountings 
 
Tripod, Machine 
Gun M1917. 
SNL A-1; SNL A-5; 
FM 23-55; TM 9-
1205 
 Field tripod mount for 
ground use with M1917 
gun, suitable for ground 
use only.  Now obsolete. 
Mount, Tripod, 
Machine Gun 
Cal. .30 
M1917A1 
SNL A-1; SNL A-5; 
FM 23-55; TM 9-
1205 
 Improved model of 
M1917 mount with new 
cradle assembly for use 
with M1917 and 
M1917A1 guns in both 
ground and A.A. roles.  
This mounts necessitates 
the use of a gun pintle 
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semi-permanently 
assembled to the gun,  The 
cradle and pintle assembly 
on this mount is used in 
the A.A. role in A.F.V.s. 
Tripod, Machine 
Gun M1918. 
SNL A-1; SNL A-5; 
FM 23-55; TM 9-
1205 
 Field tripod mount for use 
with M1917 and 
M1917A1 guns.  The gun 
pintle is dispensed with, 
the gun being fitted 
directly to the mount.  
Cannot be used in the 
A.A. role.  Now obsolete. 
 
 
The US Army purchased 1,470 Marlin-Rockwell ground-role guns during the First 
World War, all of which were used only in training.  More widely successful were the 
tank gun, and the aircraft variant of which 38,000 were built, some seeing operational 
use in 1918 (Easterly, 1998, p.247).  Although a serviceable machine gun, the Marlin 
was eclipsed by Browning’s later recoil-operated machine guns, and was relegated to 
the reserve.  In a memorandum to the War Cabinet of 29 August 1940, UK Minister of 
Supply, Herbert Morrison stated that the Americans had supplied 2,600 ‘tank machine 
guns’, by which he probably meant Marlin-Rockwell M1918 guns.  The Minister went 
on to point out that owing to all the American smallarms being in a different calibre, 
they would have to be ‘issued to the Home Guard or fixed defensive posts’.63  The 
M1917/18 Marlin is not, though, widely seen in Home Guard service, and, like the 
Hotchkiss LMG, most of the guns were used by the Merchant Navy in the light anti-
aircraft role (Hogg and Weeks, 1973, p.5.69).  Marlins only appear in Home Guard 
returns in February 1942, with 594 guns recorded, a quantity that had only climbed to 
1,451 by November 1942.64  It is likely that the majority of these guns were in the anti-
aircraft role, for factory defence (see Chapter 9).   
 
We have already established that it was neither possible, nor necessarily desirable in 
terms of the overall war effort, to provide a rifle for all 1,600,000-plus Home Guards; 
furthermore, the issue of rifles favoured those areas most directly threatened.  
Nevertheless, it is quite clear that the Home Guard was under-armed, and gaps in the 
armament of the battle platoons existed which needed to be plugged by issuing 
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grenades, submachine guns and shotguns – as well as taking advantage of the American 
medium machine gun windfall.  It is difficult to take serious issue with the way in which 
these weapons were deployed.  What emerges is the thoughtful use of limited resources.  
It is useful to bear in mind Peter Fleming’s comments (1957, p.205) on the deployment 
Home Guard: 
 … it was a largely static force and it would therefore be misleading to assess its 
operational influence on the invasion – had it been launched – in terms of its 
total strength; for the attack on south-east England would initially have had to 
overcome opposition only from those Home Guard units whose homes lay in its 
path.  The battalions in Belfast, Glasgow, Cardiff, Bristol, Liverpool, 
Manchester and other places remote from the decisive battlefield about the 
capital might have seen action; but by the time German troops came within 
range of their rifles the issue would have been decided…”  
 
This factor clearly influenced planning, and the distribution of resources.  It is quite 
apparent that the type and quantity of weapons and ammunition supplied to Home 
Guard units varied between those directly ‘in harm’s way’, such as the Polgate Home 
Guard in Sussex and those in less immediately threatened areas.  Furthermore, those 
with the unenviable task of distributing weapons took the Home Guard sufficiently 
seriously to issue a significant quantity of automatic weapons which, far from being 
‘cast-offs’ could all have found vital work with the Army, Royal Navy, Merchant Navy, 
or defending aerodromes. 
 
MACHINE GUNS IN HOME GUARD SERVICE65 
 Feb 1941 
 
Mar 1942 Nov 1942 
Hotchkiss LMG   124 323 
Lewis LMG (.303)  121 195 
Lewis LMG (.30) 2,277 2,642 3,282 
Lewis LMG (.30) (air)  11,598 12,397 12,393 
Bren LMG  61 112 
Vickers MMG (.30) 737 1,007 130 
Vickers MMG (.30) (air) 236 326 76 
Vickers MMG (.303)  250 655 
Browning MMG 4,331 5,283 6,330 
Marlin MMG  918 1,451 
Colt MMG  98 80 
Hispano 20mm HMG  71 81 
Other MGs 1,250 26 67 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
Sten Guns and Sticky Bombs 
 
 
The contention that the Home Guard was equipped with ‘weapons which in reality were 
of dubious fighting value, but which in all probability would never have to be fired in 
anger and could be presented as worthwhile’ (MacKenzie, 1996, p.177) bears heaviest 
on the unconventional and emergency weapons developed during the desperate days of 
1940 and placed in production via unorthodox routes, frequently, it is claimed, at the 
insistence of the Prime Minister (MacKenzie, 1996, passim).  The extent to which these 
extemporised weapons were used by forces other than the Home Guard is an important 
test of that hypothesis.  So too is an understanding of the real capability these weapons 
offered, in order to determine if they were indeed of ‘dubious fighting value’.  Of all the 
unconventional weapons developed for Home Defence, those most closely associated 
with the Home Guard are the ‘sub-artillery’.  Where this term originated is now unclear, 
but it was used, from 1941, in official publications, to describe a small group of 
unconventional support/anti-armour weapons eventually comprising the Northover 
Projector, the Blacker Bombard and the Smith Gun.  These weapons, and a selection of 
grenades graced with soubriquets such as the ‘Woolworths Bomb’, the ‘Sticky Bomb’ 
and the Talcum Powder Grenade’, will forever be associated with the Home Guard, and 
– at first sight – appear to support the contention that the organisation’s armoury was, at 
best, whimsical and optimistic, and at worst (to borrow a phrase from the American 
Civil War) ‘liable to do as much execution to the shooter as the shootee’ (Davis, 1989, 
p.53).  In this and the following chapter we will examine these equipments and 
challenge this view.  However, first, we must continue where we left off at the end of 
the last chapter, by examining the most successful of all the unconventional weapons 
developed by the British in the early stages of the Second World War – the Sten gun.  
 
K.R. Gulvin (1980, p.24) comments: ‘Although intended as a Home Guard weapon, the 
Sten was later on general issued to the Field Army…’  Heart-warming as it is to read an 
association of the Home Guard with a successful development in weaponry, Gulvin falls 
into the trap of confusing ‘home defence’ with ‘Home Guard’.  Home defence forces 
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included the ‘Field Force’ (Army) and airfield defence forces, as well as the Home 
Guard, all with a desperate need for weapons.  Stens first entered service with the 
Regular Army in the latter part of 1941 (Laidler and Howroyd, 1995), and were issued 
to the Home Guard from March 1942, at which point Thompson submachine guns were 
withdrawn and issued to the Army.  Curiously, Longmate (1974, p.75) suggests that this 
occurred as early as 1941: 
 In 1941 Tommy guns were no sooner issued than they were withdrawn again for 
use by the Commandoes; but soon afterwards the Home Guard received a new 
automatic weapon, the Sten… 
 
Thompsons were certainly still in service with Kent Home Guard in August 1942, as 
they are specified on the HQ Company, 20th Bn, training programme of 26 August 
(Brown and Peek, 1944, p.22).  Their first reference to the Sten is in January 1943 
(Brown and Peek, 1944, p.23).  The changeover is reflected in the Home Guard returns, 
which show that in November 1942, 12,895 Thompsons were in use by the Home 
Guard, but that figure was just half the previous month’s total, indicating that the guns 
were being rapidly withdrawn.1  Stens had arrived eight months earlier, with 7,914 
appearing suddenly in the Home Guard returns for March 1942.  The first areas to 
receive them were Northern, Scottish, Southern and Western Commands.  The 
following month there were 72,929 Stens with the Home Guard, distributed nationwide 
– an astonishing rate of production and introduction.  By November the figure had 
almost reached a quarter of a million – 248,234.2  Sten guns eventually made up 40% of 
the Home Guard armoury, and were greeted, as we have seen, with enthusiasm by those 
who appreciated that the gun represented a healthy new utilitarian approach (Longmate, 
1974, p75).  They were brutally simple, poorly finished with dangerous characteristics, 
but undeniably effective, cheap and simple to manufacture – the BSA factory at Tysley 
was able to assemble 47,000 Sten guns in a single week in 1943 (Laidler and Howroyd, 
1995, p.7).  Given that the Sten represented such a large proportion of the Home Guard 
armoury, and a seminal shift in the very definition of what constituted an effective 
weapon, it is interesting to reflect that aspects of the evolution of the Sten still remain 
unpublished, and are worth a small diversion here. 
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The story of Britain’s adoption of the submachine gun is told at length in Major F.W. 
Hobart’s useful Pictorial History of the Sub-Machine Gun (London, 1973).  Hobart 
knew Mark Dinely, owner of Bapty & Co., and weaves Dinely into the story.  
According to Hobart, Dinely (in his capacity as representative of Dinely and Dowding, 
arms importers), brought a Hungarian designed, wood stocked, delayed-blowback 9mm 
submachine gun to the attention of the War Office in May 1939 (Hobart, 1973, p.71).  
Dinely had drawings, which were made up into a prototype gun by BSA, who produced 
a small batch under licence and determined that the guns could be mass produced for £5 
each, a conclusion supported by the Superintendent of the Royal Small Arms Factory.  
The BSA-Kiraly (named after its designer) was burdened with an over-complicated 
trigger mechanism, which may partly explain the complete indifference with which the 
British military authorities regarded it.  However, once this was replaced with a 
conventional sear, the weapon was quite serviceable – and went on to serve with the 
Hungarian army as the M39/M43 series.  Around the same time, the Board of Ordnance 
also investigated the German Erma EMP 35 submachine gun.   
 
The Erma EMP model 1935 SMG 
(Photograph author’s collection) 
 
 
In a note, dated 9 May 1939, to the Ordnance Board, the Director of Artillery observed 
that: ‘although we are not particularly interested in this type of weapon, in view of the 
fact that 1,000 of this make could be procured at very short notice, we would like it 
investigated’ (Hobart, 1973, p.71).  The EMP 35 was manufactured for export, and it is 
conceivable that 1,000 of these German guns might have been available for sale to the 
UK in May 1939, although rather unlikely.  There is another possibility, raised by a 
posting from a French contributor, D. Lehman, on an internet forum.3  Lehman lists 
small arms in use by the French army in 1940, including submachine guns.4  He does 
not give his original source: 
 
 SMGs used by the French Army in 1939/1940 
 
- French origin 
PM MAS 38 : 1958 
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PM STA mle 1924 : 1200 
PM Petter mle 1939 : 50 
PM ETVS : 50 
 
- Foreign origin 
MP 28 : 1000 
MP 34 : 1200 
EMP : 3250 
Steyr : about 50 
Suomi M/31 : 150 
Thompson 1921/1928 : 3000 
 
The EMP SMG is the most common SMG used by the French Army in 1939-40.  
They actually were seized from Spanish Republican troops at the end of the 
Spanish Civil War.  3250 EMP were counted but due to lack of magazines only 
about 1000 were issued.  The most common place to find this weapon was with 
the Corps Francs. 
 
To suggest that the British Army Director of Artillery’s sudden interest in Erma 
submachine guns was sparked by a potential windfall of German weapons from the 
losing side in the Spanish Civil War might seem bizarre, but there is unexpected support 
from an unpublished document in the archives of Bapty & Co.5  The document in 
question is a laissez passer dated 25 May 1940 (reproduced below).  Mark Dinely was 
to report to Duke of York’s headquarters in Chelsea, to inspect and recondition arms on 
charge of Major Hugh B.C. Pollard.  For those unfamiliar with Major Pollard, the 
following from Graham Macklin at the National Archives may be useful: 
The recently released Special Operations Executive (SOE) personal file of Major 
Hugh Bertie Campbell Pollard (HS 9/1200/5) sheds new light on the man who 
helped fly General Franco from the Canary Islands to Morocco, leading 
ultimately to the overthrow of the democratically elected republican government 
and thirty-six years of brutal dictatorship.  Contrary to the previous portrayal of 
Pollard, a genial, rough-and-ready gung-ho ‘adventurer’ who flew the future 
Caudillo to Morocco on a whim, the files reveal Pollard to have been an 
experienced British intelligence officer, talented linguist, and firearms expert 
with considerable firsthand experience of wars and revolutions in Mexico, 
Morocco, and  Ireland, where he served as a police advisor in Dublin Castle 
during the ‘stormy days’ of the Black and Tans in the early 1920s.  Pollard, who 
listed his hobbies in Who’s Who as ‘hunting and shooting’, was the sporting 
editor of Country Life and a member of Lord Leconfield’s hunt.  He was also a 
renowned and passionate firearms expert having written numerous books on the 
subject including the section on ‘small arms’ for the official war office textbook.  
His friend Douglas Jerrold, who himself later served in British intelligence, 
recalled that Pollard ‘looked and behaved, like a German Crown Prince and had 
a habit of letting off revolvers in any office he happened to visit’.6 
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Laissez passer, dated 25 May 1940, issued 
to Mark Dinely to enable him to inspect 
and recondition arms held by the 
remarkable Major Pollard of MI6.  
(Reproduced by kind permission of Bapty 
& Co. Ltd) 
 
 
 
Dinely noted beneath the pass:  ‘This was 
so that we could make operative a terrible 
lot of rubbishy Spanish submachine guns 
collected from surrendered red arms 
dumps in France.  There are still some of 
them about.  They had much influence on 
the design?? [sic] if any of those poor 
arms the Sten and the Lanchester.’  
Dinely’s mission coincided with an 
increasingly urgent hunt for submachine 
guns for British forces.  The first request from the BEF for a ‘machine carbine or 
gangster gun’ had been back in December 1939, to which the Board of Ordnance 
responded by supplying seven submachine guns for trials.7 In January 1940 the Board 
had tested a ‘Schmeisser’.  The gun, which was of 7.65mm calibre, Hobart (1973, p.71) 
concluded, must have been an example of the Hugo Schmeisser-designed MP28, as it 
was described as ‘similar to the Bergman’.  Laidler and Howroyd (1995, p.3) state that 
the Chief Inspector of Small Arms (CISA) was given two MP28/II sub-machine guns, 
one in 7.63mm and the other in 9mm, which had been acquired by the British Consul 
General in Addis Ababa. 
 
The MP28/II was, as its nomenclature suggests, already twelve years old when tested by 
the Board, and was a modification of the MP18/I, that had entered service with German 
storm troops in the final months of the First World War.  Production had been 
undertaken in Belgium since 1934, and the weapon had been adopted by Belgian forces, 
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as well as enjoying sales to Portugal, China, Japan and various South and Central 
American countries, including Bolivia.  The British, testing the gun in January 1940, 
were, therefore, considerably ‘behind the curve’.  Writing in Smallarms Review (2004), 
Captain M. Mendenhall says of the MP28/II:   
‘Perhaps the most important impact that the MP28,II [sic] had was during the 
Spanish Civil War.  It was there that another generation of German officers 
learned first hand the value of a properly employed machine pistol.  It is very 
likely that the lessons of the Spanish Civil War influenced the German high 
command to put the Erma MP38 into production.’   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Above) The MP28/II, a modification of the First World War MP18/I for selective fire 
(semi-auto and full – the button above the trigger) and to accept a box magazine. 
(sbhac.net) 
 
(Below) The MP38 with folding stock extended. (Wiki commons) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MP28s saw little Second World War German service, generally with garrison troops, 
security police or Volksturm.  It was replaced in production by the pressed steel, folding 
stock MP38, a captured example of which was tested by the British in July 1940.  
Initially referred to as the ‘German parachutists’ machine carbine’, the Erma-built 
MP38 was subsequently referred to by the Board (and the rest of the world) as the 
‘Schmeisser’, despite having no connection with the designer, and giving rise to 
considerable potential for confusion.8  Seven months had elapsed since the British Army 
had urgently requested machine carbines, without any tangible result.  Although the 
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American Thompson sub-machine gun did not use standard UK ammunition, and 
although they cost a hefty £50 each, the Thompson was adopted for Army (and Home 
Guard) use.  In August 1940, with the Army apparently satisfied with Thompsons en 
route, the Admiralty requested 10,000 copies of the ‘Schmeisser’ (MP28), and the Air 
Ministry, having been impressed by the ‘folding stock Schmeisser’ (MP38), requested 
10,000 copies of the more modern gun.  Eventually it was agreed to produce 50,000 
British versions of the MP28/II (Hobart, 1973, pp.71 and 73). 
 
The MP28/II is, in Mendenhall’s words (2004):  ‘a finely crafted, first generation “Old 
World” submachine gun’.  At first sight it seems particularly perverse to have opted for 
this over the modern and popular MP38.  However, the shaping of a wooden stock was 
straightforward, and the receiver was a simple piece of seamless tube, extending the full 
length of the gun to hold the barrel securely and provide a forward hand grip.  The 
barrel and trigger mechanism presented no particular challenges, and the gun was 
therefore quicker and easier to get into production than the MP38, which would require 
more complex tooling.  Adopting standard UK .380in (9x17mm) pistol calibre was 
abandoned due to poor penetration, and it was agreed that the weapon would fire the 
‘enemy’ 9x19mm parabellum round (there was a precedent, as the BESA tank machine 
gun fired the continental 7.92mm ‘8mm Mauser’ round) (Laidler and Howroyd, 1995, 
p.4).  Production was given to the Sterling Engineering Co. Ltd of Dagenham, who 
were expecting an order for Bren gun carrier bogie wheels.  Seconded to Sterling, to 
assist with the production of some vehicles for the Dutch army, was automotive 
engineer George Lanchester, one of the owners of the eponymous motorcar company, 
and successful designer of armoured cars.  Lanchester and Sterling were tasked by the 
Ministry of Supply to get the ‘9mm Schmeisser Carbine’ in production as quickly as 
possible (Laidler and Howroyd, 1995, p.6).  Test firing was carried out in November 
1940, with a production order for 50,000 guns at £14 each being issued in June 1941.  
Having offered a serviceable sub-machine gun eighteen months previously, at £5 each, 
Mark Dinely can perhaps be forgiven some hostility towards what now became the 
‘machine carbine 9mm Lanchester Mk I’.  In Hogg and Weeks’ description (1973, 
p.2.42): 
The Lanchester … is memorable not for any oddity in its design nor feature in 
its manufacture but the fact that it was ever made in the form it was.  It was 
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nothing more than a direct copy of the German MP28/II designed by Hugo 
Schmeisser and the only visible differences were minor and not readily 
distinguishable. 
 
In 1999, the Royal Ordnance facility at Nottingham was earmarked for closure 
following a dismal series of sell-offs, mergers and asset strips.  Bapty & Company was 
offered the opportunity to clear out all the contents of the ‘mezzanine storage floor’.  
Apart from large numbers of components for weapons such as the L7A2 general 
purpose machine gun and AR18 assault rifle, there emerged two elderly submachine 
guns.  One was a ‘lost’ prototype Lanchester, marked ‘Sterling Sub Machine Gun PG7’ 
(Pilot Gun 7).  The other was a similar gun, judged to be a Spanish copy of the MP28, 
and subsequently identified by this author as a republican ‘subfusil Naranjero’.  The 
term ‘Naranjero’ (‘orange grower’) originates in the orange growing region of Valencia 
where the guns were produced during the Spanish Civil War.  The term is sometimes 
used as a generic term for any Spanish copy of a sub-machine gun, particularly the 
MP28 and EMP, but the true Naranjero appears to have been a Spanish Republican 
MP28/II copy distinguished by a distinctive disc-shaped cocking handle and chambered 
for the 9mm ‘Largo’ (9x23mm) round.  Approximately 2,000 of these guns are believed 
to have been manufactured during 1938 in the Ministry of Armaments, Valencia.9  The 
Nottingham Narajero was incomplete, missing its bolt and rear sight.  When the rescued 
guns and parts arrived at the Bapty armoury, the senior armourer, Carl Schmidt, seized 
on the MP28 copy and emerged triumphantly from the stores with the missing bolt.  
How the gun, one of just 2,000 built, came to be in the Royal Ordnance facility in 
Nottingham, and the matching bolt in the Bapty spares box will never be known, as all 
the organisations involved (Royal Ordnance, Sterling Armaments and Bapty) have been 
transformed by 60 years of takeovers, closures, buy-outs and relocations.10  
Nevertheless, it is not beyond the realms of probability that this is one of the ‘rubbishy 
Spanish submachine guns’ that Dinely said were ‘still about’, and therefore, “had much 
influence” on the development of the Lanchester and Sten.  
 
The Spanish gun differs from the MP28/II in two areas – it has a distinctive bolt handle 
and a copper alloy magazine housing.  The production version of the Lanchester had a 
bronze magazine housing, a feature commentators have rather imaginatively put down 
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to the fact that the gun was adopted by the Royal Navy (Hogg and Weeks, 1973, 
p.2.42).  While this piece of ‘brightwork’ does ensure the gun sits easily alongside the 
Gatling guns and Nordenfeldts of the Victorian naval landing parties, it is not 
particularly likely as an explanation for a design in the dire straits of mid-to-late 1940.  
The Spanish gun has just such a housing – probably due to the greater ease with which 
copper alloy can be cast and machined, a view supported by former REME and police 
armourer, collector and authority Richard Ashley, of the British Resistance 
Organisation Museum, Parham, Suffolk:11 
The first few [Lanchester] magazine housings were cast steel, then machined … 
The finish was superb.  It was simply that the steel magazine housing was so 
difficult to manufacture and machine to finished tolerance that Sterling decided 
to make them out of brass … As to the MP28 theory, I’ve never quite gone for 
that one because the Lanchester is a third bigger than the Schmeisser.  I can’t 
believe the designer didn’t have access to a German gun to get the correct scale.  
It’s like he copied outline from an illustration without knowing its dimensions. 
 
 
(Above) A Spanish republican Naranjero sub-machine gun recovered in 1999 from the 
Royal Ordnance factory Nottingham, and matched with a bolt found in the stores at 
Bapty & Co. Ltd.  Clearly based on the German MP28, the Narajero’s bolt handle and 
bronze magazine housing differ from the German gun.  A nearly identical magazine 
housing was adopted for production versions of the British Lanchester machine 
carbine, suggesting that it might have been this Spanish gun, rather than the MP28 
Schmeisser that was the direct design parent of the Lanchester, and hence the Sten, 
Patchet and Sterling family of sub-machine guns.  (Author’s photograph, reproduced by 
kind permission of Bapty & Co. Ltd.) 
 
Laidler and Howroyd, as well as Hobart and all other authors, give the impression that 
the German MP28/II gave rise to the Lanchester in one smooth movement.  Dinely’s 
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note suggests that this was not the case, that the Spanish Naranjero now in the 
collection at Bapty had some role in it, and that the Lanchester may be, in part at least, a 
copy of a copy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Above) An illustration from a Spanish website showing a comparison between the 
MP28/II (top) and the Naranjero sub-machine gun.  For practical purposes the lower 
gun could easily be described as a ‘Schmeisser’.  Note the rear sight, missing from the 
Bapty example.  (www.sbhac.net) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Early Lanchester prototype (Pilot Gun 7) assembled by Cogswell and Harrison.  The 
magazine housing is cast steel, not the brass used on production models. Note the 
distinctive 50-round magazine produced for the Lanchester. (Author’s photograph, 
reproduced by kind permission of Bapty & Co. Ltd.) 
 
Having placed the Lanchester machine carbine in production, Great Britain could finally 
take its place alongside the majority of European nations, not to mention China, Bolivia 
and others, in embracing the first-generation sub-machine gun.  One might expect that 
Britain’s first domestically produced, and rather old-fashioned, sub-machine gun would 
be issued to the Home Guard, but almost the entire production went to the Royal Navy, 
with whom the gun remained in service until the 1960s.  A few were used by British 
troops in India, but the urgent requirements of Home Defence notwithstanding, 
Lanchesters went to sea (Laidler and Howroyd, 1995, p.7).  The Army, as we have seen, 
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put its faith in the Thompson, and shared their precious weapons with the Home Guard.  
This, perhaps more than anything else, demonstrates the seriousness with which the 
arming of the Home Guard viewed. 
 
The gun on which the MP28 and its derivatives, including the Lanchester, was based, 
the German MP18/I, had been developed in the final months of the First World War and 
was an ersatz design, intended to be manufactured cheaply and easily.  The improved 
peacetime MP28/II was rather more luxurious and carefully constructed, but its heritage 
remained – hence the use of a tube for the receiver, rather than one machined from a 
solid steel billet.  This commended itself to wartime manufacture, but Enfield designer 
H.J. Turpin believed the original concept could be taken further.  In January 1941, with 
development of the Lanchester still underway, Turpin deconstructed the light automatic 
to produce the most basic automatic firearm built up to that time, using narrow, thin 
walled steel tube for the body of the gun, a simple cylindrical bolt with a fixed firing 
pin, a welded steel butt and simple battle sights.  The only wood on the gun was an 
insert in the small of the butt and the fore grip.  This was a true ‘second generation’ sub-
machine gun, the Sten Mk I. 
 
 
 
 
Sten gun aide memoir ‘strictly reserved for use in the 
Home Guard’, published by the Bravon Ledger Company 
in September 1942, when there were already 225,656 of 
the new guns in Home Guard service.  (Author’s 
collection) 
 
 
 
 
 
Given prevailing prejudices, it is little short of miraculous that the Sten entered service, 
as it contradicted every accepted tenet of British military small arms – that self-loading 
or automatic weapons would only encourage the soldier to waste ammunition, that 
pistol ammunition lacked range and penetration, and the design itself had dangerous 
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characteristics making it prone to runaways and inadvertent discharges.  When BSA 
established a production line at Tynsley, in September 1942, 200 Stens were built.  The 
following month that figure rose to 1,000 – 2,000 in November, and by July 1942, when 
100,000 had been built, production was running at 20,000 Sten guns per month.  The 
Royal Ordnance Factory at Fazackerly reached the same rate during 1943-44 (Hobart, 
1973).  The guns cost between £3 and £5 each (Skennerton, 1988, p.32).  In 
comparison, the highest production of Lanchesters was 3,410 per month (Laidler and 
Howroyd, 1995, p.7).   
 
 
(Left) 1942, ‘German and 
Hungarian women work on the 
manufacture of Sten guns at an 
ordnance factory, somewhere in 
Britain.’  The photograph gives 
some impression of the volume and 
speed of Sten gun production by 
largely unskilled or semi-skilled 
workers.   (IWM P869) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Right) According to the IWM caption: 
‘Two part-time war workers enter 
their 'factory’ at the beginning of their 
shift. The building is an old hen house 
which is being reused as a venue for 
the manufacture of breech blocks from 
solid steel bars. This 'factory' was 
owned by Mr C W (Charles) Packard, 
an engineer and former haulage 
contractor, and was probably in 
Welwyn Garden City.’  Sten 
production depended on outsourced 
production of components, sometimes 
at an almost ‘cottage industry’ level.  
(IWM D12305) 
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(Left) Sten Mk I*.  Over 
100,000 were produced, 
and the gun saw service 
with some Home Guard 
units. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Right) Sten Mk II.  The definitive 
wartime Sten.  Unlike the Mk I, 
which was only produced in 
relatively small numbers (by Sten 
standards), over two million Mk IIs 
were produced, and this was the 
version most widely featured in the 
various unofficial manuals. 
 
 
 
(Left) Sten Mk III.  Produced 
from January 1942 by the 
makers of Tri-ang toys, the 
sheet metal and welded 
construction anticipated 
‘third generation’ sub-
machine guns.  876,886 were 
built at the company’s Merton 
toy factory (Skennerton, 1988, 
p.34). 
 
 
(Author’s photographs, reproduced by kind permission of Bapty & Co. Ltd.) 
 
 
Apart from being easy to manufacture, the Sten did the job it was required to do, 
without wasting manufacturing effort on refinements that would mean little under less-
than-optimal real-life combat conditions.  If imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, 
then the copying of Stens worldwide – including in wartime Germany – indicates that 
the design was fit for purpose (Hobart, 1973, p.84).  Adoption of the Sten marked a sea 
change in the British attitude to military firearms.  Of the various marks of Sten, it is the 
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Mks I*, II and III that are relevant to the Home Guard.12  The Mk I* was a Mk I with 
the vestigial woodwork and flash hider deleted, the Mk II was the definitive Sten, with a 
removable barrel and magazine housing that swivelled to close the feed and ejection 
ports, while the Mk III was a redesign of the gun to facilitate manufacture by the toy 
company Lines Bros., makers of Tri-ang products.  Lines built toys using thin steel 
sheet, so the receiver of the gun was rolled from a sheet of steel and the various fittings 
welded in place.  Although not the most numerically important Sten, this was truly a 
glimpse into the future of military small arms.  It is interesting how easily the £5 Sten 
was able to replace the £50 Thompson sub-machine gun in Home Guard service.  
Writing in January 1944, the chronicler of 6th (34th GPO) Cambridgeshire Battalion, 
Home Guard (Cambs. And Isle of Ely TAA, 1944, p.64), recorded:  ‘In 1941, Tommy 
guns began to arrive and although they were later withdrawn, issues of Sten guns in 
1942 and 1943 have provided ample replacement.’ 
 
Innovative solutions to the shortage of smallarms were one thing, but if German tanks 
had come ashore on Britain’s South Coast in the summer or autumn of 1940, there 
would have been very little to stop them.  The Home Guard’s best hope was to halt the 
panzers with barricades and then pelt them with Molotov cocktails or satchel charges.  
Even if the Army had still possessed its full complement of 2pr anti-tank guns and .55in 
Boys anti-tank rifles – which it did not – it is probable that the Home Guard approach 
would have been at least as effective.  Ian Hogg (1998, p.138) notes: 
 … there were only 167 anti-tank guns left in Britain, and it was imperative to get 
more manufactured in order to re-equip formations and also meet the demands 
of a rapidly expanding army.  The question was whether to put the 6-pounder or 
the 2-pounder into production.  The latter was chosen, since production was 
running and the troops were familiar with the gun; putting the 6-pounder into 
production would have meant a delay of six or eight months before the first guns 
appeared, after which would come the problem of re-training… 
  
Nevertheless, the Director of Artillery [also] placed an order for 6-pounders in 
June 1940, on the understanding that the production would commence only 
when the immediate demand for 2-pounders had been satisfied.  The result was 
that the first [6-pounder] guns appeared from production in November 1941. 
 
The defeat of German armour remained the key challenge up to the end of 1941.  Like 
the Volunteers, the authorities turned to petrol-based weapons – under the auspices of 
the Petroleum Warfare Department.  E.W. Ashworth (1998, p.47) states that while large 
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flame traps, designed to flood defiles with burning petrol/oil mixture ‘were not, strictly 
speaking, Home Guard weapons since they formed part of the regular force’s defensive 
layout.  The smaller versions, known colloquially as Fougasses, Demi-gasses and 
Hedge-Hoppers could be improvised in the field and were used extensively by the 
Home Guard.’  Fougasses (also referred to as flame fougasses and barrel fougasses) and 
demi-gasses were barrels filled with incendiary liquid which would be ignited and 
blown forward by an explosive charge, while hedge-hoppers threw the barrel into the 
air.  These weapons were prepared by Royal Engineers Chemical Warfare companies, 
as part of district defence plans (See overleaf), because the blocking, or otherwise, or 
routes was too important to be handled with unit-level improvisations.  Military 
Training Pamphlet No. 42, Tank Hunting and Destruction, of 29 August 1940, stresses:  
‘This form of ambush should be prepared only where approved by general officers 
commanding-in-chief or such officers to whom they may delegate the authority.’13 
 
‘Petroleum Weapons against Invasion’.  Released in 1945, the photograph shows a 
demonstration of a flame fougasse ‘’somewhere in Britain’.  The car in the midst of the 
inferno, and the soldier running from left to right, give an impression of the scale and 
destructive power of these weapons.  (IWM D24854) 
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The idea of a remotely-fired buried charge, propelling a mass of stones and rubble 
towards an attacking enemy was familiar to Vauban, but the Second World War British 
version of the fougasse was significantly more dangerous.  Each installation consisted 
of four 50 gallon oil drums, as described by Adrian Armishaw: 14 
Early fougasse barrels were filled with an incendiary liquid comprising 25% 
petrol and 75% gas oil.  They had a 5lb propelling charge of gunpowder against 
the rear face, and an 8oz ammonal opening charge on the front, which also 
helped ignite the mixture…  Two replacement incendiary mixtures were 
developed; either a 40% petrol 60% gas oil mixture  (40/60 or standard mixture), 
or a tar, lime and petrol gel known as 5B… 
  
After further research and testing by the PETROLEUM WARFARE 
DEPARTMENT the charge on the front of the barrel was found to be 
unnecessary and [that an] ammonal charge alone at the rear was sufficient.  
Electron turnings (90% magnesium 10% aluminium) [were] placed between the 
charge and barrel to ensure effective ignition. 
 
Reproduced overleaf is a secret instruction from Salisbury Plain District headquarters 
concerning the handing over to the local Home Guard battalions of barrel fougasses 
installed by 64 Chemical Warfare Company.  What Home Guards made of the note that 
OPs should be provided with a get away if possible (paragraph 6.b) is anyone’s guess, 
but in February 1942, the threat was still serious enough for what was effectively a 
suicide mission to be officially considered worthwhile.  The scenario of determined 
volunteers command detonating a powerful IED under a military vehicle has been seen 
often enough in Northern Ireland, and latterly Iraq and Afghanistan, for there to be no 
doubt that these devices would have seriously inconvenienced an attacking force. 
Although an extemporised and essentially simple weapon, the fougasses’ destructive 
power impressed the Home Guards who saw them demonstrated (Smith, 1945, p.46):   
This can be described as a flame-thrower, electrically detonated and very vicious 
in its effects.  It was designed to be dug in to re-inforce a road block; only a few 
members of the Unit saw demonstrations arranged in secrecy in remote places, 
but we all had lectures on them and most of us would have liked to see one go 
off.  
 
That these spectacular weapons were placed under the responsibility of the Home Guard 
is a reflection of the organisation’s relevance in the overall scheme of Home Defence.   
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Instruction from HQ Salisbury Plain District to Home Guard Units regarding Barrel 
Fougasses, February 1942. (Reproduced by kind permission of Bapty & Co.  Ltd) 
 
Fougasses were constructed by the Royal Engineers, but the Home Guard themselves 
did produce extemporised flamethrowers, such as the ‘Nuttall flamethrower’, produced 
by Staffordshire Home Guards.  Mounted on an engineless Austin Seven chassis, the 
fuel contained in the Nuttall’s 50 gallon drum was sufficient to generate a 75-foot jet of 
flame for three minutes.15  The official equivalent was the Harvey flamethrower, which 
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used nitrogen to propel 22 gallons of creosote over a burning pad of cotton waste 
soaked in paraffin.  Although the resulting flame jet lasted just 10 seconds,16 the 
authorities were sufficiently impressed with the Harvey flamethrower to order 2,000 in 
July 1940, at an estimated cost of £60,000 (Skennerton, 1988, p75).  The Harvey lacked 
both mobility and duration of flame; nevertheless it remained in service long enough to 
arrive in the Home Guard arsenal in March 1942, with 458 reported in Home Guard 
returns.  By November 1942 the total had risen to 804.17  That, in 1940,’41 and ’42, the 
British Regular Army was anticipating fighting German tanks with what was, in effect, 
a large fire extinguisher full of creosote, once again serves to put the supposed 
deficiencies of Home Guard weapons of the time into context. 
 
The Harvey flamethrower 
in action, an illustration 
from Tank Hunting and 
Destruction of August 
1940.  The vertical 
cylinder was mounted on 
a pair of 18-inch wheels, 
enabling it to be 
transported ‘very much in 
the manner of a porter’s 
barrow’.  It was officially 
categorised as ‘static’. 
(Author’s collection) 
 
 
In a report on the British Home Guard for the United States War Department, and based 
on a visit that took place between 17 October and 8 November 1941, H. Wendell 
Endicott analysed the flame weapons, and, quoting a War Office survey, reported that 
the British had concluded that simplicity was the key to success:18 
The Hedgehopper requires such a scientific placement that it is not sure of 
reaching the right spot, and is being discouraged as a weapon of the Home 
Guard … The emphasis is being placed on the “Fougasse”, as it is considered 
much more efficient.  It can be placed in any length along the road, and can be 
more effective.  It can be operated by remote control, and can be kept in 
complete control.  With the greater importance given to the “Fougasse”, both the 
Harvey Flame-thrower and the Home Guard Flame-thrower are expected to be 
withdrawn as Home Guard weapons, but no final official decision has yet been 
reached. 
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Wendell Endicott’s comments are interesting, not least because he has the Harvey 
flamethrower in Home Guard service, and possibly being withdrawn, some four months 
before it appears on the monthly returns.  The ‘Home Guard flamethrower’ he mentions 
was a kit produced by the Petroleum Warfare department, consisting of a 50-gallon 
drum, 100-foot hose, connections, a hand pump and instructions.  The Home Guard 
were required to construct a simple two-wheeled carriage for the device, and assemble a 
nozzle and ground spike from gas pipe.  Crewed by five or six men, the flamethrower 
could produce a 60-foot flame jet of blazing 40-60 ‘standard mixture’ for around two 
minutes.  The ‘HG’ flamethrower first appears in Home Guard returns in May 1942, 
with 310 listed, the total then fluctuates over the succeeding months, between 257 and 
275, until the returns cease showing weapons in November 1942.19  The significance of 
this fluctuation is unclear, but it is apparent that the ‘HG’ was not a particularly 
important Home Guard weapon, despite its name. 
 
Another approach to the problem of defeating enemy armour was to find better 
alternatives to the Molotov cocktail and satchel charge – which would have the added 
bonus of regaining the initiative from Tom Winteringham and Osterley Park.  The result 
was a series of anti-tank and anti-personnel grenades which quickly entered service with 
the regular Army, and with which the Home Guard were also expected to become 
proficient.  In March 1941 Home Guard Instruction No. 26 announced: ‘Home-made 
grenades – The grenades to be issued to the Home Guard will be restricted in due course 
to recognized Army types.  Meanwhile the production of unauthorized home-made 
grenades must cease.’20  In the British Army of 1939-40 the term ‘grenade’ was 
synonymous with the No. 36M grenade or ‘Mills bomb’.  The most successful of a 
plethora of British ‘bombs’ developed during the First World War, Mills’ design first 
entered service as the No. 5 in 1915.  During the First World War the bomb was fitted 
with a rodded base to be used as a rifle grenade (the No. 23), and modified and 
improved to become the No. 36 (subsequently No. 36M), which could be used either as 
a hand grenade or fitted with a base plate or ‘gas check’ to become a rifle grenade, fired 
from a discharger cup clamped to the muzzle of the SMLE rifle.   
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Mills bombs.  No. 5 grenade 
dated 1916 (left), base plug and 
rifle discharging rod for a No. 
23 grenade (front).  A black 
stained (for identification) .303 
Ballistite grenade lauching 
blank (centre) and a No. 36M 
grenade of 1942 with gas check 
base plate fitted (right).  This 
No. 36M is painted white for 
‘practice’ with a red band for 
‘explosive filled’, as it used an 
adapted detonator to give a puff 
of smoke for training purposes.  
(Author’s photograph)  
 
 
When, on 5 August 1940, Lord Woolton, was persuaded to write to the Secretary of 
State for War to request uniforms and equipment for 450 members of the Ministry of 
Food LDV, amongst other items listed were 200 ‘Mills Bombs’, 24 rifle grenade 
dischargers and ‘rifle grenade accessories for 50 grenades’ (Smith, 1945, p.30).  
Anthony Eden was obliged to reply that ‘resources did not permit of immediate issues 
to all members of the Home Guard on the scale suggested’.   Mills bombs eventually 
arrived, at approximately the same time as the M1917 rifles, marking the end of the 
shotgun-and-Ross-rifle phase of the MOF Home Guard’s history.  No. 36M grenades 
are not featured in the first (August 1940) Edition of Southworth’s Home Guard 
Handbook, but are to be found in the March 1941 reprint of Brophy’s Home Guard – a 
handbook for the L.D.V (Brophy, 1941a, p.95).  They were certainly in Home Guard 
service by May 1941, when 2nd Lieutenant S.J. White, of the 1st Essex Battalion, Home 
Guard, was one of the first of several Home Guards to win bravery awards for picking 
up a smoking grenade, accidentally dropped during practise, and throwing it over the 
safety parapet.21  It is interesting that, although the Mills bomb entered service in 1915, 
a year after the Lewis light machine gun, and two years earlier than the M1917 rifle, this 
was never viewed as a shortcoming.  Various new designs were introduced during the 
Second World War, but the Mills bomb remained the “Hand Grenade” then, and for 
some time after the war.  The key factor here is the continued use of the grenade (like 
the 1907 SMLE rifle and 1905 Vickers machine gun) by the Army, which conferred a 
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perception of continued relevance and effectiveness, vintage notwithstanding.  To quote 
Grenades for the Home Guard (Manders, undated, p.8) 
The No. 36 grenade was designed during the Great War 1914-1918 for trench 
warfare.  So efficient did it prove that it still continues to be part of the Army 
equipment, and in the process it has undergone only slight modifications.  Its 
mechanism is simple and safe, and troops can be rapidly trained to its use.  It is 
small in size and can be fairly easily carried as compared with the enemy stick 
grenade. 
 
 
(Right) The Discharger No. 1 Mk I 
attached to the Rifle No. 1 (SMLE).  
These pre-war drill illustrations were 
used in later editions of the Home 
Guard Pocket Manual.  Note that to fire 
the No. 36M grenade the rifle was held 
inverted at 45° (range being adjusted 
by opening or closing the gas vent in 
the discharger), with the hands well 
clear of metal parts.  (Author’s 
collection) 
 
(Below) The No. 2 Mk I discharger cup 
could be fitted to the SMLE, P’14 and 
M1917 rifles without modification.  
Officially accepted in August 1942, it 
featured in the July 1942 edition of 
Small Arms Training, Vol. I, No. 13, 
Grenade.  (Author’s collection) 
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No.36M grenades could be thrown 25-35 yards by hand, but the rifle grenade discharger 
extended this to an impressive 80-200 yards (Manders, undated, p.10).  The grenades 
were issued in boxes of a dozen, with a metal canister containing 12 fuses (four second 
for hand grenades, or seven seconds for those to be used with the discharger cup).  
Grenades for use with the discharger also came with 12 gas checks (base plates) and 
.303 blanks, each containing 30 grains of Ballestite.  The shock of discharging a rifle 
grenade resulted in the rifle becoming ‘somewhat spoilt as a precision weapon’, to 
quote the author of Grenades for the Home Guard (Manders, undated, p27).  A special 
rifle was designated for grenade launching and marked ‘EY’, indicating that it should 
only be used to fire ball ammunition in an EmergenY.22  Service rifles were already in 
short supply, making this a wasteful arrangement, and it is curious that more use was 
not made of old ‘long’ Lee-Enfield, Lee-Metford and .303 Martini carbines, obsolete 
actions which were used for the 4-inch smoke grenade dischargers used on armoured 
fighting vehicles.   
An EY rifle prepared by Mark Dinely’s ‘Berwick St. John Arsenal’ for his Home Guard 
platoon (stamped on butt, inset).  Note the lack of magazine, strengthening bolt below 
the breech and cord binding to the fore end.  The stamps on the butt indicate that this 
particular rifle had been declared drill purpose only (‘DP’) and subsequently sold out 
of service (double broad arrow marks touching ><).  Conversion to an EY rifle was 
making excellent use of an unserviceable weapon.  (Author’s photograph, reproduced 
by kind permission of Bapty & Co. Ltd.) 
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As we have seen, the Bapty collection contains a very impressive grenade launcher built 
by Home Guards, using a No. 1 Mk. I discharger cup, fitted to a .303 Martini action and 
mounted on a base plate.  Although in the absence of .303 Ballestite cartridges it has not 
been possible to test this weapon, there is no doubt that it would work very effectively.  
Provision of EY rifles for the Home Guard was greatly simplified by the development 
of an adaptor ‘Adaptors, Discharger, 2½ in. Grenade.  No. 1’, officially adopted for 
service on 7 August 1942 (Skennerton, 1993, p.356).  This enabled the No. 1 discharger 
to be fitted to the P14 and M1917 rifles, and on the same date a simplified discharger 
cup, the No. 2 Mk I was introduced, which could be fitted to the SMLE (Rifle No. 1), 
P14 (Rifle No. 3) or M1917 without modification.  The Army gradually lost interest in 
the rifle grenade, preferring to use the 2in mortar and Projector, Infantry, Anti-tank 
(PIAT), but the rifle discharger remained a key Home Guard weapon until ‘stand-
down’, both in anti-personnel and, as we shall see, anti-tank roles. 
 
Although useful for killing AFV crews if it could be dropped into the vehicle,23 the No. 
36M was no use in defeating armour.  In the British infantry platoon of 1940, that duty 
fell to the .55in Boys anti-tank rifle, a weapon which, although amongst the best of its 
type, had proven unable to halt the heavier German tanks.  As we have seen, while the 
popular imagination, including that of the LDV/Home Guard was gripped by the spectre 
of the Nazi parachutist, it was the threat of panzers running unchecked that most 
alarmed the General Staff.  In the aftermath of the Battle of France three new grenades 
swiftly entered service to give British infantry some means of tackling German armour 
– the No. 73 Anti-tank percussion grenade, the No. 74 Sticky Type grenade, the No. 76 
Self-Igniting Phosphorous grenade – all of which featured in Tank Hunting and 
Destruction, published by the War Office on 29 August 1940.  They were followed (as 
far as the Home Guard was concerned) by the No. 68 Anti-tank rifle grenade, the No. 69 
Bakelite grenade and the No. 75 Hawkins grenade (or mine).  Tank Hunting and 
Destruction makes it clear that it was all-hands-to-the-pumps when it came to stopping 
German armour:  ‘Although this task is primarily one for the specially equipped tank-
hunting platoons, the responsibility is not theirs alone.  Every soldier and every member 
of the Home Guard should be trained in the methods of tank hunting and in the use of 
special anti-tank weapons.’24  Thus the Home Guard, who at this stage were mostly still 
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hopefully awaiting service rifles, found themselves expected to master a selection of 
challenging and dangerous anti-tank grenades. 
 
Illustration of the Self-
igniting phosphorous 
grenade from US Army 
technical manual TM31-
200-1 of April 1966.  Note 
that the grenade is 
incorrectly described as a 
‘hand or rifle grenade’, 
rather than ‘hand or 
projector’, the projector 
in question being the 
Northover (see Chapter 
7).  SIP grenades were 
never fired from rifle 
grenade dischargers, as 
the result of the bottle 
shattering (a not 
infrequent occurrence) 
would have been 
catastrophic for the firer.  
(Author’s collection) 
 
 
Ubiquitous in the Home Guard, the AW bomb (named for its manufacturer – Allbright 
and Wilson of Oldbury, leading purveyors of white phosphorous), also known as the 
self-igniting phosphorous (SIP) grenade and the Grenade, Hand or Projector, No. 76, 
was a successful effort to provide an improved Molotov cocktail.  It consisted of a 
‘short-necked half-pint clear glass bottle’25 containing benzene, gelled with rubber, 
some water and phosphorous.  The bottles were sealed, removing the hazards of spilt 
fuel and fumes, and ignited instantly on breaking.  It was said that a significant 
disadvantage of the AW/SIP/No. 76 grenade was that if dropped it would go off – but 
the same was true of the Sten gun.  Of all the variations on the Molotov cocktail theme 
developed during the 1930s and 40s, the British No. 76 SIP grenade was the only one to 
feature in the US Army training manual Unconventional Warfare Devices and 
Techniques, prepared for the US Special Forces in 1966 (see above).26  Ian Hogg (1979, 
p.163) states that the grenade was also issued to Army units in the UK during 1940-41 
‘but it was largely issued to the Home Guard.  It was officially declared obsolete in 
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February 1944…’  Military Training Pamphlet No. 42, Tank Hunting and Destruction  
makes it clear that the grenades listed were intended for home defence Army units, and 
that the Home Guard should also be trained in their use (the author’s copy was 
originally issued to a 2nd Lieutenant A.N. Young, Royal Horse Artillery).  During the 
course of the war, as the burden of home defence rested increasingly heavily on the 
Home Guard, it was forgotten that the unconventional weapons rushed into service in 
1940-41 were issued to the Army first, which significantly alters the way in which this 
equipment should be viewed. 
 
An enamel warning notice was screwed to the inside of the lid of the AW Bomb (No. 76 
SIP grenade) transit case.  This rather expensive labelling served to ensure the safety 
notice survived if the grenades were stored, as recommended, under water.  (Author’s 
photograph)  
 
No. 76 SIP grenades were issued in 53lb wire-bound wooden partitioned cases of two 
dozen.  This fragile and highly flammable glass grenade did not commend itself to 
mobile warfare, as the author of Grenades for the Home Guard was forced to admit 
(Manders, undated, p.61):   
Method of carrying.  The box seems the best means of transportation.  This 
means a two-man load.  
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In the context of a largely immobilised British force awaiting a German invasion, the 
glass No. 76 SIP grenade made very good sense.  The heavy crates could be cached near 
choke points where the defenders might expect to ambush German AFVs.  In other 
contexts the grenade had rather more disadvantages than advantages, and it soon was in 
service only with the Home Guard, who continued to train for defensive operations on 
their own ground in the UK.  
 
Part of the popularity of the No. 36M Mills grenade was its inherent safety.  The 
grenades were shipped without their fuses, which were fitted only when the grenades 
were about to be issued.  The striker was held clear of the firing cap by the tip of the 
hand lever, and the lever was held safely in place by a pin.  When the grenade was about 
to be thrown the pin was removed, the thrower’s hand keeping the lever depressed.  If 
the thrower changed his mind, he could replace the pin and return the grenade to his 
pouch.  If he threw the grenade, then as he did so the lever flew off, the striker hit the 
firing cap and ignited a short length of fuse.  The fuse burnt for four seconds (or seven 
in the case of discharger grenades), before igniting the detonator which exploded the 
grenade.  In the case of discharger grenades, the cup of the discharger held the lever in 
place in the same manner as the thrower’s hand.  The time delay system had much to 
commend it, particularly if the grenade was being thrown into a room, bunker or trench.  
But it was very unsuitable for use against moving vehicles, as the grenade would roll off 
and explode once the vehicle had passed.  What was needed was a percussion fuse, but 
one that would ensure the grenade remained unarmed until well clear of the thrower, 
and then detonated as soon as the grenade struck – regardless of whether it struck right 
way-up, sideways or upside down. 
 
This tall order was met by the No. 247 ‘All-ways’ fuse.  This featured a Bakelite screw 
cap which, once removed, revealed a length of cloth tape and a lead weight.  On 
throwing, the tape unwound until, at its full length, it pulled the safety pin from the fuse 
body.  At that point the fuse was armed.  Inside the fuse body, a firing cap sat at the 
base of a heavy cup, the ‘cap pellet’, beneath a sharply pronged striker which sat under 
a lead ball.  If the fuse struck a hard surface ‘right way up’ the lead ball drove the striker 
down to fire the cap.  If inverted, then the weight of the cap pellet drove the cap onto the 
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striker.  If sideways, the ball was driven against a slope in the closing cap of the fuse, 
forcing it to bear down on the striker. 
 
 
 
 
No. 247 ‘Bakelite’ or ‘All-ways’ fuse dismantled.  The 
safety cap (top) has been unscrewed from the fuse body 
(bottom), and the closing cap (second from top) removed, 
the concave underside of the closing cap is visible – 
which ensured that the fuse still operated if the grenade 
struck side-on.  Below the closing cap is the ball, and 
below that the pronged striker (missing its creep spring), 
below the striker is the cap pellet.  (Author’s photograph)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The No. 247 fuse was brilliantly simple, and was mated to a cylindrical tinned plate 
container, holding almost 4lb of explosive, to produce the Anti-tank Percussion 
grenade, later designated the No. 73 Anti-tank grenade (Hand).  The resulting grenade 
bore a strong resemblance to a contemporary Thermos vacuum flask, and was popularly 
known as the ‘Thermos bomb’.  It was also known as the ‘Woolworths bomb’, probably 
because of a comment in one of John Langdon-Davies’ lectures, subsequently published 
as Home Guard Warfare:  ‘The Finns could not afford sufficient expensive full-sized 
[anti-tank] mines, but they used to construct little ones out of material, all of which 
could probably be bought by you or me at a Woolworths store…’ (Langdon-Davies, 
1941, p.44).  The No. 73 was a powerful grenade capable of blowing the tracks off any 
tank, but it could not be thrown far – about ten yards – and this meant that the grenade 
presented a real threat to the thrower, as the War Office training pamphlet of August 
1941 explained: 
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The object of this grenade is to damage armoured fighting vehicles, the 
best effect being obtained when used against the track or suspension of a 
tank.  Owing to its weight and shape it can only be thrown quite short 
distances, 10-15 yards; and, owing to the powerful nature of the grenade, 
it is absolutely essential that the thrower is behind cover.  The use of it, 
therefore, is limited to ambushes or road blocks.27 
 
 
 
 
Illustration of the No. 73 
grenade taken from Lieut. 
E.W. Manders’ Grenades 
for the Home Guard, 
published by the Practical 
Press Ltd.  The cut away 
shows the components of 
the No. 247 fuse 
assembled.  (Author’s 
collection) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The No. 73 had the hallmarks of a ‘Victoria Cross weapon’, and it is probably not 
surprising that troops preferred the Sticky bomb – which allowed the tank to trundle 
away from the thrower before exploding, or could be placed on a parked vehicle, 
allowing the tank-hunter time to slip away.  The ‘Sticky Bomb’, or No. 74 ST grenade, 
used a Mills-type firing mechanism, and solved the problem of attacking moving tanks 
by remaining glued to the vehicle while the fuse burnt.  Introduced for home defence in 
1940, and forever associated with the Home Guard, the Grenade Hand, No 74 ST 
(‘Sticky Type’) was privately developed and entered service via MD1, the department 
responsible for the provision of weapons to clandestine organisations including SOE 
(Cornish, 2003).  MacKenzie (1996, p.93) records that, following a demonstration on 
28th July 1940, Churchill: 
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 Personally ordered that the weapon go into production…  When the Ordnance 
Board opposition seemed to be causing delays, he sent a sharp note to his 
scientific adviser, Professor Linderman: ‘Sticky Bomb.  Make one million.  
WSC’.28 
 
(Left) Cut away illustration of the 
No. 74 ST grenade from Small 
Arms Training pamphlet No. 13 
SUPPLEMENT No. 2 of August 
1941.  (Author’s collection) 
 
 
(Below) Five No. 74 ST Grenades 
in their transit chest, the handles 
are detached (placed in the bottom 
left and right corners) and the tube 
clipped inside the lid contains the 
fuses.  (Official, via Robert 
Millard) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The bomb consisted of a glass (later Bakelite) sphere filled with nitro-glycerine, to 
which a wooden handle, containing a firing mechanism, was screwed.  The sphere was 
covered with stockinet material soaked in birdlime, protected until the moment of 
throwing by a sprung, two-part metal cover.  The bombs were fragile and tended to leak 
nitro-glycerine, which, quite apart from being an explosive sensitive to impact, caused 
severe headaches and ‘nitro-glycerine poisoning’.29  In the opinion of the Board of 
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Ordnance, as recorded by Ian Hogg (1979, p.162), ‘the whole article is most 
objectionable’.  MacKenzie (1996, p.177) interprets Churchill’s determination to 
overrule the experts as further evidence of what he terms ‘a manifest desire on the part 
of the Prime Minister and War Office to maintain public confidence in the usefulness of 
the Home Guard through public gestures.’  There is, of course, the alternative view that, 
while the Board of Ordnance might have, given time, come up with a better alternative, 
time was the one thing Britain did not have.  The No. 74 ST grenade was a ‘bird in the 
hand’ during the eighteen months when Britain’s anti-tank defences consisted of 
Molotovs, and a few 2pr guns and .55in rifles. 
 
Curiously, the ST grenade was popular with the Home Guard – probably because it was, 
in Ashworth’s words (1998, p.44): ‘effective against the side or roof plates of all 
contemporary German tanks.’  Ashworth states that ‘the army remained reluctant to 
have anything to do with it, leaving its use almost exclusively to the Home Guard’.  The 
Army manual Tank Hunting and Destruction of August 1940, whilst setting the 
extensive safety precautions to be observed when handling ST grenades, was 
enthusiastic about the grenade’s potential, but realistic about its performance: 
 The S.T. grenade is most effective against baby tanks and armoured cars 
having plating under 1 inch thickness.  It is not effective against plating 
exceeding this thickness. 
 Medium or heavy tanks encountered will probably be vulnerable only on 
the roofs, engine casing and under parts. 
 The S.T. grenade should be considered as a portable demolition charge 
which can be quickly and easily applied.  One of the safest and easiest methods 
of application is to drop the grenade from the upstairs window of a building 
overlooking a road along which a tank is proceeding…30 
 
Similar sentiments are to be found in the grenade training manual issued a year later: 
 
For night raids on tank parks, the grenade is an ideal weapon. It can be regarded 
as a portable demolition charge and planted by hand instead of thrown, so long 
as the operator retreats in such a direction that he is protected from the 
explosion.  With practice and training, the grenade can be thrown about 20 
yards.31 
 
The grenade was the product of manufacturing chemists Kay Brothers, makers of a well 
known adhesive, ‘Coaguline Cement’.  Kays were tasked to develop a way of making a 
2lb bomb stick to an armoured fighting vehicle long enough to detonate, ensure that the 
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bombs did not stick to each other, or the thrower, and develop an adhesive that would 
remain effective across the range of climates experienced by British troops.  The No. 74 
ST grenade met all these criteria, and Kay Bros. were responsible for fitting the 
adhesive-soaked knitted sleeves to the glass spheres of the grenades, and attaching the 
handle.  Kay’s own records put production of No. 74 ST grenades by their Kayborough 
Works at Reddish at 2½ million bombs, and state that the grenade saw service in North 
Africa, Italy and in France during the latter part of the Second World War.32 
 
 
 
Released in July 1943, this official photograph is one of series showing the manufacture 
of ST grenades, ‘just off the secret list’, at Kay Brothers’ Kayborough Works.  Mrs 
Colman (nearest camera), Miss Brearley and their colleague are fitting ‘woollen 
jackets’ (which held the sticky glue) to each of the 2½ million grenades manufactured 
by the works.  (Official photograph, author’s collection) 
 
Most sources agree that, apart from the Home Guard, No. 74 ST grenades saw service 
in occupied Europe, via SOE, as demolition charges (see Hogg, 1979, p.163).  Army 
use of the No. 74 ST grenades has been virtually forgotten, although they were 
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extensively used in action by the British Eighth Army during 1942 – as in this example, 
one of many recorded in the New Zealand official war history: 
A 23 Battalion man who had strayed from his company was armed with a sticky 
bomb with which he set a tank alight.  By the illumination thus provided 
Sergeant Lord (B Company) climbed onto another tank, shot the commander 
and dropped a grenade inside, while others fired tommy guns through the slits, 
killing the crew and setting it on fire also.  Lord killed the commander of 
another tank in the same manner, but the crew climbed out and surrendered 
before they could be dealt with.  The rest of the tanks scattered into the 
darkness.33 
 
The action tool place at Ruweisat Ridge, during the early stages of the Battle of El 
Alamein, when many weapons then or later issued to the Home Guard saw operational 
service, including another innovative anti-armour weapon, the No. 68 Anti-tank grenade 
(rifle).  The shaped charge or high explosive anti-tank (HEAT) round is usually 
associated with Second World War German developments, particularly demolition 
charges and the Panzerfaust.  However, the first HEAT anti-armour projectile to enter 
service with any army was the British No. 68 rifle grenade, issued from February 1941.  
Fired from the ‘EY’ rifle fitted with a 2½ in discharger cup, No. 68 grenades saw some 
service with the BEF in 1940, with the Eighth Army in the Western Desert, and from 
1941 to 1944 with the Home Guard (Hogg, 1979, p.160).  Unlike the No. 36M, the No. 
68 was designed only to be used as a rifle grenade.  It was fired from the prone position, 
with the rifle the correct way up, almost horizontal, and butt braced against a sandbag or 
similar, the grenade following a relatively flat trajectory to the target.  The No. 68 had 
an effective range of 75-100 yards, and was aimed through a simple sheet metal sight 
clamped to the rifle.  The bomb could penetrate two inches (50mm) of armour, making 
it rather more than twice as effective as the Boys anti-tank rifle (20mm penetration, 
ideal range 300 yards), and even the 2pr anti-tank gun (42mm penetration), although it 
lacked the range of either weapon (up to 1,000 yards, but 300-500 being ideal for the 
2pr).34  Undoubtedly difficult to use effectively, the No. 68 was the infantry’s best hope 
against armour until the arrival of the 6pr anti-tank gun and PIAT in 1942, and it was 
another weapon which the Army and the Home Guard shared. 
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Practice No. 68 grenade 
(white painted body, centre) 
with its cardboard shipping 
tube (left) and a .303in and 
.300 rifle rounds for scale.  
(Author’s photograph) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, this takes us somewhat ahead of the narrative.  To return to the darkest days 
of July-August 1940, and the familiar Mills bomb; the No. 36M ‘Mills’ grenade is 
sometimes referred to as a ‘defensive’ grenade, a term based on the fact that that the 20-
100 yard lethal radius of its fragments (Manders, undated, p.10) exceeded the distance it 
could be thrown, and therefore it was best thrown from the safety of a trench or similar 
cover at an exposed (i.e. attacking) enemy.  The term is not, and never has been 
recognised in British military circles, if only because the Mills bomb was universally 
used in offensive action.35  Nevertheless, early in the Second World War there was 
recognition that some type of ‘offensive’ grenade, i.e. one that would stun an enemy, 
but not inflict casualties on one’s own side, would be useful.  The result, introduced in 
February 1941, was the No. 69, a plastic hand grenade, consisting of a No. 247 ‘all-
ways’ fuse attached to a simple Bakelite body.  The No. 69 was widely used by the 
Home Guard, and sometimes employed as a training ‘thunderflash’.  In May 1942, 
Captain Southworth (formerly RSM Southworth, and author of the Home Guard Pocket 
Book) demonstrated No. 36M grenades and No. 69 grenades to Sevenoaks Home Guard.  
CSM Brown and Sgt. Peek recorded (Brown and Peek, 1944, p15):  ‘Capt. 
Southworth’s stroll along the “road” apparently carelessly throwing 69’s all around him 
produced a fitting finale.’  Officially, the grenade was described thus:  ‘a light hand 
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percussion grenade for offensive action.  The area of burst is very limited and it can, 
therefore, be thrown standing in the open.  The material effect is small but the moral 
effect is considerable, particularly at night since each man, thinking an H.E. grenade has 
been thrown believes himself (in the darkness) to be the only one left alive’.  The 
pamphlet added:  ‘the grenade can also be used for adding realism to exercises with 
troops …they will be regarded as having a danger area of 30 yards.’ By November 1943 
Home Guard Instruction No. 51 was already describing the No. 69 grenade as: ‘not a 
general issue, but is found in operational stocks in some localities’ [original italics]. 
 
The No. 69 ‘Bakelite’ 
grenade, from Small 
Arms Training, 
Volume I, of July 
1942.  (Author’s 
collection) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If the soubriquet ‘Woolworth bomb’ did originate in Langdon-Davies’ lecture, then it 
was perhaps more appropriate for what Norman Longmate calls the ‘Talcum Powder 
grenade’, as this really was a ‘small mine made from common materials’.  Introduced in 
1942, the Hawkins grenade, or No. 75 grenade, to give it its correct name, consisted of a 
screw topped rectangular tinned plate container, of the sort commonly used to hold 
talcum powder.  Soldered to one face were two fuse pockets, protected by a plate.  The 
‘grenade’ nomenclature was applied because it was theoretically possible to throw the 
‘grenade-mine’ into the path of an oncoming tank.  The rectangular ‘talcum tin’ shape 
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ensured that it would land with the fuse uppermost or underneath, in a good position to 
be crushed as the vehicle rolled over it.  Generally, the grenades were placed or buried, 
like normal mines, or strung together in such a way that they could be dragged into path 
of an oncoming vehicle.  Home Guard Circular No. 43 (15 December 1943) reported on 
experiments undertaken by the Eighth Army to assess the effectiveness of the No. 75 
Hawkins grenade:   
 3.  New Experiments with the 75 grenade 
The Eighth Army recently made experiments with the 75 grenade, using 
a captured German Mark IV tank, which was towed at about 6 m.p.h.  
This is what happened:-   
A single grenade was placed so that one of the tank’s tracks went right 
over it.  This shattered two links of the track, causing a clean break.36   
 
The No. 75 and No. 75A (with diagonal fuse pockets) were widely used by British and 
American troops (it was known as the ‘Mine, Light, Anti-tank, M7A2’ in US service).  
It remained in service until 1955 and was used against British troops in Aden.  Apart 
from anti-tank use, the Home Guard were taught to use two No. 75s taped together as a 
demolition charge for ‘mouseholing’ when fighting in a built up area.37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The ‘Talcum Powder grenade’, Hawkins grenade or No. 75 Mk I contained one and 
three-quarter pounds of Ammonal, Burrowite or Nobel’s 704B.  200lb pressure on the 
top plate activated the crush igniters beneath.  (Author’s photograph) 
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The anti-tank grenades developed in 1940-41 were best suited to the defence, and as the 
tide of war turned, the No. 73 Anti-tank percussion grenade and No. 74 ‘Sticky bomb’ 
in particular became less suitable for an army now on the offensive on every front.  The 
new airborne troops and Commandos, in particular, were unwilling to struggle with 
bulky and fragile grenades.  A solution was found in the No. 82 or Gammon grenade 
(named after its inventor, Captain ‘Dick’ Gammon MC, 1 PARA).  This was remarkable, 
in that consisted of nothing more than a No. 247 all-ways fuse to which a small cloth 
skirt was attached, closed with elastic to form a bag.  Regular troops were issued plastic 
explosive, and a quantity of this was placed inside the bag to form the charge of the 
grenade.  Although the size of the bag was supposed to limit the size of the charge, quite 
alarming amounts of PE could be squeezed into a Gammon grenade, particularly when 
it was being used as a demolition charge.  By adding a handful of gravel or pebbles a 
useful anti-personnel effect could also be achieved.  The combination of the No. 36M 
and the No. 82 Gammon grenade was quite suitable for most purposes during the latter 
part of the war, and the other grenades were increasingly left to the Home Guard, who 
were not generally issued PE, and in any case, had a static, defensive role.  This is why 
they have become so strongly associated with the Home Guard.  It is entirely typical of 
the people and time that British grenades were given homely nicknames.  This should 
not detract from the fact that these grenades were at least as effective as any others 
fielded by the combatant nations at that time – or that tank hunting was dangerous and 
the odds of success would be slim.  Good or bad, these grenades were all standard issue 
throughout the Army, Royal Air Force airfield defence units, and the Home Guard too. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
Sub-Artillery 
 
The arrival of new smallarms and grenades at the end of 1940 provided the opportunity 
to ban home made weapons, and replace of Osterley Park with an official school and 
training teams.1  Osterley had championed the Home Guard mortar, and there remained 
the problem of fire support.  The homemade mortar had become a Home Guard byword, 
and quickly reached a reasonable level of sophistication.  Their immediate replacement 
was an officially-produced, but unconventional, weapon, which was developed as the 
‘Northover (Bottle) Mortar’,2 entered service as the ‘Projector 2½ in Mks I and II’,3 but 
was universally known as the ‘Northover Projector’.  Major Northover was a Home 
Guard officer whose ‘projector’, described, somewhat harshly, by Ian Hogg (1979, 
p.160) as ‘a primitive smoothbore gun’, replaced the homemade mortar as principle 
Home Guard support weapon.  The ‘NO’ (NorthOver) suffered from the same drawback 
as the Osterley Park mortars, in that its gunpowder propelling charge generated a 
distinctive cloud of white smoke, and the added disadvantage that, at 134 lbs it was 
decidedly heavy.4  On the other hand, it could discharge the No. 76 SIP grenade, the No. 
36M grenade, and the No. 68 grenade – all a great improvement on jam tin bombs – to a 
range of 300 yards (150-200 effective).5  Furthermore, the professionally produced, pre-
packaged black powder charges were safer and more effective than the homemade 
version or recycled fireworks. 
 
 
A War Office training team 
demonstrates a Mk I Northover 
Projector to members of Saxmundham 
Home Guard, 30 July 1941.  The mount 
could be set much lower in operational 
use.  The photograph illustrates the 
white smoke ‘signature’ generated by 
the Northover’s gunpowder propelling 
charge.  (IWM  H12293) 
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(Left)  The 2½ in 
Projector Mk I.  
13,000 of these guns 
were produced by the 
Bisley Clay Target 
Company between 
August 1940 and July 
1941.  The four-legged 
mount enabled the gun 
to be carried 
‘stretcher-wise’.  
(Author’s Collection)  
 
 
 
(Right) The 2½ in 
Projector Mk II.  8,000 
were built by the 
Selection Manufacturing 
Company in 1940.  The 
most obvious 
modification is the tripod 
mount, but more 
important was the welded 
boss holding the 
foresight, which 
prevented the sight being 
screwed too far in, thus 
obstructing the barrel 
and causing the round to 
explode in the bore. (Author’s collection) 
 
The Northover Projector was officially described as:  ‘primarily an ambush anti-tank 
weapon to be sited as part of the defences to fire enfilade on likely tank approaches’.6  
The first 277 examples were issued to London District in June 1941, and by the 
following month 6,630 were in the hands of Home Guard units, illustrating the speed 
with which the weapon could be manufactured and distributed.  The highest figure in 
the Home Guard returns is 18,992, in September 1942, falling off by a dozen the 
following month (the last for which figures are given).  Skennerton lists contracts for 
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total a production of 21,000 Northover Projectors between August 1940 and December 
1941.7 
 
A special version of the No. 76 SIP grenade was produced for the Northover Projector, 
with a diameter of 2½ inches, rather than the 2¾ inches of the hand thrown version 
(Manders, undated, p.60).  It had thicker glass, and green, rather than scarlet, crown cap 
as a distinguishing mark.  These grenades did still sometimes break up in the bore of the 
projector, with a flamethrower-like effect (although usually with no lasting ill-effects on 
the crew).  Conversely, they could be difficult to ignite unless they struck a hard object 
squarely and with force (Smith, 1945, p.46).  During the latter stages of the Norhover’s 
career, a paper sleeve and fibreboard base ring were used in an effort to protect the 
grenade from the shock of firing (Smith, 1945, p.46),8 and the Projector was sometimes 
used without its mount, rested on cover, rather like a light mortar or rocket launcher.9  
Certainly simple and robust, the Northover does not deserve to be described as 
‘primitive’, particularly when compared to its Soviet equivalent, the Ampulomet 1941 
System Kartukov (below). The Ampulomet saw action at Stalingrad in 1942, and used a 
gunpowder cartridge to propel a spherical 127mm diameter glass incendiary bottle 
containing diesel oil and phosphorous up to a range of 250 metres.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Soviet Ampulomet and its spherical glass projectile (inset).  Compared to the Northover 
of 1940, this ‘bottle mortar’ of 1941 is decidedly unsophisticated.  (www.sinopa.ee) 
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Unissued and unfilled box for percussion caps to 
fire the Northover Projector.  These were brass 
musket caps, similar to those shown below the 
box.  This box was one of several thousand 
recovered, in 2007, from the attic of a Yorkshire 
pharmacy, presumably bought as surplus to use 
as pill boxes.  (Author’s photograph) 
 
 
 
 
The Northover Projector should not be dismissed as a joke – it was, for example, fired 
by a percussion cap ‘of the standard military type’,11 not a ‘toy pistol cap’ as 
MacKenzie states (1996, p.94).  The Northover was carried by platoons engaged in 
‘offensive defence’ (i.e. counter-attacking) as indirect fire support – analogous with the 
2in mortar of the Army – as well as in ambush or defensive positions.12  It was 
envisaged that, in action, the Northover could disable a light tank by hitting the running 
gear with a No. 68 grenade, then destroy the vehicle or smoke out the crew with the No. 
76 SIP.  Using the No. 36M grenade, the projector could be used ‘in any suitable anti-
personnel role’,13 which made it extremely versatile, and it remained in service long 
after more potent and more conventional weapons were introduced.  Confirmation of its 
demise is to be found in the Home Guard Information Circular No. 53 of 9 August 
1944:  ‘Consequent on equipments having been declared obsolete, the undermentioned 
handbook relating thereto is hereby cancelled.  Handbook for the Projectors, 2 ½ inch, 
Marks I and II on Mountings 2 ½ inch Projector, Marks I and II, 1941.  Copies of this 
handbook will be disposed of in confidential waste.’14 
 
Whilst the Northover was not universally popular, particularly because of its smoke 
cloud signature, it did make a positive impression on those who appreciated the urgency 
of quickly providing some kind of support weapon to Regular troops and Home Guard 
preparing to take on invading German tanks.  In his report of February 1942, US War 
Department special observer H. Wendell Endicott says of the Northover Projector:15 
I consider this an amazing weapon – effective – accurate – simple in 
construction – easy to operate, requiring no expert technique – no maintenance 
problem – produced at low cost. 
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He goes on to describe a demonstration given in March 1941 at ranges of 75-200 yards, 
20 shots were fired with one ‘blow’ (a No. 76 SIP grenade breaking in the bore) and the 
accuracy was ‘surprising’.  Reporting on another, in October 1941, with the projector 
fired at targets 150-250 yards away, Endicott observed two ‘blows’ out of 30 shots 
fired, noting that ‘if the target had been a tank [the Northover Projector] would have 
scored one hundred percent hits’. 
 
 
Evidence of Regular Army use of the 
Northover Projector from a most 
unexpected direction – the caption for 
this official photograph reads: ‘Men of 
the 2nd Gordon Highlanders demonstrate 
the Northover projector to Major General 
F. Keith Simmons, GOC Singapore 
Fortress, and other senior officers, 17 
October 1941.’    (IWM FE15) 
 
 
 
 
The Northover Projector was to become absolutely associated with the Home Guard, yet 
it is evident from Military Training Pamphlet No. 42, Tank Hunting and Destruction, of 
29 August 1940, that the weapon was developed for Army use, and was one of the 
‘special weapons’ the Home Guard were also expected to master.  At the time Tank 
Hunting and Destruction was published, the ‘Northover (Bottle) Mortar’ was not yet in 
production, and the pages devoted to the weapon were marked ‘to be issued later’.16  In 
December 1940 it was a Regular Army officer, 2nd/Lt Young of the Royal Horse 
Artillery, the owner of the pamphlet presently in the author’s possession, who duly 
pasted the amendment in, now marked ‘Northover Projector’.  As late as October 1941, 
the Northover was being demonstrated by Regular Army troops in Singapore (see 
above), although no record has yet come to light of combat use.   
 
It is sometimes said that the Northover Projector also saw naval service, and even 
downed a German bomber, but this is not quite true (See Ashworth, 1998, p.46).  The 
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maritime equivalent of the Northover was the Holman Grenade Projector.  The product 
of a Cornish engineering company, 17 the Holman Projector also fired the No. 36M 
grenade from an unrifled barrel, but did so using compressed air or steam from a 
vessel’s boiler as the propellant.  The Holman was supposed to protect vessels such as 
armed trawlers from air attack, by launching No. 36M grenades into the path of 
oncoming aircraft.  Large numbers were produced, but they were never particularly 
popular, except as a means of bombarding friendly forces with potatoes or empty tins.18  
The issue of around 4,500 Holman Grenade Projectors to the Royal Navy and merchant 
marine does, though, serve to place the Northover Projector in context, and illustrates 
the extent to which this sort of unconventional weapon was taken seriously in 1940-41.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Mk I (compressed air) Holman Projector demonstrated to a group of Royal Marines, 
July 1942.  Note the anti-aircraft sight.  A similar projector was emplaced to protect 
coastal defence guns at Tynemouth Castle.  This example is mounted on a naval 12pr 
gun limber.  Mk II projectors were steam powered; the Mk III was self-loading, but was 
not placed in production.  (Official photograph, author’s collection) 
 
Typically the Holman scared off attackers, but they could actually down an enemy 
aircraft, as the following RAF report for 2 August 1940 describes: 
A report has been received from SS Highlander that she was attacked by two 
enemy aircraft at about 2345 hours on 1st August, 6 miles south of Stonehaven.  
She claims that one He115 [a large seaplane torpedo bomber] was brought 
down by a Holman projector and crashed on the poop deck, and that the other 
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aircraft crashed into the sea in flames due to Lewis gun fire.  Both aircraft are 
stated to have made aerial torpedo and low machine gunning attacks.19 
 
The He115 was a substantial aircraft, with a crew of three and a 73-foot wingspan, and 
downing two, with a Holman Projector and a Lewis gun, demonstrates what could be 
achieved with emergency weaponry – given luck and the right combination of 
circumstances.  Holman projectors were also used in coastal defences, and may have 
been encountered by Home Guard coast artillery units. 
 
Left:  A thumbnail showing SS Highlander in 1932.  In 
peacetime the ship sailed between Aberdeen, Newcastle and 
Hull (http://www.rls.org.uk) 
 
 
 
 
Right:  Heinkel He115 
floatplane, described as 
‘without doubt the most 
effective of the 
Luftwaffe’s attack and 
reconnaissance 
floatplanes’ (Mondey, 
1997, p.92).  (www.royal-
naval-reserve.co.uk) 
 
 
The hypothesis that emergency unconventional weapons such as the Sticky Bomb and 
Northover Projector were produced merely as ‘public gestures’ to quieten the Home 
Guard is further undermined by the fact that both were officially ‘secret’, and could not 
be discussed, which is why they do not feature in the numerous unofficial manuals 
produced in 1941-42.20  To quote John Brophy, writing in June 1941 (1941b, p.64): 
 Anti-Tank Weapons. – In order to preserve secrecy and add to the effect of the 
 unpleasant surprises awaiting the invader, only those weapons which were in 
 general use before the outbreak of war may be described or even named in 
 public print.  No one will question the wisdom of this ruling.  Since the L.D.V. 
 days when Molotov cocktails were first made and tested in this country, a 
 sizeable range of anti-tank weapons has become available to the Home Guard.  
 Those units which are stationed in areas regarded as most vulnerable are 
 supplied first, but it can safely be said that very soon after this book is 
 published (if not before) every Home Guard formation will have several of 
 these new and secret weapons among its armaments. 
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Brophy was obviously trying to make his audience feel special, laying great stress on 
the imminent arrival of ‘secret’ equipment.  He went on: 
 Nor will it be long before the whole range – some items of which are 
 exclusive to the Home Guard, so that supplies will not be held up while 
 deliveries are made to the full-time Army – is available for every unit. 
 
In pressing the point, Brophy may have gone too far, and laid the foundations for the 
subsequent conviction that the sub-artillery and the anti-tank grenades which arrived at 
this time were ‘Home Guard only’.  This, as we have already established, was 
dangerous, when the Home Guards themselves were determined that they should be, as 
closely as possible, equipped as per the standard British line infantryman of the time.   
 
Hollow charge anti-tank warheads, such as the No. 68 grenade, are least effective if they 
arrive on target at high velocity or spinning, in other words, they commend themselves 
to means of delivery other than conventional high-velocity rifled ordnance.  Thus the 
combination of the low-velocity, unrifled Northover Projector and the hollow charge 
No. 68 grenade was, in theory at least, an ideal anti-tank weapon.  The No. 68 was never 
the major ammunition for the Northover, the phosphorous incendiary No. 76 SIP 
grenade being the preferred projectile throughout the projector’s service, and this was 
doubtless due to the No. 68’s rather lacklustre performance.  To significantly increase 
the penetration of a hollow charge warhead it is necessary to increase its diameter, 
which was impossible with cup or tube-type dischargers, such as the EY rifle or the 
Northover Projector.21  Efforts were made to increase the potency of the No. 68 
grenade,22 but it was clear that if the British infantry was to take on the panzers on 
anything approaching equal terms, a more powerful weapon was required, and one that 
could be put into production quickly.   
 
Colonel L.V.S.  Blacker, a Territorial Army officer, had offered a spigot-type smoke 
grenade launcher, the ‘Arbalest’, to the British Army in 1939, which was rejected in 
favour of the 2in mortar (Hogg, 1979, p.148).  Blacker now designed a spigot mortar he 
named the ‘Bombard’, which fired a large high explosive anti-tank round, and which 
was developed into a serviceable weapon with the support of MD1 (Cornish, 2009, 
p.35).  Blacker had a Churchillian taste for antiquarian nomenclature, and we have seen 
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how irritating this could be to the modern-minded Volunteers.  The official terminology 
for his weapon – ‘29mm Spigot Mortar’ (a reference to the diameter of the spigot) – 
made it one of a minority of British weapons to be given a ‘modern’ metric designation.  
Nevertheless, David Carroll (1999, p.72) comments beneath an illustration of 
Sevenoaks spigot mortar crew: 
 Officially known as the Blacker Bombard … the Spigot Mortar possessed a 
 short barrel … It was an ungainly piece of equipment – a highly whimsical 
 contraption, in fact, whose name and appearance suggest that it might have 
 been more comfortably employed in the rough-and-tumble of the English Civil 
 War rather than Britain’s mighty struggle with Hitler’s Germany. Although 
 the Spigot Mortar came widely into use with the Home Guard … more than 
 one ex-member of the force has complained of its unpredictability when firing, 
 coupled with a daunting lack of accuracy in the field. 
 
Setting aside Mr Carroll’s confusion regarding the correct historical context for a 
bombard,23 this description is unhelpful – particularly in view of the recorded reaction 
of Sevenoaks Home Guard to the spigot mortar (Brown and Peek, 1944, p. 15): 
 17/5/42.  Demonstration at Sandpit, Shoreham Lane. 
 A spigot mortar team … also gave a demonstration with practice bombs.  The 
 shooting was remarkably accurate and created a good impression, especially 
 as this was the first occasion on which many of us had seen the mortar in 
 action. 
 
The roof armour of a tank is its weakest point – just 26mm in the case of a Tiger I – and 
that is where the spigot mortar round would strike.24  Henry Wills (1985, p.68) records 
the reaction of one ex-tank crewman to a spigot mortar demonstration against a concrete 
pillbox: 
 I would think that 5-10 rounds were fired by the spigot mortar.  Looking back 
 on my tank experience, I doubt if anything would have survived after the first 
 hit.  I do not recollect any misses.  An effective tool … 
 
Whether Brophy’s ruling that “only those weapons which were in general use before the 
outbreak of war may be described or even named in public print” applied to official 
manuals is a moot point.  Certainly, the tactical field manuals prepared for the Regular 
Army between August 1940 and September 1941, such as the series making up 
Operations, Military Training Pamphlet No. 23 (The War Office, various dates from 
1940-42), avoid any reference to sub-artillery, although, as we shall see, Colonel 
Blacker’s Bombard certainly was in service with British Empire troops towards the end 
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of that period.  In truth, the volumes of Pamphlet No. 23 published in late-1940 and 
1941 describe a model British Army equipped with 18pr and 25pr field artillery, Bren 
light machine guns and ‘Army tanks’ that totally fails to reflect the threadbare reality of 
the time.  It is therefore not surprising that until very recently most sources gave the 
impression that sub-artillery was developed and produced specifically for the Home 
Guard, and that the ‘real’ Army would have nothing to do with it.  Increased interest in 
the Home Guard has resulted in more research and, whilst an element of ‘Mind my Pike’ 
lingers on, there now no escaping the fact that these devices were developed as weapons 
for the perilously under-armed British armed forces in general, not as political gestures 
to quieten a supposed restive and influential Home Guard lobby.   
 
In fairness to modern authors, however, Home Guards themselves are unhelpful when it 
comes to sub-artillery, as the following posting regarding the Blacker Bombard on the 
Portsdown Tunnels research website demonstrates: 
 Going through the web site of Portsdown Tunnels under ‘invasion’ I came 
 across the Spigot Mortar; the Blacker Bombard.  During part of my time spent 
 as a private in the Chesterfield Home Guard I was in the Blacker Bombard 
 Squad.  However during my 5 years in the Army (infantry) nobody I spoke to 
 had ever heard of the Blacker Bombard.  Old soldiers I have spoken to since 
 had never heard of it and I feel sure they thought that I was making it up.  
 Thank you very much for providing the proof that there was such a weapon. 
 The base of the Mortar had four legs made out of 2 inch red band tube which 
 slotted into the base of the Mortar itself.  We were suppose [sic] to be mobile.  
 When firing it we had to lay down and there was a padded roller at the end of 
 the firing butt and you had to rest your head on this to look through the site 
 [sic].  When you fired the thing the front end jumped up and the roller hit your 
 forehead and nearly broke your neck.  I only fired this contraption once thank 
 goodness.  The Blacker Bombard squad consisted of six men and a Sergeant.  
 It was really the days of Dad’s Army.  At 18 I joined the real Army. 
 
 Harry Bradbury, Derbyshire – January 200725   
 
Mr Bradbury’s recollections illustrate the difficulties and dangers of relying too heavily 
on the testimony of surviving former Home Guards, whose two teenage years in the 
organisation have been overlaid by service in the Army and sixty or so subsequent 
years, and many showings of Dad’s Army.  His colleagues in the ‘real Army’ were not 
quite so well informed as he might have been led to believe, and the 29mm Spigot 
Mortar/Blacker Bombard was a more proven piece of equipment than he, and most 
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modern commentators, imagine.  Just as a point of order, it is worth quoting from the 
safety precautions in the 29mm Spigot Mortar (Blacker Bombard) training manual:  
‘The number 1 will not rest his head on the rubber pad when sighting.  This pad is fitted 
as a safeguard should the bombard recoil excessively.’26 
 
(Left) The German Granatenwerfer 1916.  The round was 
approximately the same size as a 3in or 81mm mortar bomb, 
but the launcher was significantly smaller.  It is interesting to 
note, given the Second World War manufacture of weapons 
by British toymakers Tri-ang, these German spigot mortars 
were manufactured by the famous Nuremburg toymaker Bing.  
(www,landships.freeserver.com) 
 
 
 
 
(Below) The 20lb High Explosive 29mm Spigot Mortar anti-tank round.  The rifle 
rounds alongside illustrate the scale of the bomb, which could destroy or disable any 
contemporary tank.  Base fused and designed to squash against the armour of a tank, 
the round did not detonate if it hit soft ground.  Home Guard Circular No. 45 of March 
1942, stated:  ‘It has been specifically designed not to detonate when it strikes a soft 
surface, the object of this feature being to ensure that in the event of a miss there is no 
explosion to betray to the tank crew that they have been fired at.  This feature should be 
explained to all troops to avoid loss of confidence…’  (Author’s photograph) 
 
Spigot mortars are a well established family of weapons, with the German 
Granatenwerfer of 1916 being an early successful example.  Replacing the conventional 
gun barrel with a steel rod, fitting into a tubular tail on the projectile, which also 
contained the propellant, enabled a relatively small, light, and unsophisticated launcher 
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to fire a very large projectile.  British forces made extensive use of spigot mortar 
technology during the Second World War, including the Blacker Bombard (29mm 
Spigot Mortar), the PIAT (Projector, Infantry, Anti-tank), Petard (290mm Spigot 
Mortar), Hedgehog (multiple launcher for 7in anti-submarine depth charges) and 
Hedgerow (a version of Hedgehog fired from landing craft to clear mines).  These were 
all systems developed by MD1 (Cornish, 2009, p.35).  According to the Blacker family, 
the prototype Blacker Bombard was mounted on a 2pr gun anti-tank carriage.27  In 
service, however, the 29mm Spigot Mortar, was provided with a robust cruciform 
‘portable mounting’ of steel tube, secured with angle-iron pickets, and four pedestal 
mountings, designed to be cast into substantial concrete posts.28  Each 20mm Spigot 
Mortar was supplied with twelve anti-personnel rounds and twenty 20 lb high explosive 
anti-tank rounds, which were propelled by a small black powder charge, and more than 
a match for any contemporary tank.29  The 29mm Spigot Mortar was officially 
described as ‘the most destructive of all the Home Guard anti-tank weapons’ at a time 
(in 1943) when these included conventional 2pr anti-tank guns and .55in anti-tank rifles. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘Members of the Post Office Home Guard receiving lessons on how to load the Spigot 
Mortar, 21st June 1943.’  (Official photograph, author’s collection) 
 
Documents in the National Archive reveal that Army high command reacted with 
considerable enthusiasm when the Blacker Bombard was demonstrated and tested at 
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Bisley in April 1941.30  According to GHQ Home Forces, the weapon’s performance 
‘fully justified its adoption as an anti-tank weapon both by regular formations and the 
Home Guard.’  There had been teething troubles and initial scepticism, as is clear from 
a minute dated 30 April 1941, from one R.J. Sinclair to Engineer Vice Admiral Sir 
Harold Brown CBE, KCB, Director General Munitions Production at the Ministry of 
Supply:31 
I am told that the result of the demonstration yesterday of special Anti-
Tank weapons were extremely favourable to the Blacker Bombard and the S.T. 
[Sticky] Bomb. 
Neither of these weapons, of course, are new, but initial defects which 
made them very much less effective appear to have been overcome and, in 
particular, the new fuze which D. of A. [Director of Artillery] has designed for 
the Bombard ammunition has altered the whole complexion of the weapon so far 
as its effectiveness and desirability from the point of view of the General Staff is 
concerned. 
  
Sinclair goes on to confirm a General Staff requirement for 14,000 Blacker 
Bombards/29mm Spigot Mortars, and 3½ million rounds of ammunition.  GHQ Home 
Forces intended to issue spigot mortars on a scale of 24 per anti-tank regiment, eight per 
infantry brigade anti-tank company, two to every Home Guard company, and 12 each to 
detachments of regular troops defending aerodromes.  The training of Home Guard 
instructors would take place at the new official training school, No. 1 Home Guard 
Training School, at Dorking.32 
 
However, and despite the enthusiasm for the spigot mortar at senior levels, something of 
a rural revolt broke out in Wiltshire, when a demonstration failed to convince the local 
Home Guard that the spigot mortar was the support weapon of their dreams.  Devices 
such as the Sten gun, Northover Projector and Blacker Bombard pushed the limits of 
what could be accepted as a viable and reliable weapon system, and already being at the 
limit, any further degradation or lowering of standards was likely to have unfortunate 
results.  A rush to issue 29mm Spigot Mortars resulted in early examples leaving the 
factory without complete sights (the range calibration was printed on a piece of paper), 
and this, together with an initial batch of poor quality ammunition, undermined 
confidence in the weapon.33  The situation was inflamed because the local Home Guard 
commander was unable to attend, and sent as his representative a lowly HG Lieutenant 
– one Mark Dineley.  We have already seen Dineley’s frustration at the introduction of 
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the Lanchester and Sten, when he had previously offered the Government a reasonably 
priced and viable submachine gun.  Now his ‘Berwick St. John Arsenal’ was to cease 
production of mortars and bomb-throwers and adopt the Blacker Bombard/29mm 
Spigot Mortar.  The demonstration was clearly mishandled, and there is undoubtedly an 
element of ‘not-invented-here syndrome’ in Dineley’s report, but he makes some valid 
and intelligent comments about the arming of the Home Guard:34 
        The Priory 
        Berwick St. John 
3 November 1941 
Dear Major Collett,      
 
Under your instructions, 3 NCOs and myself went and attended the 
Blacker Bombard demonstration at Bulford Camp this morning. 
 
The Weapon 
This is an adaption of the old German Stick “Grenaten Werfer”, Types 
1915 and 1916. 
In these mortars the bomb contains the charge and barrel, which is 
slipped on to a spigot on the mortar, which has the striker running through it. 
This has never been a particularly satisfactory type of mortar and has 
long been abandoned as unsuitable, i.e. since 1916. 
The mortar is a box of tricks, heavy, clumsy and the sighting fragile.  
The firing mechanism, activated by Bowden cable, will, as Bowden cable 
always does, go wrong, especially if someone picks it up by it. 
It has the normal mortar disadvantages, the most noticeable of which is muzzle 
loading, meaning exposure [of the] crew when used for flat firing, its normal use 
against tanks. 
It requires a crew of 5, has no very great range and the bombs [are] 
fragile – the tails get bent and, also owing to their type dirt in the tail tube 
produces misfires. 
Tactically 
The weapon is purely static as now made.  The bed, made of vast tubes, 
has to be nailed into the ground by a sledgehammer.  The mortar body is clumsy 
and, as before stated, the bombs long and fragile.  Any attempt to move it means 
the use of a lorry and the attendant hiring troubles, and it takes 5 men about 5-10 
minutes to get it into action.  When in action its range is short, 100-300 yards, 
lacks accuracy or reliability, (20% misfires and lost fins at demonstration). 
It is a weapon which can only be used in open country given a 
sufficiency of men and time and then is not very good. 
It can be used in static defence positions covering road-blocks with better 
success. 
Fitted with wheels or on a car it might be used with some success against 
crash landing planes. 
Outside this and at road blocks, it is, as far as I can see of very little use 
to the H.G.  Normal Stokes 3” mortars would have been better. 
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It is a weapon and better than nothing but that is all and Country 
Platoons, in a large number of cases, would be far better without it, as too many 
of their few men will tend to be occupied with it instead of harassing the enemy 
with their L.M.G.s 
There are not enough Infantry to protect it and it is not a mobile or useful 
enough arm to be worth protecting. 
From some personal experience one can have too many kinds of 
weapons.  The Home Guard, in Country Districts, would be better off with Rifle, 
Sub-machine Guns, L.M.G., Heavy M.G., Grenades – Some Platoons Stokes, 
some Mobile A.T. Guns, or A.T. Rifles, plus some Land Mines. 
The Blacker Bombard is the last weapon I would issue, heavy, 
complicated, fragile and not super-excellent. 
  The men I took agree, as did most of the spectators. 
 
(Signed)  Mark Dineley  
Lieut. 
 
Dineley’s report opens a window into the minds of Home Guards, 18 months into the 
organisation’s existence, and with the war going badly on all fronts.  It is clear that the 
Berwick St John platoon commander is still thinking primarily about enemy airborne 
troops ‘crash landing planes’ and his men harassing enemy infantry with Lewis guns.  
He is at a loss to understand how the situation will be helped by a weapon only suited to 
static defence, covering road blocks.  That, of course, was precisely how the General 
Staff wanted to see the Home Guard employed – dug in, in static positions, acting as an 
endless series of road blocks to slow the enemy and allow the field army manoeuvre 
force to attack at the time and place of its choosing.  To say that the Home Guard would 
be better off with anti-tank guns and anti-tank rifles was stating the obvious, and 
suggests that even someone as well acquainted with the military and the British arms 
industry as Mark Dineley, was unaware of just how severe the losses of conventional 
equipment were, and (more importantly) how difficult it was proving to make them up.  
As we shall see in Chapter 8, the Home Guard was in the queue for 2pr anti-tank guns, 
and anti-tank rifles, but would not (for the most part) receive them until they had been 
replaced in Army service in 1943.  Until then, the 29mm Spigot Mortar/Blacker 
Bombard, even if it was ‘not super-excellent’, was the best alternative solution for 
destroying enemy tanks – and that was the British General Staff’s most pressing 
concern. 
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It is entirely typical of the Home Guard that no one was afraid to air their views, and 
that the forthright opinions of a Home Guard lieutenant from a Wiltshire hamlet should 
finish up preserved in the Blacker Bombard files at The National Archive.  It was 
eventually necessary for Brigadier Collingwood MC to re-assert military authority and 
bring the matter to a close, in a minute to Colonel F.G. Drew, GSO1 Home Guard, 
Salisbury Plain District.  The Brigadier also makes it crystal clear that the 29mm Spigot 
Mortar/Blacker Bombard is a weapon the Home Guard shares with the Regular Army:  
I am sorry to hear that members of the Wiltshire Home Guard are 
inclined to be pessimistic about the Blacker Bombard.  I think this is a pity as it 
has many good points.  People who have recently returned from the Home 
Guard School at DENBIES are most enthusiastic about it. 
It undoubtedly had teething troubles to start with but these have now 
been largely overcome and the number of duds [misfires] are now very few. 
The issue to the Home Guard and Regular Troops has been on a fifty-
fifty basis and I notice that Static Headquarters in 5 Corps District are making 
good use of their bombards for defending approaches to their Headquarters. 
 
The spigot mortar appeared in Home Guard returns in August 1941, but with a nil 
return, indicating that the weapon was anticipated, but introduction was delayed.  The 
first 130 only appeared in October, curiously, 123 of these were in Northern Command.  
The following month, when Dineley attended the demonstration in Bulford, 2,150 
spigot mortars were with the Home Guard, a figure that rose rapidly to 7,643 by 
February the following year.  The highest entry in the Home Guard returns is for 17,954 
in September 1942, although that is undoubtedly less than the eventual total, as they 
were still reaching Home Guard units in 1943.  One of these was the Ministry of Food 
Home Guard, who, being based on the Welsh coast, were a low priority. The author of 
their unit history said of the Northover Projector:  ‘Those of us who had much 
experience of the Northover Projector prayed fervently that we might never have to 
employ it to betray our position when attacking a tank’ (Smith, 1945, p.78).  He was, 
though, much more impressed by the 29mm Spigot Mortar:  ‘Unlike the Northover 
Projector, the Spigot Mortar, although unorthodox in design was extremely accurate and 
effective, and had indeed been put to very good use by the defenders of Stalingrad, 
delivery to whom had for a time precluded its supply to the Home Guard’.    
 
 211 
It is clear from the Ministry of Supply files that, once the initial resistance was 
overcome, demand for the 29mm Spigot Mortar skyrocketed, before the strategic 
situation began to shift from defensive to offensive and orders were cut back, in August 
1942.  The initial requirement of 14,000 weapons was increased to a ‘finite 
requirement’ for 24,500.  Eventually orders were placed for 32,500 mortars, the same 
number of mobile mountings, and 18,000 static mountings.  Fretful minutes in the 
Ministry of Supply files from 1942 show civil servants trying to determine just how 
many spigot mortars were ordered, delivered and actually needed.  It was eventually 
agreed that 32,195 29mm Spigot Mortars (or Blacker Bombards, as the Ministry 
insisted on calling them) had been accepted for service, plus 30,275 mobile mountings 
and 18,162 static mountings.35 
 
Not all of these went to the Home Guard or even British troops.  As Henry Smith 
describes in the history of the Ministry of Food Home Guard quoted above, 29mm 
Spigot Mortars/Blacker Bombards were supplied to the Soviet Union.  As at 30 June 
1942, military items supplied to the USSR, included 250 Blacker Bombards.36  A 
Ministry of Supply minute from February 1942 shows this to be part of a total 
requirement of 5,000 spigot mortars for the Soviet Union.37  It would be interesting to 
know if the spigot mortars saw any action on the Eastern Front.  Chamberlain and 
Gander (1975a, p.51) state that Blacker Bombards saw operational service ‘in North 
Africa during the siege of Tobruk and were used by some Indian Army units with 
varying degrees of success’.  This is corroborated to some extent by Home Guard 
Instruction No. 40, of November 1941:  ‘The mortar is effective against heavy tanks at 
short ranges and has been taken into use in the Middle East’.38     
 
There is, though, a ringing endorsement of the combat performance of the 29mm Spigot 
Mortar, dating from May 1943, when the following entry was published by the War 
Office in Home Guard Information Circular No.  27: 
 
4.  The Spigot Mortar 
 The following extracted from a letter received from a theatre of operations is 
 published for information. 
“…  Spigot mortars were used extensively to thicken up A.Tk. defences 
in our area of … RIDGE – i.e., a defensive and static role during Oct., ’42…  
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They were used with good effect in fwd coy’s FDL’s [forward company’s 
forward defensive locations] on …RIDGE where the enemy had observation at 
some 500 yards range.  His fire, both mortar and SAA [smallarms], was accurate 
and heavy and our mortar fire did not have much effect.  A spigot mortar was 
put in position during the night and succeeded in subduing the enemy’s fire 
using AP bombs… 
 
  “…  Even if we had more inf. A.Tk. guns we would still use spigots in 
 defence as they were so very inconspicuous, have a tremendous hitting power 
 and are very simple to teach and learn…”39 
 
The entry was sponsored by War Office department HG1(T), i.e. Home Guard training, 
and raises the question of where this action, in which the 29mm Spigot Mortar proved 
so effective, took place, and who the satisfied user was.  The date of October 1942 
suggests the place was Ruweisat Ridge, and the troops involved were from the 8th 
Army.  A somewhat bemused exchange on an internet forum thread reveals that records 
in the Australian War Memorial archives show the 9th Australian Division was equipped 
with 29mm Spigot Mortars at El Alamein.40  The New Zealand official war history, 
which is replete with references to weaponry discussed in this thesis – Sticky Bombs, 
Hawkins mines, and the spigot mortar – and amply demonstrates the degree to which 
British Dominion forces of 1942 were users of weapons that we now associate solely 
with the Home Guard, indicates that the 29mm Spigot Mortar reached New Zealand 
troops in North Africa in June 1942: 
The ground at Minqar Qaim was extremely hard and, although the 
urgency of the task kept many of the troops digging till well after midnight on 
26-27 June, some slit trenches were still very shallow and sangars had, in some 
cases, been built up from the excavated rocks.  The digging-in of the spigot 
mortars, the new but rather big and clumsy infantry anti-tank weapons which 
were supposed to be most effective if a hit was scored at 100 yards  range, 
proved virtually impossible in the time available.  The news that the enemy had 
‘broken through’ at Charing Cross stimulated the diggers to make fresh efforts.41 
 
The Kiwi’s difficulties become apparent when one considers the recommended design 
of a spigot mortar position (see photograph below), which was a deep circular trench, 
surrounding a central core or pillar on which the mortar stood.  This was necessary to 
afford 360º of traverse and cover to load and fire the weapon, in actions that were 
expected to take place suddenly and at very short ranges. 
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Regular Army troops man a 29mm Spigot Mortar on its mobile mounting in a weapon 
pit – an illustration from the 1942 manual.  It is clear from this picture why the spigot 
mortar’s legs needed to be both strong and long.  In action great efforts were made to 
camouflage the position and thus preserve the element of surprise.  (Author’s 
collection) 
 
There is a longstanding association of the operational use of the 29mm Spigot Mortar 
with Indian troops, and, given the location and the date, we can be reasonably certain 
that the satisfied user quoted in Home Guard Information Circular No.27 was an officer 
of the 4th Indian Division.  The Indian dimension was elaborated to the author in 
correspondence with a retired Indian Army officer, J.G. Rawlinson, who in 2002 
forwarded a manuscript of personal reminiscences for vetting to the Directorate of 
Corporate Communication (Army) at the MOD, where the author was on attachment.  
Mr Rawlinson wrote describing his period as an instructor at the Indian Company 
Group (ICG) at the Small Arms School at Saugor (now Sagar), between May 1942 and 
April 1943.  Expecting to take over the sniper course, Captain (acting unpaid) 
Rawlinson found himself responsible for the 29mm Spigot Mortar (Rawlinson, 2002): 
 In June [1942] the first Spigot Mortar, also known as the Blacker Bombard 
 after the inventor, arrived in India.  This was an ungainly weapon with a large 
 tripod, on which sat the ‘gun’, a spigot which fired the bomb.  This had a head 
 the size of a football filled with explosive, and a tubular tail which fitted over 
 the spigot.  It was an anti-tank weapon with a range of about 500 yards.  The 
 mortar had been brought out from England to India by a Captain Faber and 
 sent to Saugor.  I recall the delays and frustrations in getting the ammunition 
 from the depot in Bombay, where it had been stored on arrival.  Indian red 
 tape held up despatch by about two months.  I worked with Captain Faber on 
 the running of courses, which included the drills. 
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Thus 29mm Spigot Mortars arrived at the Indian Army training centre, and with New 
Zealand troops in action against the Afrika Korps, one month after one was first 
demonstrated to the Home Guard in Sevenoaks, Kent.  This suggests that, at the very 
least, ‘frontline’ Home Guard units were being accorded the same priority as Empire 
and Dominion fighting troops.  That Spigot Mortars were in use in the Indian small 
arms training school prompts the question of whether they were also used operationally 
in the Far East.  Mr Rawlinson was fairly certain this was not the case: 
 I have no knowledge of the use of the Mortar outside Saugor, and I cannot say 
 whether it was ever used ‘in anger’ in Burma.  I rather doubt whether it would 
 fit in with the Burmese jungles.  It was ungainly, difficult to transport, and 
 with [sic] its limited range allowed it to be easily located and destroyed by the 
 Japs.  I did know it had been used in the Western Desert, but I do not know to 
 what effect.42 
 
The National Archive holds records of experiments in mounting a ‘Blacker Bombard’ 
on a Sherman tank, which took place in 1944, under the auspices of Allied Forces South 
East Asia.43  Beyond that, operational use of the Blacker Bombard/Spigot Mortar on 
operations in the Far East awaits further research. 
 
A Spigot Mortar detachment in position using a concrete pedestal mounting.  The 
ammunition number (right) is removing a drill round from the concrete roofed 
ammunition store, another of which is situated to the bottom centre of the picture.  
From the manual of 1942.  (Author’s collection) 
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Mr Rawlinson’s reply echoes Mark Dineley’s observations on the spigot mortar’s 
shortcomings, which turned enthusiasm into disillusionment.  The spigot mortar was 
extremely heavy: the gun itself weighed 112lbs, the pivot 56lbs and each leg 44lbs, and 
it was moved in five man-loads, exclusive of ammunition (increased to seven in an 
amendment of 1944).44  Had it been deployed on a 2pr gun carriage, or even a simple 
trolley, like the Soviet Sokolov Maxim machinegun carriage, as Dineley suggested, its 
use might have been easier. As it was, its short range and immobility were tactical 
limitations that could render it a one-shot gun.45  In the defensive context of the UK, 
this problem was countered by preparing a series of up to four weapon pits for every 
spigot mortar.  Each pit contained a concrete pedestal on to which the firing post could 
be quickly mounted.  Well camouflaged and defiladed, these positions made the most of 
the mortar as an ambush weapon. 
 
Spigot Mortar pedestals are the most 
enduring memorial to the Home 
Guard, with hundreds, possibly 
thousands, still existing throughout the 
UK.  Typically the pit has long-since 
been backfilled, as in this example 
excavated by the author in woods near 
Churchill’s residence at Chartwell, but 
the concrete ‘holdfast’ and stainless 
steel ‘pivot’ remain in surprisingly 
sound condition.  (Author’s 
photograph) 
 
 
The Northover Projector, although easy to produce, had a performance that was, at best, 
marginal; the 29mm Spigot Mortar, although undeniably effective, lacked mobility.  
Both these faults were addressed by what E.W. Ashworth calls ‘the last and best of the 
privately developed weapons, the Ordnance Smoothbore (OSB) gun 3in Mk. I, or 
‘Smith Gun’ (Ashworth, 1998, p.46).  The gun was developed by Major (Retired) 
William H. Smith, the managing director of Trianco Ltd., a firm of structural engineers.  
Writing in the Journal of the Ordnance Society, in 2005, Terry Gander says of the 
Smith Gun (Gander, 2005, p.60): 
 Mr Smith must have been a very capable engineer.  Appreciating that priority 
 had to be given to speed of production at a time when every source of raw 
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 materials was already hard pressed, he placed emphasis on simplicity and 
 incorporation of as many non-critical materials as could be managed.  Taking 
 heed of these basic requirements he approached his project with a completely 
 open and original mind. 
 
It is clear from the correspondence in the Ministry of Aircraft Production files that 
initially, in the spring of 1941, the Smith Gun was viewed with considerable 
enthusiasm.  It was anticipated that the Army would order 20,000 guns, with further 
orders for the Royal Navy ‘for all ships’, the RAF wanted the gun for airfield defence, 
and there would undoubtedly be orders from the Empire and Dominions and probably 
the Soviet Union too.46  Under the circumstances, it made sense to pay off Smith as 
quickly as possible and, in effect, buy the rights to his gun.  In April 1941 very 
substantial payment of £30,000 was agreed, with some graciousness on Smith’s side, 
payable monthly as war loans.  Although there was great enthusiasm for Smith’s gun, it 
was its ammunition that created the biggest stir.  The Smith Gun fired a 3in shell which 
benefitted from an ‘obturator case’, which expanded on firing to seal the shell in the 
bore.  Both bore and shell could be a slack fit, allowing the barrel to be manufactured 
from ordinary drawn steel tube and hugely easing manufacturing tolerances for both gun 
and projectile.  It was even anticipated that Smith’s obturating system might be applied 
to ‘Stokes guns’, i.e. conventional muzzle-loading mortars, to extend their range.47   
 
At first sight the Smith Gun resembles a conventional artillery piece and limber, but, 
although not as radical a solution to the tank threat as the German Panzerfaust, it 
displayed highly original features.  Its low weight enabled the gun and limber to be 
towed by a 10hp car, a single horse, or as separate loads behind motorcycles, and its 
large wheels enabled the crew to manhandle it into position over rubble or broken 
ground.48  Coming into action, gun and limber (correctly termed ‘trailer, artillery, No. 
39’) were tipped on to their left hand wheel.  The allowed the gun to be traversed 
through 360º with the minimum of effort.  The 54 inch, low-velocity, smoothbore, 
barrel fired a 6lb, 3in calibre, finned HEAT round, with an effective range of 200 yards 
(100 yards ‘best’), and an 8lb fragmented cast iron anti-personnel round, fitted with a 
No. 245 fuse, or the ubiquitous No. 247 ‘Bakelite’ fuse.  This was effective at 650 
yards, ‘best’ being 150 yards.  The gun could also fire high explosive or smoke 3in 
mortar bombs.49  By way of comparison, the maximum range of the conventional 2pr 
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anti-tank gun was (by 1943) 500 yards, 200 yards ‘best’, and it had no anti-personnel 
capability.50  The Smith Gun could penetrate 3.15 inches (78.75mm) of armour, or put a 
two-foot diameter hole in a nine-inch reinforced concrete wall.51  Ten 8lb shells, or five 
10lb bombs were carried on the gun, and another 40 8lb shells or 20 10lb bombs on the 
limber.52 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Quintessential Home Guard.  The first picture of the Smith Gun to be officially released, 
on 24th May 1944, by which time it was already something of an historical curiosity, 
‘which was for primary use in case of invasion’ according to the picture caption.  The 
crew have chalked lead marks on the inside of the lower wheel, as reference points for 
indirect fire.  The No. 1 (gun commander) is standing to the left of the gun, No. 3 is 
operating the breech, and No. 2 (responsible for the ammunition and limber) is 
receiving a round from No. 4 (the driver, who also assisted with the ammunition).  No. 2 
bears a disconcertingly close resemblance to the late John Laurie – Private Fraser in 
Dad’s Army.  (Official photograph, author’s collection) 
  
In late spring 1941, orders were placed for 6,000 guns and limbers, and 2,600,000 
rounds of ammunition.  The provisional manual for the gun, now designated ‘The 3in 
OSB Gun’ (OSB standing for ‘Ordnance Smooth Bore’) was issued in July 1941 and the 
gun was carried as a nil return on Home Guard returns from August.  However the first 
examples – just six issued to Northern District – did not appear until February 1942.  
This appears to have been a two-month troop trial, with the guns withdrawn in April.  In 
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May 1942 ten guns appeared in London District, the following month there were 145 on 
Home Guard strength.  A year after the gun first appeared on the returns there were just 
1,328 in service with the Home Guard.  The highest figure in the returns (November 
1942) is 2,187.   
 
All members of Sevenoaks Home Guard were expected to show a ‘working knowledge’ 
of the Smith Gun, Northover Projector and Spigot Mortar in the training schedule of 
December 1942, the Smith Gun, like the Spigot Mortar, having arrived earlier in that 
year.53  Similarly, the fetchingly blue-painted Smith Gun in the historical collection of 
the RAF Regiment is stated to have entered service with that organisation in 1942.54  
The slow roll-out to the Home Guard is almost certainly due to this Ministry of Aircraft 
Production project going to meet MAP requirements (such as airfield defence) first, 
which is interesting, as, once again, it calls into question the ‘Home Guard only’ view 
of sub-artillery.  To give an impression of the way Home Guard support weapons were 
organised, September 1943 saw 6 (Ministry of Food) Platoon of E Company, 2nd City of 
London (Civil Service Battalion), Home Guard, become that company’s designated 
Sub-Artillery [sic] Platoon.  The platoon was equipped with one Smith Gun, two Spigot 
Mortars, one Boys anti-tank rifle and a Lewis gun.  Subsequently two Vickers machine 
guns were added to the platoon’s considerable firepower.  
 
Tactical deployment of the Smith Gun is extensively covered in Home Guard 
Instruction No. 51, Battlecraft and Battle Drill For The Home Guard, Part IV, The 
Organization of Home Guard Defence, of November 1943, which stresses the need for 
covering fire, to the extent that a three-man Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR) group is 
assigned to the Smith Gun detachment.  Whether this is a result of operational 
experience with conventional (i.e. 2pr) anti-tank guns is unclear (War Office manuals 
dealing with anti-tank guns in defence, stress concealment, flash, mutual defence 
against encirclement, and siting within defended localities55), but it was already a 
recognised factor when the manual for the Smith Gun was issued in July 1942:  ‘The 
gun should never be called upon to operate unsupported by infantry and the detachment 
should be provided with small arms and grenades for self defence.’56  This requirement 
to provide personal weapons for the gun crew totally undermines the oft-heard assertion 
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that crew-served weapons were issued to ameliorate the shortage of Home Guard 
weaponry. 
 
The 1943 battle drills manual drives home the point about covering fire, with a series of 
parade ground drills in which the BAR group participates alongside the gun and crew: 57 
 Each man comes to attention in turn, calls out his number and duty, and stands 
 at ease.  The duties are:- 
 Detachment Commander. – I command the detachment, am responsible for all 
 orders, select the gun site, and control the fire. 
 No. 1. – I fire the gun.  I also load and set the range when in the open. 
 No. 2. – I assist No. 1 and pass ammunition.  I load, and set the range when the 
 gun is firing from behind cover. 
 No. 3. – I carry ammunition from the trailer to the gun site.  I also drive the 
 towing vehicle. 
 BAR Group. – We are attached for covering fire and all-round protection. 
 
The image of the BAR group chanting their devoir in unison is delightful.  The 3in OSB 
Gun (Smith Gun) was listed as one of the three heavy weapons available to Home 
Guard mobile battalions and companies, alongside the anti-tank rifle and 2pr anti-tank 
gun, which started to reach the Home Guard during 1943, as 6pr guns and PIATs 
became increasingly available for the regular forces.58  It is worthwhile pausing to 
compare the capabilities of all the Home Guard weapons as they were given in 
November 1943, the apogee of the force in terms of training and equipment:59 
 
 Northover Projector using: -   Maximum  Best 
  68 grenade    60 yards  50 yards 
  76 SIP grenade   120  ,,   70  ,, 
  36 grenade-      
   4 sec. fuze   150  ,,     __ 
   7 sec. fuze   200  ,,     __ 
 
 29-mm Spigot Mortar:- 
  20 lb. HE anti-tank   200  ,,   100 yards 
  14 lb. HE anti-personnel  750  ,,   400  ,, 
 
 3-inch OSB Gun:- 
  8 lb. HE anti-personnel  650  ,,   150  ,, 
  6 lb. HE anti-tank   200  ,,   100  ,, 
 
 2-pr., armour piercing shot   500  ,,   200  ,, 
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The original design of the 3in OSB Gun was geared to anti-tank operations, with open 
sights and a 360º free traverse.  Nevertheless, through its service life there were efforts 
to develop it as a gun-howitzer in the indirect fire role.  The 29mm Spigot Mortar’s long 
range and hard-hitting anti-personnel shell made it a useful infantry mortar, as had been 
demonstrated at Ruweisat Ridge.  But opening fire compromised the position, weapon 
and crew, necessitating an immediate move, which was easier said than done, given the 
weapon’s lack of mobility.  As a result, priority was given to anti-tank action, holding 
fire until the last possible moment.  To quote the manual:  ‘it will be realised that the 
element of surprise essential to success will be lost if the mortar is first used on anti-
personnel targets at long ranges’.60  The 3in OSB Gun, although lacking 100 yards on 
the Spigot Mortar, still had a respectable range, particularly in close country or an urban 
area, and the bonus of mobility.  It is interesting to note that by November 1943 the 3in 
OSB Gun’s anti-personnel capability was being listed above its anti-tank performance.  
This is also reflected in the notes on tactical handling: 
In defence the anti-personnel shell should be used to cover dead ground by either 
direct or indirect fire, the gun can be fired off any sort of ground provided the 
wheel base is roughly level.  Owing to difficulties of concealment, alternative 
positions should be selected and prepared… 
 
 In reserve the gun can be retained by the Force commander with the reserve to 
 reinforce any threatened locality with the minimum of delay… 
 
 In counter attack the gun can support infantry with fire from a flank.  It can be 
 used to dislodge enemy established in a building.  Having wheels, it is more 
 suitable than the Northover for use with standing patrols…61 
 
For indirect fire the entire gun, by virtue of the fact that it rotated on its lower wheel, 
and with a little DIY from the crew, became a dial sight, a system that was both simple 
and workable: 
 3. Indirect Laying 
    i.  When gun and target are not intervisible, the method of “indirect laying” 
 is adopted.  This method requires that a scale of leads should be painted or 
 chalked on the base cone…  A stick or post is planted about 50 yards in front 
 of the gun on the estimated line to the target.  For the first round the gun is laid 
 on the post over the open sight and clamped.  An arrow is chalked on the base 
 wheel opposite the “0” graduation.  The range is set on the quadrant sight, thus 
 depressing the line of sight and displacing the bubble.  The bubble is brought 
 back to the centre of its run by means of the control levers and the elevation 
 locking lever clamped.  The observer, who is away from the gun but in a 
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 position to see the fall of shot, orders fresh ranges as required, and these are 
 applied to the sights, and the gun relaid from round to round as already 
 described.  The correction to direction is estimated and ordered as lead.  The 
 layer traverses the gun until the lead ordered is opposite the arrow [on the base 
 cone of the gun mounting], and reclamps.  The following table shows the 
 amount of lead which should be ordered… 62 
 
The Smith Gun or 3in OSB Gun, was an imaginative and workmanlike weapon, and 
there is no reason to doubt that given the chance it would have given a decent account 
of itself.  Certainly, the nearest equivalent, the German 8.8cm Racketenwerfer 43 
‘Püppchen’, a simple artillery piece that fired a rocket propelled HEAT round from a 
smooth-bore closed barrel, proved effective in the limited service it saw (although the 
Panzerschrek shoulder-fired rocket launcher used a similar round more economically 
and saw more extensive service).  There remains the question of to what extent 3in OSB 
Gun’s produced served beyond the Home Guard.  In 1975 Chamberlain and Gander 
stated that ‘the Smith Gun was issued to Home Guard units and at one time it was 
intended to issue it to regular Home Defence units, but that does not appear to have 
happened’.63  Ashworth, writing more recently, states: ‘A total of 4000 Smith Guns 
were built with a small proportion being used by the regular army and RAF regiment for 
the static defence of airfields’.64  Air Ministry records in the National Archive make it 
quite clear that 3in OSB Guns were widely used for ‘aerodrome defence’ during the 
period 1941-43, with RAF personnel being trained as gun crews,65 and, as we have 
seen, one RAF example actually survives in the historical collection of the RAF 
Regiment.   
 
However, the Smith Gun/3in OSB Gun does not figure in any of the Western Desert 
accounts that show extensive use of other contemporary unconventional weapons – the 
Hawkins mine, Sticky Bomb and 29mm Spigot Mortar – by Commonwealth troops.  
Records survive of experiments carried out in 1943, to determine if a Smith Gun could 
be dropped by parachute from a Wellington bomber aircraft, in order to provide a 
support weapon for airborne troops (an airborne derivative of the 6pr anti-tank gun was 
subsequently adopted), but the 3in OSB Gun only saw service in the UK.  Given that 
the 29mm Spigot Mortar saw quite extensive service in the Western Desert, it may seem 
strange that the powerful and versatile 3in OSB Gun did not.  Indeed, it will be apparent 
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that the anticipated Smith Gun ‘gold rush’ failed to materialise.  The most serious 
shortcoming of Major Smith’s gun was its most innovative feature, the fact that it went 
into action using its 4-foot diameter wheel as a turntable.  The gun needed to be levelled 
with sandbags or similar if it was to be used on any sloping or uneven ground, and in its 
firing configuration was also very tall, overall width (i.e. height ‘in action’) being 5’6”.  
In open ground this presented far too large a target for an anti-tank weapon with a ‘best’ 
range of 100 yards.  For these reasons the 3in OSB Gun would not have commended 
itself to use in the undulating and barren desert.  In the hedgerows of Kent and Sussex, 
or in blitzed towns, the gun had rather more potential, and much training seems to have 
centred on using the gun in urban warfare. 
 
Left: 8.8cm Raketenwerfer 43 ‘Püppchen’ deployed 
with its steel disc wheel removed.  The similarity to a 
29mm Spigot Mortar position is noteworthy in this 
operational German anti-tank weapon of 1943-44.  
Range was 700m, 230m ‘best’. (Chamberlain and 
Gander) 
 
Right: US soldiers examine a 
captured ‘Püppchen’, in a view 
that clearly shows the 
conventional pressed steel 
carriage.  A carriage like this 
would have greatly increased the 
utility of the 29mm Spigot Mortar 
and the 3in OSB Gun.  (US Army 
official) 
 
 
Understanding the issues surrounding the development and use of the British Second 
World War ‘sub-artillery’ is absolutely pivotal to a comprehension of the wider 
arguments concerning the arming of the Home Guard.  Although issuing 
unconventional crew-served weapons might have helped ease the embarrassment caused 
by the shortfall of conventional arms for the Home Guard (a contention which is 
disputed, in any case), there were also recipients, such as the Army county battalions, 
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Dominion and Empire forces and the RAF Regiment, whom the Government would not 
have felt politically obliged to placate.  The clue to understanding the sub-artillery is in 
the nature of the equipment itself.  The LDV formed as a result of popular anxiety about 
German paratroops, with whom the Home Guard remained fixated until well into 1941.  
It is abundantly clear that the sub-artillery and anti-tank grenades of 1940-41 were 
developed as anti-panzer, not anti-falschirmjaeger weapons, and were a reaction to high 
command, not grassroots, concerns.  They were issued to Home Defence units – Army, 
RAF and Home Guard – not to keep the Home Guard feeling important, but in response 
to the Army command’s own nightmare scenario that German armour would get ashore 
and there would be nothing to stop it, resulting in panic and panzers pushing inland 
unchecked. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Smith Gun coming out of action, an 
illustration from Home Guard 
Instruction No. 52, Battlecraft and 
Battle Drill for the Home Guard, Part 
IV, The Organization of Home Guard 
Defence, published by GHQ Home 
Forces in November 1943.  Contrary 
to the traditional bucolic image of the 
Home Guard, the Smith Gun is 
portrayed throughout in action in a 
‘blitzed’ urban landscape.  The 
drawing serves to illustrate the tall 
target the gun presented in open 
ground. (Author’s collection) 
 
 
 
 
 
Of the various weapons devised in 1940-41, the Blacker Bombard/29mm Spigot Mortar 
and the Sticky Bomb were the most practical, but in the case of the unwieldy spigot 
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mortar, only in operations based on prepared defence.  Accordingly, both saw 
widespread service in the Western Desert, until the military balance shifted, and 
operations switched to the offence, at which point, like the trench mortars of the First 
World War, the spigot mortar was left behind.66  In the UK, where the military task 
remained defensive, the sub-artillery remained relevant.  As regular troops were drawn 
away to other theatres of war, the operation of these equipments increasingly fell to the 
Home Guard, which is one reason why they are so strongly associated with that 
organisation.  Short memories in the Army, and Brophy’s suggestion that some of the 
new anti-tank weapons were ‘exclusive to the Home Guard’, together with the fact that 
most operational use was in the hands of Dominion and Empire troops, led to the belief 
that these were ‘Home Guard only’ weapons, which continues to this day.   
 
There is a real need to challenge a narrative convention, which, when discussing sub-
artillery, appears unshakeable.  To take an example concerning the 3in OSB Gun on the 
internet, a most important research resource for modern schoolchildren, the National 
Army Museum website states:   
 The Smith Gun was designed by the Trianco toy company at the beginning of 
 the Second World War (1939-1945).  It was one of several homemade pieces 
 of artillery produced in Britain during the desperate days of 1940 when the 
 threat of German invasion was at its greatest… 
 
After explaining that the gun entered service in 1941 with the Home Guard and for 
airfield defence, it concludes: 
 The Smith Gun was one of the many weird and wonderful devices used by 
 Captain Mainwaring and the Walmington-on-Sea Home Guard of TV’s 
 ‘Dad’s Army’.  This is one of the few remaining examples in existence 
 anywhere in the world. 
  
The 3in OSB Gun/Smith Gun is, of course, exactly as ‘home made’ as the Mk. III Sten 
gun (as manufactured by toy manufacturer Tri-ang), and the sub-artillery deserves a 
better reputation.  The Home Guard’s automatic distrust of anything not on issue to 
Regular infantry has been noted, and the weapons were not without their shortcomings, 
resulting in an understandable, and unfortunate, conflation.  Seen objectively, and in 
context, the sub-artillery must be viewed as a genuine attempt to provide defensive anti-
tank weapons quickly, at a period, between the summer of 1940 and the winter of 1942, 
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when the outcome of the war was by no means a forgone conclusion.  The three 
weapons, the Northover Projector, the Blacker Bombard and the Smith Gun, were less 
successful than they might have been, not because they were poorly constructed – they 
were not – or because they didn’t work – they did.  Their shortcoming was their lack of 
mobility, in artillery parlance, not the ordnance but the carriage.  It would have taken 
very little work to mount each weapon on the sort of simple two-wheeled carriage used 
for the German Püppchen.  That they were not so mounted is a reflection of the military 
mindset when they were first accepted for service, which saw assaulting panzers being 
checked by desperately-held fixed lines of defence, whose defenders had nowhere to 
run, no prospect of reinforcement or withdrawal, and would seek to degrade the 
attackers by attrition.   
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CHAPTER 8 
 
Artillery 
 
Thus far in this study we have followed the arming of the Home Guard from the initial 
distribution of service rifles to the LDV in the most threatened coastal areas of England, 
through various stages of unofficial and official improvisation; the arrival of military 
reserve stock and commercial smallarms from the United States, and the issue of current 
British-issue Sten submachine guns, No. 4 service rifles and Bren light machine guns, 
finally bringing (at least in some areas) the Home Guard armoury in line with that of the 
British Regular Army.  In this chapter we will look at parallel developments, which saw 
the Home Guard armed with the really big guns – coastal artillery, field artillery, anti-
aircraft and anti-tank artillery (in which latter category we will, for convenience, also 
consider the Boys anti-tank rifle).  In doing so we will illustrate the manner in which the 
Home Guard evolved rapidly from a civilian militia to a valued military resource, 
completely integrated into the structures of Home Defence.  We will also continue to 
rehabilitate serviceable weaponry that has gained an undeservedly poor reputation.  
 
The Home Guard proficiency certificate, illustrated overleaf, shows the wide variety of 
activities the organisation was supporting by the time this particular example was 
issued, to Pte. L. Fueggle in Reigate, in March 1944, eight months before the Home 
Guard ‘stood down’.  It will be noted that the terms ‘battery’ or ‘company’ were to be 
applied as appropriate, and that (in paragraph 5) Pte. Fueggle might be expected to 
specialise in ‘(a) Battlecraft, (b) Coast artillery, (c) Heavy A.A. Bty. work, (d) “Z” A.A. 
Bty. work, (e) Bomb disposal, (f) Watermanship, (g) Motor transport.  The first of these 
refers to infantry skills, which still made up the bulk of Home Guard activity, and the 
latter three fall outside the scope of this study.1  In this chapter we will start our 
examination of the ‘big guns’ by looking at the Home Guard’s involvement in coast 
artillery.   
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Army Form 4026, the Home Guard Certificate of Proficiency, illustrates the diversity of 
Home Guard roles by the beginning of 1944 – battlecraft (infantry), coast artillery, 
heavy anti-aircraft battery, ‘Z’ (anti-aircraft rocket) battery, bomb disposal, 
watermanship and motor transport all being listed as possible specialisations. 
(www.redhill-reigate-history.co.uk/homeguard.htm) 
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The Home Guard began to be recruited to augment Royal Artillery coast artillery 
personnel in the latter part of 1941.  At that time coastal batteries were very much ‘front 
line’ positions, expected to engage enemy raids and landings, marauding enemy 
warships, surfaced submarines and attack craft.  They also provided covering fire for 
naval inspection parties sent to examine passing shipping, and for friendly ships as they 
lay in harbour.  The possibility of involving the Home Guard in coast artillery started to 
be examined in July 1941,2 and reflected the move away from the static defence of the 
UK favoured by General Ironside, to the mobile forces championed by his successor 
Alan Brooke (Danchev and Todman, 2001, p.94).  Brooke needed to extract troops from 
the coast batteries in order to build up the armoured divisions that would be the 
effective counter to a German invasion, but do so without compromising the 
effectiveness of his first line of defence.3  The idea was to replace each of the higher 
gun numbers (i.e. those men whose duties were mostly handling ammunition4), with 
two Home Guards (to allow for part-time working), and also raise a Home Guard 
platoon for local defence of each battery.  The chief difficulty lay with maintaining full 
readiness, whilst depending, in part, on part-timers, and it took until September 1941 
before HQ Home Forces and Director General Home Guard had thrashed out the detail 
and recruiting could begin. 
 
The importance of coast artillery had been established in the reign of Henry VIII, when 
a chain of purpose-built coastal artillery forts were constructed, many of which were so 
well placed they were still being manned during the Second World War.  It was also 
painfully emphasised in June 1667, when a Dutch fleet captured the fort at Sheerness in 
Kent and entered the Medway, to wreak havoc amongst the anchored British fleet.  The 
threat did not pass with the end of the age of sail as, during the First World War, the 
Kaiser’s High Seas Fleet bombarded English coastal towns, including Scarborough, 
Hartlepool and Whitby.  The bombardment of Hartlepool by the German battlecruisers, 
Seydlitz and Moltke, and heavy cruiser Blücher, commenced at 08.10 on 16 December 
1914, and in 40 minutes 1,150 shells were fired at the shore gun emplacements and 
harbour, killing nine and wounding 12 of the coast artillery crews, as well as killing 86 
civilians and wounding 424.  Hartlepool’s Heugh and Lighthouse batteries fought back, 
firing 143 6in shells, damaging three of the German ships, including the Blücher.5  
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Naval bombardment of the 
UK in the 20th century.  
British troops pose with 
unexploded armour 
piercing shells (note 
armoured nose caps), fired 
by the German High Seas 
Fleet, Hartlepool, 1914.   
(Durham County Council 
Archive, Misc. 0002) 
 
 
Britain’s shore batteries were abandoned in the 1950s,6and there is, therefore, a 
temptation to look on Second World War coast artillery as being old-fashioned and in 
decline.  This is certainly not how it was viewed during the Second World War, indeed 
153 new ‘Emergency Coast Batteries’ were built in 1940, as explained by Ian Hogg 
(2002, p.184): 
  The events of 1940 saw considerable activity around the shores of 
 Britain, guns being installed to cover almost every possible location capable of 
 admitting a German landing, but few of these really qualify as coast artillery.  
 The difference is significant; coast artillery was provided with range-finding 
 and position-finding equipment which enabled them to engage enemy 
 warships on the move and at considerable range.  But the ‘Emergency 
 Batteries’ and many of the beach batteries were simply concerned with direct 
 shooting at vessels attempting to land troops and equipment, though many of 
 them were given rudimentary fire-control systems which extended their sphere 
 of activity a little.  Actual additions to the coast defences around Britain 
 between 1939 and 1945 were largely concerned with placing better weapons 
 in significant positions; thus, numbers of twin 6pdr equipments were placed in 
 the Thames Estuary in order to protect coastal shipping from possible torpedo 
 boat raids, and the Straits of Dover were eventually covered by a massive 
 collection of armament in the Dover area.  But in other forts there was little 
 change, since none was really needed; the pre-war gun strength was still 
 sufficient to deal with any threat, and there was no need to spend time and 
 money on reinforcement. 
 
To say that few of the Emergency Coast Batteries ‘really qualify as coast artillery’ is a 
little harsh because, as we shall see, some were actually quite well equipped for the task 
they were expected to perform.  We can, though, (and admitting considerable latitude 
and blurring of boundaries) usefully categorise the coastal gun positions into the 
following groups: 
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• Coast Artillery Batteries:  Established and formal positions, many of 
which were sited in artillery forts that had been in occupation (and an 
almost continuous state of development) for four hundred years  
• Emergency Coast Batteries:  Properly configured gun positions built 
hastily in 1940 to defend vulnerable coastal points that had previously 
been overlooked  
• Beach Batteries:  Improvised positions in which a gun of almost any type 
or vintage might be bolted to a Heath-Robinson firing platform from 
which it could be used to engage an enemy landing force over open 
sights 
One Emergency Coast Battery, at Workington docks, on the Cumberland coast, has 
been examined as part of a wider study of the Workington Home Guard, by Russell W. 
Barnes, to whom I am indebted for kindly allowing me to share his research.7  
Workington serves as a useful example of the completeness and sophistication of some 
Emergency Coast Batteries, and the importance of the role played by the Home Guard 
in the coast defences.  Construction of the Emergency Coast Batteries at Workington 
and Bransty (Whitehaven) began in July 1940, while nearby Maryport received a Beach 
Battery at the same time.  The three installations together formed 406 Coast Battery, 
manned by 561 (later 562) Regiment, Royal Artillery.  Two 4in BL (Breech Loading) 
Mk VII guns were emplaced at Workington, two more at Whitehaven, and one at 
Maryport.  The 4in guns at Workington dated from 1912 and 1914 (the design having 
been first introduced in 1908), and they would have originally been mounted in the 
secondary armament positions of major warships, such as a Dreadnought battleship, or 
as primary armament on a cruiser.8  The Admiralty Gunnery Branch handbook 
describes the guns as follows:   
 There are three designs of 4-inch BL guns. The Mark VII is a high velocity 
 gun, having a M.V. of 2,852 f.s. It is mounted as an anti-torpedo craft gun in 
 large ships, and in the main armament of smaller ships. The Mark VIII and 
 VIII* are medium velocity guns, having a MV of 2,287 f.s. They are mounted 
 in light craft where heavy deck strains cannot be allowed.9 
Apart from their use on warships and in shore emplacements, these versatile guns were 
widely used to arm merchant ships during both World Wars.  At Workington, the guns 
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were emplaced in separate concrete casemates 30 yards apart.  Each could traverse 
through 80° and had a range of 2,000 to 10,000 yards, with 6,000 yards as the limit of 
effective fire.10   
 
With respect to Ian Hogg’s point about target location and fire control, at Workington 
gunfire was directed from the Battery Observation Post (BOP), which was equipped 
with a 4’6” Barr and Stroud prismatic co-incidence rangefinder (replaced in April 1942 
with an 80cm rangefinder11) and a Dumaresq, a device which calculated the speed of a 
target relative to the line of fire, to enable the correct deflection (aim off) and range to 
be given to the gunlayers.  The equipment was the same as that was carried by a well 
armed Defensively Equipped Merchant Ship (DEMS).12  In addition, the guns were 
flanked on either side by two ‘Defence Electric Lights’ or ‘DELs’, searchlights 323 
yards apart, controlled from the BOP, which could be used to illuminate and range a 
target at night.  These arrangements were quite sufficient for the intended role of the 
battery, which Russell Barnes describes as follows:  
 Enemy attacks by fleet action on the West Cumberland coastline were 
 considered unlikely.  It was thought that the greatest threat would be an 
 audacious invasion attempt with violent assaults on coastal defences by the 
 use of gas, dive-bombers and machine-gunnery. Enemy troops would use light 
 craft and parachute landings in an attempt to secure a beach-head.  Port and 
 harbour installations were considered to be under threat from close-range 
 warship gunfire and blockships. Enemy submarines were thought to be a likely 
 form of attack.13 
 
Construction of the batteries was undertaken by civilian contractors under Royal 
Engineer Works supervision, and the technical aspects were the responsibility of experts 
from the Coast Artillery School and a specialist gun mounting party.  In operation, apart 
from Royal Artillery personnel, there were also Royal Marines (based at the XDO Post), 
who were responsible for signalling to shipping in the Solway Firth, and naval 
personnel – who made up the Royal Naval Examination Party, which boarded ships 
halted under the battery’s guns in the designated area known as ‘Workington Roads’.   
 
The reader will have noticed that there is no mention of Home Guard – and this is an 
important point.  The early history of the Workington Emergency Coast Battery serves 
to illustrate the extent to which ad-hoc, extemporised defences were constructed for 
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Army use.  It also illustrates the commonality between emergency armament for Home 
Defence and emergency maritime armament, which we have noted in previous chapters.  
At the time of the battery’s construction, in the summer of 1940, there was no prospect 
of the Local Defence Volunteers (as they still were at that stage) participating in its 
operation.  This changed, however, in December 1941, when recruiting advertisements 
for a new Home Guard unit were placed in local newspapers.14  In the case of 
Workington, many of the men who responded were Special Constables, who had not 
been encouraged to join the Home Guard up to that point, as they had other emergency 
and volunteer duties.  The Home Guard coast artillery volunteer unit formed in January 
1942, and began training alongside Regular personnel, reaching a sufficient standard of 
competence to be award Royal Artillery shoulder flashes and be entitled to wear the 
white lanyard of the trained gunner.15   
 
 
(Upper) Home 
Guard gunners of 
Workington 
Emergency Coast 
Battery pose on one 
of the 4in guns.  
Note the white 
lanyard on the 
Home Guard at the 
extreme left.  
(R.W. Barnes)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Lower) View of the 
breech of 
Workington No. 1 
Gun.  The gun is 
‘Hard to Port’, i.e. 
fully traversed to the 
left. The forward 
edge of the casemate 
is on the extreme 
right of the picture.  
(R.W. Barnes) 
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Workington Emergency Coast Battery 
(RAF aerial photograph, taken May 1948) 
 
1) North searchlight emplacement 
2) Inland defence dug-outs 
3) Concrete terracing sea wall 
4) Concrete square purpose unknown 
5) Bases for ZAA rockets 
6) Small building (rocket magazine?) 
7) Battery observation post 
8) No:2 gun 
9) No:1 gun 
10) Concrete sea wall 
11) Slit trench air raid shelter 
12) Small building 
13) Searchlight engine house 
14) Assault course 
15) Concrete square, purpose unknown 
16) South searchlight emplacement 
17) NAAFI 
18) Billet blocks 
19) Battery camp 
20) XDO/Marines signalling post 
21) Fuel tank 
22) Guard house 
 
English Heritage (NMR) RAF aerial photographs  
(via R.W. Barnes, annotation Barnes.) 
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The Royal Artillery battery was divided into three eight-hour watches, with eight (or, 
ideally nine) men crewing each of the 4in guns.  The Home Guard contingent joined 
with the Regulars at night, parading at 19.25hrs and being dismissed at 08.00hrs.  The 
coast artillery task was ‘for real’, and required high levels of competence and vigilance.  
There were a number of occasions when the batteries at Workington and Whitehaven 
actually fired across the bows of vessels not flying the correct signal, or not responding 
to signals from the shore.  This fire could either be a burst of machinegun fire from a 
Lewis gun, or a ‘Bring-to’ round – a sand-filled projectile from one of the 4in guns.  It 
is recorded in the War Diary of 561 Regiment (of which only two months’ entries 
survive16), that on 20 September 1941, Workington fired two burst of Lewis gun fire 
across the bows of one fishing boat trying to enter the harbour with the incorrect signals 
and a week later fired a ‘Bring-to’ round across the bows of another.  The other 
surviving month, April 1942, also saw Workington firing a ‘Bring-to’ round, this time 
at a merchant ship, and stopped another merchantman with warning bursts from the 
Lewis gun.  The same month Whitehaven fired two ‘Bring-to’ rounds.  This suggests 
that either these were two particularly active months, or the batteries were required to 
fire warning shots quite frequently.  
 
By ‘Stand Down’, in November 1944, 7,000 Home Guard were employed in coast 
artillery, freeing around half that number of Regular gunners for duties elsewhere 
(Brophy, 1945, p.41).  The professionalism of the Home Guard in this demanding role, 
and the extent to which they integrated with the Regular Army was praised by Major 
Winter, Commanding Officer 562 Regiment (as it had become), when the all the Home 
Guard, including the coast artillery units, was stood-down in November 1944: 
It has been given to me, as Regimental Commander in Coast Artillery for  more 
than four years, to be in at the birth of several fine bodies of Home  Guard Coast 
Artillery Personnel, and to watch them and try to help in their steady 
advancement towards becoming Gunners of high proficiency and outstanding 
zeal. Of these colleagues of mine, men whom it has been a delight and honour 
for me to number as operational members of my Regiment, there is no section, 
sub-unit or battery which stands out more prominently as an example of the 
qualities and attainments required for this great service, than the Workington 
Coastal Artillery Home-Guard.17 
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Ian Hogg (2002, p.194) lists the following naval guns as having been made available by 
the Admiralty and subsequently emplaced in Second World War Emergency Coast 
Batteries: 
 6in Gun Mks 7, 11, 11*, 12, 12A, 13, 16 
 5.5in Gun Mk 1 (naval gun of 1915 unrelated to the Land Service 5.5in gun) 
 4.7in Gun Mk 5 
 4in BL Gun Mk 7 
 4in BL Gun Mk 9 
 4in QF Gun Mk 4 
 12pdr 
 3in 
 3pdr 
He goes on to say:  
 [A]nother offer was of twenty-seven French 138mm guns removed from the 
 French warships Courbet and Paris.  These were said to be the 1910 model, 
 but it turned out that they were a mixture of 1910, 1918, 1923, 1924, 1925, 
 1927 and 1929 models, none of which was exactly the same.  They were 
 provisionally allocated the nomenclature ‘Ordnance QF 138mm Mk 6 or Mk 
 7’ depending on the original model, an odd selection since there never was a 
 Mk 1 to 5.  In February 1942, the director of Artillery reported that he had had 
 the guns carefully examined at Hilsea Ordnance Depot; all were so worn as to 
 be at the end of their useful life, one so badly that no trace of rifling remained 
 in the bore.  The offer, therefore, was declined. 
 
Contrary to the assertion that the French 138mm guns were declined, 561 Regiment’s 
War Diary has the following entry for 12 April 1942:  ‘Whitehaven – 138mm Gun 
proofed and pronounced ready for action.’18  Courbet and Paris were Dreadnoughts, 
launched in 1911 and 1912 respectively, and rebuilt in the 1920s (Moore, 2001, p.184).  
Courbet was seized in Portsmouth, after the Franco-German armistice, and disarmed 
and ‘hulked’ in April 1941, subsequently being sunk as a breakwater during the 
Normandy landings,19 Paris was seized in Plymouth and spent the remainder of the war 
as a depot ship.  In addition to their main armament of 12 305mm (12in) guns, each ship 
carried 22 138mm (5.4in) guns for anti-torpedo boat defence – the same role for which 
British Dreadnoughts carried 4in Mk VII guns.   
 
The ‘Mk 6 or 7’ designation can best be explained by the fact that seven different year 
marks of 138mm gun were salvaged from the two ships, and presumably only the most 
recent, i.e. those dating from 1927 and 1929, were deemed still useable.  This might 
also explain why only 27 out of a possible 44 138mm guns were offered for coastal 
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service.  As we have already seen, the Ordnance authorities tended to display a cautious 
attitude that was at odds with the seriousness of the situation in 1940-41.  However, 
commonsense clearly prevailed, and the sketch by former wartime Army Cadet Frank 
Lewthwaite (reproduced below), clearly shows two 138mm guns from, what he 
identifies as ‘the cruiser’ Paris emplaced at Whitehaven.20  Removing standard-issue 
4in (c.105mm) guns, for use elsewhere, and replacing them with non-standard, but 
powerful, 138mm (c.5.4in) guns, and whatever ammunition was seized with them, 
makes good sense, as the change-over took place in the spring of 1942, when the 
prospect of enemy action against the Cumberland coast was greatly diminished.21 
 
 
Having started with the emplacement of 4in BL guns at Whitehaven, Workington and 
Maryport, we have now added Lewis light machine guns and a pair of French 138mm 
guns to the armament used by the gunners of 561/562 Regiments and their Home Guard 
colleagues.  In fact the War Diary, although only a fragment survives, allows us to add 
still more weaponry.  We know, for example, that the beach battery at Maryport was 
equipped with a French 75mm gun on a static mount, and that this gun was removed on 
28 April 1942, following the arrival of a ‘75mm Fr Mobile Gun’ on 6 April.  
Whitehaven lost the second of its 4in guns and gained a ‘6pdr 6 cwt Mobile Gun’ on 29 
April.22   
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One of two French 138mm M1910 naval guns removed from the battleship Paris and 
mounted to replace two British 4in guns of similar vintage in the Emergency Coast 
Battery at Bransty (Whitehaven). (R.W. Barnes) 
 
The 6pr 6cwt was a shortened version of the 6pr 8cwt Hotchkiss naval gun of the 1880s, 
and was used as the main armament of First World War British ‘Male’ tanks (‘Females’ 
being armed with Lewis or Hotchkiss machine guns).  These 6pr guns were quite widely 
used in the Second World War for emergency defences, both on the coast and inland, on 
mounts varying from field carriages to armoured trains.  It is tempting to imagine that 
they were salvaged from the 265 war-surplus ‘Presentation Tanks’, donated by the 
Army Council to various civic authorities in 1919, as thanks for the efforts made to 
generate War Savings – almost all of which were, unfortunately, scrapped in 1940.  
Sadly, this swords-into-ploughshares-into-swords theory founders on the fact that the 
presentation tanks were all machinegun-armed ‘Females’.23   This in itself is interesting, 
as it suggests that the ‘Males’, or at least their armament, were preserved for possible 
future use.  The 57mm/2.24in 6pr 8cwt of the Mk I tank, and the shortened 6pr 6cwt of 
its successor, as fitted to the Mk IV tank of 1917 (the first specialist tank gun ever 
manufactured) were the largest calibre guns mounted as main armament on British tanks 
until the arrival of the 6pr 7cwt in 1941.  Although supplanted by the 3pr, and later the 
2pr, during the inter-war years, it is apparent that numbers were retained in store after 
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the First World War, still mounted in the curved vertical mantlets needed to fit the side 
sponsons of First World War tanks.  In 1940 these guns were returned to service in a 
variety of mountings.  In ‘frontline’ Sussex, for example, the beachfront at Bognor 
Regis, was defended by a 6pr 6cwt on a field carriage (below), and at Bodiam Castle, 
one appears to have been mounted in a Type 25 pillbox instead of a 2pr anti-tank gun.24  
The 6pr was designed to fire a high explosive (HE) shell, but for anti-tank use during 
the Second World War solid steel armour piercing shot was provided.  The Home Guard 
took over its first 6prs from the Army in October 1941.  Forty-nine 6pr ‘light coast 
defence guns’ were in Home Guard service in March 1942, and 124 by November 
194225 (the last month for which figures are available). Clearly, these improvisations 
were developed for Home Defence use by the Army and subsequently passed on to the 
Home Guard, and it would be unfair to characterise the 6pr 6cwt field gun, delightfully 
Heath-Robinson as it undoubtedly appears (see below), as a ‘Home Guard’ weapon. 
 
(Left) Bognor Regis sea front, 
defended by a 6pr 6cwt tank gun 
on an extemporised field carriage 
with wire spoke motor car 
wheels.  The photograph appears 
to show live firing in progress, 
with an ammunition number 
standing-by with the next round 
(centre) and an officer spotting 
the fall of shot (centre right). 
 
 
(Right) Another view of the 
same gun, showing the design 
of the box trail, and the 
armoured mantlet, shaped to fit 
the gun sponson of a First 
World War ‘Male’ Mk IV tank.  
The crew are Army and the gun 
was described as a ‘Light 
Coastal Defence Gun’ – 
‘designed to deal with sea 
raiders in small craft [it is] 
mobile and has a very high rate 
of fire’.26 
(Both via Peter Hamblin, 
Military Vehicle Trust) 
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A hybrid 6pr anti-tank gun in service 
with the Home Guard – “Men of the 
Cheshire Home Guard  man a 6 
pounder naval gun mounted on a field 
gun chassis at Hoylake on the Wirral, 1 
June 1943”.  (IWM H30442) 
 
 
 
 
Apart from the emplaced 4in guns, Workington Emergency Coast Battery was, like 
Maryport, also equipped with a mobile French 75mm gun, and it might seem odd 
issuing these field pieces to coastal artillery.  In fact there was nothing new in this, as 
coast batteries and coaling stations throughout the Empire were always equipped with 
field or mountain guns as ‘movable armament’, chiefly to defend against landward 
attack.27  This was the case at Workington, where the 75mm field gun was used to 
defend the battery from landward, for training, and to supplement the 4in guns in the 
coastal role.  The Emergency Coast Battery’s responsibilities were given, in declining 
order of priority, as follows:28 
• Anti-shipping 
• Support of the Royal Naval Examination Service 
• Defence of the Beach and Shoreline 
• Landward Defences 
The landward defences at Workington consisted of three ‘dug-outs’, two behind the 
north searchlight position, and one north of the BOP.  Around a third of the small 
garrison could be spared for local defence, and in addition to the 75mm gun, the battery 
was armed with SMLE rifles and (later in the war) with Sten guns and Bren guns.  The 
final defensive element of the batteries at Workington and Whitehaven consisted of ‘Z’ 
twin anti-aircraft rocket launchers.  We will be looking at ‘Z’ AA in more detail later, 
but first we will look in broader terms at the Home Guard’s use of field guns and anti-
tank guns. 
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29 March 1942: ‘Members of 1st 
Battalion (Exeter) Home Guard 
training with an 18 pounder field gun 
at Okehampton Range’. The pole 
trail limited the extent to which the 
gun could be elevated, thus limiting 
the range of the 18pr Mks I, I* and 
II.  
(IWM H18273)  
 
  
 
 
 
In Chapter 3 we noted Churchill’s description of the transfer of war material from the 
USA to the UK in the summer of 1940 (Churchill, 1955, p.127): 
 As early as June 1 the President sent out orders to the War and Navy 
Departments to report what weapons they could spare for Britain and France …  
In forty-eight hours the answers were given, and on June 3 [General] Marshall 
approved the lists.  The first list comprised half a million .30 calibre rifles 
manufactured in 1917 and 1918 and stored in grease for more than twenty years.  
For these there were about 250 cartridges apiece.  There were 900 “soixante-
quinze” field guns, with a million rounds, 80,000 machine-guns, and various 
other items…  Since every hour counted, it was decided that the Army should 
sell (for thirty-seven million dollars) everything on the list to one concern, which 
could in turn resell immediately to the British and French. 
 
By these extraordinary measures the United States left themselves with the 
equipment for only 1,800,000 men, the minimum figure stipulated by the 
American Army's mobilisation plan. 
 
The “Soixante-Quinze” (Matériel de 75mm Mle 1897) was a French field gun that 
transformed field artillery at the end of the 19th century.  The first true Quick Firing or 
‘QF’ field gun, the ‘75’ used a fixed round of ammunition – shell and cartridge, with a 
primer in the base – much like an oversized rifle round.  At the time most artillery was 
loaded with a separate shell, bagged propelling charge, and a tube primer inserted into 
the breech block – the system used in the naval 4in guns at Workington, and known as 
Breech Loading, or ‘BL’.  The combination of fixed ammunition, a quick-acting rotary 
breech mechanism and carriage recoil, which permitted the barrel to recoil almost its 
full length in a cradle (so the gun did not need to be laboriously re-laid between shots), 
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gave the French ‘75’ a world-beating rate of fire, up to 20 rounds in a minute, compared 
to the four rounds per minute of a typical BL field gun. 
 
Britain responded with two new QF field guns, a 13pr for the Royal Horse Artillery and 
a functionally identical, but slightly larger, 18pr for the Field Artillery, which entered 
service from 1904.  They were joined in 1908 by an excellent 4.5in field howitzer.   The 
‘75’ was the main French field gun during the First World War, and the 18pr gun and 
4.5in howitzer the main British ones – the lighter 13pr gun proving less useful once 
trench warfare made its mobility less of an advantage.  Design limitations emerged 
during the 18pr’s first ten years in service – the gun’s pole trail, recuperator and breech 
mechanism all needed to be improved in the light of experience, and specifications for a 
new equipment were drawn up in 1913-14, but not acted on, due to the outbreak of the 
First World War.  Design shortcomings notwithstanding, during the First World War 
99,397,670 rounds of 18pr ammunition were fired on the Western Front alone, making 
up the greater part of the total British artillery expenditure of 170,305,595 rounds (in 
comparison, 13prs fired 1,520,155 rounds) (RAI, 1919, p.66).  A new version of the 
18pr, the Mk IV,29 entered service in the final two months of the First World War, 
featuring a variable-recoil hydro-pneumatic recuperator, box trail carriage and single 
action ‘Asbury’ breech, which were features found on the 4.5in howitzer.  In this 
respect, the design of the 18pr Mk IV presaged the idea of combining field gun and field 
howitzer in a single ‘gun-howitzer’ equipment.  The gun’s increased elevation (achieved 
because of the box trail) extended its range from the 6,525 yards of the Mk I/II to a 
maximum 10,400 yards.30   
 
Following the First World War another version of the QF 18pr Mk IV was adopted, 
with a split trail carriage, and all variants of the gun continued to serve during the inter-
war period, with the older types passing to Territorial Army and training regiments.31  
The drive to achieve longer range led to the development of a new 25lb, 3.45-inch 
diameter shell, and, as a temporary measure, from August 1936, 1,000 QF 18prs Mk IV 
were re-barrelled to produce the ‘Ordnance QF 25pr Mk I’, often termed the ‘18/25-
pounder’.32  Work was also undertaken to design a purpose-built 25pr gun-howitzer, 
and this was approved for service in December 1937, although the first batteries were 
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not operational until May 1940.  The first use of the new ‘QF 25pr Mk II on Carriage 
25pr Mk I’, universally called simply ‘the 25-pounder’, was during the campaign in 
Norway.  The new gun achieved a maximum range of 13,400 yards (Henry, 2002, p.24).   
 
During the First World War, Britain turned to American industry to augment domestic 
artillery production, and 851 18prs and 100 13prs were manufactured in the United 
States (RAI, 1919, pp.12 and 18).  When America entered the First World War, the 
principle field gun of the United States Army was the 3in M1902, an elderly design that 
was meant to have been replaced by a modern, quick firing split trail 3in (c.76mm) gun, 
the M1916.  However, there had been considerable difficulty manufacturing the 
recuperator system for the M1916 in the United States, and the programme was further 
delayed by a last-minute decision to chamber the gun for French 75mm ammunition 
(Breer, 2007, pp.2 and 3).  In the absence of their own gun, the Americans adopted the 
French Soixante-Quinze, as the 75mm Gun M1897.  Initially French manufactured guns 
were bought (Breer, 2007, p.10), and while tooling up for domestic manufacture of the 
M1897, the United States also produced a stopgap 75mm version of the British 18pr – 
in much the same manner as the M1917 rifle had been produced using P14 tooling.  The 
resulting field gun was designated the 75mm Gun M1917 (British).33  The M1897 
75mm gun was still the standard US field gun in 1940, particularly in its modernised 
M2 form with a split trail and pneumatic tyres, although work was well advanced on its 
replacement, the 105mm howitzer M2A1, which entered production in 1940. 
 
The 900 guns purchased by the British from the American reserve stocks in 1940, as 
described by Churchill, did all chamber the French 75mm round, but only a proportion 
were actually Mle 1897 ‘Soixante-Quinzes’ – the eventual inventory of ‘75s’ included 
M1897, M1916 and M1917.  The British gave the guns the following designations: 
M1897 – Ordnance QF 75mm Mk 1 or Mk 1* (The star indicated modernised, 
‘Martin-Parry conversion’ carriages with pneumatic tyres)   
M1916 – Ordnance QF 75mm ‘S’ Mk 2 or Mk 2* (The ‘S’ standing for split 
trail, the star for pneumatic tyres) 
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M1917 – Ordnance QF 75mm Converted Mk 1 or Mk 1* (The gun was 
‘converted’ in the sense that the design was converted from that of an 18pr.  The 
star designated pneumatic tyres) 
In 1940, 395 M1917s arrived in the UK, the guns having been purchased by France, but 
diverted to Britain following the fall of France.  Britain also purchased 500 M1897s – 
making up the bulk of Churchill’s 900 guns.  A further 170 M1916s were released to the 
UK under lend lease in 1941.34 Apart from using the M1897s on field carriages, a 
pedestal mount was developed, the ‘Mounting 75mm Mk 1’, which would have been 
type used for the static 75mm gun in the beach battery at Maryport.35 
 
 
 
Regular Army 
artillerymen training 
with a QF 75mm Mk1 
(M1897) in the direct 
fire, anti-tank role, at 
a range in Scotland, 
1941.  (IWM via UEA) 
 
 
 
After Dunkirk, 100 18pr, 210 18/25pr, 30 25pr Mk II, 200 4.5in howitzer and 135 
heavier guns were all the field artillery remaining in the UK.36  By the end of July 1940, 
manufacture, reconditioning, and utilising obsolete equipments had raised the UK field 
artillery park to 3,100 guns, or 52% of requirement.37  The 820 American 75mm guns 
added another 29% of the requirement.38  The American ‘75s’ were immediately used to 
re-equip British field artillery batteries, as well as Allied units forming in the UK, such 
as the Free Polish and Free Czech armies.39  Hence, in his study of wartime defences at 
Walberswick, on the Sussex coast, D. Sims says (Sims, UEA, 2008): 
 The provision of field artillery was also increased during June and July [1940].  
 Taking the area from Sandymount covert to Southwold, on 1st June 1940 some 
 five field guns were able to fire on this part of the coast.  By mid July, this 
 number had increased to thirteen and would remain at this figure until 
 October.  The quality of ordnance had improved too; 136 Field Regiment, for 
 example, who had one troop at Sallow Wood Covert were re-equipped with a 
 full compliment of 75mm field guns in late August.  
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(Upper)  A QF 75mm Converted 
Mk1* (American 75mm M1917), 
as found by the author in 1995, 
outside the Falcon public house 
in Enfield, Middlesex.  The gun 
had been rescued from a 
scrapyard by the late publican, 
a classic car enthusiast and 
mounted on wheels from a 
steam lorry.   
 
 
(Lower)  Following cosmetic 
restoration by the author (in 
order to portray a QF 18pr in 
the recreation of the shelling of 
the Dublin General Post Office, 
in the feature film Michael 
Collins).  The flat shield and 
shorter barrel (lacking the 
belled muzzle) differentiate this 
gun from the British 18pr. 
(Author’s photographs) 
 
 
 
As the Royal Artillery re-equipped with 25pr Mk IIs, older British equipments and ‘75s’ 
were ‘pooled’ and then released for anti-tank defences.  The process was described in a 
secret memorandum from Headquarters Home Forces to regional commands, issued on 
23 September 1941, which is reproduced in full below, as it gives useful context as to 
what was occurring in other areas of Home Forces:40 
 
SUBJECT:  Manning of surplus Field Artillery Equipments by units other than 
Field Regiments R.A.  SECRET   
   
Reference this Headquarters letter, number as above, dated 9 Aug, the 
Commander-in-Chief directs that surplus artillery equipments, allotted to 
Commands on a pool basis, shall be given to units in the following order of 
priority:- 
(i) Defence Regiments. 
(ii) Coast Artillery Batteries. 
(iii) Super Heavy and Heavy Batteries 
(iv) Home Guard 
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2. Defence Regiments 
 
75mm. or 60-prs should be allocated to Defence Regiments to 
replace the 4” Naval guns, the withdrawal of which is to start shortly.  It 
should be possible for the personnel of the existing detachments to man a 
number of these equipments in excess of the existing number of 4” guns.  
Moreover, in some places the same detachment may usefully be able to 
man two guns; one sited to enfilade the beach, and one sited to shoot 
landwards against localities where air descent may be expected.  There is 
no objection, where necessary, to siting the two guns up to, say, 200 
yards apart:  but in these circumstances each gun should be complete 
with its own dump of ammunition. 
 
3. Coast Batteries 
 
75mm. guns should be allotted as supplementary weapons for 
protection landward and to cover areas where enemy air descent is 
possible. 
 
4. Super Heavy and Heavy Batteries 
 
75 mm. guns should be allotted as supplementary weapons to 
engage targets with direct fire from within the battery’s protective wire.  
These batteries will thus give added depth to the system of anti-tank 
defence. 
 
5. Home Guard 
 
The policy should be to allot initially to Home Guard surplus 18-
pr, 13-pr and 4.5” Hows, since ex-gunners of the last war will be familiar 
with these weapons.  Later, if any 75mm. equipments remain surplus 
after the requirements of priorities (i), (ii) and (iii) have been met, these 
may be offered also to the Home Guard. 
 
It should be emphasised that the first priority in the use of Home 
Guard with guns is in Coast Artillery Batteries, where these are sited in 
the vicinity of Home Guard units (H.F. 4022/9/G(s.D.) dated 19 Sep 41 
refers). 
 
 
 G.H.Q., Home Forces     (Signed) H.C. Loyd 
 23 September, 1941     Lieut. General 
        Chief of the General Staff 
 
It is an interesting reversal that, in the case of field artillery, the American equipment 
would go to the Regulars and the British equipment to the Home Guard.  Points to note 
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are the withdrawal of 4in naval guns, which were used both as fixed coast artillery (as at 
Bransty, where, as we have seen, the guns were removed a few months later, in the 
spring of 1942) and on self-propelled (lorried) mobile mounts.  The memorandum 
reflects the situation at Workington, as described by Russell Barnes, and it is important 
to note the emphasis placed on getting Home Guard gunners into coast batteries.   
 
A solid steel 18-pound armour piercing shot Mk IIIT could defeat 62mm of armour 
plate,41 and it, or its 75mm equivalent, would be likely to disable or destroy anything 
struck at the sorts of operational ranges to be encountered in southern and eastern 
England.  Home Guard returns show the first two 18prs with the Home Guard in 
Southern Command in June 1942.  By November Home Guard units were operating two 
3prs, 124 6prs, four 13prs, nine 18prs, two 60prs, six 75mms and 11 6in mortars.42  
Field guns were distributed individually to boost the tank-killing potential of Home 
Guard units, as recorded in the following reminiscence from the small village of 
Bunwell, Norfolk: 
 Later in the war Bunwell was supplied with a field gun which was kept at 
 Home Farm.  My father had been a gun layer in the navy so he was put in 
 charge of the gun.  He went on a course, at Dorking, with the Regular Army 
 and on his return was promoted to Lieutenant.  He selected a crew of mainly 
 younger men to handle it; Frank and Jack Brown used their Ford tractors to 
 pull it.  Training was done in the farmyard on Sunday mornings.43 
 
MacKenzie (1996, p.135) is dismissive of the conventional artillery supplied to the 
Home Guard:   
[I]t remained War Office policy to keep introducing ‘new’ weapons to the Home 
Guard (while keeping as much existing equipment in service as long as possible) 
for the sake of appearances.  Hence the allocation of 100,000 obsolete Boys anti-
tank rifles in July 1943, and then a relatively small number  of ‘special’ Home 
Guard 75mm anti-tank guns.  The 75mm anti-tank gun was  a hybrid, consisting 
of the shortened barrel of the now-obsolete 3” anti-aircraft  gun mounted on the 
modified carriage of a First-World-War-vintage 4.5” Howitzer.  It had a 
maximum range of 10,450 yards, a muzzle velocity of 2,500 ft/sec., and was 
mostly used for coastal defence.  Only when very obsolete weapons (such as the 
Northover Projector and the dreaded pikes) could be replaced at once with 
marginally less ineffective cast-offs from the Army (such as the 18-pounder 
field gun or 2-pounder anti-tank gun) was anything taken out of service. 
 
The passage takes us into the same murky waters that we previously encountered when 
unpicking the reality behind the Home Guard’s supposedly ‘ancient’ grease-encrusted 
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M1917 American rifles.  The reader will be alive to the dangers of  pejoratives such as 
‘First-World-War-vintage’ and ‘obsolete’, which are meaningless in a context where 
many First World War (and earlier) weapons continued to serve with distinction.  We 
have also established that the ‘marginally less ineffective’ 18prs were quite fit-for-
purpose as Home Defence anti-tank guns,44 and cannot, in all seriousness, be lumped 
together with the Northover Projector and ‘Croft’s Pikes’.   The ‘special’ 3in/75mm 
anti-tank gun MacKenzie refers to is something of a mystery.  The United States Army 
combined a 3in AA gun with the carriage of the 105mm (4.1in) howitzer to produce an 
interim heavy anti-tank weapon, the 3in M5, which saw extensive service with the US 
Army from 1942 onwards (Hogg, 2002, p.88), and the Americans also used some 75mm 
M2 field guns as anti-tank guns (illustrated overleaf).  A self-propelled version of this 
gun, mounted on the M3 halftrack was extensively used by US and British forces in 
North Africa and Italy.45  As we have already discussed, the M2 was the ultimate 
evolution of the French ‘75’, the gun being mounted on an M1916-type split trail 
carriage, and there is clearly scope for confusion here.  In the passage quoted on the 
above MacKenzie references K.R. Gulvin’s Kent Home Guard:  A History.  Gulvin, as 
we have already seen, can be a little uncertain on matters of military technology, and his 
description of the Home Guard’s supposed special 75mm/3in anti-tank guns on 4.5in 
howitzer carriages is illustrated with a photograph of the Southern Railway Home 
Guard from the same series as the shoot at Lydd, illustrated overleaf.  The guns in 
question most certainly are not mounted on the 4.5in howitzer carriage, as that had a 
box trail, as opposed to the split trail depicted, nor do they have the barrels of anti-
aircraft guns; they are in fact American 75mm M1916MIA1s. 
 
As far as the British 3in anti-aircraft/anti-tank gun is concerned, in 1941 an attempt was 
made to counter the increasing armour thicknesses of German tanks by producing a 
powerful self-propelled anti-tank gun.  This consisted of a Churchill tank hull with the 
turret and 2pr gun replaced by a large, fixed, armoured box or casemate.  Through the 
box’s vertical front armour projected a shortened 3in anti-aircraft gun.  The result was a 
tank destroyer, roughly similar to those later built by the Soviets and Germans.46  The 
service history of the vehicle is rather obscure, and at least one website ascribes them to 
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the Home Guard, which would have given the Home Guard a very impressive weapon 
system indeed.47 
(Above) ‘Southern Railway Home Guards have been trained as anti-tank gunners and 
they are now doing duty, fully trained, in the south country area.  This unit has been 
specially trained by a Regular Army gunnery officer.  After firing tests had been passed 
the Home Guard gunners were allocated garrison defence posts.  Every man in the unit 
is a fully trained infantry man as well as a gunner.  PHOTO SHOWS:- Gun crews of the 
Southern Railway Home Guard anti-tank unit running to their guns for action during 
firing practice at Army ranges in Kent.  August 6th 1943.’   
 
The Home Guard gunners are running to ‘take post’ on QF 75mm ‘S’ Mk2* guns 
(American split-trail M1916s fitted with pneumatic tyres).  The range is the coastal 
artillery training depot at Lydd. (Official, author’s collection) 
 
 
 
 (Left) Preserved at Fort Sill, 
Kentucky, a US M2A2 75mm 
gun converted for anti-tank 
use.  The similarity to the 
guns above is obvious.  
However, they have the 
shorter, bell-mouthed barrel 
of the M1916 series, whereas 
this has the longer barrel of 
the M1897. 
(www.csdg.org) 
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Known as the Carrier, 3in Gun, Churchill Mk I (armoured fighting vehicle designation 
A22D), the 3in tank-destroyer was developed following a General Staff requirement 
issued in September 1941.  The vehicle was ready for testing by February 1942, by 
which time it had already been decided that the requirement should be reduced from 100 
to 25, in order to concentrate on production of conventional turreted Churchill Mk IV 
tanks armed with the 6pr anti-tank gun.  However, as the modified hulls had been built 
by the manufacturers, Beyer-Peacock, the order was reinstated, although only 50 were 
completed.48   
 
The 3in Gun Carrier 
was a stopgap Home 
Defence tank 
destroyer, issued to 
armoured brigades 
in the UK.  Although 
attributed to the 
Home Guard, it is 
unlikely that they 
were ever in Home 
Guard service. 
(www.wwiivehicles.com/unitedkingdom/infantry/churchill.asp) 
 
It is not widely known, but Churchill 3in Gun Carriers briefly saw service with UK-
based British and Canadian armoured brigades.  In June 1942, Heavy Support 
Squadrons of nine 3in Gun Carriers were formed, attached to brigade headquarters.49  
They were disbanded in March 1943, when sufficient 17pr anti-tank guns became 
available.50  Subsequently Churchill Gun Carriers were used in training and (without 
guns) to test the Snake minefield breaching system.51  It is unlikely that a system as 
large and complicated to operate and maintain as the Churchill Gun carrier was passed 
on to the Home Guard – but not impossible, and research continues.52  However, the 
remaining 50 3in 16cwt guns (as the shortened anti-tank gun version of the 3in 20cwt 
anti-aircraft gun was designated) were fitted to 17pr gun carriages.  Of these, 25 were 
kept in the UK for Home defence, and would certainly have been encountered by the 
Home Guard.  The remainder were sent to the Middle East.  Virtually no documentation 
 252 
exists concerning this hybrid, but it does fit with Gulvin’s reference to anti-tank guns 
made up of 3in anti-aircraft guns on 4.5in howitzer carriages (the 17pr carriage would 
have been a better choice for a direct fire, high velocity anti-tank gun, but surplus 4.5in 
howitzer carriages were available).  The resulting weapon would have been both potent, 
firing a 12½lb armour piercing shot capable of penetrating 100mm of armour at 200 
yards,53 and practical.  However, it had already been overtaken by the 6pr 7cwt and 17pr 
anti-tank guns.  
 
Hybrid artillery certainly was produced, such as the 6pr 6cwt tank guns on field 
carriages already described, as stop-gap anti-tank weapons for Army use, and later 
inherited by the Home Guard, but the idea that a 75mm gun was built specially for the 
Home Guard can be dismissed as a conflation of the use of American 75mm guns, and 
various stop-gap hybrids placed in Home Defence service in 1940-41. Compared to the 
other weapons associated with the Home Guard, conventional artillery arrived late and 
initially in fairly insignificant numbers.  The Home Guard operated an increasing 
quantity and range of field artillery from the winter of 1942, as they took over 
responsibility for beach batteries from the Army.  The distribution of Home Guard 
conventional artillery was national, with the largest proportion being in Southern 
Command (but not South Eastern Command), followed by Scottish and Northern 
Commands.54 
 
Having established that the field guns and artillery hybrids which found their way into 
service with the Home Guard were quite suitable for the direct fire anti-tank role 
required of them, we need to examine whether the same can be said of the specialist 
anti-armour weapons, the 2pr anti-tank gun and the Boys anti-tank rifle.  The first Boys 
anti-tank rifles appear on Home Guard returns in March 1942, with 17 rifles listed, 
spread over Northern, Southern and Eastern Commands, and the Home Guard holding 
remained in the teens, climbing to 29 by the end of the year.55  At this period the rifle 
was still very much standard infantry equipment (see photograph below), giving the lie 
to the suggestion that the Boys was obsolete when issued to the Home Guard.  
However, both the Boys and the 2pr anti-tank gun only became wide-scale standard-
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issue Home Guard weapons from mid-1943, when Regular infantry regiments began to 
re-equip with the 6pr 7cwt anti-tank gun and PIAT infantry anti-tank spigot mortar.   
 
Infantry from 9th Battalion, Royal 
Warwickshire Regiment, wading 
across a stream, Northern Ireland, 
11 September 1942. The leading 
man is carrying a Mk I Boys anti-
tank rifle.  The photograph 
illustrates both the ungainly nature 
of this unpopular weapon, and the 
fact that it was still in Regular 
Army Home Service in late 1942.  
(IWM H23857) 
 
 
 
The reader may recall from previous chapters that Number 6 Platoon, E Company, 2nd 
City of London (Civil Service) Battalion – civil servants who had been left in London 
following the departure of the rest of the Ministry of Food to Colwyn Bay – became, in 
September 1943, their battalion’s specialist sub-artillery platoon.  The platoon was 
equipped with one Smith gun, two spigot mortars, a Lewis gun and a Boys anti-tank 
rifle, a grouping that produced a support weapons or heavy weapons platoon, echoing 
the arrangements of the republicans in the Spanish Civil War.  In the North East, 
Workington’s Home Guard battalion had four 2prs and no less than 19 Boys anti-tank 
rifles.56  Workington’s 2prs were distributed piecemeal to the rifle companies, one each 
to B and D companies, based in the town itself, and two to E company, defending the 
Heavy Duty Alloys aircraft parts ‘shadow factory’ at Distington.57   
 
It is widely stated that both the Boys anti-tank rifle and 2pr anti-tank gun were already 
obsolete at the outbreak of the Second World War, but, like most commonplaces we 
have encountered in this study, it is not really true.58  The typical anti-tank equipment 
for all combatants during the early stages of the Second World War was a high-powered 
armour-piercing rifle, and a small high-velocity artillery piece.  Comparative 
performance figures are unreliable, due to the number of variables involved, but the 
British 40mm 2pr anti-tank round was at the upper end of performance.  The 2pr could 
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penetrate 42mm of armour, at an angle of 30º, at 1,000 yards, 53mm at 500 yards,59 
which meant that it could disable or destroy all German armoured vehicles in service in 
1940, including early PzKpfw IIIs and IVs.  To illustrate, the 10mm armour of the pre-
war Panzer III was increased to 30mm on the front, sides and rear in the Ausführung 
(batch) D,E,F (1939-40) and G (1940-41) models, which was still within the 2pr’s 
capabilities.  The H (1940-41) model had an additional 30mm plate bolted to the front, 
making it impervious from that angle at more than 500 yards, and the J (1941-42) model 
had 50mm of solid armour at the front and rear.  Likewise, the Panzer IV started with 
14.5mm of frontal armour, increased to 30mm on the Ausf B model.  The turret armour 
was increased to 30mm on the Ausf C; the D model (1939) had its side armour increased 
to 20mm, and Ausf E had 50mm on the bow and an additional 30mm appliqué on the 
glacis, at which point it became invulnerable to the 2pr from the front, except at very 
close range.  Hull armour only reached 50mm in April 1941, with the F variant (Perret, 
1999a, 1999b). 
 
Thus the 2pr could defeat any armoured fighting vehicle the German army could field in 
1940, and it remained effective, in theory at least, into 1942/43, when Panther and Tiger 
tanks entered service.60  Even then, the Panther had 40mm side armour, which was, 
theoretically, within the reach of the 2pr (the Tiger had 60mm hull armour).  This places 
the gun in context, and shows that the decision to continue 2pr production in 1940, even 
if it delayed the introduction of the 6pr anti-tank gun, was absolutely correct.  At the 
outbreak of war, the 2pr gun was operated by anti-tank regiments of the Royal Artillery.  
Once the 6pr 7cwt became available in quantity (from November 1941), the Royal 
Artillery began re-equipping with new gun and the following year 2prs were passed to 
infantry battalions (Hogg, 2002, pp.73 and 75).  When the 17pr anti-tank gun entered 
Royal Artillery service in 1943, the 6pr was passed to the infantry and the 2pr passed to 
the Home Guard.  It is hard to fault the logic of this, as the 2pr was still capable of 
dealing with any light armour that might be air-landed in some sort of raid, and even the 
heavier German tanks at close ranges.  In Home Guard service the operating range of 
the 2pr was given as a very realistic (even pessimistic) 500 yards maximum, 200 yards 
‘best’.61 
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A Home Guard stand at a War Savings drive on Swanage station in Dorset.  Weapons 
displayed are, from left to right: a Blacker Bombard drill round, Mk II Sten, Mk III* 
(.300) Lewis gun, EY rifle, various grenades, a Mauser C96 ‘Broomhandle’ pistol with 
holster/stock fitted, M1917 rifle, Mk II Boys anti-tank rifle (short barrel, ‘V’ shaped 
bipod and square muzzle brake), Mk III Sten, and QF 2pr anti-tank gun.  (Forty, 1998, 
p.204) 
 
The 2pr gun remained in British Army service in the Far East until 1945, and in Europe 
it was the main British tank armament until 1942.  It was also fitted to British armoured 
cars throughout the Second World War.  It is therefore incorrect to describe the gun as 
obsolete; it clearly had limitations, but, in one guise or another, it remained an important 
anti-armour weapon throughout the Second World War.  The manner in which the 
Home Guard would deploy the 2pr anti-tank gun was set out in Home Guard Instruction 
No. 51, Part IV, The Organization of Home Guard Defence: 
 
(f) The 2-pr.  The 2-pr is an accurate and quick-firing A-tk weapon with a flat 
trajectory.  It is small and easily concealed.  It can be manhandled and towed on 
the road behind any vehicle capable of carrying the crew of four and a supply of 
ammunition.  The maximum range at which fire will be opened is 500 yards, but 
the best range is 200 yards. 
 
   Tactical handling.  In view of its longer range, the primary use 
  of the 2-pr is to cover likely tank and soft vehicle approaches to the 
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  defensive locality which are beyond the range of the Home Guard sub-
  artillery weapons.  It may also be used as a reserve A-tk weapon in the 
  hands of a commander to destroy any tanks which may penetrate his 
  locality, and to replace any anti-tank weapons which may have been 
  overrun.62 
 
The photograph of Swanage Home Guard shown on the previous page, illustrates the 
chief shortcoming of both the 2pr and the Boys anti-tank rifle, which was their size.  
Both weapons were bulky and heavy, limiting their mobility.  Neither offered a 
commensurate return in terms of hitting power, for the burden they imposed.  Neither 
weapon was likely achieve an outright ‘kill’ – with the enemy tank ‘brewing up’ – and 
the Boys was unlikely even to achieve a ‘mobility kill’, halting the enemy tank in its 
tracks.  That is not to say that the rifle did not have any effect on enemy armour, as a 
.55in bullet penetrating the interior of the tank could do considerable damage to the 
crew, but it was unlikely to have any visible effect, and this undoubtedly contributed to 
the rifle’s unpopularity.   
 
 
 
 
The Anti-Tank 
Rifle (Boys), 
from the manual 
of April 1942.  
(Author’s 
collection) 
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Although rated amongst the best anti-tank rifles, the Boys quickly fell out of favour 
with the infantry due to its weight, lack of hitting power, muzzle blast and recoil.63  
Small Arms Training, Volume I, Pamphlet No. 5, Anti-Tank Rifle, of April 1942 
describes the factors affecting the performance of the rifle:   
Although the bullet will penetrate the armour of light A.F.Vs. up to 500 
yards, and inflict casualties on the crew, fire should be withheld until the range 
is well within 300 yards.  The angle of impact of the anti-tank rifle bullet on the 
armour has a greater influence than the range at which it is fired.  For example, 
while the penetrative power is only 10 per cent. less at 300 yards than at 100 
yards, it is 25 per cent. less when the angle of impact is over 20 degrees, and 50 
per cent. less at over 40 degrees at the latter range…  The exact moment of fire 
must therefore be decided by the firer’s determination to hit the selected part of 
the tank fair and square, rather than by range only.  As a general rule the .55-in. 
anti-tank rifle bullet will penetrate all parts of the Pz. Kw. Mk. II light tank, at 
250 yards range at an angle of impact of 20 degrees or less.  It does not penetrate 
the armour of heavier tanks except in certain points such as the rear of the turret 
and cupola of the Pz. Kw. Mk. IV at very short range.  When shooting at 
German tanks of the [sic] Pz. Kw. Mk. III and larger tanks fire should be aimed, 
if it is possible, at vulnerable points, especially on the junction point of turret 
and hull and gun mantle, to cause burring over of working surfaces and thus 
produce jamming.64 
 
Pamphlet No. 5 also gives the following penetration figures, it will be noted that the 
rifle was effective against early and lighter tanks, as well as armoured cars and half 
tracks:65 
 
Effective attack 
Range Normal 20 degrees 40 degrees 
yards in. m/m in. m/m in. m/m 
100 
300 
500 
.91 
.82 
.74 
23.2 
20.9 
18.8 
.67 
.63 
.60 
17.0 
16.0 
15.3 
.43 
.38 
.35 
11.0 
9.6 
8.8 
 
 
TABLE II 
Performance against brick walls and shingle 
 
     Brick walls  Shingle in sandbags 
Greatest penetration …    14 ins.   10 ins. 
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A charger of expended .55in 
Boys anti-tank rifle cases, 
with .30-06 and .303 bullets 
for comparison.  These huge 
rifle rounds, were capable 
of defeating 21mm of 
armour at 300 yards.  
Although similar to the .50 
Browning round, the Boys 
cartridge featured a belt 
around its base because of 
the very high pressures it 
developed. (Author’s 
photograph) 
 
 
The Boys rifle was superseded in Regular Army service with a portable one-man 
derivative of the Blacker Bombard, a miniaturisation made possible by the use of a 
hollow charge warhead.  The weapon started life as the ‘Baby Bombard’, but was 
subsequently adopted, in August 1942, as the ‘projector, infantry anti-tank’ or PIAT.  
The “Piat” was a handful – heavy, difficult to cock, and with recoil nearly as spectacular 
as that of the Boys rifle, but it could, and did, knock out Tiger tanks, which made it 
worth the effort.66  The PIAT was not issued to the Home Guard, who were not required 
to be as mobile as Regular infantry, and therefore could continue to make use of the 
Blacker Bombard, with its big anti-tank bomb and useful anti-personnel round.  
However, as the Boys rifle passed from Regular service it was added to the Home 
Guard arsenal.  In November 1943, in Home Guard service, assessment of the 
performance of the Boys anti-tank rifle was realistic: 
Tactical handling.  The A-tk rifle is not effective against heavy armour, and 
heavier A-tk weapons should be used for this purpose.  It can, however, break 
the tracks of heavy tanks.  The bullet can pierce light armour and put soft 
vehicles out of action.  It can be allotted to those parts of the defences where 
suitable targets are most likely to approach.67 
 
By the time it reached the majority of the Home Guard, the anti-tank rifle was 
discredited with its users, and this is how posterity continues to remember it.  Indeed, 
when Hogg and Weeks published their authoritative Military Smallarms of the 
Twentieth Century in 1973, very heavy rifles were regarded as totally extinct, an 
evolutionary cul-de-sac (Hogg and Weeks, 1973, p.6.01): 
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 The career of the anti-tank rifle lasted a mere three decades from the first tanks 
 of World War 1 to the close of World War 2…  The thickness of tank armour 
 rapidly outstripped the efforts of the designers to produce a tank-killer light 
 enough to be operated by one man yet still fire conventional fixed-case 
 ammunition, and so the military turned to handheld rocket projectors, recoilless 
 guns and similar devices:  the anti-tank rifles, cumbersome and ineffective, were 
 discarded. 
 
Actually, very heavy rifle never entirely went away and they have enjoyed a huge 
renaissance since the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s.  The Barrett M82 ‘Light 50’, firing 
the M2 Browning heavy machinegun .50in round, is a favoured long range sniping 
weapon at ranges out to 2,000 yards, and long range sniping and ‘anti-materiel’ rifles 
exist in calibres up to 20mm.  The Boys rifle played a role in the development of large 
calibre sniping, as examples converted from .55in to .50in Browning and fitted with 
tank telescopic gunsights, were used in the long range sniping/harassing role by US-
supported Nationalist Chinese forces in Taiwan during the Korean War.68  Fired from a 
Home Guard defended locality, the Boys could have easily halted any vehicle that 
German parachutists might commandeer, and shoot through most forms of cover to hit 
the soldier behind.  In terms of a modern sniping application, though, wartime 
deployment of the Boys rifle was limited by the lack of a telescopic sight, and, more 
importantly, the rifle’s broader uses were obscured doctrinally by the fact that it had 
been introduced specifically as, and was always thought of as, the ‘anti-tank rifle’.  It 
would be naïve to suggest that the 2pr and the Boys anti-tank rifle were ideal anti-
armour weapons – they were not.  Their performance had been outstripped by tank 
development by late 1942 and the PIAT and 6pr 7cwt were better, more effective, anti-
armour weapons for the infantry.  But the 2pr and Boys were neither useless nor 
obsolete.  The 2pr could knock out any armoured (or un-armoured) vehicle the Home 
Guard were ever likely to encounter, and the Boys anti-tank rifle, although restricted to 
lightly armoured and un-armoured targets by the time it entered Home Guard service, 
was a useful weapon at a road block, and with imagination, could have been used in 
ways that anticipated the modern anti-materiel rifle (AMR) role. 
 
To conclude our examination of the Home Guard and artillery we must look at air 
defence – an arena in which the Home Guard played a particularly important role.  The 
late-1930s had seen the adoption of the sophisticated Swedish-designed 40mm Bofors 
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automatic canon, to replace the Lewis gun in the light anti-aircraft role, and the elderly, 
but popular, 3in 20cwt anti-aircraft guns of the Royal Artillery Heavy AA Regiments 
began to be superseded by a powerful new 3.7in gun.69  Both new equipments 
represented a significant increase in capability, and were allied to a ‘Kerrison predictor’, 
a mechanical analogue computer that fed settings directly to the gun layers, in order to 
ensure that the target aircraft and shell arrived at the same point at the same time.  
However, they were both ‘a lot more gun’ than the weapons they supposedly replaced.  
As we have seen, the Lewis continued to be extensively used throughout the Second 
World War in the light AA role – and with some success – chiefly due to demand for 
the Bofors gun consistently exceeding output.70  The very big, very heavy and 
complicated ‘3.7’ was at first regarded with suspicion, and it was the familiar, relatively 
light and simple, First World War 3in 20cwt that served with the British field armies in 
the early part of the Second World War.71  Eventually it was recognised that the 
considerable advantages of the 3.7in gun outweighed its disadvantages and the 3in 
20cwt anti-aircraft gun was slowly phased out, 100 being earmarked for conversion to 
the 20pr 16cwt anti-tank guns, described above.72   
 
The best defence against massed air attack (particularly at night) quickly proved to be 
massed anti-aircraft artillery, firing barrage patterns through which the enemy was 
forced to fly in order to reach the target.  Guns were marshalled into ‘Gun Defended 
Areas’, such as ‘Thames and Medway (South)’, which stretched from Dartford to 
Sheppy and defended the south eastern approaches to London.  The area contained 72 
HAA guns grouped in four-gun batteries or ‘sites’.  In 1940 these consisted of eight 3in 
guns, eight 3.7in mobile guns, 24 3.7in static guns, and 32 4.5in guns.  By 1944, 
although the number of guns remained the same, the 3in and 4.5in guns had been 
replaced, the total number of 3.7s being increased to 64, and the balance made up of 
four twin 5.25in mountings.73  The gun crews (eleven men for each 3.7in), plus 
accompanying height finders, predictor operators, battery command post staff and so 
on, absorbed an immense amount of manpower (and there were also barrage balloon 
and searchlight crews to take into consideration).  This soon led to the employment of 
women in the batteries.  The charter for the formation of mixed anti-aircraft batteries 
was issued in May 1941, and the first confirmed aircraft to fall a mixed battery was 
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brought down on 8 December 1941 (MOI, 1943, p.59).  Although women shared the 
gun pits with men, they were not permitted to serve the guns – their duties included 
radiolocation, height and range finding, and operating the predictor and the aircraft 
identification telescope.74 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The author’s children pose on a 3.7in mobile mount (the photograph was taken in 2001, 
when this study was still in its early stages).  The picture well illustrates the size and 
complexity of the gun, even in its mobile version.  The mount is a late Mk III, the barrel 
in recoiled position.  The 94mm calibre 3.7in gun is often compared to the German 
‘88’, but it was a significantly bigger and heavier equipment.  The gun shown remains 
in storage awaiting restoration.  (Author’s photograph)   
 
The Home Guard participated in air defence as part of their infantry duties, one Home 
Counties platoon, for example, shot down a low-flying Dornier Do17 in August 1940, 
with 180 rounds of rapid fire from P14 rifles.75  However, the topic of aircraft 
recognition was demoted in the Home Guard training syllabus in March 1942, on the 
basis that the Home Guard was not issued tracer ammunition, making it impossible to 
engage aircraft accurately at heights above 2,000 feet.  Below that altitude, it was 
determined, aircraft would be immediately recognisable by their national markings or 
‘their hostile action’.  Therefore, it was unnecessary to waste time on more aircraft 
recognition than was necessary for ‘self-defence’.76  However, at the same time training 
was underway of the first specialist Home Guard anti-aircraft artillery units.  Like the 
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coast artillery, Home Guard air defence artillery began with recruiting in late-1941, as 
described by the Sir Frederick Pile, GOC-in-C, AA Command, writing shortly after the 
war (Pile, 1949, p.224): 
The same pressure, the same claims of pure mathematics that had forced the 
hands of those opposed to the acceptance of A.T.S., now forced their hands into 
the acceptance of the Home Guard being used in A.A. Command.  The greatest 
snag was that Home Guards were not allowed to perform more than 48 hours’ 
training and duty in 28 days.  Even in the event of air raids, they were unable to 
volunteer for extra duty without permission from their civil employers.  This 
meant that we couldn’t immediately hand over the most important defences to 
them.  But they could be used both on some of the light anti-aircraft defences of 
factories and railways and on the new rocket deployment designed to reinforce 
existing anti-aircraft defences. 
 
Although the Home Guards were part-timers, they could, unlike the ATS, serve the 
guns.  The first Home Guard units were ready in early summer 1942,77 and in 
September, General Pile was able to rebalance AA manpower.  At its peak his command 
absorbed half a million men and women, and by further increasing the use of Home 
Guards, it was eventually possible to free 71,000 male soldiers for other duties.78  By 
the time Home Guard ‘Ack-Ack’ units were stood down in 1944 there were 141,198 
Home Guards in Anti-aircraft Command.79 
 
The first weapon system selected for Home Guard Ack-Ack gunners was one we 
previously encountered earlier in this chapter, as part of the defences at Workington and 
Whitehaven – the ‘Z’ anti-aircraft projector.  The ‘Z’ projector reflected practical 
experience which showed that hundreds, even thousands, of anti-aircraft shells were 
fired for each plane shot down.80  Under the circumstances, a shotgun approach was the 
best way to intercept a bird on the wing, and the ‘Z’ projector was designed to put as 
much explosive in the air as possible, in the shortest possible time.  The system 
comprised of the usual battery command post arrangements, but the guns were replaced 
with considerably less expensive and sophisticated rocket launchers or ‘projectors’, 
each capable of firing, first a single, and later, two, 3in ‘unrotated projectiles’ or UPs. 
British development of anti-aircraft rockets had begun in 1934 and resulted in a 2in 
rocket which eventually saw wartime service on merchant ships, and some limited use 
in coastal batteries, utilising the 2in Rocket Mounting Mk II or ‘Pillar Box’ – a 20-
rocket volley mounting (Chamberlain and Gander, 1975c, pp.49-52).  However, in 1937 
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the Committee on Air Defence Research directed that work should concentrate on a 3in 
projectile with a similar lethality to the 3.7in anti-aircraft gun round.  Trials were 
undertaken in 1939, and by September 1940 1,000 3in projectors had been built.  The 
initial ‘Projector, 3in, Mk I’ fired a single rocket, and was rather less sophisticated than 
its successor, the Number 2 Mk I, which was a twin rocket launcher.  Both types saw 
operational service in the UK and North Africa, and the Mk I was adopted by the Royal 
Navy for DEMS use.  A mobile launcher, the Projector, 3in No. 4, which could fire nine 
rockets, was mounted on the carriages of the 100 3in anti-aircraft guns retired and 
converted into anti-tank guns, discussed previously.   The final version, the Number 6 
projector, which fired 20 rockets, entered service in 1944 (Chamberlain and Gander, 
1975c, pp.49-52).  Initially the Mk I projector (see below) was deemed suitable for 
Home Guard use, as described by the former GOC-in-C AA Command (Pile, 1949, 
p.225): 
The single-barrelled U.P. projector was selected for their use, chiefly because of 
the simplicity with which the equipment could be handled. 
 The first of these units was formed in Liverpool and went into training in 
October 1941. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Home Guards on 
Merseyside 
loading a Mk I 
‘Z’ projector, 6 
July 1942.  
(IWM H 21135) 
 
 
 
 264 
For the defence of major targets each ‘Z’ battery consisted of 64 twin projectors.  Each 
projector was operated by a crew of two, so the whole arrangement was considerably 
more economical than a conventional HAA battery.  Nevertheless, 64 projector batteries 
still required considerable manpower.  Home Guard batteries were formed, around a 
core of Regular Army personnel.  Summing up the Home Guard’s contribution to the 
war effort, Director General Home Guard said of the ‘Z’AA batteries:81 
Home Guard have taken over all duties in connection with rocket batteries and 
apart from a very small regular component for maintenance of the equipment 
and for training, these equipments are manned entirely by the Home Guard. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This remarkable photograph shows 
the square pattern of shell bursts 
from a 128-rocket ‘Z’ battery salvo.  
Note the Number 2 Mk I (i.e. twin) 
projectors at the bottom of the 
picture. 
 
(Official, reproduced from Pile, 1949, 
p.128.)   
 
 
 
There is a good account of the formation and operation of an Essex Home Guard AA 
‘Z’ battery, by Peter Helsdon, a former member, in the BBC People’s War resource.  
First, a training unit with four projectors was established, then, in July 1942, the full 
battery set up in the Recreation Ground, Chelmsford: 
When the new site was completed in February 1943 there were 64 twin rocket 
projectors, organised in four troops, Able, Baker, Charlie and Dog, located on 
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the open area bounded by the river, the lake, Park Rd. and the then cattle market.  
Two G.L. [Gun Laying] Radar Cabins operated by Regulars (later ATS girls) 
were sited on the other side of the river in the cricket ground.  These Radar 
Cabins were linked to the operations room near Park Rd.  Canteen suppers were 
provided by ATS cooks and site services by the Regulars.  
Each projector could fire two 3" anti-aircraft rockets having a maximum altitude 
of 19,000 ft. and a ground range of 10,000 Yards (5.7 Miles).  The heavy finned 
rockets were about six feet long and each had an adjustable nose fuse to be set to 
explode the warhead at the correct altitude.  Two men manned each projector.  
The commands for altitude, bearing, elevation, loading, etc. came over a sound-
powered intercom from the operations room to a headphone worn by No.1, who 
relayed the orders to No.2.  Each man set a fuse, No.2 loaded the rockets onto 
their guide rails and pulled them down onto the electrical firing pins and then set 
the elevation wheel.  The firing pins were connected via safety switches to a 
firing handle and a 6v. dry battery.  No.1 set the bearing and reported "Charlie 5 
ready" etc.; on the command "Fire", he depressed the firing handle.  If the 
rockets misfired, we had to wait 20 minutes before unloading.  
The sound powered headphone system was not very clear and probably was 
responsible for some early bearing/elevation setting errors.  But some 
enthusiastic HG Marconi engineers soon designed a powerful valve (vacuum 
tube) amplifier to replace the official system.  Before this there were a few near 
accidents.  On one occasion the Railway Station-Master phoned the Battery 
Commander to complain about the flight of two lonely rockets, which had nearly 
shot down some of his wagons standing at the station.  All the rest went in the 
direction of the enemy planes.  
The flight path of a rocket is quite different to the simple maths curve governing 
the ballistics of ordinary A.A. guns.  Our operations room used a plotting table, 
and a prediction device like a three dimensional slide rule, to give us fuse 
settings etc. from the Radar data fed in by the ATS teams.  
The "slide-rule" scales were prepared from a series of 3" rocket flight tests 
optically tracked and recorded by a team of ordnance experts sent to the clear 
skies of the West Indies.  
Area command was provided by a master control centre at Sandon that covered 
all the local A.A Batteries, including the heavy 3.7" guns down on the Meads 
and the Bofors along the Chelmsford by-pass road.  
To be fully operational the "Z" Battery site required a total of 1424 men in eight 
shifts, so in April 1943 I and many others were transferred from the 6th 
Battalion to the 211(101 Essex Home Guard) "Z"A.A.Battery. Each shift then 
spent one night in eight on duty.82  
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The ‘Z’ projector is, quite rightly, associated with the Home Guard, as it was the Home 
Guard who provided the majority of the ‘Z’ AA batteries’ manpower.  The weapon was, 
it is true, a Sten gun, to the 3.7in gun’s rifle, but like the Sten it was cheap, easy to mass 
produce and deadly – and it represented the future of air defence.83  Like the Sten, the 
‘Z’ projector was a weapon that the Home Guard shared with the Army, although in this 
case it was in the form of mixed Home Guard, Regular, ATS batteries, with the three 
organisations working alongside and completely dependant on each other. 
 
A march past by Home Guards at a rocket projector site, 18 March 1944.  Note the twin 
Number 2 Mk I ‘Z’ mounting, which is rather larger and more sophisticated than the 
small single rocket Mk I unit illustrated on p.266.  The original caption states: ‘The 
intense barrage put up by the “projectors” is one of the methods used to combat enemy 
air attacks and it has proved very effective, a number of enemy aircraft having been 
destroyed by its means.  Home Guards, under Anti-Aircraft Command, trained 
throughout the country, enable regular soldiers to be released for active service on 
other fronts’. (Official photograph, author’s collection) 
 
Air defence also formed a major part of the duties of the Home Guard factory units, 
which were formed from the workforce to guard key industrial installations.  The 
official summation was as follows:84 
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L.A.A.  All important factories and undertakings are defended against low flying 
and dive bombing attacks by factory workers who are enrolled in the Home 
Guard and are prepared to man the guns on receipt of the alarm 
 
At Workington, for example, ‘E’ Company of the local Home Guard battalion, which 
was responsible for security at the High-Duty Alloys ‘shadow factory’, reorganised in 
January 1944 to include a light anti-aircraft troop, designated ‘C’ LAA troop, and 
equipped with eight Marlin machineguns and nine 20mm Hispano-Suiza cannon.  The 
nearby Workington Iron and Steel Works also formed a Home Guard LAA detachment, 
equipped with an impressive 18 20mm Hispano-Suiza guns.  Both detachments were 
disbanded in September 1944.85  We encountered the .30-06 calibre Marlin machinegun 
in Chapter 5, noting that many went to the merchant navy for anti-aircraft use.  The 
Hispano-Suiza was a French-designed 20mm aircraft canon, originating in a license-
built Oerlikon design, but evolved into a more sophisticated weapon that would be 
mounted between the ‘V’ cylinders of a Hispano-Suiza aircraft engine, firing through 
the propeller boss (Wallace, 1972, p.78).86  
 
At the outbreak of war the ‘Hispano’ cannon was regarded as the pre-eminent weapon 
of its type, undergoing service trials and development with various European air forces, 
the French air force, the US Navy and the RAF.  Described as ‘one of the most 
important guns used by the RAF’ (Wallace, 1972, p.77),87 it was eventually fitted to 
numerous fighter and attack aircraft, including the Whirlwind, Spitfire, Hurricane, 
Tempest and Beaufighter, as well as the post-war Shackleton maritime patrol aircraft 
and Vampire jet fighter, amongst others.  At the outset its only significant limitation as 
an aircraft weapon was that it was fed from a drum magazine, which meant it had to 
either be mounted in such a way that the magazine could be replaced by the crew of the 
aircraft, or settle for a rather limited supply of ammunition (60 rounds).88  The problem 
was resolved by development in early 1941 of a belt feed mechanism, interchangeable 
with the magazine.89  In the ground role, however, the drum magazine was no problem, 
and the Hispano-Suiza was used in single and multiple light anti-aircraft mountings by 
British Commonwealth and US forces during the Second World War.  It saw further 
action with various armies after the Second World War.   
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Hispano-Suiza 20mm cannons were manufactured in the UK and, from January 1942, in 
the USA, where they were standardised as the M1.  Large quantities of M1 guns were 
supplied to the UK, but failed to perform as well as the British guns.  In the early stages 
of the Hispano gun’s development, difficulties had been experienced with ‘soft strikes’ 
(stoppages due to a failure to ignite the round – relatively easy to clear on the ground, 
by re-cocking the gun, but enough to put a gun out of action if wing-mounted in an 
aircraft).  The cause had been identified as poor quality cartridges which ‘crushed up’ 
when fed into the chamber.  This was resolved by shortening the chamber by 2mm.  The 
Americans resolutely refused to make a 2mm or 1/16 inch adjustment to the chamber of 
their guns, as it was an ammunition rather than gun design fault, and refused to 
standardise with the improved British Mk II gun, as they were re-drawing the plans 
from millimetres (as used by the British and French) to inches to suit their production 
methods (Wallace, 1972, pp.176-178).  According to British aerial ordnance specialist 
G.F Wallace, as a result, ‘it was decided by the Director of Equipment that no 
American-built Hispano 20mm guns would be issued for installation in RAF aircraft.’  
Nevertheless, ‘some thousands’ were delivered.  Some re-chambered to British 
dimensions and fitted with triple-wire recoil springs (more resistant to breaking than the 
single wire springs used by the Americans), and fitted to ground mounts but (according 
to Wallace) ‘never used in action’, and they are undoubtedly the ones issued to the 
Home Guard for factory defence (Wallace, 1972, p178).  Hispano 20mm anti-aircraft 
guns were in use for airfield defence as early as August 1940 (where they most certainly 
did see action) and subsequently saw service in all theatres with RAF ‘ground gunners’ 
and their successors the RAF Regiment.90   
 
Anti-aircraft Command GB made considerable use of Hispanos, because they were ideal 
for engaging fleeting targets and only needed a single operator, compared to the crew 
required for a 40mm Bofors.  For example, 60 Bofors guns were withdrawn and 
replaced by 200 Hispanos to combat ‘tip-and-run’ air raids on the South Coast in 1942 
(Pile, 1949, p.242).91  The Hispano first appears in Home Guard records in March 1942, 
71 guns distributed around the country in threes and fours, with the exception of 
Western Command, which had 20.  By September of that year 87 were reported – 
although it is clear that very many more were eventually issued, particularly in the 
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approach to D-Day.92  References to the Hispano-Suiza are rare; Home Guard 
Instruction No.  60 of December 1943, lists the ‘20mm Hispano gun’ among other 
Home Guard weapons, noting that care had to be taken to keep the gun serviceable:   
In order to get best results with the 20mm Hispano gun, a high standard of care 
of arms must be maintained.  Dust covers should be kept on the gun whenever 
the situation permits.93 
 
Dust covers notwithstanding, the use of surplus Hispano aircraft cannon on simple AA 
mountings, manned by factory workers who were in the Home Guard, was an intelligent 
and effective way to boost low-level anti-aircraft defences of vital installations.   
 
 
 
(Left) An undated 
photograph of a 20mm 
Hispano-Suiza cannon 
on a simple ground 
mount, newly issued to 
the Home Guard at the 
Fairey Aviation factory, 
Heaton Chapel, 
Manchester.  
(K. Musgrave, 
www.levyboy.com) 
 
 
 
 
(Right) 20mm 
Hispano-Suiza 
(possibly the same 
gun) fitted with an 
armoured shield 
and emplaced on 
the roof of the 
factory fire station.   
(K. Musgrave, 
www.levyboy.com) 
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The use of Home Guard on Ack-Ack duties was not without its difficulties, both 
because of the numbers of Home Guard required to man the numerous shifts for each 
site – around 1,400 per rocket site (Pile, 1949, p225) – and the quality of manpower, 
which was declining, with the Ministry of Labour ‘directing’ men into Home Guard AA 
units.94  As AA Command’s manpower was further eroded, the Home Guard assumed 
an ever larger and more important role, and, during 1942, the Home Guard started to be 
used on 3.7in guns.  Once again, to quote the Director General Home Guard:95 
H.A.A.  Home Guard assist existing regular batteries by taking over certain guns 
and by manning extra guns on existing sites. 
 
The Home Guard performed sufficiently well that units were rotated, those from the 
Midlands and North, quieter areas later in the war, coming south to relieve gunners in 
the South East, which was still an active area.  This gave the opportunity for men used 
to the basic 3.7in mobile HAA gun to experience the latest state-of-the-art remotely 
controlled, power-operated static mountings, and gain operational experience against a 
live enemy.  There is an interesting account by Joe Carley, a gunner with 71st HAA 
(Home Guard) Battery in Stockport, Manchester, in the BBC ‘People’s War’ archive, 
describing a tour of duty in the Thames and Medway (South) Gun Defended Area:96 
 
Towards the latter part of 1944 [this should be 1943, as Home Guard AA units 
disbanded in September 1944], training began to pall, there was little else to 
teach the majority of the Home Guard gunners. They all knew what was 
required of them, they could man and fire the guns, knew sufficient facts about 
fire control, care and maintenance, barrages etc., and the repetition of training 
had its inevitable effect - we were getting a little 'browned off'.... 
 
When things were at their blackest, many of us were suddenly bucked up and 
made cheerful by the news that Home Guard contingents were to travel from 
Manchester to the region of Chatham to help man the guns. It gave us a chance 
of some real experience, relieved tired gunners from the strain of almost nightly 
alerts in that district, and furthermore would enable us to see the more up-to-date 
guns of which we had heard so many rumours, guns which made our own 
weapons at Mount Road (Levenshulme) seem antiquated and redundant." 
 
- In November having settled into their new quarters near Chatham they were 
introduced to the new guns... 
 
Superficially the old 3.7 but with what is known as the No.11 Fuse setter plus 
the almost complete working of the gun by remote control,97 it made the type on 
weapon on which we had trained at Mount Road seem obsolete and old 
fashioned. It was strange to watch the guns, with seemingly nobody near, swivel 
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and turn from side to side, like a wild beast seeking its prey, or raise and lower 
its slim muzzle as directed from the Command Post and Radar. 
 
Home Guard anti-aircraft and coastal defence units stopped parading for duty in 
September 1944, and the Home Guard was officially stood-down the following month.  
The organisation’s contribution to the manning of anti-aircraft and coastal artillery 
batteries illustrates the extent to which the part-time soldiers were trusted to take on 
frontline roles, and the way most rose to the challenge.  It is important to remember that 
they were unpaid, and, typically, working long hours in work that was already important 
to the war effort.  Home Guard duties were undertaken at night; they slept if they could, 
and went to work the following day.  The robot guns of Thames and Medway (South) 
notwithstanding, much of the artillery of Home Defence was an eclectic mixture of the 
improvised, elderly and superseded.  This is not a reflection of the way the Home Guard 
was regarded or treated by the authorities, but the way in which the last drops of 
usefulness were squeezed out of whatever equipment was available.  Most of these 
stopgaps and improvisations were originally manned by Army personnel before they 
were handed over to the Home Guard, and all of them worked sufficiently for the 
limited duties they were expected to perform.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Home Guard detachment manning 
a 40mm Bofors gun of Anti-aircraft 
Command. (IWM H 34424) 
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CHAPTER 9 
 
Auxiliary Units 
 
The story of the Auxiliary Units is intimately related to the subject of this thesis, as the 
lack of arms for the original LDV was one reason why an asymmetric resistance was 
prepared and organised.  Auxiliary unit organiser Major Nigel Oxenden MC* 
commented in his post-operation report for the War Office, Auxiliary Units History and 
Achievement 1940-44 (Oxenden, October 1944, published 1998, p.1): 
  The organisation of a guerrilla force had the double advantage of 
 building up a body of men to work behind the enemy’s lines with much more 
 success than would probably attend the road block efforts of the Home Guard 
 proper, and doing it moreover, without drawing upon the country’s scanty 
 supply of small arms.  Their mission was to ‘create havoc and destruction 
 among the enemy’s supplies and communications’.  
 
Oxenden placed the ‘birthday’ of the Auxiliary Units as 2 July 1940, the date Colonel 
Colin McVean Gubbins began assembling a staff of junior officers, known as ‘IOs’, 
who were to form guerrilla cells in coastal districts from ‘Caithness to Wales’: 
 Their mission was to find reliable men, about thirty each, to leave them a 
 ‘dump’ of assorted explosives and incendiaries, to help these ‘dump-owners’ 
 to form their cells of five desperate men, to train them in the use of weapons 
 that were as new to them as to the trainees, and to provide the cells with some 
 form of ‘hideout’. 
 
When researching his 1968 study The Last Ditch, David Lampe became (wrongly) 
convinced that there was no official documentation recording the existence of the 
Auxiliary Units.  He was therefore delighted to find, in the 1943 Auxiliary Units 
textbook “The Countryman’s Diary 1939”, a reference stating ‘Auxunit packing is 
O.K.’, 1 which he took to be a unique surviving reference naming the organisation.2  We 
now know it refers (with unhelpful ambiguity) not to the men, but their sabotage 
equipment packs.  As Oxenden went on to explain (1998, p.4): 
 The first dumps, afterwards called ‘packs’, and finally Aux Units, were 
 contained in cardboard boxes that disintegrated if buried or left out in the rain, 
 and included, besides 10lbs of Plastic Explosive and a mass of feeble and 
 uncertain incendiaries, a hollow bronze casting of a lump of coal that could 
 hold two ounces of H.E. and a detonator.  This museum piece was a clue to 
 our proposed activities in July 1940 – the crippling of our railway system, 
 assumed to be in use by the enemy. 
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Why Oxenden calls the dummy coal in the pack a ‘museum piece’ is unclear, as these 
items must have been comparatively recent, albeit belonging to the pre-history of 
special operations.  Mark Seaman, in discussing the origins of SOE, specifically MI(R) 
and Section D, makes reference to a ‘brown book of devices’ published at the end of 
1939, and now lost:  ‘mention of its contents offers confirmation that, even at an early 
stage, [Commander] Langley’s team [the experimental component of Section D] had 
already … developed explosive devices camouflaged as pieces of coal or logs of wood’ 
(Seaman, 2000, p.4).  It is likely that this booklet has thus far eluded rediscovery 
because it was produced as an ‘anti-sabotage’ handbook for Royal Navy boarding 
officers inspecting merchant shipping, rather than a saboteur’s catalogue, as was done 
later, once war had started.  Research into sabotage equipment was, at that stage, ‘purely 
experimental’ and supposedly defensive in nature.3 
 
Oxenden’s cynicism regarding dummy coal was shared by Major Leslie Wood, 
Commander Langley’s second-in-command, and subsequent Officer Commanding, of 
Station XII, the SOE research centre at Aston House, near Stevenage.  As remembered 
by Wood, the coal was required for use by the French Resistance (Turner, 2006, p.95): 
  The idea was we should produce camouflaged pieces of coal which, in 
 fact, contained high explosives.  Our gallant boys were to risk their lives 
 planting some of these in the bunkers used by locomotives…  Well, of course 
 it was absolutely ridiculous – made me so angry, the thought of risking our 
 chaps’ lives for such a futile thing.  Luckily, in those days I was still quite a 
 good mathematician, and I’d got with me a very good volume on the Law of 
 Averages.  I worked out properly, so that it could be checked, the chances of 
 one piece of coal ever getting into the fire-box of a French locomotive that 
 happened to be in the right place and happened to be taking troops.  It worked 
 out at one in ten million, or something like that.  I wish I had kept that file – I 
 didn’t like to.  It came back – and this is absolutely true, this is a proper 
 official War Office file, red tape and everything else, and across it was written 
 ‘Bless you.’  But that was crossed out and underneath was ‘God Bless you.’  
 And that was crossed out and underneath was ‘May the good Lord shine the 
 light of His countenance upon you for ever and ever, Amen.  Signed.’  That 
 finished the whole thing because nobody could ever refute those figures. 
 
Whatever Majors Oxenden and Wood’s opinion, far from finished, ‘Explosive Coal’ 
continued in production throughout the Second World War, and still featured in the 
Descriptive Catalogue of Special Devices and Supplies issued by ‘MO1 (SP)’, i.e. 
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Aston House, in 1945 (Seaman, 2000, p.193).4  It was never again issued to the 
Auxiliary Units though. 
 
One of the original IOs, Lt. Stuart Edmundsen, took delivery of a lorry load of 50 
‘packs’.  Edmundsen recalled that each pack contained (Warwicker, 2004, p.5): 
 
 5lbs gelignite 
 3 Mills bombs 
 2 Magnesium incendiary bombs 
 Box detonators 
 Instantaneous fuse 
 Fast burning fuse 
 Slow burning fuse 
 Selection of ‘Time Pencils’, delay switches ranging from 10 minutes to 2  
  weeks, colour coded 
 Pressure switches 
 Trip switches 
 Coils of trip wire 
 A crimping tool 
 Sticky tape 
 
It will be immediately apparent that there is some difference between Edmundsen’s 
description of the pack contents and Oxenden’s.  Whether this reflects regional 
differences (Oxenden being on the East Coast, Edmundsen in the South West), or 
recollection of equipment schedules that differed over time is unclear.  At least two 
‘marks’ of Aux Unit pack are recorded, and the presence of gelignite rather than plastic 
explosive suggests that Edmundsen’s were the later type of ‘Mk. I’, Oxenden’s being 
the earlier pattern.5  What is clear is that this equipment was all intended for acts of 
sabotage, with nothing, with the possible exception of the Mills bombs, being provided 
for self-protection.  This led to a famous intervention by the Prime Minister, as recorded 
by Oxenden (1998, p.4): 
 In August Col Gubbins, in his weekly report to the C.I.C, which was always 
 read with interest by the Prime Minister, recommended the issue of revolvers.  
 Mr Churchill added a note, “these men are to have revolvers.”  Accordingly 
 four hundred .32 Colt automatics were distributed at once, and the next month 
 a 100% issue of .38 revolvers was made, followed much later by ammunition 
 that fitted them. 
 
Oxenden noted the psychological significance of the Auxiliers’ weapons: 
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These, and hunting knives, were a great source of pride to the auxiliers, 
and a valuable recruiting draw.  They enhanced a reputation for toughness that 
the unit was building up, as opposed to the ‘church parade’ activities of the ill-
equipped Home Guard proper.  The limit was reached when an individual was 
apprehended by police at a London terminus wearing a balaclava, a battledress 
without any sort of flash or title, and conspicuously  armed with a revolver and a 
knife. 
 
We have already examined the provision of handguns in Chapter 5.  Further to that we 
can add that ex-Auxilier and researcher Robert (Bob) Millard has identified the 
following types as issued to Auxiliary Unit patrols – .32 Colt Special Police, .32 Colt 
Police Positive, .32 Colt Semi-automatic, and Smith and Wesson .38/200 British 
Service Revolver.6  It is apparent, therefore, that the immediate issue of 400 .32 
handguns was made up of something of a potpourri of assorted Colts, from civilian 
stocks available in the UK, while the ‘100% issue of .38 revolvers’ in September will 
have come from the order of 65,000 revolvers placed with Smith & Wesson at the end 
of May 1940 (Skennerton, 1988, p.27).  In common with the remainder of the Home 
Guard, Auxiliary Units personnel made the most of whatever privately owned and First 
World War trophy handguns were available to them.  Makes confirmed as in use with 
patrols included .455 Webley, and Beretta and Mauser pistols.7  The Auxiliary Units 
also appear to have been beneficiaries of the ‘Committee for American Aid for the 
Defense of British Homes’.8  These privately donated American weapons, or some of 
them, were channelled through Section XII at Aston House, 9 which is how Auxiliary 
Unit patrols in Bath came to be issued ex-New York Police Department Colt revolvers 
and black leather police holsters.10 
 
Although a weapon not particularly valued in British military doctrine, the handgun 
was, at least familiar and an existing service weapon.  Fighting knives were an entirely 
different matter.  Various private purchase and improvised ‘trench knives’ had been 
used during the First World War, but in 1940 the British soldier’s sidearm was still a 
twenty-one-and-three-quarter inch ‘sword bayonet’, which was particularly unsuited to 
close combat, except as an attachment to the Lee-Enfield rifle.  Silent killing of sentries 
at close quarters required a completely different arrangement and weapon – a situation 
which became increasingly apparent in June 1940, with the formation of the 
‘Independent Companies’ and ‘Special Service’ units, later to become the Commandos.  
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The immediate response was the issue of a hunting knife, the ‘RBD’, as what today 
might be termed a ‘survival knife’, suitable for combat or utility duties.  Olof Jansen 
explains:11 
The RBD hunting knife was first made by Wilkinson Sword in 1869 for R. 
Beauchamp Drummond Esq. whose initials were etched on the design drawing 
(hence the name ‘RBD’).  A very popular design, Wilkinson Sword began to sell 
the knife commercially in the 1880s.  Wilkinson Sword had a stock of these 
knives which they had not been able to sell before the war.   Now after Dunkirk 
there was a desperate demand for all kinds of weapons including knives.  It was 
now that the importance of this particular was fully recognised.  The last of the 
RBDs were assembled and despatched for the Commandos in 1940.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Personal equipment issued to Auxilier Pte Banham in Bath.  Note .38 Smith & Wesson 
revolver and 36 rounds of ammunition in column three, the ‘Knife (hunting)’ in the first 
column, amended to ‘FIGHTING’, and the ‘Rubber truncheon’ deleted from the second 
column.  (auxunit.org, with thanks to Robert Millard)12 
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It will be seen from the illustration (below) that the RBD was a large, ‘clip point’ 
Bowie, originally produced with a nine-and-a-half or 10½ inch blade.  The knives 
issued during the Second World War appear to have had seven inch blades, and current 
research suggests that all of the Wilkinson stock went to the Commando Basic Training 
Centre at Achnacarry.13   Very similar knives were produced by Sheffield cutlers 
including William Rodgers, who produced the other knife illustrated, which appeared 
for sale during 2007, with an apparently solid Home Guard provenance.  There are three 
recorded Auxiliary Unit ‘hunting knives’; all three being Bowie knives by another 
Sheffield knife maker, Joseph Rodgers.  The knives are described by researcher Richard 
Ashley at the British Resistance Organisation museum as having a ‘5½ in blade of very 
thin construction’.14  ‘Special service’ personnel of all sorts would have received an 
RBD or similar Bowie knife, if they were lucky – at least one Auxilier was issued with 
a Stanley kitchen knife.15 
 
 
Post-war ‘RBD’ knife by 
Wilkinson (top) compared to 
a small ‘ex-Home Guard’ 
Bowie by William Rodgers 
(below).  The lower knife has 
been sharpened away, but the 
similarity in blade shape is 
apparent.  (Upper image 
Olof Jansen, lower author’s 
collection) 
 
 
In November 1940 the doyens of close-quarter fighting, W.E. Fairbairn and E.A. Sykes 
met with ‘Jack’ Wilkinson Latham at the Wilkinson premises in Pall Mall to discuss the 
production of a purpose-built fighting knife, a meeting apparently enlivened by a 
vigorous simulated knife fight between the two ex-Shanghai policemen.16  Fairbairn and 
Sykes left one of their Shanghai fighting knives with Wilkinson.  This was a rather 
short, double-edged dagger, with a simple flat aluminium guard and a turned, knurled, 
brass hilt of ‘Coke bottle’ shape, held together with a pommel nut.  The double edged 
blade was ground from a Pattern 1903 Lee-Metford bayonet, and the dagger was dated 
1937.17  A prototype ‘Fairbairn-Sykes fighting knife’ was swiftly produced by 
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Wilkinson and, after some modifications, approved by the two experts.  This knife had a 
rather longer blade than the original Shanghai knife as it was designed to kill after 
penetrating the thickest clothing of any enemy soldier, which at that point in the war, 
was considered to be a Russian in full winter clothing.18  Robert Wilkinson Latham 
shows on his website an extract from the Wilkinson order book, with an order dated 
November 1940 for ‘500 RBD and commercial knives’, which he states was a cover for 
a preliminary order of the new F-S fighting knives.  He is certainly well placed to know, 
and the quoted price (13 shillings and sixpence each) is the same as would later be 
charged for the F-S knife.19  But there is also a listing for ‘1,000 F-S knife first pattern’ 
in the same entry, and it may well be that Wilkinson had already provided 500 RBDs 
and similar knives, and was balancing the books before embarking on production of the 
new fighting knife. 
 
F-S knives: Top, 1st Pattern 
(from 11/1940), turned, 
knurled hilt, ricasso to blade 
with Wilkinson and FS 
markings, nickel plated.  S-
shaped early guards.  Centre, 
2nd Pattern (from 8/1941), no 
ricasso, blacked turned and 
knurled hilt, bright blade 
(blackened 1943).  Bottom, 
3rd Pattern (from 9/1942), 
blade as 2nd pattern, but with 
Rodgers’ ringed alloy hilt.  
(Olof Jansen) 
 
 
F-S knives (and the RBDs) did not fall under the Chief Inspector of Small Arms, but 
were special operations stores, alongside time pencils, limpet mines and so forth.  
Contracts to supply F-S knives were issued to Wilkinson by ‘Room 55a, the War 
Office’.20  This was the War Office ‘front’ address for Station XII procurement, which 
maintained secrecy, by making it unnecessary for suppliers to visit Aston House, as 
FANY typist Ishbel Mackenzie recalled (Turner, 2006, p.179): 
  Aston House needed lots of technical supplies from companies like 
 ICI who thought they were dealing with a War Office department E.S.6 (WD) 
 in London.  We couldn’t reveal the Aston House address, so when someone at 
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 ICI telephoned and said, ‘look I’m going to be in London this morning can I 
 pop in and see you at E.S.6 (WD)?’  We had to say, ‘Well I’m sorry but major 
 so and so is terribly busy this morning, perhaps in a day or two, may I ring 
 you back?’  Then you waited until our representative hurtled up to our room 
 [55a] at the War Office in London to meet them and act out the pretence of 
 working there permanently.  No outside business people were allowed to visit 
 Aston  House. 
 
 
Unmarked (therefore probably not Wilkinson manufactured) Second Pattern F-S knife 
issued to Auxilier Robert Millard in 1941.  Mr Millard recalled:  ‘our patrol sewed the 
F-S securing tabs [on the sides of the sheath] to loops so that the knife could be slipped 
onto a belt worn horizontally on the small of the back under a pack carrying explosives.  
It was easily accessible if you were lying behind a sentry and did not foul up when 
crawling.’  (Via Robert Millard) 
 
Wilkinson’s contract book records deliveries to Knebworth (the railhead for Aston 
House) and Weedon (location of the Army Small Arms Depot), and ‘Station 6 (WD), 
which was another cover title for Aston House.21  In a monograph on the F-S fighting 
knife, William L. Cassidy notes: 
 The first government order of the Fairbairn-Sykes [fighting knife] came 14 
 January 1941, from one of Fairbairn’s colleagues at SOE.  In the absence of a 
 formal contract (security demanded that such matters be dispensed with), 
 Wilkinson’s own order number 960 was written for 98 Fairbairn-Sykes 
 knives:  50 to be sent to Knebworth, whence they were removed to SOE’s 
 Station XII; 48 sent to Weedon, bound for SOE’s Depot School near there.  
 From these two centres the first specially purchased Fairbairn-Sykes knives 
 were disbursed to other SOE schools and centres. 
 
 Wilkinson Sword Company awakened to demand for the weapon.  According 
 to Robert Wilkinson-Latham, “Deliveries were made to certain specified 
 depots but the bulk of the production as it became available was held at the 
 London showrooms, where they were given out against signed chits.”  For not 
 only SOE, but the whole of Britain’s special forces clamoured for the 
 286 
 Fairbairn-Sykes.  “The day they arrived,” Fairbairn remembered, “there was a 
 near riot in the rush to buy them.”22 
 
Cassidy is incorrect in stating that a formal contract was not issued, as contracts were 
issued, but from Station XII (in the guise of ‘Room 55a, War Office’), and are not 
therefore recorded under the Chief Inspector of Small Arms contract lists examined by 
Skennerton (which include other items, such as bayonets, ordered from Wilkinson, and 
inspected by the CISA ‘viewer’ and stamped at the factory).  SOE had its own quality 
control and inspection operation at Aston House, from where stores were shipped to 
whichever part of the special operations structure required them.23 
 
Weapons and sabotage equipment for the Auxiliary Units were collected and packed at 
Aston House, from where they were moved to the Auxiliary Units HQ at Coleshill 
House, near Swindon,24 then to the area IOs, and from the IOs to the patrol leaders 
(Oxenden, 1998, p.13).  Therefore F-S knives for the Auxiliers came from the stock 
modern researchers have identified as ‘SOE’.  Cassidy puts the number of knives 
supplied to SOE by Wilkinson at 3,019,25 which is some 500 fewer than the total 
number of Auxiliers on strength in 1941,26 so many more knives must have been 
supplied to the special forces establishment to meet the requirements of the Auxiliary 
Units and the other components of SOE.  It is worth noting that some 100 companies 
are believed to have been manufacturing or retailing F-S knives by 1942 and collectors’ 
interest and research has tended to concentrate on Wilkinson.27  Although Wilkinson’s 
part in the development of the original knife is beyond dispute, it is quite possible that 
William Rodgers is the more important manufacturer, in terms of quantities of knives 
on operational service.  Estimates of wartime British FS knife manufacture put the total 
at some 2,000,000 knives, of which 231,769 were produced by Wilkinson.28  What is 
certain, is that no Auxilier could have received an F-S fighting knife before December 
1940, any issue prior to this date being a hunting knife or similar.  The majority of 
surviving F-S knives with confirmed Auxiliary Unit provenance are of the second 
pattern, however, Robert Millard notes:   
 We had an early 1941 issue of the second pattern [unlikely to have been 
 before August 1941, Wilkinson’s introduction date of the second pattern FS 
 knife], straight crossguard, not stamped...  Geoff Bradford (now deceased) 
 from a Devon patrol had a third pattern knife which  he gave to Parham [BRO 
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 museum].  Captain Ford, I/O in the Ramsey area also had a third pattern 
 knife.29 
 
Researchers recognise some fourteen variations of the F-S knife in use during the 
Second World War, including wood-handled versions which were available for aircrew, 
and variations on the second pattern F-S with so-called ‘beaded’ and ‘roped’ brass 
grips.  These are regarded by some as the best balanced and finest F-S knives built, and 
are believed to have been produced by William Rodgers.30  There is also a variant with 
a rather narrow steel hilt, variously referred to as the ‘arctic’ version (on the basis that it 
has turned up in Norway, and the shape of the grip and pommel might have suited 
gloved hands), or the ‘French Resistance’ or ersatz version (on the basis that it may 
have been produced cheaply and in bulk prior to D-Day).  An ersatz F-S knife was 
issued to an Essex Auxilier (see below), and a reference to the Arundel patrol in 
Angell’s Secret Sussex Resitance, suggests they too had this pattern:  ‘When the men of 
Arundel Patrol were issued with these knives, they found the handles too narrow, so 
wound them round with plastic tape to build up the grip to the desired thickness’ 
(Angell, 1996, p.45).  Issue to the Auxiliary Units would seem to run counter to the 
argument that this particular type of knife was a 1944 bulk order for D-Day, as, by that 
time, the Auxiliary Units were in decline.  Further research is continuing on these 
weapons.31 
Knives carried by Auxilier 
Dennis Gray in Byfleet, 
Essex.  The F-S (top) is the 
so-called ‘ersatz’ version, 
with a distinctive hilt and an 
unusual scabbard.  The 
broad bladed knife was 
hand made during 1942 in 
the Saunders Roe aircraft 
factory, from stainless steel, 
and is painted with service 
aircraft paint.  It appears to 
be a version of Fairbairn’s 
‘other knife’, the ‘smatchet’.  
(auxunit.org) 
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Other close combat weapons used by Auxiliers included home-made fighting knives, 
including punch daggers made up from broken fencing foils, and at least one example of 
the ‘smatchet’ (another of Fairbairn’s inventions), as well as wire garrottes, and various 
clubs, knuckledusters and coshes.32  If the F-S knife was a rapier, then the smatchet was 
a broadsword, with a heavy blade to deliver a cutting blow.  Fairbairn, single-mindedly, 
and rather optimistically, promoted the smatchet as the ideal weapon for any man not 
carrying a rifle, in his 1943 book Get Tough:33 
 The psychological reaction of any man, when he first takes the smatchet in his 
 hand, is full justification for its recommendation as a fighting weapon.  He will 
 immediately register all the essential qualities of a good soldier – confidence, 
 determination, and aggressiveness. 
 
 Its balance, weight, and killing power, with the point, edge or pommel, 
 combined with the extremely simple training necessary to become efficient in 
 its use, make it the ideal personal weapon for all those not armed with a rifle 
 and bayonet. 
 
 Note. – The smatchet is now in wide use throughout the British armed forces.  
 It is hoped that it will soon be adopted by the United States Army.34 
 
Fairbairn’s quote captures the character of the man, and his absolute determination to 
close with the enemy and fight hand-to-hand.  Although the smatchet did have some 
users, troops, on both sides of the Atlantic, ‘not armed with a rifle and bayonet’ seem to 
have preferred the option of a submachine gun.  
 
While there can be no doubt that being issued a fighting knife greatly boosted the 
owner’s moral and self-esteem – whether he be an Auxilier or Commando – there was, 
and remains, some question over the practicality of a knife that was designed (if 
brilliantly) for the single purpose of killing another human being.  Silently and 
deliberately killing an enemy soldier with a knife requires the very highest standards of 
skill, fieldcraft, fitness and nerve.  It is likely that the Auxiliary Units achieved these 
standards, but, in reality, the only real advantage of killing with a knife over – for 
example – the silenced firearm, is that the victim can be lowered and dragged away, 
rather than toppling over with a clatter of arms and equipment.  Given the relatively few 
instances of fighting knives actually being used in this way, they were in danger of 
becoming weapons of symbolic significance, no more practical than an officer’s sword.  
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This was apparent by 1944, when Oxenden was recording his ‘lessons learned’ from the 
Auxiliary Units experience (Oxenden, 1998, p.27): 
  The knife is perhaps the hardest and noisiest way of killing a conscious 
 man, but is light to carry.  The rubber club might be useful on occasions; but 
 both these are rendered superfluous by the Welrod [silenced pistol], and call, 
 in addition, for a very high degree of luck and skill in stalking. 
 
 
Personal weapons carried by the 
Bathampton, Somerset, auxunit patrol.  
Top, Smith & Wesson .38 revolver in 1937 
pattern holster, with a home-made ‘punch 
knife’ in the cleaning rod pocket (the 
cleaning rod is displayed below the 
holster) and a second pattern FS fighting 
knife.  Former patrol member Robert 
Millard recalled:  ‘The picture shows a 
punch knife with a knurled brass handle, 
forged from the end of a broken fencing 
foil.  It was the cleaning rod plus a 
“kidney thrust” instruction at Coleshill 
that developed the punch knife concept.  
The holster is a short tank holster, in those 
days there were probably more holsters 
than tank crews.  We liked them when on a 
crawling night exercise they could be worn 
on the right side towards the back.  This 
still allowed access but did not interfere 
with crawling.35  (Via Robert Millard) 
 
 
 
 
Oxenden’s mention of the Welrod is interesting, as he was obviously very impressed by 
this SOE silenced pistol, although there is no evidence it ever was issued to the 
Auxiliary Units.  It does, however, lead us to consider the patrols’ other weapons.  All 
Sussex patrol leaders were given the following list of stores to be held at the patrol 
leader’s house (Angell, 1996, p67): 
 Rifles .300     2 
 Thompson sub-machine gun   1 
 Thompson SMG sling    1 
 Sten guns     4 
 Sten gun [magazine] fillers   4 
 Pull throughs     6 
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 Gauzes     10 
 .22 Rifle with rod    1 
 Cells for telephone    4 
 Rifle slings     2 
 Thompson SMG magazines   10 
 Box w/cleaning brushes Thompson SMG 1 
 Sten gun magazines      up to 32 per patrol 
 Sten gun slings    4 
 Oil bottles     6 
 Rum      1 gallon 
 Telephones     2 
 Goggles NP [night patrol simulating?] 3pr 
 
It is obvious that, while remainder of the Home Guard never had quite enough weapons 
for all its members, the five man (after spring 1941, seven man – Oxenden, 1998, p.6) 
Auxiliary Units patrols had something of an embarrassment of riches.  This arsenal was, 
however, accumulated over time, and with variations – the list shown being for Sussex 
patrols, directly in the path of a German invasion or raid.  As we have established, the 
first weapons apart from grenades and explosives, were knives and pistols, received in 
August and September 1940, along with rubber truncheons, which appear to have been 
withdrawn, at least from some patrols.  These were followed by rifles, on a scale of two 
per patrol.  As usual, memories of the rifles’ manufacturer are hazy and confused, but 
we can be confident that they were standard Home Guard issue M1917s, which arrived 
in the UK in July 1940.36  Oxenden (1998, p.5) regarded the rifles as something of a 
mystery:  ‘American rifles, on a scale of two per patrol, were an early issue, nobody 
quite knew why, and this item was never afterwards changed.’  Giving the patrols a 
couple of rifles does not seem unreasonable at a time when the only other personal 
weapons available were pistols.  In Oxenden’s words the rifles ‘came into their own’ 
from the summer of 1942, when the Auxiliary Units started to concentrate less on 
resisting an all-out invasion (which was now vanishingly unlikely), and more on 
disrupting a temporary landing or raid (Oxenden, 1998, p.17). 
 
What was really required was a light automatic weapon, and initially Browning 
Automatic Rifles were issued, one per patrol.  A full length self-loading rifle is 
awkward in a role that involves infiltration and clambering in and out of an 
underground hide.  Oxenden (1998, p.5) states that the BAR was: ‘extremely popular, 
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though quite alien to our role, and was later exchanged in England for the more portable 
Tommy Gun.’  The Thompson SMG would appear to be very well suited to the 
Auxiliary Units role (it even had an easily removable stock), and it is interesting that a 
scale of just one per patrol seems to reflect a stringency with these guns, despite the 
very high priority the Auxiliary Units enjoyed.  Although Thompsons were popular with 
the Army, SOE preferred the Sten, regarding it as lighter, simpler, easier to conceal and 
more natural to aim for reflex shooting than the Thompson.37  This may be why the 
scale of issue was not higher – the ‘Tommy Gun’ perhaps also being regarded as too 
clumsy for the Auxiliary Units.  Andrew Taylor, Director of the British Resistance 
Organisation museum, noted that by 1943 two types of patrol existed – Type A, 
equipped with the .45in Thompson SMG, and Type B equipped with (presumably a 
single) 9mm Sten machine carbine (Warwicker, 2004, p.168).  The ‘Raid Role’ from the 
summer of 1942 saw a special issue of Stens to coastal patrols (Oxenden, 1998, p.17) – 
which explains the rather lavish armoury of the Sussex patrols, shown in the list above. 
 
One item on the patrol list that has excited a great deal of interest is the ‘.22 Rifle with 
rod’.  These were described by Oxenden (1998, p.12): 
  .22 rifles of various patterns, fitted with silencers and telescopic sights, 
 the first of 500, began to arrive, but long before delivery was complete, the 
 telescope was found to be a mistake, adding little to accuracy even when 
 carefully zeroed, and being so easily shifted by handling that ranging shots 
 were always necessary.  However it was too late to stop the issue, and many 
 rifles had no backsights, the telescopes having been fitted in their place. 
 
The interest is due to the fact that these rifles would appear to be a tangible link with the 
Auxiliary Units’ supposed assassination role.  In John Warwicker’s phrase:  ‘many 
Auxunit patrols regarded themselves as Judge, Jury and Executioner when collaborators 
were identified’ (Warwicker, 2004, p.168).  There is no doubt that the idea of Auxiliers 
ruthlessly sniping Quislings and Fifth Columnists seems to hold a certain fascination, 
even if it is peripheral (at best) to their operational role.  Skennerton (1988, pp.21-22) 
lists contracts for 12,500 ‘miscellaneous .22 rifles’ placed between April 1940 and 
January 1943; many of these are quite obviously trainers for use on indoor ranges, but 
others, specified as being supplied with telescopic sights, are probably the rifles 
Oxenden refers to, and give some indication of the types and make.  The following 
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extracts show the date the contracts were placed, description of the weapons purchased, 
supplier, quantity and (sometimes) unit price: 
 19.8.41 Win. s/s w/5X scope             Salter & Varge     10 
   Win. s/s w/scope and peep sight        Salter & Varge     10 
   Win. rep. w/5 shot mag & 5X scope  Salter & Varge    10 
 
 (The first two entries above, from August 1941, were Winchester single shot 
 rifles, ten fitted with 5x magnification telescopic sights and ten with telescopic 
 sights and peep sights, supplied by Messrs Salter & Varge.  The third entry 
 was for five shot repeaters.) 
  
 2.10.41 Win. Mod 69 BA w/5X scope Geo. Greene    10   £6ea 
   Win. Mod 72 BA w/5X scope Geo. Greene    10   £8ea 
 
 (Winchester Model 69 and 72 bolt action rifles with 5x magnification 
 telescopic sights – see illustration below.) 
  
 31.1.42 Remington b/a s/s & Weaver scope Remington Arms 10 
   Remington rep & Weaver scope Remington Arms 10 
 
 (Remington bolt action single shot and repeating rifles with Weaver telescopic 
 sights.) 
 
Amongst all these batches of ten rifles, an undated contract from 1942 shows two bulk 
orders from Salter & Varge: 
 
 --.--.42  repeating rifle   Salter & Varge 250 
   s/s rifle with scope  Salter & Varge 230 
 
Salter & Varge Ltd., of Empire House, St Martins-le-Grand, London, were noted for 
their game rifles and shotguns.38  These two orders are intriguing, as they may account 
for the bulk of Oxenden’s 500 rifles, the other orders only adding up to 70 weapons 
(although many more .22 rifles were ordered without a telescopic sight being specified).  
There is no more detail of date than ‘1942’ on the contracts list, and it is difficult to 
reconcile the entry with a crucial contract with Parker-Hale discussed below, as it is 
placed below it in the list.  However, it is entirely conceivable that this was the order for 
the bulk of the Auxiliary Unit rifles. 
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Most relevant to any discussion of Oxenden’s 500 .22 rifles is an entry for March 1942: 
 13.3.42 .22 rifle silencers, fitted for Parker Hale 660 19/3ea 
         use by Home Guard 
 
The very existence of this contract is interesting, as it shows that, unlike the F-S knives, 
conventional contracts were placed for the silenced rifles, through the CISA system.  A 
total of 660 silencers fitted to .22 rifles gives enough for one for each Auxiliary Units 
patrol – 576 patrols, as at 1941 (Lampe, 2007, p.160), but described as ‘rather more 
than 640’ by early 1944 (Warwicker, 2004, 235) – plus a residue for the Regular Army 
Scout Sections, which were part of the Auxiliary Units structure (Warwicker, 2004, 
p.68), and for training, or spares.  The contract could have been drafted once the work 
was completed (‘on termination’ – although that is not specified).  So, judging by the 
contract list, the earliest issues of .22 rifles with telescopic sights could have been in 
August 1941, but a delivery date of the final weapons is unlikely to be much earlier than 
March 1942.39  This timing fits well with a diary entry by Firle (Sussex) patrol leader 
Bill Webber, recording the first issue of silenced .22 rifles in his area occurring at a 
patrol leaders’ meeting at Allington Farm on 30 April 1942 (Angell, 1996, p35).   
 
It has been said – by no lesser authority than the UK National Rifle Association online 
historical resource – that, apart from silencers, Parker Hale also fitted these 660 rifles 
with the No. 42 straight sighting telescope.40  The No. 42 is similar to the Army’s No. 
32 sniper’s sight, which was developed in 1939 for use on the Bren light machine gun, 
but saw all of its military service on the sniper version of the No. 4 Lee Enfield, the No. 
4(T).41  Once the idea of mating the Bren to a telescopic sight had been abandoned, all 
efforts concentrated on the No. 4(T) rifle / No. 32 ‘scope combination.  Development 
took until March 1941, with the first snipers’ rifles delivered in December 1941 
(Laidler, 1993, p.6).   The No. 42 scope (and subsequent Nos. 53 and 55), are identical 
to the No. 32, with some minor differences in optical arrangements between the marks.  
However, a major difference is that none of the three has any facility for adjusting range 
or deflection, in other words, the cross hairs are fixed.  The development and use of 
these sights remains subject to discussion, but they were chiefly built for use with 
BESA machine guns mounted in tanks.  There is, however, evidence (see below) that 
some of these sights were fitted to Winchester Model 75 self-loading .22 rifles, fitted 
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with Parker-Hale silencers, for use by the Auxiliary Units.  The timing (delivery to the 
Auxunit patrols in April 1942) is reasonable, and the combination is workable – and 
rather more robust than contemporary civilian ‘scopes of the day.  In what quantities 
these combinations were produced is difficult to determine, but they may well be the 
250 repeating rifles in the Salter & Varge order that do not have telescopic sights 
specified. 
 
Winchester Model 74 repeating .22 rifle with a Parker-Hale silencer and No. 42 
telescopic sight (compare inset).  This particular rifle is attributed to the Auxiliary 
Units in Ladd, Melton and Mason’s Clandestine Warfare (1988, p.36).42 
 
Lampe (2007, p.78) states that the .22 rifles were fitted with a ‘powerful telescopic sight 
and a silencer, [and] fired high-velocity bullets capable of killing a man a mile away’.  
This is to seriously overestimate the power of a .22 bullet – and there is no evidence that 
the ammunition used was anything than standard .22 ‘long rifle’ rim-fire.43  This 
ammunition is marked ‘dangerous to one mile’,44 but that is not to suggest that one 
could deliberately hit a target at that range, as velocity falls off and the bullet drops 
dramatically after a few hundred yards.  In any case, high velocity ammunition is the 
last thing one wishes to fire from a silenced weapon.  There are three areas to consider 
when silencing a firearm:  Firstly, there is the mechanical noise of the mechanism 
operating, which, in a single shot bolt action .22 is minimal – and becomes even less of 
an issue if the weapon is carried to the firing point loaded and cocked, and does not 
need to be operated again once the shot is fired.  It is slightly more on a repeater, but 
still negligible.  Secondly there is the ‘report’, the sound caused by high pressure gases 
leaving the muzzle as the bullet exits.  This can be defeated by trapping the gases and 
allowing them to dissipate their energy using a tube containing a series of baffles, 
attached to the muzzle of the weapon – the ‘silencer’, more correctly termed a 
‘suppressor’, a device successfully demonstrated by Hiram Maxim on a series of rifles, 
including a .22 Winchester, in 1909.  The sound of Maxim’s Winchester firing was 
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described by the New York Times as:  ‘… a “click” about as loud as one would make by 
snapping the trigger of an old-fashioned musket.’45  The final element is the ‘ballistic 
crack’, a small sonic boom, caused by the bullet, or air surrounding the bullet, travelling 
faster than the speed of sound (circa 1100 ft/s depending on conditions).  This can be 
obviated by using ammunition which is already sub-sonic, such as the .45ACP round 
used in the Thompson SMG, or bleeding gases from behind the bullet to reduce muzzle 
velocity to a sub-sonic rate. 
 
 
A Winchester Model 69 with 
British proof marks and a 
Winchester 5x telescopic 
sight, for sale in 2008 
through an American 
dealer.  The photographs 
illustrate the profile of a 
normal civilian 5x 
telescopic sight of the 
period.  This is what many 
of the Auxunit .22 rifles 
would have looked like.   
(Photograph Cabelas)46 
 
 
 
 
 
A .22 rifle can be virtually silent if subsonic ammunition (around 950 ft/s) is used, but 
this low-velocity ammunition further diminishes the hitting power of what is already a 
low powered round.  With a muzzle velocity of 1085 ft/s, standard .22LR ammunition, 
such as that used by the British Army on miniature ranges, is subsonic to transonic 
under most temperatures experienced in the UK.47  On firing, the Auxiliary Unit sniper 
would have made some sound, but one that would be almost impossible to pinpoint, or 
even identify as a shot.  But, there remains the problem of the round’s hitting power.  
Oxenden (1998, p.12) was quite specific about the purpose of the silenced .22 rifles:  
‘These weapons were intended at first for the sniping of enemy sentries, and to fill the 
larder’.  .22 rifles are typically used to shoot small game or vermin such as squirrels, 
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rats or rabbits at ranges out to 150 yards.  Foxes can be shot at up to 80 yards, and 
American figures give 65 yards for animals as large as coyotes – and these must be head 
or chest shots.  In 1970 a Home Office committee, convened to examine police use of 
sniping rifles, examined various options and calibres.  On the subject of .22 ammunition 
the committee reported:48 
 The .22” Long Rifle rim-fire cartridge which is made in the United Kingdom 
 lacks hitting power even in the sporting, high velocity versions and is accurate 
 only within 100 yards.  Even, up to this range, and some way beyond it, it is 
 much inferior in hitting power to the recommended pistol cartridge.  
 
An un-silenced 
Winchester Model 61 
.22 rifle with a 
telescopic sight, used by 
an Auxiliary Unit patrol 
in Bath, Somerset.  (Via 
Robert Millard) 
 
 
We can conclude that, as originally conceived, the Auxiliary Unit sniper might have 
expected to drop an enemy with a well-aimed shot (avoiding his steel helmet, if worn) 
at around 50-75 yards range.  Robert Millard, whose patrol was armed with a 
Winchester repeater very similar to the one illustrated, elaborated: 
Re:  .22 sniping.  I have tried to think pragmatically about this.  In my two visits 
to Coleshill [training centre, in early and late 1941] nothing was said about 
sniping sentries, they were to be dealt with by the F-S knife, the garrotte (a 
problem with a coal scuttle helmet, tunic collar and chin strap) and a blow to the 
temple or carotid artery with the rubber truncheon.  Two of us were rifle club 
members so 100 yds with target sights was standard.  Rabbits at 75 yds with a 
scope was also a familiar shot.  However, these were shots taken at leisure and 
under no stress.  We practised in a quarry at about 100 yards and with a scope I 
could make a head shot in twilight conditions BUT no stress, a still target and a 
comfortable firing position.  A sentry is not going to be standing in the open 
with the moon behind him … we had a Winchester 74 which is a semi automatic 
so two or three quick chest shots was a possibility. 
 
Given the relatively short range, the lack of adjustment on the No. 42 sight would not 
represent too much of a problem, as long as the sight was squarely mounted on the rifle.  
A telescopic sight would certainly help ensure absolute accuracy, and ‘gather light’ in 
poor light conditions, but the .22s were definitely not going to assassinate anyone at 
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ranges out to one mile.  As Oxenden commented (1998, p.12):  ‘In the end they proved 
their value for competitive training’.49  
 
During the Second World War much more effective silenced weapons were available to 
the special operations community – the De Lisle carbine, silenced Sten guns, and 
Oxenden’s favourite, the Welrod pistol.  Post-war Territorial Army four man stay-
behind patrols were issued a single L34A1 silenced Sterling sub-machine gun, a weapon 
consanguineous with the Lanchester machine carbine and the De Lisle carbine.50  The 
L34A1, it was assumed, would deal with any silent killing that needed to be done, no 
thought being given to the use of fighting knives, garrottes or coshes.  We might, 
therefore, reasonably expect to see a silenced Sten or De Lisle carbine in service with 
the wartime Auxiliary Units, but the key here is timing.  Work on the De Lisle and 
silenced Mk II Sten did not begin until mid-to-late1942 (rather later for the Welrod51), 
by which time the Auxiliary Units had already identified the requirement, and met it by 
issuing silenced .22 rifles in the winter of 1941-42.  This undoubtedly reflected the 
benefit of having an organisation containing numbers of poachers and gamekeepers, 
who would have been familiar with silenced smallbore rifles.  By 1943, when specially 
built silenced military small arms started to become available, the contingency for 
which the Auxiliary Units had needed them was impossibly remote, and organisation 
itself was deliberately keeping a low profile to avoid being stood-down.52 
 
This thesis has, thus far, made every effort to stress the effectiveness of Home Guard 
weapons that have traditionally been characterised as ineffective.  It might therefore 
seem strange that we have rather diminished the Auxiliary Units’ two ‘signature’ 
weapons, their F-S fighting knives and silenced rifles.  However, the aim of this whole 
body of work has been to achieve a balanced assessment of the Home Guard’s military 
effectiveness, and to concentrate on daggers and sniping is to totally miss the point.  
The Auxilier’s personal weapons and small arms were never more than a means to end, 
a way of ensuring the success of their real task, which was demolition and destruction 
using explosives and incendiaries.  Oxenden makes this quite plain in his 
recommendations, should a similar force ever be called into being: 
PERSONAL WEAPONS.  There are strong arguments against the 
carrying of firearms on night operations [the only sort of operation seriously 
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considered for Auxunit patrols].  One shot could betray the presence of the 
patrol and turn the attack into a headlong rout. 
  The only weapon of this sort that could be used without wrecking the 
 chances of the attackers is one that is silent and fitted with luminous sights.  
 Such a pistol has been produced under the name of ‘Welrod.’ 
 
To illustrate the sort of use to which Oxenden would have seen Auxunit firearms put, it 
is worthwhile reproducing the ‘general instructions for use’ from the Welrod manual,53 
although it must be stressed that there is no evidence of Auxiliary Units ever having 
used this weapon.  
 
The .32in (7.65mm) Welrod Mk. II 
with magazine / pistol grip removed.  
(REME Museum) 
 
 
 
 
  
 Function: 
 The 9mm.  Welrod is a silent single shot pistol, intended for use by specially 
 trained operators for specific tasks. 
 
 General Description: 
 The Weapon is a specially constructed single shot pistol with a detachable 
 silencer.  It is silent, reliable in action and easy to conceal.  It is accurate up to 
 30 yards in daylight or 20 yards on a fairly light night, but is most effective 
 when fired in contact with the target. 
 
 Notes on use: 
 The gun has three distinct and separate uses: 
 
a) For aimed and deliberate shots in daylight or darkness.  The effective range 
of the gun with normal handling is 15/30 yards.  For deliberate shots, 
extreme accuracy is required and can only be obtained by correct trigger 
squeeze, i.e. a gradual squeeze by the whole hand.  With training and 
practice it is possible to obtain very accurate groups at the distances 
mentioned.  The gun should be held with the thumb and forefinger of the left 
hand as close up to the muzzle as possible, the pistol grip being held by the 
right hand.  For standing shots, the left elbow should be as close to the body 
as possible and the rear of the gun approximately 6”/7” from the operator’s 
eye. 
 
b) Without its silencer and used as a single-shot weapon. 
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c) By use of the weapon at the closest quarters, i.e. with the muzzle against the 
target.  For this purpose no special training is required. 
 
We have seen that each Auxilier was issued a quantity of equipment and weapons to 
keep at home, while more was stored by the patrol commander.  The third and final 
component of the patrol’s equipment was stored at their underground hide or OB 
(operating base) (Angell, 1996, p.69):54 
 
 Grenades 36M  48 
 Aux units Mk. II  1 
 Compass magnetic  1 
 Tyre cutter   1 
 Spare detonators  50 
 First aid set   1 
 Monocular and case  1 
 Primus stove   1 
 Lamps hurricane  2 
 Pick and helve   1 
 Pouches basic   2 
 Shovels   2 
 Det. Carriers   8 
 M.E.B. [?]   48 
 Elsan and Elsanol   1 [Chemical toilet and fluid] 
 Tripwire rolls   24 
 Trapwire rolls   24 
 Ammunition .450  1200 
  ,, 9mm  1250 
  ,, .22  200 
 Bottles AW   48 
 Release switches  50 
 Pull switches   50 
 Pressure switches  50 
 Paraffin     up to 10 gals. per patrol 
 Thermometer   1 
 Shell dressings    up to 4 per patrol 
 Telephone cable        already laid 
 Plastic H.E.     up to 30lbs per patrol 
 L. delays 1hr   15) unless L. delays for aux unit 
 L. delays 3hr   15)     Mk II have been issued 
 Cotton waste   ½lb 
 Crimping tools  4 
 C.T.I. (where issued)  60 [copper tube igniters] 
 Striker boards   24 
 Magnets   24 
 Time pencils (where issued) 240 
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 Camouflage cream  3 black 
  ,,   3 green 
  ,,   3 brown 
 
The OB stores list brings us full circle, as it includes 15 ‘packs’, in this case the ‘Aux 
units Mk II’, as well as significant additional quantities of explosives and initiators of 
various sorts.  The inclusion of Mk II Aux units and L-delay timers puts this list late in 
the Auxiliary Units brief history, probably 1943.  It is interesting to note that the patrol 
has two cases of ‘AW Bottles’ (No. 76 SIP grenades), but the sticky bomb (No. 74 
grenade) is not mentioned, although it featured in the first two editions of the Auxunit 
textbook, the “Calendar 1937” and “1938”.55 
 
  
ST grenade from the Auxunits’ 
second textbook, the ‘Calendar 
1938’.  As used by Auxiliary Units, 
the Mills initiator was replaced with 
a time pencil (see below) and a 
length of safety fuse, giving a much 
longer delay than the usual 5 
seconds. (Via Robert Millard) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Auxiliary Unit mission started out, as Oxenden put it, as:  ‘the indiscriminate and 
malicious damage of anything that worked’ (Oxenden, 1998, p.5).’  Incendiarism and 
wrecking the transport infrastructure was a role recognizable to francs-tireurs of the 
Franco-Prussian war and Lawrence’s Arab irregulars of the First World War.  However, 
as we have seen in previous chapters, in 1940-41, British high command was rather 
more vexed by the threat of panzers running unchecked across the Home Counties than 
the Deutsche Reichsbahn Gesellschaft taking over the Southern Railway.  In short 
order, the Auxiliary Units patrols became some of the specialist ‘tank hunters’ referred 
to in Tank Hunting and Destruction of August 1940.56  Working on Lawrence’s dictum 
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that materiel is harder to replace than men, in those vital hours and days after a landing, 
the fifty snorkelling PzKpfw III and IV ‘Tauchpanzers’ would have been a worthwhile 
target for patrols, whose operational life expectancy was only ever going to be measured 
in days.  In Oxenden’s words (1998, p.5):  ‘Briefly, sabotage gave place to attack by 
night, mainly upon A.F.V.’  Tank and steamroller hulks were arranged in the grounds of 
the Auxiliary Units headquarters at Coleshill House to represent AFVs parked-up in a 
tactical laager, for the Auxiliers to practice placing sticky bombs and other charges on 
the vehicles at night (Lampe, 2007, p.77). 
 
 
Cutaway illustration of the 
No. 77 phosphorous smoke 
grenade, taken from the 
third and final auxunit 
textbook “The 
Countryman’s Diary 
1939”.  (Author’s 
collection via John 
Warwicker) 
 
 
 
 
 
Apart from ST and SIP grenades, the Auxiliers were also issued, as we have seen, with 
No. 36M (Mills) grenades, and, later, the No. 77, a phosphorous smoke grenade, using 
the ubiquitous No. 247 ‘All-ways’ fuse.  This grenade never reached the remainder of 
the Home Guard (nor indeed did any smoke grenade or generator, the No. 76 SIP being 
used instead).  The No. 77, which was in service by July 1942, was described as a ‘hand 
percussion smoke grenade’.57  It was not, strictly speaking, a weapon, as it was designed 
to burst producing an instantaneous, but short duration, smoke screen.  Being 
phosphorous, it did however have a useful anti-personnel effect.  For the Auxiliary 
Units patrols, this combination of instant and noxious smoke was an excellent way to 
discourage pursuit, and the Auxiliary Units took to the No. 77.  In November 1943 
Auxiliary Units placed an order for 50,000 No. 77 grenades (exceeding their issue 
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recommendation by 2,500%), which was optimistic and, at that stage in the war, asking 
for trouble.  The issue was eventually approved in January 1944, subject to being 
phased over three months (Warwicker, 2004, p.48).  Oxenden (1998, p.27) placed the 
No. 77 grenade alongside the Welrod as an item required for any Auxilier of the future: 
 The No 77 is the grenade that would prove most useful on patrol.  There is no 
 indication of the point from which it is thrown, and there is no chance of 
 taking cover from it.  It would always baffle pursuit. 
  In short no arms are needed but the Welrod for attack and the 77 for 
 defence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photograph of the Time Pencil, and as illustrated and explained in “The Countryman’s 
Diary 1939”.  (Author’s collection via John Warwicker.  Colour illustration, via Robert 
Millard) 
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To return to explosives, the period 1940-41 saw increasing use of a diversity of 
initiators, including time pencils, and pressure and pull switches.  The time pencil was 
one of the earliest and most important products of MI(R).  Commander Langley began 
work to produce a simple, silent, reliable timer which could fire an HE charge or 
incendiary, in early 1939.  Work on the rate at which corrosive solutions ate through 
wire being carried out in laboratories at the University of London.  Langley’s design 
(for it was his, and not Polish, as is sometimes stated) was produced in immense 
quantities and remained in use throughout the Second World War and beyond.  
12,800,000 ‘pencil time fuses’ were produced in the UK, more in the USA, and it was 
copied by other nations including the USSR.58  Throughout British special operations 
the 1940-41 period was one of exuberant enthusiasm and experimentation, characterised 
by a boyish attitude to explosive devices.  Booby trapping was elevated to something of 
a team sport, and Commandos, Station XII, and the rest, competed to see who could 
most surprise visitors from the other sections with exploding lavatory seats and 
mattresses rigged with coils of instantaneous fuse – calculated to levitate the occupant 
of an army cot just short of the ceiling.59  This gaiety doubtless owes much to the 
irrepressible character of Major Leslie John Cardew Wood, who succeeded Langley as 
Officer Commanding Station XII at Aston House.  The war news was shaky, but within 
the special operations community, anything and everything was possible. 
 
This culture encouraged offensive spirit, inventive solutions and an easiness with 
explosives, but for the part-timers of the Auxiliary Units there were disadvantages as 
use of explosive devices became more complex.  Mid-1941 saw targets begin to shift 
towards airfields, threatening any German air bridge and efforts to maintain local air 
superiority.  The patrols were also reorganised to be able to mount large-scale ‘group’ 
attacks, which, as MBRO Director Andrew Taylor has pointed out, seriously 
compromised the original, relatively secure, cellular structure of the force (Warwicker, 
2004, p.34).  Oxenden comments (1998, p.11): 
Operational complexity at this time was accompanied by a boom in ‘practical 
jokes’.  New mechanisms and new ideas for booby traps were constantly 
cropping up, and although they may have increased the ‘explosive- mindedness’ 
of some of the auxiliers, they unquestionably produced a state of mental fog in 
the remainder.  This was realised later, and teaching amended accordingly. 
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Explosives hardware – 
left to right, a pull switch 
for booby traps, an awl 
for making detonator 
holes in gelignite, awl 
blade cover with W^D 
marking, fuse 
cutter/crimping tool with 
copper clad prod for 
opening detonator holes.  
(Author’s photograph) 
 
 
 
 
 
As we have noted with relation to the Auxiliers’ smallarms, the final recommendation 
in Oxenden’s PXR was simplicity.  Just as the possession of an armoury of firearms was 
more likely to result in the patrols being compromised, so the construction of elaborate 
booby traps was more likely to defeat the object of the mission (Oxenden, 1998, p.15):  
 Once the matter was seriously questioned it became increasingly obvious that 
 the auxilier had been in some respects over-rated, and that such a policy would 
 inevitably mean confusion and inefficiency in action. 
  Tests of cross-sections of the unit here and there showed that, after two 
 years training, less was known about the use of explosives than in 1940, that 
 many of the ‘toys’ since issued would never, and could never successfully be 
 used, and that liaison between patrols was little more than wishful thinking, 
 and questionable at that.  At one stroke our policy had been cleared of much 
 hampering undergrowth.  From now on the patrol was self-contained and 
 would fight alone; from now on the rank and file would not be asked to think. 
 
A practical outcome of the re-think was the development of a one-size-fits-all ‘unit 
charge’ that could be pre-prepared and used for almost any sabotage task.  Oxenden 
explained (1998, p.16): 
 1lb was fixed as a weight of explosive that was light enough to carry in 
 reasonable numbers, and powerful enough for all practical purposes.  A simple 
 make-up was adopted as official, universally taught, and illustrated in our 
 revised textbook, the ‘Calendar 1938’.  Briefly, the charge had one ounce of 
 primer and a twelve inch tail of detonating fuse, to which were taped two time 
 pencils with detonators.  The fuse itself ended in a double loop, for threading 
 when necessary onto a ‘ring main’. 
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  The auxilier would not now be asked to play with bits and pieces in the 
 target area, or to devise ‘booby traps’ under the noses of enemy sentries, 
 where his powers of thought might not be at their clearest; his work would 
 simply be to get in and place a unit charge, a form of fieldcraft that had 
 reached a very high standard.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The 1lb unit charge, as 
illustrated in the 
“Calendar 1938” (Via 
Robert Millard) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By the time the final Auxiliary Unit manual, “The Countryman’s Diary 1939” was 
issued, the unit charge had further diminished to ½lb.60  Where larger amounts of 
explosive were required, multiple charges were used on a ‘ring main’.  Each man was to 
carry nine or ten of these down the front of his battledress blouse, in waterproof paper 
bags (to prevent the explosives giving a severe headache).  It is evident from the OB 
stores list that the patrols had considerable stores of explosive, and the potential to do a 
great deal of damage for as long as they could remain operational.  To reinforce the 
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point, it is worthwhile listing the explosive stores recorded by a Royal Army Ordnance 
Corps NCO when the explosive stores of the five Auxiliary Unit patrols in Dengie 
Marshes in Essex were finally handed over to the authorities on 7 April 1964 (Lampe, 
2007, pp.146-7): 
 14,738 rounds of ammunition for pistols, rifles and sub-machine-guns,  
  including a quantity of incendiary rounds 
 1,205lbs of gelignite, of Nobel 808 and of plastic explosive, most of it in a 
  safe enough condition to take away 
 3,742ft delayed action fuse 
 930ft instantaneous safety fuse 
 250ft detonating cord 
 1,447 time pencils 
 1,207 L-delay switches [a later form of time pencil which, instead of relying 
  on acid, is triggered by induced metal fatigue] 
 1,271 detonators of various types 
 719 push, pull and pressure-release booby-trap switches 
 314 paraffin bombs and 
 340 igniters for these bombs and for the safety fuses 
 131 fog signals 
 121 smoke bombs 
 212 thunderflashes 
 571 primers 
 36 1lb slabs of gun cotton 
 4 hand-grenades 
 10 phosphorous grenades 
 33 time-pencils and booby trap switches attached to made-up charges 
 
 
The Home Guard Auxiliary Units patrols demonstrated that outstandingly high 
standards of professionalism could be achieved by unpaid part-timers.  They also 
demonstrated the need to concentrate on doing a small number of things very well, and 
avoid the temptation to increase interest and variety at the expense of quality.  These 
conclusions were equally applicable to the Home Guard as a whole.  In the end, 
commitment and determination, a silenced pistol and a unit charge, were as much as the 
Auxiliary Units really needed, everything else was simply impedimenta. 
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 The author served in the Honourable Artillery Company in the 1980s, when stay-behind patrols, 
expected to operate as forward artillery observers behind Soviet lines in the event of war, were each 
issued with a single L34A1 silenced Sterling SMG.  Following the issue of the SA80A1 assault rifle in 
the mid-1990s the silenced SMG was withdrawn without replacement. 
51
 There were two versions of the Welrod, the Mk II in .32in and the Mk I in 9mm.  The Mk II appears to 
have come into service first, during 1943, the Mk I arrived later, mid-1944.  See:  
www.timelapse.dk/production.php.  Accessed 11/2/2008 
52
 ‘The first year had been a blaze of wild priority; then in 1941 and 1942 had followed a period of 
organised power, guarded by a security that nobody 
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and now, in 1943 there was, throughout the areas, a realisation that the soundest attitude was 
unobtrusiveness.’  Oxenden, 1998, p.21. 
53
 Reproduced at http://timelapse.dk/mk.I.php.  Accessed 11/2/2008 
54
 Angell, 1996, p.69. 
55
 Equipment covered in the first Auxiliary Unit handbook, included the paraffin incendiary, SIP grenade, 
time pencil and the sticky bomb. 
56
 Tank Hunting and Destruction, Military Training Pamphlet No. 42, War Office, 29 August 1940. 
57
 Small Arms Training, Volume I, Pamphlet No. 13, Grenade, 1942, War Office, 1942, p.35. 
58
 Aston House production figures, reproduced in Turner, Aston House Station 12, appendix A. 
59
 Colonel L.J.C. Wood, interview.  Turner, 2006, p.65. 
60
 Talent, P., ‘The Countryman’s Diary 1939’, Coleshill, 1943, p.41. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Who is the Happy Warrior, who is he? 
How different from what he used to be!” 
 
‘Portrait of a soldier’, by E.H. Shepard, Punch, 12 May 1943.  Marking the third 
anniversary of the formation of the Home Guard, Shepard questions the changes that 
have overtaken the Home Guard from the relatively easygoing days of LDV armband, 
pitchfork and cudgel to the bewildering armoury of weapons in use by May 1943.1 
 
This thesis grew out of an observation that Home Guard weapons in the Bapty 
collection were of a significantly better quality than popularly imagined, which 
suggested that the combat power of the wartime Home Guard was being seriously 
underestimated.  Subsequent examination of the few modern books on the subject, 
revealed that (with the possible exception of Ian Beckett) the authors had accepted the 
poor quality of the Home Guard arsenal without question; indeed Professor S.P. 
MacKenzie based his hypothesis on the premise that Home Guard was armed with 
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‘weapons which in reality were of dubious fighting value, but which in all probability 
would never have to be fired in anger and could be presented as worthwhile’ 
(MacKenzie, 1996, p.177).  In contrast, it should now be clear that monopolising 
imported American weapons placed the Home guard at a significant advantage over 
other components of Home Defence.  The accurate, high velocity, M1917 rifle was 
ideally suited to the Home Guard who, even the authors of training manuals finally 
admitted, were better off relying on marksmanship than ‘cold steel’.  Of the Home 
Guard’s automatic weapons, the Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR), whilst not as good a 
section automatic as the Bren gun, was sufficiently highly regarded by US forces to 
have remained in service until the Vietnam war.  The Browning medium machinegun 
was another highly effective weapon that the Home Guard shared with American 
troops, while the Vickers machinegun – although unpopular with the Americans – 
continued to serve with British infantry battalions until 1968.  The Home Guard’s main 
light machinegun, the Lewis, had only retired from frontline service with the British 
Army in 1938 and still equipped some of the TA units of the BEF.  Far from being a 
‘cast-off’, the Lewis was in universal demand – particularly in a light anti-aircraft role – 
throughout the Second World War. 
 
Professor MacKenzie dismissed the Home Guard’s unconventional weapons: ‘mass 
production of cheap, ineffective weapons such as the Northover Projector allowed the 
War Office to have its cake and eat it too.  Maintaining the Home Guard from 1941 
onward cost about £1,000,000 a month … a tiny fraction of what was being spent on the 
regular Army’ (MacKenzie, 1996, p.177)   But this is just too cynical: the Sten gun, for 
all its shortcomings, was one of the most successful British smallarms designs of all 
time.  The ST grenade saw service in the Western Desert and occupied Europe, and was 
not obsolete until 1955; the Spigot Mortar too saw action in the Middle East.  The 
Northover differed little in effectiveness from the Holman Projector, which equipped 
fishing boats, merchant vessels, and minor naval vessels, and the Smith gun was issued 
to RAF Regiment airfield defence units.  These were not, on the balance of evidence, 
tokens to appease a noisy Home Guard ‘lobby’, but genuine attempts to provide 
weapons at a time when demand entirely exceeded Britain’s capacity to produce.  They 
were also optimised for static defence, which is why they continued to meet the 
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requirements of the Home Guard, whilst becoming obsolete for the Regular Army, as it 
turned to the offensive. 
 
As the demand for manpower to meet Britain’s military commitments became 
unsustainable, the burden of Home Defence increasingly fell to the Home Guard.   
MacKenzie states that: 
 [When ] there were no more sub-artillery curiosities dating from 1940 to draw 
upon … it remained War Office policy to keep introducing ‘new’ weapons to the 
Home Guard … for the sake of appearances …  Only when very obsolete 
weapons (such as the Northover Projector and the dreaded pikes) could be 
replaced at once with marginally less ineffective cast-offs from the Army (such 
as the 18-pounder field gun or 2-pounder anti-tank gun) was anything taken out 
of service. (MacKenzie, 1996, p.135) 
 
To suggest that service weapons such as the 18pr or 2pr were only marginally more 
effective than the Northover Projector is either to significantly overrate the performance 
of the Northover or underrate the performance of two early mainstays of the regular 
artillery.  Such statements are careless, and cannot help form a coherent idea of the 
Home Guard’s military potential.  Over time the Home Guard acquired a suite of 
weapons – improvised, obsolescent, current and experimental – which constituted the 
Home Defence arsenal.  Effective ranges were shortened and tactics altered to continue 
to make the most of each weapon (the Northover Projector being a prime example) and 
weapons moved back from ‘frontline’ Home Guard units to less immediately threatened 
ones.  It is difficult, when all things are considered, to find fault with such a strategy. 
 
In the final analysis, the Home Guard arsenal had two significant shortcomings: firstly, 
there were not ‘plenty of rifles’ – an already discredited Government failed to meet 
public expectation of a service rifle for every Volunteer, leading to the perception that 
the authorities were not taking the Volunteers seriously and, subsequently, that any 
equipment issued that differed from that of a British line infantryman was ersatz.  
Secondly, there were always more Volunteers than weapons – although, from the arrival 
of the first US shipments in late summer 1940, the Home Guard, as a domestic 
resistance army, was luxuriously equipped – compared to the French Forces of the 
Interior (FFI), for example.  The cherished image of old men and boys preparing to 
meet the Nazis with pikes is a synthesis. It combines a folk memory of the period, in 
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June and July 1940, when the LDV (largely made of volunteers in their prime, but not 
yet liable for call-up) impatiently awaited the arrival of its weapons – and the latter part 
of the Home Guard’s existence, 1943-44, when the rapacious demands of conscription 
increasingly confined the Home Guard to the middle-aged and under-aged.  As we have 
seen, the pikes were, in any case, shared with the regular troops of Anti-aircraft 
Command.  One cannot help but notice the devastating effect of those adjectives ‘old’ 
and ‘First World War’ – and conclude that there is one rule for describing Home Guard 
equipment, and another for everyone else’s.  Describing the Home Guard’s rifles as 
‘First World War’ is to suggest that there was another kind.  There wasn’t.  The 
cherished SMLE of the Regular Army dated from 1907, and the only truly modern rifle 
was the No. 4 Lee-Enfield, which was not generally available until 1943 – at which 
point it began to be issued to the Home Guard.  
 
In order to make the argument that the weapons of the Home Guard were fit for 
purpose, it has been necessary to examine them all, to avoid the charge of being 
selective with the evidence.  That has pushed even a PhD thesis to its limits, as there is a 
great deal of ground to cover.  Having made the point in general terms, there is now 
scope for much more detailed examination of the various areas.  The reasons for the 
shortage of service rifles in 1940, and the development, sponsorship and service history 
of the sub-artillery are two subjects that merit further serious examination.  More 
broadly, the Home Guard returns, held at the National Archive, have only been used in 
the most basic manner in this study, to illustrate when a certain item entered service, 
and how many were in use at a given time.  The returns have considerably more 
potential for statistical analysis.  It would for example, be most interesting to model the 
roll-out of new weapon types across the country.  One would expect to see a ‘wave’ 
spreading inland from the south and east coasts, but the indications are that this is not 
the case, and new items like Sten guns plugged gaps in less front line areas first.  In 
many ways, home defence, 19390-45 offers an ideal opportunity for research that is 
both accessible and innovative, and prime examples used in this study are the 
University of East Anglia ‘Defence of Walberswick’ project2 and Russell W. Barnes’ 
‘Defence of Workington’.3 
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To usefully examine Home Defence we have to get past what Calder characterised as 
the ‘Myth of The Blitz’.  Ian Beckett has noted the extent to which even contemporary 
images of the Home Guard differ from reality: ‘many contemporary accounts were 
redolent with a rustic imagery of oak, elm, cow-byres and village cricket grounds that 
paid only lip service to the realities of a force largely urban and industrial in 
composition’(Beckett, 1991, p.278).  We have seen how, from the very outset, the 
emotional levers of the Home Guard were pulled not by vicious street fighting in the 
London suburbs or tank-killing in ‘metroland’, but defence of a rural ‘Dream of 
England’.  By the same token, Omdurman veterans back in uniform, ‘Three Generations 
Serving Together’ and antiquated or eccentric arms made the best press for the 
contemporary media.4  Such is the power of these myths that, bolstered by Dad’s Army, 
they filter and constrain our understanding of the reality of ‘Total Defence’.  In more 
mundane reality the Home Guard, drilling twice a week and exercising with the ‘Field 
Force’, while world war rage around and above them, must have been – at the very least 
– the equal of the pre-war Territorial Army.  Historians need to set mythology aside and 
– with an affectionate nod to Dad’s Army – recognise the Home Guard as the United 
Kingdom’s most fundamental response to ‘Total War’, and a real and potent component 
of Home Defence during that period when the eventual course and outcome of the 
Second World War was entirely uncertain. 
 
DALE CLARKE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Reproduced in Summerfield and Penniston-Bird, Contesting Home Defence, pp.122-123. 
2
 www.walberswickww2.co.uk/academic-research 
3
 www.users.globalnet.co.uk/~rwbarnes/index.htm 
4
 See: Beckett, 1991, p.269.  Also: ‘Is it a Family Record? Three Generations in Home Guard at Dunton 
Green,’ Sevenoaks Chronicle, 4 July 1941. 
 315 
REFERENCES 
 
 
Agar, H. 
(1972) 
Britain Alone: June 1940-
June1941 
Bodley Head, London. 
Angell, Stewart. 
(1996) 
Secret Sussex Resistance:  1940-
1944. 
Middleton Press, Midhurst. 
Archer, F.,  
(1975) 
When Village Bells were Silent. Hodder and Stoughton, 
London. 
Ashworth, E.W. 
(1998) 
Dad’s Army against the 
Panzers. 
Military Illustrated, No 120, 
May 1998. 
Ballou, James L., 
ed. Stevens, R. 
Blake.  
(2000) 
Rock in a Hard Place:  The 
Browning Automatic Rifle. 
Collector Grade Publications, 
Ontario. 
Banks, Lieut. 
A.G 
(1950)  
“A.G.’s” Book of the Rifle, 4th 
edition. 
Jordan and Sons, London. 
Barlow, Lt. Col., 
J.A. 
(1942) 
The Elements of Rifle Shooting, 
3rd edition. 
Gale and Polden, Aldershot. 
Baxley, Major 
Brian T. 
(1997) 
9 April 1940 German Invasion 
of Norway - The Dawn of 
Decisive Airpower During Joint 
Military Operations. 
The Research Department, 
Air Command and Staff 
College (US).  Available 
online at 
www.blackvault.com 
/documents/ADA394016.pdf 
Baxter, Ian. 
(2001) 
Hitler’s Last Defenders. Military Illustrated, No. 156, 
May 2001. 
Beardmore, G.,  
(1984) 
 
Civilians at War: Journals 
1938-1946, 
John Murray, London. 
Beckett, Ian F. 
W. 
(1991) 
The Amateur Military Tradition 
1558-1945. 
Manchester University Press, 
Manchester. 
Breer, A.  
(2007) 
American Acquisition of French 
Field Artillery in the Great War. 
Western Front Association-USA 
Phi Alpha Theta prizewinning 
essay, 2007 
Available online at: 
www.wfa-
usa.org/new/wfa_pat.htm 
Briggs, Asa. 
(1995) 
The Channel Islands:  
Occupation and Liberation 
1940-45. 
B.T. Batsford, Imperial War 
Museum, London. 
Brophy, John, ill. 
Kennington, Eric. 
(1945) 
 
Britain’s Home Guard:  A 
Character Study. 
George G. Harrap, London. 
 316 
Brophy, John. 
(1941a) 
Home Guard:  A Handbook for 
the L.D.V.  6th impression. 
Hodder and Stoughton, 
London. 
Brophy, John. 
(1941b) 
Advanced Training for the 
Home Guard, with Ten 
Specimen Field Exercises. 
Hodder and Stoughton, 
London. 
Brophy, John. 
(1942) 
A Home Guard Handbook.  
Revised ed., second impression. 
Hodder and Stoughton, 
London. 
Brown, G.L. and 
Peek, A.W. 
(1944) 
1940-44, Being a Diary of “D” 
Company 20th Bn. Kent H.G. 
Sevenoaks, private circulation 
only. 
Cambs. and Isle 
of Ely TAA – 
The 
Cambridgeshire 
and Isle of Ely 
Territorial Army 
Association. 
(1944) 
“We Also Served” – The Story 
of the Home Guard in 
Cambridgeshire and the Isle of 
Ely. 
W. Heffer and Sons, 
Cambridge 
Canfield, Bruce 
N. 
(1991) 
A Collectors Guide to 
Winchester in the Service. 
Andrew Mowbray, Rhode 
Island. 
Carrol, David. 
(1999) 
The Home Guard. Sutton Publishing, Stroud. 
Cassar, George 
H. 
(1998) 
The Forgotten Front:  The 
British campaigns in Italy, 
1917-1918. 
Continuum International 
Publishing, London. 
Chamberlain 
Peter and Gander, 
Terry. (1975a)  
WW2 Fact File Series:  Infantry, 
Mountain and Airborne Guns. 
Macdonald and Jane’s 
Publishers, London. 
Chamberlain 
Peter and Gander, 
Terry. (1975c) 
WW2 Fact File Series:  Mortars 
and Rockets. 
Macdonald and Jane’s 
Publishers, London. 
Chamberlain 
Peter, and 
Gander, Terry. 
(1974) 
WW2 Fact File Series:  
Machine Guns. 
Macdonald and Jane’s 
Publishers, London. 
Chamberlain 
Peter, and 
Gander, Terry. 
(1975b) 
WW2 Fact File Series:  Light 
and Medium Field Artillery. 
Macdonald and Jane’s 
Publishers, London. 
Chamberlain 
Peter, and 
Gander, Terry. 
(1976) 
WW2 Facts File Series: Allied 
Pistols, Rifles and Grenades. 
Macdonald and Jane’s 
Publishers, London. 
Churchill, 
Winston S. 
(1954a) 
The Second World War:  
Volume One:  The Gathering 
Storm, 8th impression. 
 
Reprint Society, London. 
 317 
Churchill, 
Winston S. 
(1955) 
The Second World War:  
Volume Two:  Their Finest 
Hour, 8th impression. 
Reprint Society, London. 
Churchill, 
Winston S. 
(1954b) 
The Second World War:  
Volume Four:  The Hinge of 
Fate, 8th impression. 
Reprint Society, London. 
Clarke, Dale, ill. 
Delf, Brian. 
(2004) 
British Artillery 1914-19:  Field 
Artillery. 
Osprey Publishing, Oxford. 
Cole, Howard 
and Fulton, 
Robin. 
(1990) 
The Story of Bisley. Biddles, Guildford. 
Cornish, P.  
(2003) 
Clandestine Weapons and the 
Welwyn Connection (lecture 
notes). 
Report (Quarterly Bulletin of 
the Historical Breech Loading 
Smallarms Association), 
London, July 2003, p.35. 
Danchev A. and 
Todman, D (eds.) 
(2001) 
Field Marshall Lord 
Alanbrooke. War Diaries 1939-
1945. 
Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 
London. 
Davis, William C. 
(1989) 
Rebels and Yankees, The 
Fighting Men of the Civil War. 
Salamander, London. 
Delaney, J. 
(1996) 
The Blitzkrieg Campaigns. Arms and Armour Press, 
London. 
Dowling, 
Christopher. 
(1970) 
The Campaign of Hate Purnell’s History of the First 
World War, Vol.  2, No.  13, 
London. 
Easterly, William 
M., ed. Stevens, 
R. Blake.  
(1998) 
The Belgian Rattlesnake:  The 
Lewis Automatic Machine Gun, 
a Social and Technical 
Biography of the Gun and its 
Inventors. 
Collector Grade Publications, 
Ontario. 
Ellis, J. 
(1990) 
The Sharp End: The Fighting 
Man in World WarII, 2nd ed. 
Pimlico, London. 
Fairfax, Ernest. 
(c.1945) 
Calling All Arms.  Hutchinson, London. 
Featherstone, 
Donald, ill. John 
Mollo. 
(1996) 
Weapons and Equipment of the 
Victorian Soldier. 
Arms and Armour Press, 
London. 
Fleischer, 
Wolfgang. 
(1994) 
Panzerfaust and Other German 
Infantry Anti-tank Weapons. 
Schiffer Publishing, Atglen. 
Fleming, Peter. 
(1957) 
Invasion 1940. Rupert Hart-Davis, London. 
Forty, George. 
(1998) 
British Army Handbook 1939-
1945. 
 
Sutton Publishing, Stroud. 
 318 
Foss C.F. (ed.).  
(1981) 
Tanks and Armoured Fighting 
Vehicles, 5th impression. 
Salamander Books, London. 
Foss, Christopher 
(ed.). 
(2002) 
The Encyclopedia of Tanks and 
Armoured Fighting Vehicles. 
Spelmount, Staplehurst. 
French, David. 
(2000) 
Raising Churchill’s Army:  The 
British Army and the War 
against Germany 1919-1945. 
Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
Gander, T. 
(2005) 
Desperate Measures:  The Smith 
Gun. 
Journal of the Ordnance 
Society, Vol.  17, July 2005, 
p.60. 
Gander, Terry 
and Chamberlain, 
Peter.  
(1978) 
Small Arms, Artillery and 
Special Weapons of the Third 
Reich, an Encyclopedic Survey. 
Macdonald and Jane’s 
Publishers, London. 
Gilbert, Adrian. 
(1997) 
Stalk and Kill, the Sniper 
Experience. 
Sidgwick and Jackson, 
London. 
Goldsmith, Dolf 
L., ed. Stevens, 
R. Blake.   
(2006) 
The Browning Machine Gun, 
Volume II:  Rifle Calibre 
Brownings Abroad. 
Collector Grade Publications, 
Ontario. 
Goldsmith, Dolf, 
L., ed. Stevens R. 
Blake. 
(1994) 
The Grand Old Lady of No 
Man’s Land:  The Vickers 
Machinegun. 
Collector Grade Publications, 
Ontario. 
Greene, Graham. 
(1999) 
The Last Word and Other 
Stories. 
Penguin Books, New York. 
Guderian, 
General Heinz, 
trans. Fitzgibbon, 
Constantine. 
(1952) 
Panzer Leader. Michael Joseph, London. 
Gulvin, K.R. 
(1980) 
Kent Home Guard:  A History. North Kent Books, 
Gillingham. 
Hamilton, N. 
(2000) 
Wanted:  Cult of Personality. Times Higher Education 
Supplement, 10 March 2000, 
p.19. 
Headlam, Major 
General Sir John. 
(1937) 
The History of The Royal 
Artillery From the Indian 
Mutiny to the Great War, 
Volume II (1899-1914). 
Royal Artillery Institute, 
Woolwich. 
Henry, Chris, ill.  
Fuller, Mike. 
(2002) 
The 25-pounder Field Gun 
1939-72. 
Osprey Publishing, Oxford. 
Hobart, Major 
F.W.A (Retd.) 
(1973) 
Pictorial History of the Sub-
Machine Gun. 
 
 
Ian Allen, Shepperton. 
 319 
Hogg, Ian and 
Weeks, John. 
(1973) 
Military Smallarms of the 
Twentieth Century. 
Arms and Armour Press, 
London. 
Hogg, Ian V. 
(1979) 
The Encyclopedia of Infantry 
Weapons of World War II, 4th 
impression. 
Arms and Armour Press, 
London. 
Hogg, Ian V. 
(1992) 
The Guinness Encyclopedia of 
Weaponry. 
Quarto Publishing, London. 
Hogg, Ian V. 
(1998) 
Allied Artillery of World War 
Two. 
Crowood Press, Marlborough. 
Hogg, Ian V. 
(2002) 
British & American Artillery of 
World War Two, revised edition. 
Greenhill Books, London. 
Hunt, Richard. 
(2002) 
Uniforms of the Home Guard. Historic Military Press, 
Pulborough. 
Jowitt, The Earl. 
(1954) 
Some were Spies. Hodder and Stoughton, 
London. 
Klee, Karl. 
(1959) 
Dokumente zum Unternehmen 
,,Seelöwe”:  Die geplante 
deutsche Landung in England 
1940. 
Musterschmidt-Verlag, 
Gottingen, Berlin.   
Ladd, James, 
Melton, Keith 
and Mason, 
Captain Peter. 
(1988) 
Clandestine Warfare:  Weapons 
and Equipment of the SOE and 
OSS. 
Blandford Press, London. 
Laidler, P and 
Howroyd, D. 
(1995) 
The Guns of Dagenham. Collector Grade Publications, 
Ontario. 
Laidler, Peter. 
(1993) 
Telescope Sighting No.32, Mk 1 
– OS 466A, Mk 2 – OS 1650A, 
Mk 3 – OS 2039A, including the 
No. 42, 53 & L1 A1:  An inside 
view of the Snipers rifle 
telescope. Reprint of 3rd edition. 
IDSA Books, Piqua. 
Lampe, David., 
int. Sheffield, 
Gary. 
(2007) 
The Last Ditch, reprint with new 
introduction. 
Greenhill Books, London. 
Langdon-Davies, 
John. 
(1941) 
Home Guard Warfare. George Routledge and Sons, 
London. 
Langdon-Davies, 
Major John. 
(1942a) 
The Home Guard Fieldcraft 
Manual.  2nd ed. 
John Murray and the Pilot 
Press, London. 
Langdon-Davies, 
Major John. 
(1942b) 
The Home Guard Training 
Manual.   Facsimile reprint of 
6th edition, 1942. 
 
R.J. Leach, Ditton. 
 320 
Longmate, 
Norman. 
(1974) 
The Real Dad’s Army:  The 
Story of the Home Guard. 
Arrow Books, London. 
Lyall, W. 
(1976) 
Some Memories of Bapty’s 
Gunshop. 
Guns Review, June 1976, 
p.309 
Mace, Martin F. 
(2001) 
Vehicles of the Home Guard. Historic Military Press, 
Pulborough. 
MacKenzie, S.P. 
(1996) 
The Home Guard, paperback 
edition. 
Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
Manders, Lieut. 
E.W. 
(Undated) 
Grenades, EY Rifle and Cup 
Discharger, for the Home 
Guard. 
Practical Press, London. 
Marks, Leo. 
(2000) 
Between Silk and Cynanide:  A 
Codemaker’s War 1941-1945.  
Corrected paperback edition. 
Harper Collins, London. 
Mazower, Mark. 
(1998) 
Inside Hitler’s Greece:  The 
Experience of Occupation, 
1941-44.  2nd paperback edition. 
Yale University Press, New 
Haven. 
Mendenhall, 
Captain M. 
(2004) 
The MP28,II, Successor to the 
MP18,I.  
Small Arms Review, March 
2004. 
MOI - Ministry 
of Information 
(1943) 
Roof Over Britain:  The Official 
Story of Britain’s Anti-aircraft 
Defences 1939-1942. 
HMSO, London. 
MOI – Ministry 
of Information. 
(c.1943) 
Britain’s Modern Army. Odhams Press, London. 
Mondey, David. 
(1997) 
The Concise Guide to Axis 
Aircraft of World War II. 
Reprint, 2nd edition. 
Chancellor Press, London. 
Moore, Captain 
John (ed.). 
(2001) 
Jane’s Fighting Ships of World 
War I (facsimile reprint of 
Jane’s All the World’s 
Ships,1919, with additional 
material from the 1914 edition). 
Random House Group, 
London. 
Oxenden, Major 
N.V.  
(1998) 
Auxiliary Units: History and 
Achievement 1940-1944. 
Reprint of 1944 War Office 
report. 
390th Group Memorial Air 
Museum, Parham. 
Perret, B. 
(1999a)  
Panzerkampwagon III Medium 
Tank, revised edition. 
Osprey Publishing, Oxford. 
Perret, B. 
(1999b) 
Panzerkampfwagon IV Medium 
Tank. 
Osprey Publishing, Oxford. 
Pile, Gen. Sir 
Frederick. 
(1949) 
Ack-Ack:  Britain’s Defence 
against Air Attack during the 
Second World War. 
George G. Harrap, London. 
Ponting, Clive. 
(1990) 
1940:  Myth and Reality. Hamish Hamilton, London. 
 321 
Preston, Anthony 
(ed.). 
(2001) 
Jane’s Fighting Ships of World 
War II (reformatted reprint of 
Jane’s Fighting Ships 1946/47, 
with additional material). 
Random House Group, 
London. 
RAI - Royal 
Artillery 
Institution. 
(1919) 
Growth and Development of the 
Royal Artillery During the War. 
Royal Artillery Institution, 
Woolwich. 
Rawlinson, J.G. 
(2002) 
My War Years, 1939-1946. Temple Sowerby, private 
circulation only. 
Rigden, Denis. 
(2001) 
SOE Syllabus:  Lessons in 
ungentlemanly warfare, World 
War II. 
PRO, Richmond. 
Robinson, 
Captain Ernest H. 
and King, Gordon 
R. 
(1940) 
Rifle Training for War.  3rd ed. Cassell & Company, London. 
Robinson, Derek. 
(2006) 
Invasion 1940, 2nd edition. Constable and Robinson, 
London. 
Schellenberg, SS 
General Walter, 
int. Erickson, 
John. 
(2000) 
Invasion 1940, 2nd ed. St Ermin’s Press with Little, 
Brown and Company, 
London. 
Schenk, P.,  
(1990) 
Sealion – the invasion that never 
was. 
After the Battle, No. 69. 
Seaman, Mark 
(Intro). 
(2000) 
Secret Agent’s Handbook of 
Special Devices.  Reprint of the 
SOE Descriptive Catalogue of 
Special Devices and Supplies 
(1944), with introduction. 
PRO, Richmond. 
Shirer, William 
L. 
(1962) 
The Rise and Fall of the Third 
Reich. 3rd ed. 
Reprint Society, London. 
Shore, Captain C. 
(1997) 
With British Snipers to the 
Reich.  Facsimile reprint of 
1948 first edition. 
Greenhill Books, London. 
Sims, D. 
(2008) 
Defence Against Invasion:  The 
Suffolk Coastline, Aldeburgh to 
Walberswick, 1939-4.  MA 
dissertation, University of East 
Anglia. 
Elements available online at 
www.walberswickww2.co.uk/ 
Skennerton, Ian. 
(1984) 
The British Sniper: British and 
Commonwealth Sniping and 
Equipments, 1915-1983. 
 
 
Ian Skennerton/Arms and 
Armour Press, London. 
 322 
Skennerton, Ian. 
(1993) 
The Lee-Enfield Story:  The 
Lee-Metford, Lee-Enfield 
S.M.L.E. and No. 4 Series Rifles 
and Carbines, 1880 to the 
Present. 
Greenhill Books, London. 
Skennerton, Ian.  
(1988) 
British Small Arms of World 
War 2:  The Complete 
Reference Guide to Weapons 
Codes and Contracts, 1936-
1946. 
Greenhill Books, London. 
Slater, Hugh. 
(1941) 
Home Guard for Victory.  
(4th edition.) 
Victor Gollancz, London. 
Smith, Henry. 
(1945) 
Bureaucrats in Battledress:  A 
history of the Ministry of Food 
Home Guard. 
R.E. Jones & Bros., Conway. 
Smith, Robert D., 
and Rhynas 
Brown, Ruth. 
(1989) 
Bombards: Mons Meg and Her 
Sisters. 
Royal Armouries, London. 
Southworth, A. 
(1940) 
The Home Guard Pocket 
Manual. 
The Rubberoid Company, 
Stonehouse. 
Southworth, 
Capt. A. 
(1944) 
The Home Guard Pocket 
Manual. 10th edition. 
The Rubberoid Company, 
Stonehouse. 
Stamps, Mark 
and Skennerton, 
Ian  (1993) 
.380 Enfield No. 2 Revolver Greenhill Books, London. 
Steppler Glenn A. 
(1997) 
Britons To Arms!  The Story of 
the British Volunteer Soldier 2nd 
edition. 
Budding Books, Stroud. 
Stroud, A., et al, 
Salisbury.  
(1944) 
Intelligence Section Home 
Guard. 
Salisbury, private circulation 
only (Bapty archive). 
Summerfield, 
Penny and 
Peniston-Bird, 
Corinna. 
(2007) 
Contesting Home Defence:  
Men, Women and the Home 
Guard in the Second World 
War. 
Manchester University Press, 
Manchester. 
Talent, P. 
(1943) 
The Countryman’s Diary, 1939. War Office/Coleshill House, 
Highworth. 
Turner, Des. 
(2006) 
Aston House, Station 12:  SOE’s 
Secret Centre. 
Sutton Publishing, Stroud. 
Wade, Col. G.A. 
(1940) 
The Defence of Bloodford 
Village. 
War Office/HMSO, London. 
Wallace, G.F. 
(1972) 
The Guns of the Royal Air 
Force. 
William Kimber, London. 
Ward, Arthur. 
(1997) 
Resisting the Nazi Invader, Constable, London, 
 323 
Warwicker, John. 
(2004) 
With Britain in Mortal Danger:  
Britain’s Most Secret Army of 
WWII. 2nd edition. 
Cerberus Publishing, 
Whitchurch. 
Whiting, C. 
(1998) 
Skorzeny:  the most dangerous 
man in Europe, 2nd ed. 
Leo Cooper, Trowbridge. 
Wills, Henry. 
(1985) 
Pillboxes:  A Study of U.K. 
Defences 1940. 
Leo Cooper/Secker and 
Warburg, London. 
Woodhall, M. 
(1974)  
Modelling the Churchill 3-inch 
gun carrier. 
Airfix Magazine Annual 1974, 
Cambridge. 
 
 324 
PRIMARY SOURCES 
 
 
National Archives: 
AVIA 22/576  Blacker Bombard weapon requirements Ministry of Supply 
AVIA 22/1520 Smith 3" lightweight gun and equipment 
AVIA 22/2921 Manufacture of Mortar, Spigot, 29 mm 
AVIA 38/340  Self-propelled 75mm gun 
CAB 66/11/19 Minister of Supply’s report to the War Cabinet, August 1940 
CAB 66/28/47 Fulfilment of the Moscow Protocol 
CAB 66/36/9 Munitions production, 1942 
HO 186/838 Vehicle requisitioning 
Prem 3/428/10 Northover Projector 
WO 199/191-1913 Blacker Bombard 
WO 199/1912 Blacker Bombard, Southern Command papers 
WO 199/3237   Home Guard administration and Policy 
WO 199/3243 History of formation and organization Home Guard 
WO 199/3247   Monthly strength returns and arms Home Guard 
WO 199/3248  Home Guard Instruction 
WO 199/3262  Endicott (USA) report on the British Home Guard 
WO 199/3264  Anti-aircraft Battalions 
WO 199/9757  Employment of Home Guard in Coast Artillery 
WO 203/540  Blacker Bombard 
 
Imperial War Museum: 
Photographic archive. 
 
Reserve collection:  Surviving 29mm Spigot Mortar (‘Blacker Bombard’). 
 
 
Royal Ordnance, Pattern Room Collection: 
Surviving Northover Projector. 
 
 
Museum of Army Transport, Beverly: 
Surviving 3in OSB ‘Smith Gun’, undergoing restoration. 
 
 
National Army Museum: 
Surviving 3in OSB Smith Gun and limber. 
 
 
Bapty (2000) Ltd., Archives and Collection: 
Archives:  ‘Home Guard’ folio, comprising miscellaneous letters, official ephemera, 
photographs and cuttings, chiefly relating to Home Guard in Wiltshire. 
 
Collection:  Sundry smallarms, and improvised smallarms and light ordnance, including 
products of the ‘Berwick St John Arsenal’. 
 325 
 
 
Official Ephemera: 
 
LDV Instruction/Home Guard Instruction series: 
(Note, the author worked largely from his own collection of Home Guard Instructions 
and Home Guard Information Circulars.  However, sets of both may be viewed at the 
National Archives.) 
 
No. 8 
Chief of the Imperial 
General Staff (CIGS) 
July 1940 
Tanks and Tank Destruction, War Office/HMSO, 
London. 
No.11 
Chief of the Imperial 
General Staff (CIGS) 
August 1940 
Miscellaneous Notes. William Clowes & Sons, 
London, for War 
Office/HMSO. 
No.14 
CIGS 
18 September 1940 
Winter Training. War Office/HMSO, 
London. 
No.23 
CIGS 
16 January 1941 
Night Training. War Office/HMSO, 
London. 
No.26 
CIGS 
March 1941 
Miscellaneous Notes. William Clowes & Sons, 
London, for War 
Office/HMSO. 
No.30 
CIGS 
8 May 1941 
Collective Training. War Office/HMSO, 
London. 
No.38 
CIGS 
September 1941 
Winter Training 1941-1942. War Office/HMSO, 
London. 
No.45 
CIGS 
10 March 1942 
Miscellaneous Notes. War Office/HMSO, 
London. 
No. 47 
C-in-C Home Forces 
3 May 1942 
Miscellaneous Notes. War Office/HMSO, 
London. 
No. 50 
C-in-C Home Forces 
25 September 1942 
Winter Training for 1942-1943 War Office, London. 
No.51 
C-in-C Home Forces 
September 1942 
Battlecraft and Battle Drill for 
the Home Guard,  
Part I: Introduction and 
Battlecraft 
War Office/HMSO, 
London 
No.51 
C-in-C Home Forces 
September 1942 
Battlecraft and Battle Drill for 
the Home Guard,  
Part II: Battle Drill 
War Office/HMSO, 
London. 
 326 
No.51 
C-in-C Home Forces 
January 1943 
Battlecraft and Battle Drill for 
the Home Guard,  
Part III: Patrolling 
War Office/HMSO, 
London. 
No. 51 
C-in-C Home Forces 
November 1943 
 
Battlecraft and Battle Drill for 
the Home Guard,  
Part IV: The organization of 
the Home Guard Defence. 
War Office/HMSO, 
London/ 
No.56 
C-in-C Home Forces 
20 February 1943 
Summer Training for 1943. War Office/HMSO, 
London. 
No.58 
C-in-C Home Forces 
20 July 1943 
Miscellaneous Notes from 
Other Theatres of War. 
War Office/HMSO, 
London. 
No.59 
C-in-C Home Forces 
September 1943 
Winter Training for 1943-
1944. 
War Office/HMSO, 
London. 
No.60 
C-in-C Home Forces 
December 1943 
Miscellaneous Notes – 
Weapon Training. 
War Office/HMSO, 
London. 
No.62 
C-in-C Home Forces 
6 December 1943 
Miscellaneous Notes:  Notes 
from North Africa, November 
1942-May1943. 
War Office/HMSO, 
London. 
No.64 
C-in-C Home Forces 
March 1944 
Notes on Summer Training, 
1944 and Revised Range 
Courses. 
War Office/HMSO, 
London. 
 
 
Home Guard Information Circular series: 
 
No.19 
Army Council, 2 December 1942. 
The Whitefriars Press, London, for HMSO. 
No.27 
Army Council, 12 May 1943. 
The Whitefriars Press, London, for HMSO. 
No.30 
Army Council, 16 June 1943. 
The Whitefriars Press, London, for HMSO. 
No.37 
Army Council, 10 November 1943. 
The Whitefriars Press, London, for HMSO. 
No. 53 
Army Council, 9 August 1944. 
The Whitefriars Press, London, for HMSO. 
 
 
Home Guard Training Posters and Notice Board Information: 
 
Undated, c.1940 .300 inch Browning 
Automatic Rifle Instruction 
Sheet  
 
Fosh and Cross, London, for 
HMSO. 
 327 
Notice Board Information 
No. 87.  
March 1944  
Injuries and Damage 
caused by Accidents with 
Ammunition and Explosives 
War Office/HMSO, 
London. 
 
 
Misc. Provisional Training and Instructional Notes (date order): 
 
Chief of the Imperial 
General Staff (CIGS) 
28 August 1940 
Instructional Notes on the 
.300-inch Browning 
Automatic Rifle, 1940, 
PROVISIONAL. 
War Office/HMSO, 
London. 
CIGS 
September 1940 
(October 1941 impression) 
Instructional Notes on the 
.300-inch Browning 
Machine Gun (Model 1917) 
1940, PROVISIONAL. 
War Office, London 
Chief Inspector of 
Armaments 
September 1941. 
(2006, facsimile reprint) 
Handbook for the 
Projectors, 2½-inch Marks I 
& II on Mountings, 2 ½-inch 
Projector Marks I & II.   
Military Library Research 
Services, Smalldale. 
CIGS 
11 November 1941. 
(Undated facsimile 
reprint) 
29mm. Spigot Mortar 
(Blacker Bombard), 
Training Instruction 
PROVISIONAL.   
Military Library Research 
Services, Smalldale. 
CIGS 
April 1942 
Instructional Notes on the 
.300-inch Lewis Machine 
Gun (Ground Action), 1940, 
PROVISIONAL, amended 
reprint. 
War Office, London. 
CIGS 
23 July 1942. 
(2006, facsimile reprint) 
The 3-Inch O.S.B. Gun 
(Smith Gun). 
Military Library Research 
Services, Smalldale. 
 
 
Small Arms Training (SAT), Vol. I pamphlet series (in pamphlet number order): 
 
SAT, Vol. I, Pam. 3. 
Army Council. 
18 October 1939. 
Small Arms Training, Volume I,  
Pamphlet No. 3:  Mortar (2-inch). 
War Office/HMSO, 
London. 
SAT, Vol I, Pam 5. 
Army Council. 
25 April 1942. 
Small Arms Training, Volume I,  
Pamphlet No. 5:  Anti-Tank Rifle. 
War Office/HMSO, 
London. 
SAT, Vol. I, Pam. 6. 
Army Council. 
14 January 1942. 
Small Arms Training, Volume I,  
Pamphlet No. 6:  Anti-Aircraft. 
War Office/HMSO, 
London 
SAT, Vol. I, Pam. 13. 
Army Council. 
15 July 1942. 
 
Small Arms Training, Volume I,  
Pamphlet No. 13:  Grenade. 
War Office/HMSO, 
London. 
 328 
SAT, Vol. I, Pam. 13, 
Sup. 1. 
Army Council. 
8 February 1941. 
Small Arms Training, Volume I,  
Pamphlet No. 13, SUPPLEMENT No. 
1:  No. 68 Anti-tank Grenade (Rifle), 
No. 69 Bakelite Grenade (Hand). 
War Office/HMSO, 
London. 
SAT, Vol. I, Pam. 13, 
Sup. 2. 
Army Council. 
27 August 1941. 
Small Arms Training, Volume I,  
Pamphlet No. 13, SUPPLEMENT No. 
2:  No. 73 Anti-tank Grenade (Hand), 
The S.T. Grenade, The Hand 
Incendiary Bomb. 
War Office/HMSO, 
London. 
SAT, Vol. I, Pam. 23. 
Army Council. 
7 November 1942 
Small Arms Training, Volume I,  
Pamphlet No. 23:  The 29-mm Spigot 
Mortar. 
War Office/HMSO, 
London. 
SAT, Vol. I, Pam 27. 
Army Council. 
5 February 1944. 
Small Arms Training, Volume I,  
Pamphlet No. 27:  6-pr., 7-cwt. Anti-
Tank Gun.  
War Office/HMSO, 
London. 
 
 
Miscellaneous War Office manuals: 
 
War Office,  
February 1924 
Handbook for the Q.F. 18-pr Gun on 
Marks III, III*, IIIT and V Field 
Carriages, Land Service, 1924, 
War Office/HMSO, 
London 
CIGS 
29 August 1940 
Military Training Pamphlet No. 42, 
Tank Hunting and Destruction. 
War Office, London. 
Wade, Col. G.A. 
1940 
The Defence of Bloodford Village. War Office/HMSO, 
London. 
CIGS. 
23 March 1942 
Military Training Pamphlet No. 23 
Part II – the Infantry Division in the 
Defence. 
War Office, London. 
CIGS 
May 1940 
Military Training Pamphlet No. 23 
Part VI – Withdrawal. 
War Office, London 
CIGS. 
21 July 1941 
Military Training Pamphlet No. 23 
Part IX – the Infantry Division in the 
Attack. 
War Office, London. 
CIGS 
22 September 1941 
Military Training Pamphlet No. 23 
Part X – the Infantry Division in the 
Advance. 
War Office, London. 
Talent, P. 
1943 
The Countryman’s Diary, 1939. War Office/Coleshill 
House, Highworth. 
 
 
War Office intelligence publications on the German army: 
 
Periodical Notes on the German Army, No. 24.  
July 1940 
General Staff, War Office, London. 
Periodical Notes on the German Army, No. 28.  
June 1940 
 
General Staff, War Office, London. 
 329 
Periodical Notes on the German Army, No. 30.  
August 1940 
General Staff, War Office, London. 
The German Forces in the Field. 
July 1940 
General Staff, War Office, London. 
The German Army in Pictures. 
January 1941 
General Staff, War Office, London. 
Popular Guide to the German Army, No.  3. 
June 1941 
General Staff, War Office, London. 
 
 
Admiralty publications: 
 
Admiralty Gunnery 
Branch. 
(1913) 
Handbook for the 4inch Mark VII and 
VIII BL. 
Admiralty, London. 
Admiralty Gunnery 
Branch. 
(1939) 
Notes on Gunnery for Defensively 
Equipped Merchant Ships. 
Admiralty, London. 
 
 
Home Office publications: 
 
Home Office, Air Raid 
Precautions Department. 
(1937) 
Air Raid Precautions Handbook No. 1, 
Personal Protection Against Gas. 
HMSO, London. 
Regional Commissioner 
for Civil Defence. 
(1942) 
Consolidated Instructions to Invasion 
Committees in England and Wales. 
HMSO, London. 
 
US official publications: 
 
TM 31-200-1: Unconventional Warfare Devices and 
Techniques 
(1966) 
Department of Defense, 
Washington. 
 
 
Non-official Home Guard ephemera: 
 
Commercially produced weapon manuals: 
 
(Undated) The Bren Light Machine 
Gun, Description, Use and 
Mechanism. 
Gale & Polden, Aldershot. 
(Undated) The Browning Automatic 
Rifle. 
Gale & Polden, Aldershot. 
Manders, Lieut. E.W. 
(Undated) 
Grenades, EY Rifle and Cup 
Discharger, for the Home 
Guard. 
Practical Press, London. 
 330 
(Undated) Manual of Modern Automatic 
Guns, undated facsimile 
reprint. 
Anonymous reprint of 
Bernards’ original. 
(Undated) The Thompson Submachine 
Gun Mechanism Made Easy. 
Gale & Polden, Aldershot. 
(1940) Handbook of the Thompson 
Submachine Gun, Model of 
1928. 
Auto-Ordnance Corporation, 
Bridgeport. 
‘An Instructor’ 
(1940) 
The Complete Lewis Gunner. 
Reprint of 1918 edition. 
Gale & Polden, Aldershot. 
(1941) .300 Lewis Machine Gun for 
the Home Guard, 3rd ed. 
The Bravon Ledger 
Company, Bradford-on-
Avon. 
(1941) Lewis Gun Mechanism Made 
Easy, 6th ed., 20th impression. 
Gale & Polden, Aldershot. 
(1942) Sten Machine Carbine, 9mm.  
Mk.  II and Mk. III, 4th ed. 
The Bravon Ledger 
Company, Bradford-on-
Avon.  
(1942) The Browning Heavy 
Machine Gun, .300 Calibre 
model 1917 (water cooled) 
Mechanism Made Easy. 
Gale & Polden, Aldershot. 
 
 
Commercially produced Home Guard training manuals, strategy and tactics: 
(Note, where these are also listed above under ‘References’ they are shown in bold) 
 
Brophy, John. 
(1941) 
Advanced Training for the 
Home Guard, with Ten 
Specimen Field Exercises. 
Hodder and Stoughton, 
London. 
Brophy, John. 
(1942) 
A Home Guard Handbook.  
Revised ed., second 
impression. 
Hodder and Stoughton, 
London. 
Brophy, John. 
(1941) 
Home Guard:  A Handbook 
for the L.D.V.  6th 
impression. 
Hodder and Stoughton, 
London. 
Elliot, Andrew G, with 
“J.B.” and Scientist. 
(Undated) 
The Home Guard 
Encyclopedia. 
Thorsons, London. 
Langdon-Davies, John. 
(1941) 
Home Guard Warfare. George Routledge and 
Sons, London. 
Langdon-Davies, 
Major John. 
(1942) 
The Home Guard Fieldcraft 
Manual.  2nd ed. 
John Murray and the 
Pilot Press, London. 
Langdon-Davies, 
Major John. 
(1998) 
 
The Home Guard Training 
Manual.   Facsimile reprint 
of 6th edition, 1942. 
R.J. Leach, Ditton. 
 331 
Levey, Lieut.-Colonel 
J.H. 
(1940) 
Home Guard Training.  3rd 
impression. 
Eyre and Spottiswoode, 
London. 
Marques, Capt. C.A. 
(1942) 
Training Course for Home 
Guard Instructors.  3rd ed. 
Privately Published, Gt. 
Amwell. 
Robinson, Captain 
Ernest H. and King, 
Gordon R. 
(1940) 
Rifle Training for War.  3rd 
ed. 
Cassell & Company, 
London. 
Slater, Hugh. 
(1941) 
Home Guard for Victory!  4th 
impression. 
Victor Gollancz, London. 
Southworth, A. 
(1940) 
The Home Guard Pocket 
Manual. 
The Rubberoid Company, 
Stonehouse. 
Southworth, Capt. A. 
(1944) 
The Home Guard Pocket 
Manual. 10th edition. 
The Rubberoid Company, 
Stonehouse. 
Thompson, Major Paul 
W. 
(1942) 
Modern Battle.  Penguin 
edition. 
Penguin Books, 
Hamondsworth. 
 
 
